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

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SUPPLEMENTARY

DESPATCHES AND MEMORANDA

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

INDIA.

1797—1805.

EDITED BY HIS SON,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

36911

VOLUME THE FIRST.

VV-d-6

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

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1858

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AND CHARING CROSS.

TO

THE QUEEN,

BY THE GRACIOUS PERMISSION OF

Her Majesty,

THESE VOLUMES ARE DEDICATED WITH THE MOST PROFOUND RESPECT OF

HER MAJESTY'S

DUTIFUL SERVANT,

WELLINGTON.

APSLEY HOUSE,
January, 1858.

PREFACE.

SINCE the appearance of the Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, the Editor has discovered many unpublished papers, and others have been placed at his disposal by the executors of Marquess Wellesley and of Lord Cowley.

These documents, derived from sources of the highest value, cannot fail to be useful and important for the elucidation of events in India during the period between 1797 and 1805.

Europe presents no parallel with Asia in warfare or in politics: Indian records can alone furnish precedents to guide and to warn us amid the difficulties which surround the prosecution of the present struggle, and which complicate the details of future legislation.

In examining the course of preparation for the siege of Seringapatam and the administration of Mysore by Colonel Wellesley, the conflicts with freebooters and jungle chieftains, the more extended contest with the leaders of the Mahratta confederacy terminating in the battles of Assaye and of Argaum, and the wiliness of Eastern diplomacy, the mind may derive lessons of practical wisdom for guidance in war and in peace, applicable to most times and circumstances,

but peculiarly so in the remarkable regions which form the subject of these documents.

Some of these papers the Editor ventures to hope may not be uninteresting as showing the military opinions, the civil training and personal feelings, the difficulties and the aspirations of the young soldier, whom seven years of unceasing activity in a country proverbially the nursery of soldiers, and the command of miscellaneous armies of Oriental dimensions, prepared for European renown.

TO THE READER.

It has been necessary to determine to which of the two Editions of the Duke of Wellington's Despatches these Papers shall form the supplement: each has distinctive merits; in both may be seen the skill, industry, and honesty of purpose of the late Colonel Gurwood; and the Editor sincerely regrets that he cannot have his assistance in this work. He feels, however, that he decides in accordance with the convenience of the reader by selecting the First Edition, of which there are a greater number of copies in the hands of the public than there are of the Second.

As some letters appear in the second edition only, they are republished, marked with asterisks.

Notes have been added when requisite for explanation or for giving interest to the text; together with a Map, on which it is hoped that the reader may be able to follow the movements of the armies.

An Index is also given, on the excellent plan adopted by Colonel Gurwood in the publication of the principal work.

SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES.

To Major-General St. Leger. [1.]

MY DEAR GENERAL, Fort William, 11th April, 1797.

I send you back the memorial respecting the light artillery. Without being regularly bred to artillery, it is not difficult to perceive the advantages which would attend such an establishment as it proposes in this country. There are certain principles in artillery, the truth of which is undeniable in all countries, and which the light artillery would bring into effect in this. One of these is, that the more speedily and the greater ease with which the gun is transported the better, provided there is equal weight of metal and equal strength of carriage.

The want of speed in the artillery of this country has been the cause that many advantages have been missed, many opportunities of bringing the enemy to action have not been taken because the artillery could not be brought up in time; and, for some unaccountable reason, the Native armies, having had better draught-bullocks and larger establishments, have been able to draw off their artillery when that of the British army could not be moved. The only objection to light artillery is the scarcity of horses in India. I put the expense out of the question, as, if the establishment is necessary, the expense of it is not to be considered. I am afraid that scarcity will be fatal to what is proposed in the memorial, although I think that an establishment adopting some of its great principles may be had without difficulty and at a trifling expense, and that it will render as effectual service in this country as that proposed, which, I think, must be rejected on account of the want of the necessary supply of horses.

Everybody is aware of the difficulty which attends the movement of artillery by means of horses even in Europe, where the roads are comparatively excellent, where forage is comparatively plentiful, and the climate so favourable to them.

The largest establishment of horses that can be supposed necessary for a park of artillery is never equal to transporting it for any length of time or distance, and the only method of supply that can be adopted is that of pressing horses from the country in proportion as it is found that those belonging to the artillery are knocked up.

That is the universal practice in all the armies in Europe, and, however improper, it cannot be dispensed with.

[During the Mysore War, I am informed that Lord Cornwallis had some light guns drawn by horses; but I believe before—I am sure very shortly after he ascended the Ghauts*—long before he was near the enemy, the horses were knocked up and the guns were drawn by bullocks.]

Recourse cannot be had to such a measure in India; and, therefore, supposing that it was possible to establish a train of light artillery drawn by horses, which would be attended with some difficulty, the want of the supply of horses in the countries in which it is intended it would be used is an objection to the establishment which must be fatal.

However, to have some artillery which can be moved with celerity will be attended with such advantages, that I cannot readily give up the idea merely because there is a difficulty attending the original purchase of horses, and because their future supply would be impracticable.* I should therefore propose that there should be an establishment of horses for eight guns and four howitzers, with harness, &c., at all times ready at the Park, in addition to their usual establishment of bullocks, &c. &c. It is unnecessary at present to enter into a detail of all that would be necessary for such an establishment; but my idea is that the horses should never be used excepting when it is desirable, on account of being near an enemy, to move the artillery at a quick rate; and that all the ordinary duties of transport should be done as usual by the bullocks.

I likewise think that the artillerymen might ride upon the horses and upon the carriage of the guns. I am aware that the latter is liable to objections, but, in my opinion, not to those to which it is liable in Europe, as it is not intended that the artillerymen should be upon the carriage for a greater length of time than during that which the horses are drawing it, and it

* The word is sometimes used to signify a mountain range, sometimes a pass or gorge through the range.—ED.

cannot therefore be supposed that they will strain it to the same degree as it is strained in Europe, where the horses being at all times to the gun, and generally going at an advanced rate, the artillerymen are obliged to sit upon them and upon the carriage, which by constant use becomes strained.

I think the long and heavy brass 6-pounders and the 5½-inch howitzers would answer best for this purpose. The former I know to be of as great use in the field as any gun can be; being lighter than the 12-pounders, they are more easily transported; and carrying both grape and round shot as far, they ought to be preferred for all field purposes. I have not yet had an opportunity of examining the artillery here, but I imagine the mechanism of the carriage is good, and well calculated for quick movements; if so, it ought not to be altered for the sake of a few light guns, as, in my opinion, the carriages of all guns, light or heavy, should be upon the same construction, and all should be liable to have the horses put to them and moved at any rate that may be thought necessary.

If the gun-carriages are not so constructed as to be easily moved, they ought all to be altered, whether they are to be drawn by bullocks or by horses. Thus, then, by this plan you would gain the great advantage of being at all times prepared to move twelve pieces of cannon at an advanced rate; the horses, being but little worked (for, by all accounts, the enemy in this country is not generally very close), would at all times be able to do the work required from them, and the establishment would require additional supplies but seldom. I should propose to attach to these guns, when they are in use, a party of light dragoons; these would answer the double purpose of escort, and they could assist in holding the horses when the guns were unlimbered.

Parties of the 15th Dragoons and of Rohan's hussars attended some British light artillery for a length of time, and did besides the patrol duty of the posts to which it was attached.

I think that if more is attempted at present, all will fail; and, as I stated above, I really think that it is utterly impracticable to find horses in India to supply the loss and waste of them which would be occasioned by an establishment of light artillery.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wesley.

[2.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort William, 17th April, 1797.

Since my last an expedition to Manilla has been talked of, upon which I am to go, and I believe to have the command of the corps furnished by this settlement.* It was proposed by

* Lord Teignmouth, the biographer of his father Sir John Shore, who was elevated to the peerage on his return to England in 1797, says, in reference to this matter, "On the object of the expedition to which he was destined, Colonel Wesley furnished a spirited plan, and corresponded with the Governor-General." (*Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of John Lord Teignmouth*, vol. i. p. 425.) No copy of this plan has been found among the records at Apsley House, but it is given by the noble Lord as follows:—

"MEMORANDUM ON THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SPANISH ISLANDS, BY THE HON. COLONEL WESLEY.

"I understand that the force which is to be sent from Bengal for the Expedition to Manilla is to consist of 1400 infantry, some artillery and military stores, with the *Heroine* frigate, and five armed Indiamen. I propose, as soon as that can be got ready, it should be sent immediately to attack Batavia and the Dutch Settlements upon the Island of Java: at all events, destroy the first entirely; and either make an establishment at the latter, or otherwise, as the Government may think fit. If they should choose to have an establishment, I have a plan for providing a force for the protection of it; which I will communicate, if I think necessary. In case the general proposition is admitted, that it would be a desirable object either to destroy or get possession of the Dutch Possessions in the Island of Java, of which there can be but little doubt, I proceed to detail the information which I have collected upon the state of the Dutch force there: which however, I must observe, is not so complete as it ought to be; as, in order to avoid giving suspicion that such a plan is in agitation, I have been obliged to be cautious in seeking it. The Dutch have, in the whole island, about 2000 men, some of which are Natives; but few of these are at Batavia, on account of the unwholesomeness of the situation. Some of them are at Sheribon, and some at Shamarang, and some are with the Sultan of Java; so that, upon the whole, I conclude that a force of 600 men could not be collected in any one place under ten days, which would be more than sufficient for the operation against Batavia, as I shall proceed to show.

"Sheribon and Shamarang are the places where the Dutch keep their stores and merchandise, and are not fortified. The town of Batavia is surrounded by a slight brick wall, which has no defence. It has on the eastern side of it a citadel, which stands close to the bay, but which, however, is not within shot of the artillery-ground. There are no guns mounted on the land side of the citadel. In the rear of the town, at some distance, are two redoubts; in which, however, as I am informed, there are no guns. But even if the place were strong and in good order, as the Dutch have but few good troops nearer than Sheribon, which is at the distance of forty miles at least, they could not stand against the attack which would be made upon them by surprise. I look upon the Expedition to Manilla to be the principal object; and therefore I should propose, that as soon as Batavia shall be destroyed, the fleet should proceed to Tanjoran, upon the eastern side of the Malaya Peninsula; unless the Governor-General should wish to keep the place; in which case I have a plan,

Mr. Speke, the Deputy-Governor, to give me the chief command of the expedition; but I desired the person who communicated his wishes to me to decline it in my name, and to propose Doyle. If any thing should prevent Doyle from accepting it in case they offer it to him, and they should afterwards offer it to me, I intend to accept of it; taking the chance that the large force they intend to send, the known pusillanimity of the enemy, and my exertions will compensate in some degree for my want of experience.

Sir John Shore is expected on the 27th of this month. He has got an addition of 5½ lacks to the tribute. The Nabob [of Oude*]

as I before stated, for providing a force for the protection of it, without diminishing that which is intended to join the forces from Madras for the attack of Manilla. In my opinion, Tanjoran ought to be the place of rendezvous, even in case the expedition to Batavia is not adopted. I suppose the attack upon Manilla will not be made till the month of October; because if it is, the wind blows right into the bay; and, as was the case when Sir William Draper made his attack, the shipping will not be able to ride there in safety. After the change of the monsoon in October, they will be protected by the land. I should propose that the fleet should remain at Tanjoran till the 1st of October: they may then sail right before the wind to Manilla Bay, and will arrive there by the time the south-west monsoon breaks up. The troops will have been refreshed at Tanjoran, and will all be in health; whereas if the rendezvous be at Penang, the fleets will have a long and an intricate and uncertain navigation between their port of refreshment and their destination: it cannot be expected that the troops will be as healthy, and the time of the arrival at Manilla cannot be so exactly fixed, as it would be if the rendezvous is at Tanjoran. I conclude, therefore, that the rendezvous ought to be at Tanjoran, even if Batavia is not to be attacked. There will be no disadvantage nor inconvenience in keeping the fleets separate for such a length of time, for the attack of that place.

"I do not conceive that any danger is to be apprehended from the six French frigates which are said to be cruising in the China Seas. I conceive the frigate and armed Indiamen to be more than equal to them; and besides them, the three ships going as transports carry guns.

"Upon the whole then, seeing that the place is so weak and that it would fall so easily, and that a force sufficient to destroy it can be sent there without any inconvenience, danger, or much additional expense, I consider that it would be an expedition honourable to the Governor-General, and to those employed upon it; and useful to the country, as it would deprive the enemy of his only remaining port in the Eastern Seas, and of one of which he has lately made the greatest use; and as such I offer my plans.

"(Signed) A. W."

[*Appendix to Memoir*, vol. i. pp. 509-512.]

* This province lies north-west of Benares, between 25° and 29° north lat., and is 270 miles in length from south-east to north-west, and 160 miles in breadth. Area 23,738 square miles. An ancient city of the same name, distant 75 miles east from Lucknow, is supposed to have been one of the earliest seats of Indian government and civilization. The independence of

has dismissed his ministers who were obnoxious to us, and has entered into a kind of engagement to give us possession of Allahabad * whenever it may be necessary to us, which engagement of course he won't fulfil, as it seems a rule of policy here never to give assistance to your friend when he stands most in need of it, and always to break your treaty with him at the moment when it would be most convenient to him that you should fulfil all its stipulations.

I hear that an Indiaman has taken a French frigate in the China Seas; I cannot vouch for the truth of this news.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WESLEY.

[3.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort William, 20th May, 1797.

Nothing particular has happened since I wrote to you last, but as the ship now about to sail is the last that is likely to leave Calcutta before I go to Manilla, I take the opportunity of writing. I have been perfectly well ever since my arrival, indeed better than it is probable I should have been if I had remained in Europe, or any colder climate than this, as I have missed the ague, which in all probability I should have had any where else. The going upon the expedition to Manilla is lucky, as I shall be absent, in consequence thereof, during the most unhealthy season, the months of August and September: the last is the month in which I ought to expect the ague, and I should probably have it if I remained here. We shall be ready to leave this for our attack upon Manilla in the beginning of July, and I imagine the Madras people will be ready at about the same time. There are divers opinions upon the propriety of making the attack at the time when we shall

Oude as a Hindoo kingdom was destroyed by the Moslems in the 12th century of the Christian era. On the dismemberment of the Mogul Empire, Shuja-ud-Dowlah (the Vizier of the Mogul, and also the Viceroy of Oude) seized (A.D. 1760) the territory for his own use, after the manner of the other Moslem satraps in India. In 1775 the Nabob subsidized British troops for his defence. In 1819 the reigning prince formally renounced his title of Nawab-Vizier, and his dependence on the Great Mogul, then a pensioner of the East India Company, and obtained permission from the British Government to assume the title of King of Oude.—ED.

* A strong fortress at the junction of the Ganges and Jumna rivers.—ED.

arrive there, supposing that we sail as soon as we are ready; but as the decision upon that subject depends upon the Admiral, who is the only independent and uncontrolled man in these parts, it is impossible to say what he will do; and as an attempt of the Government to influence him, or convince him, might be attended with bad consequences, they don't seem to me to have given sufficient attention to that part of the question. Ships cannot lie in Manilla Bay in safety during the south-west monsoon. They cannot get there after the north-east monsoon will have set in, and being in the China Seas at the time of the change from the south-west to the north-east is attended with much danger, so that there is much difficulty in coming to a proper decision about the time of attack. This difficulty would be removed if they would determine to attack a fort (Cavité) which commands the entrance of a bay in Manilla Bay, which is sheltered from the south-west monsoon; but in that case they must be stronger both in men and stores, as they will have two sieges instead of one, whereas if they begin by Manilla itself, Cavité falls of course afterwards.

—— is determined to send —— as Commander-in-Chief, notwithstanding the entreaties of his friends and the orders of his superiors. He does so without fear of failure, although he knows his incapacity, as he says he sends with him a good Adjutant-General, and a good Quartermaster-General, and a good army. But he is mistaken if he supposes that a good, high-spirited army can be kept in order by other means than by the abilities and firmness of the Commander-in-Chief. I don't say that he won't succeed in his object, but things won't be done in the manner they ought to be. He has lately quarrelled with General Harris upon the subject of the disposal of the patronage of the army upon the coast, which both parties claim, and both have referred their dispute to the Court of Directors. I fancy —— must be wrong, as by the Acts of Parliament, and by the order from the Directors, it appears to have been the intention of the Legislature and of the Government that the Commanders-in-Chief should recommend for all vacancies in the military, and the Councils should appoint.

Sir John Shore is come down to Calcutta. He had got a promise of Allahabad, an addition to the subsidy, and had

turned out the Vizier's ministers and given him others, and had left every thing in tranquillity at Lucknow. I believe before he arrived at Calcutta the Vizier quarrelled with his new minister, turned the English resident out of his house, and there is reason to believe that he intends to break his word respecting Allahabad; so that there is here no cause for triumph. Things, however, look better than they did; the Mahrattas* are fully employed at home, Tippoo is watching them, and at the same time endeavouring to get a kind of interest in the Nizam's Court, with a view to seizing some of his territories as soon as the old man dies. However, there are British troops at Hyderabad,† and a large force in the Circars‡ ready to move to the assistance of the young Nizam, in case of such an attempt being made, and probably that may keep him quiet for some time longer.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WESLEY.

I have not heard from England since I left it.

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* The people of Maharashtra, a geographical division of the north-west quarter of the Deccan. The original country of the Mahrattas (a Hindoo race) included Candeish, Baglana, part of Berar, and part of the Concan, countries of great natural strength, interspersed with mountains, defiles and fortresses, and well adapted for predatory pursuits and defensive warfare. The union and dominion of the Mahrattas commenced under their leader Sevajee, who was born in 1628; at his death in 1680 he bequeathed an extensive dominion to his son, who was put to death by the Mohammedans, under Aurungzebe, in 1689. The Mahratta territories were subsequently divided among federal chiefs, and have since been subject to varied fortunes.—ED.

† The capital of the territory of a Mohammedan prince. Nizam-ool-Moolk (*regulator of the State*) administered the government of the Deccan as Viceroy of Aurungzebe; but after his death (in 1707) gradually cast aside all allegiance to the Mogul throne. Nizam-ool-Moolk died in 1748. The right of succession was disputed, and European aid sought by the rivals: the English espoused the cause of the son (Nazir Jung); the French that of the grandson of the deceased. Wars, poisonings, and assassinations ensued. In 1766 the then reigning Prince, Nizam Ali, entered into a subsidiary alliance with the English E. I. Company, which has continued, under several modifications, to the present period. The dominions of the Nizam extend nearly 100,000 sq. miles over a tract of the Deccan, which has an elevation above the sea of from 700 to 2500 feet. The city *Haider-abad*, or Lion-town, is on the Musi river, in 17° 22′ lat., 78° 32′ long., 389 miles north-west of Madras, 449 south-east of Bombay, and 962 miles south-west of Calcutta.—ED.

‡ An antiquated division of the Madras territories, between 15° and 20° lat. *Circar* signifies government or province.—ED.

To the Right Hon. the Governor-General, Sir John Shore. [4.]

SIR, Fort William, 23rd June, 1797.

Having been informed that it is the intention of Government to make no greater allowance to the captains of the Indiamen which are to carry the troops upon the intended expedition than two Government rupees per day for each officer in order to provide a table, and being convinced that that sum is insufficient for the purpose for which it is granted, and that the deficiency must fall upon the officers of the army who are embarked, I take the liberty of representing the matter to you, in hopes that you will apply such remedy as you may think fit. It is to be considered that the captains of the Indiamen will upon this voyage have no advantage whatsoever from trade, nor any additional allowances. Under these circumstances it will be impossible for the officers of the army to suffer them to incur any expense on their account, and of course they must bear the expense of the table. This allowance must have been originally granted in order that officers going upon these expeditions, which are always attended with considerable expenses, might have the full benefit of their pay and allowances to defray them. If it be true that it is insufficient for the purpose for which it was granted, and if the captains of the ships have no advantage from trade to make up for any loss they may sustain by keeping a table, surely it cannot be said that the allowance ought not to be increased. The pay and allowances of the subalterns at present are just sufficient: by means of the advantages arising from being occasionally on board ship at no expense, they are enabled to live comfortably when on shore; but if they are obliged to pay the expenses of their table upon these occasions, not only they will be deprived of their future comforts, but they will be unable to bear the expenses attending upon fitting themselves out.

All these circumstances considered, I am induced to apply to you for an additional allowance.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WESLEY.

To the Right Hon. the Governor-General, Sir John Shore. [5.]

SIR, Fort William, 1st July, 1797.

I have been informed that the Medical Board have received a letter from the Secretary of the Supreme Board, stating it to

be the Resolution of the Governor-General in Council that the usual allowance of Sicca rupees, 28 per month for each of the European troops that may embark on the intended expedition, be granted to the surgeons of the Indiamen on which they shall embark. As I heard some days ago that there was a doubt upon this subject, I did myself the honour of waiting upon you yesterday and the day before to have some conversation with you upon it, but unfortunately you were not well; and I should now wait upon you again, only that I fear you are not recovered, and I imagine it will be more satisfactory to you to have my sentiments upon this subject in writing than in conversation. I have to state to you that this arrangement is inconsistent with the former practice even in voyages from England to India, that it will not tend to the preservation of the health of the men, that it takes out of my hands entirely the superintendence and control over the management of the sick, and that it will be extremely injurious to the surgeon of the 33rd Regiment.* I hope to be able to convince you of the truth of these propositions; and, if I do, I am certain that you will wish to have this subject reconsidered by the Board, and that the arrangement will be altered.

I am ready to admit that when the King's or Company's recruits are embarked on board an Indiaman and brought from England, it has been usual to pay the surgeon half a guinea per man upon the certificate of the military commanding officer, or, if there is no military commanding officer, of the commander of the ship, that he has attended them during the voyage.

The certificate of the commanding officer is the proof required of the attendance; but now such certificate, even when there is a whole regiment concerned, is not requisite: not only they may not attend to the sick, but they may not have what is necessary for them, and yet they will be entitled to their allowance. If a regiment is embarked on board an Indiaman coming from England, I conceive that if the commanding officer chooses not to employ the surgeon of the ship, he is at liberty so to do, and he may afterwards, if he pleases, refuse to give him the certificate of attendance, and may give it to his own surgeon. The former I have always practised; the latter I have refrained from, because I have not wished to be the cause of disappointment to anybody.

* Mr. Trevor.—ED.

Such a certificate would entitle the regimental surgeon, even upon a voyage from England, to the allowance of the Company for medical attendance upon the troops during such voyage. But it appears that this is a military expedition, and not a common voyage of transport from place to place; therefore in this, above all other voyages, care should be taken that the sick are properly attended, and that allowances are not paid unless proper provision is made for them. If the troops were embarked in common transports, or in ships unprovided with surgeons, this same medical allowance would be given to the regimental surgeon. Where, then, is the difference in this case? What can be the advantage of taking the sick from under the care of their own surgeons? They will be placed under that of persons totally unaccustomed to them, and who, even if they were the first men of their profession, will labour under that disadvantage, which is fatal in so many instances.

Besides, the certificate of attendance from the commanding officer being no longer necessary, attendance may not be given and allowances will still be received. These gentlemen being under the orders of their own officers, they may and they ought to refuse to have any communication with me upon the subject of the stores, medicines, &c., with which they supply their ships. They will refuse to obey any orders or regulations of mine in the detail of the management of the hospital; they will refuse to give me or my officers even the common sick report (and of which I have known instances even in the voyages from England); and thus I shall be deprived of that part of the superintendence over my corps which is most gratifying to me when they are embarked, and by exercising which I can render most service to the soldiers. This, considering the claims of command which have been already made, will be exceedingly disagreeable and distressing to me.

It will not be denied that this arrangement is very disadvantageous to the surgeon of the 33rd, to whose attention to his duty and whose exertions I am indebted for the lives of many men both before and since my arrival in this country. But I must inform you, Sir, that not only it deprives him of a fair emolument, but it confers it upon a set of men, who, if my information respecting their practices upon this subject be correct, have done that for which they ought to be dismissed the service instead of being rewarded.

The proposal of the Medical Board I understand was that 2½ Sicca rupees per man per month should be given to the regimental surgeon to find medicines, wine, &c.; and that in those ships in which there should be no surgeon of the 33rd embarked, the allowance to the surgeon of such ships should be one rupee per month per man in case they were furnished with medicines. If this subject be reconsidered, and the arrangement be altered, the surgeon of the 33rd is willing to furnish those ships with all the necessary medicines, wine, attendance of servants, &c. &c., and to make the allowance of one rupee to the ship surgeons who give their attendance, as proposed by the Medical Board, or to agree to such other arrangement as you or the Medical Board may think fit to propose.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the arrangements which have been made upon this subject at Madras. You will observe that the surgeons upon that establishment receive this allowance only for the attendance of servants upon the hospital, for food for the sick men only, and that medicines of all kinds and wine are provided for them; but the surgeon of the 33rd will be content with what has been proposed to be given to the surgeons of the Indiamen; and I trust that, considering what I have above stated, and the hardship and disgrace under which he will labour of serving with the surgeons of another establishment, who would have the charge of his hospitals and double his allowances and emoluments, you will be induced to have this subject reconsidered.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WESLEY.

[6.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort William, 12th July, 1797.

No opportunity of sending letters to England has offered lately; but even if any had offered, so little has passed which could interest anybody at a distance from this country, that it would not have been worth while to write. Everybody has been taken up with making preparations for the expedition, which is at last to sail from hence in the beginning of August, and from Madras in the middle of that month. Such is the strength and goodness of the army, that I have little doubt of its success, whether the attack be made upon Manilla, Mauritius, or Bata-

via.* The Admiral and the Governments say that their intentions are upon the former; and as their preparations, such as ordering refreshments at Prince of Wales' Island, at Malacca, &c., are upon the road to it, I believe them. They have, however, been guilty of great neglect in suffering a ship under Danish colours to go out of the Ganges about six weeks ago, avowedly bound to Manilla; and of great oversight in not fitting out the expedition in time to attack and destroy the Dutch settlements upon Java with the same force which is to attack Manilla. If they had been ready early in this month, they would have arrived at Batavia early in the next, when the climate is not as unwholesome as at other periods of the year; and such is the weakness of the Dutch, that it is universally believed by those who are best acquainted with their situation, that our objects there, whether of destruction or of making permanent establishments, would have been accomplished the moment we appeared; whereas if we go after we shall have been at Manilla (which we must do now or not go to Manilla at all), although we shall meet with the same success, yet it will be with such loss from the unwholesomeness of the climate at that season of the year as this country cannot well bear. The destruction of Batavia would ruin the Dutch; but it may be a question whether it would be right completely to annihilate them, and it is probably that consideration which has prevented us from attacking them at this moment. Mauritius ought to be taken. As long as the French have an establishment there, Great Britain cannot call herself safe in India. They must be particularly guarded against after the war, as it may be depended upon that swarms of them (aristocrats, democrats, modérés, &c. &c.) will come here to seek service in the armies of the Native princes, and all Frenchmen in such a situation are equally dangerous. They would shortly discipline their numerous armies in the new mode which they have adopted in Europe, than which nothing can be more formidable to the small body of fighting men of which the Company's armies in general consist; and in the end they would force us to increase our armies and of course our expense to such a degree, that the country could not be kept, or indeed would not be worth keeping. At present the country powers are quiet. People say that

* Chief settlements in the Eastern seas of the Spaniards, the French, and the Dutch.—ED.

Tippoo Sahib has an army on foot, which I don't believe, as I have observed since my arrival here that he is a constant object of fear to the English, and whenever they want to add a little colouring to a statement of danger, they find out that he has an army in motion. I make no doubt but that if the Nizam had died at the close of last year, and a detachment from Bengal had not been sent into the Circars and part of it to Hyderabad, he would have taken advantage of the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah,* of the disturbed state of the Mahratta Government, of the dissensions in the Bengal army, and of the weakness of that in the Carnatic,† and would have attacked us either there or in the Circars; but now from what I can learn all is safe, and certainly if it is not, Lord Hobart is not very justifiable in sending six thousand men upon an expedition to the eastward. They likewise say that Zemaun Shah will attack Hindustan in the next season; but that I equally disbelieve, from a conviction of its difficulties, and of its inutility even if it should succeed. There is no plunder to be got now; and as to a permanent establishment in India, he can expect to make it only in the Punjab‡ or the Delhi§ countries after a severe contest with the

* Ruler of Affghanistan, who threatened to invade India:—ED.

† A division of Southern India whose limits are imperfectly defined. They may be assumed to be between the parallels of 8° and 16° of south lat., and from the sea on the east to 77° on the west. The Carnatic was the theatre of contest for dominion between the English and French in the last century.—ED.

‡ Country of the five rivers which unite to form the Indus.—ED.

§ Delhi. This ancient city is in 28° 39′ N. lat., 77° 18′ E. long., built over a low rocky range on an offset of the river Jumna, which leaves the main stream five miles above, and rejoins it two miles below, the town. The elevation above the sea is 800 feet. Ancient Delhi, or Indraput, a seat of empire for many centuries, is said to have extended above thirty miles along the bank of the Jumna; the present city, founded by the Mogul emperor Shah Jehan, in 1631, is about seven miles in circumference, enclosed on three sides by a wall which is interrupted towards the river.

History records in the year 980 A.D. a Rajah of Delhi, a member of a Hindoo confederacy who was defeated in the Punjab by Subuktugeen the Ghuznevide, a Moslem leader. Delhi is mentioned A.D. 1191 as one of the four great Hindoo Powers, and appertained to the Prithwi Rajah, a Rajpoot prince, who was defeated and slain by the Mohammedans in a great pitched battle on the plains of Sirhind. Kutb-oo-deen, as lieutenant of the victor, took possession of Delhi A.D. 1193, and established there the dynasty known as the "Slave Kings." In 1288, the Khiljis, an Affghan tribe, murdered the reigning prince, and placed one of their chiefs as head of a house, which held sway until 1321, when the assassination of Sultan Mobarik caused the transfer of power to Toghluk, the founder of another dynasty, whose representative, Mahmud, was driven out of Delhi, A.D. 1398, by Tamerlane, the Tartar conqueror, who desolated the city by indiscriminate slaughter and plunder. In

Seiks * and Mahrattas; and after success he will have a ruined country in lieu of his present possessions, which are rich, of which he would undoubtedly be deprived. I don't doubt but that he will again get Lahore,† and occupy it in strength; but that only with a view of driving the Seiks (the worst of neighbours) farther from him, and of getting an additional barrier to his present territories. There is nothing to induce him to advance any farther. The Vizier has broken his word, I believe, in every point of the

1450, the Affghan tribe of Lodi re-established the dominion of their race; but this house was destroyed by the Mogul emperor Baber, in 1526. With a slight interregnum during the reign of Humayun, Delhi remained thenceforth the principal seat of the Mogul empire. In 1739, it was almost ruined by Nadir Shah, the usurper of Persia. In the middle of the 18th century, the Mahrattas, with varied fortune, strove for the mastery of this city; but in 1803, during the administration of the Marquess Wellesley, their forces, though disciplined and led by French officers, were defeated by General Lake outside the walls of the city, which was occupied by the British forces, and with the surrounding country annexed to the Crown of England. The titular Mogul, Shah Alum, who had been blinded and imprisoned by conflicting factions, was rescued from his oppressors and placed in Delhi with a large annual stipend for his support, and with the concession of the nominal rank which he had previously held, but devoid of any political or military power.—ED.

* The Seiks, or Sikhs, are a martial, handsome race, located principally about Lahore and Amritsir in the Punjab. Their religion is in some points similar to that of the Hindoos. They believe in the divine origin of the founder or *Guru* of their sect, Nanac, who was born in 1469, and is regarded as a Saviour and as a Mediator with God: his votaries assumed the appellation of *Seiks*, or disciples. No kind of food is prohibited but beef; the use of fermented liquors is permitted, but that of tobacco is forbidden. There is no distinction of caste; proselytes are admitted; and to bear arms is considered the imperative duty of all ranks of society. The sect as originally constituted was peaceable and humble; but the Mohammedans having murdered their fourth Guru in 1708, his successor drew the sword in revenge, and it has never since been sheathed. The title of Sing (lion), formerly used only by the Rajpoots, became in the beginning of the 18th century an appellative in several Seik families, who formed themselves into an irregular republic, which in cases of great emergency held a Gurumata or general assembly at Amritsir. Runjeet Sing endeavoured to consolidate the power of the Seiks, and to form them into a great state; he added largely to his dominions, and organized a great military force, disciplined by French and Italian officers. But on his death in July, 1839, the state of Lahore became a scene of anarchy and murder; contests with the British power soon arose; and within ten years from the demise of the "Lion of Lahore," the family of Runjeet was declared to have ceased to reign, and the Punjab was annexed to the dominions of the Crown of England.—ED.

† Lahore, in 31° 36' N. lat., about one mile E. of the Ravee river, is a city of considerable antiquity. In the year 1152 A.D. it became the capital of the Ghuznevide dynasty. In 1523 it was made the favourite residence of the Mogul Emperor Baber. In 1799 Runjeet Sing was invested by Zemaun Shah with the government of the place, and the title of Rajah: from this period it became the capital of the Punjab.—ED.

late agreement with Sir John Shore. The Mahrattas are still in a disturbed state. There is all the Indian news.

Lord Cornwallis is daily expected. It is impossible to describe the astonishment and consternation which the news of his appointment occasioned. Lord Hobart has determined that he will remain at Madras as long as Lord Cornwallis does here, and he imagines his stay won't be long.

I have not heard from England since I left it, which is extraordinary, considering that that was in June '96. I hope to receive some account that can be depended upon of the Irish invasion; old John Latouche must have made a good orderly dragoon. The confusion must have been comical.

The success at sea is astonishing.

Excepting a slight fever, which I had about a month ago at the cantonment at Moorshedabad,* I have been perfectly well ever since my arrival in this country. We have got through the hot weather, as it is called, and are now in the midst of the rains; but I have not found either so oppressive as people in general have represented them. It is, however, a miserable country to live in, and I now begin to think that a man well deserves some of the wealth which is sometimes brought home, for having spent his life here.

The natives, as far as I have observed, are much misrepresented. They are the most mischievous, deceitful race of people I have seen or read of. I have not yet met with a Hindoo who had one good quality, even for the state of society in his own country, and the Mussulmans are worse than they are. Their meekness and mildness do not exist. It is true that the feats which have been performed by Europeans have made them objects of fear; but wherever the disproportion of numbers is greater than usual, they uniformly destroy them if they can, and in their dealings and conduct among themselves they are the most atrociously cruel people I ever heard of. There are two circumstances in this country which must occasion cruelty, and deceit, and falsehood wherever they exist. First, there is a contempt of death in the natives, high and low, occasioned by some of the tenets of the religion of both sects, which makes that punishment a joke, and I may say an honour, instead of

* Moorshedabad, 124 miles N. of Calcutta, was formerly the capital of Bengal, and a place of great trade and wealth. The city is built on the Bhagruttee river, an offshoot of the Ganges. From want of drainage and from its low position, the cantonment was formerly very unhealthy; latterly the insalubrity of the place has been much mitigated.—ED.

what it is in our country. All our punishments almost are the same, excepting imprisonment and whipping, which occasion loss of caste, and are, therefore, reckoned too severe for the common crimes for which we inflict them at home. The punishments of the Mussulman Governments are precisely in the same state. The Hindoos don't care for them, excepting they occasion loss of caste; and the Mussulmans are now so nearly Hindoos, that they have not a better effect upon them. Secondly, there is no punishment for perjury either in the Hindoo or Mussulman law. Their learned say that God punishes that crime, and therefore man ought not; and as oaths are notwithstanding administered and believed in evidence, no man is safe in his person or property, let the Government be ever so good. The consequence of all is, that there is more perjury in the town of Calcutta alone than there is in all Europe taken together, and in every other great town it is the same.

Notwithstanding all this, being here for a few years would place you in so high a situation for the remainder of your life, that I should like to see you in that of Governor-General.

I have no time to write to anybody else, and I wish you would let my mother, &c., know that I am well.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [7.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort William, 27th July, 1797.

I have received your letters of the 5th and 21st of March. You will have seen before now what my sentiments were respecting your coming to this country. In a letter which I wrote to you, I believe in the month of March, I pressed you to look to the Government of this country, and you may easily conceive that I am glad to find that there is so near a prospect of my wishes upon that subject being accomplished. I am convinced that you will retain your health; nay, it is possible that its general state may be mended; and you will have the fairest opportunities of rendering material services to the public, and of doing yourself credit, which, exclusive of other personal considerations, should induce you to come out. I acknowledge

that I am a bad judge of the pain a man feels upon parting from his family; but in this case it is to be considered that it is impossible to bring them with you without doing each of them, according to their respective ages, a very material injury; nay, that you might lose some of them: and, on the other hand, if for the sake of remaining with them in England you refuse this offer, you forego both for yourself and them what will certainly be a material and a lasting advantage. I shall be happy to be of service to you in your Government; but such are the rules respecting the disposal of all patronage in this country, that I can't expect to derive any advantage from it which I should not obtain if any other person were Governor-General. You may nevertheless be certain that I shall do everything in my power to serve you. I have written you several letters, in all of which I have delivered opinions upon military and political subjects as they occurred to me: probably upon reconsidering some of them I should not think them well founded, but in general I believe they are so. As I am going to Manilla, I probably shall not hear of your appointment as Governor-General as soon as it takes place; but as soon as I do hear of it I will write you a letter, which will be delivered to you upon your arrival, in which you shall have my opinion of the principal men in this country, as far as from the short acquaintance with them I have been able to form it. At present, to leave it here would betray your secret, which I shall take care to avoid; and to write you a letter upon that subject to England would be useless, as probably you will sail before it would reach you. If you should not have sailed before this reaches you, I shall have returned from the expedition before your arrival, in which case I shall be able to give you opinions in person better founded of course than those I have now upon the different subjects which you have desired me to consider.

I am obliged to you for your applications to Lord Camden,* and respecting the 33rd Regiment I don't think the letter you sent gives me any reason to hope for any thing from his Excellency. However, I have long determined to be silent, and if possible not to think upon that subject, and I shall at present adhere to that determination. I have received the papers, &c. &c. They make me to a certain degree *au*

* Then Viceroy of Ireland.—ED.

fait of what has been going on since my departure from Europe.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WESLEY.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS FOR ON BOARD SHIP. [8.]

R. O. Fort William, July, 1797.

1. It is necessary that on board each of the ships in which the regiment embarks there should be certain regulations, and Colonel Wesley requests that the following may be observed and adhered to during the passage:

2. The men's hammocks must be numbered the moment they arrive on board their ships; each man's name and the number of his hammock must be entered upon a paper, and every man must be responsible for his hammock.

3. The hammocks must be brought upon deck every morning at seven o'clock, properly rolled and tied up as those of the seamen are, and remain there, if the weather will permit, till sunset in the evening, when they will be taken down. They must be scrubbed once a fortnight at least. When it becomes necessary on account of bad weather to take down the hammocks, they must be hung up as if they were about to be used, and never left upon the deck.

4. All the men must be upon the deck from seven o'clock in the morning till sunset, unless obliged to go down by bad weather.

5. They will be divided into three watches, or into two in case the commanding officer on board should find it necessary.

6. One watch must always be on deck, and particular care must be taken by the officer that no man goes down after his watch is over till the whole watch has been regularly relieved. A proportion of non-commissioned officers of each company must be in each watch, and they must be made responsible that the men come up to their watch at the hour they are called.

7. There must be a guard on board each ship: it will mount after the parade every morning with sidearms. From this guard will be taken all the sentries.

8. In case of bad or cold weather, the commanding officer will endeavour to procure a place for the guard to remain in; and, unless in a case of absolute necessity, the guard must not

be permitted to remain at night on the same deck with the other soldiers.

9. The commanding officers of ships will order an officer for each watch; he is to remain on deck during the whole time of his watch. There must also be an orderly officer of the day, whose duty is the same as it is on shore, with this addition, that he must see the hammocks brought up in proper time and order, and that he must see the decks scraped and swept out in the morning, after the men have turned out after their dinner, and again in the evening.

10. In case there should be only three subalterns on board any ship, that one who has the first watch at night will be orderly officer next day. The orderly officer must see the lights put out at eight, or at nine at latest if the commanding officer on board chooses.

11. The men will breakfast as soon after eight o'clock in the morning as possible.

12. There must be a parade every morning at seven, and in the evening as early as is convenient to the officers, but the men should be ordered to be in readiness for the parade at four o'clock.

13. The officers will inspect their companies very minutely, and see that the men keep themselves clean.

14. They should all be exercised both morning and evening with dumb-bells, in order that they may preserve their air and appearance, particularly those whom the commanding officer may observe gaining a stoop in their shoulders. Occasionally in fine weather the arms should be brought out from the place where they are kept, and be cleaned and examined: on those days the men must be exercised with arms if the ship be sufficiently steady.

15. On Sundays the men must all be dressed in their hats, coats, gaiters, and accoutrements, and must hear Divine service if possible; and, after that is over, the coats must be turned or taken off, and the accoutrements and hats carefully laid by.

16. Every Sunday a weekly state must be made out, and sent to the commanding officer of the regiment when an opportunity offers.

17. Whenever such an opportunity offers, the surgeon on board each ship will send to the commanding officer a return of the sick, in the form which Mr. Trevor will communicate to him.

18. The officers commanding companies will be so kind as to settle the men's accounts, and make as many of them as are present sign the books, on the 24th of each month: they will likewise make out their pay states on the same day, and send them by the first opportunity to the paymaster, who will return the abstract to each as soon as he conveniently can.

19. The officers on board the ships will make such arrangements as they may think necessary in order to prevent the soldiers from losing their necessaries, which of course will be inspected every Monday.

20. It is almost needless to remind the officers of the necessity of preserving cleanliness in the ship.

21. The men should be made to wash their feet and legs every morning and evening, and occasionally water should be thrown over every man; every day if possible.

22. The decks must frequently be fumigated. The windsails must constantly be kept down, and the orderly officer in the daytime, and the officer of the watch at night, ought to inspect them occasionally, lest they should not be properly trimmed to the wind, or get foul in any manner.

23. As there will be a considerable number of natives in the ships, the greatest attention must be paid, lest accidents by fire should happen.

24. The officers commanding in each ship will therefore inquire from the captain whether he allows smoking on board, and in what place: if he allows smoking, the soldiers and natives must be informed that if they are ever found with a pipe or cigar in any part of the ship excepting that in which smoking is allowed, they will be most rigorously punished. There must be a sentry below, with express orders not to suffer any man to smoke on the orlop-deck; and in case any person whatsoever is found smoking there, and that a non-commissioned officer can be proved to have been near enough to perceive him, such non-commissioned officer must be brought to a court-martial, and will doubtless be reduced and punished for neglect of a most essential part of his duty.

25. As the ships in which the regiment is about to embark are armed, and are to be taken into the line in case of meeting with an enemy, the officers commanding on board will be so kind as to render every assistance in their power to the commanders both in working and fighting their ships. The

honour of the regiment will be at stake in case of a contest, and therefore it is certain that everything will be done which can tend to its successful issue.*

26. With this view it will be essentially necessary to conci-

* Lord Teignmouth, in the Memoir before quoted, refers to a correspondence between his father and Colonel Wesley, consequent upon an order which had been issued by Major-General St. Leger, that "the soldiers when embarked should be placed under the direction of the officers commanding the ships, in the event of their engaging the French frigates cruising in the Eastern Seas." The correspondence has not been found at Apsley House; and as an important principle is involved, it is here given on the authority of Lord Teignmouth.—ED.

"HON. COLONEL WESLEY TO SIR JOHN SHORE.

"SIR, "*Heroine*, 6th August, 1797.

"I have just received an Order from Major-General St. Leger, stating that, 'in case of coming to action, the troops will be under the command of the captains of the ships.' In the different conversations you did me the honour to hold with me upon this subject, I uniformly stated it to be my determination that every assistance should be given to work and fight the ships. I told you that the directions of the captains of the Indiamen, upon those occasions, would of course be obeyed; and I communicated to you an extract of my instructions to the officers commanding the troops on board the different ships upon this subject, which you thought fully sufficient. Confiding, then, that there would be no order from Superior Authority to put me, or the regiment I have the honour to command, in any situation under the command of the captains of the Indiamen (however I or every other officer might think it necessary that we and the men should obey their orders upon certain occasions), I embarked with the regiment; a step which, however attached I may be to the King's Service, I would sooner have quitted it than have taken, had I known that matter was to be arranged as I find it is.

"In addition to the objections I have to be under the command of persons who have thrown so many difficulties in the way of the Service, and who are now throwing so many, that I shall probably be obliged to write an official complaint of some of them before the fleet sails; and in addition to the difficulties of *obliging* officers (particularly field-officers) to put themselves under the command of captains of Indiamen, or of taking the soldiers from under the orders of their own officers, there is this legal objection to the measure; viz. that the captains of the Indiamen have no legal method of enforcing obedience to their orders from their own seamen, much less will they have it of enforcing obedience from soldiers; and therefore if it does not suit the pleasure of the men, they will not obey them.

"In my opinion, it would have been better to have left the matter where I placed it, and have trusted to the good sense and honour of the officers, and to the spirit of the soldiers, that every assistance would be given when the occasion might require it; and in that case, as they would not have felt themselves or their Service disgraced, their exertions would have been greater, and their assistance more cordial, than it can be expected to be under the existing circumstances.

"However, Sir, uncomfortable as I feel it embarking under such circumstances, I shall do every thing in my power, and shall make those under me do every thing in their power, to forward the Service; and I hope that you

liate the officers and seamen of the ship, to which it is likewise certain that everybody is already well inclined.

27. The commander of each ship will quarter the men, and of course orders will be given that every person shall be at the quarters he proposes, whether it be to small arms or the great guns. As often as the commander wishes to exercise the latter, of course the men will exercise them; and, as the soldiers, from not having had an opportunity lately of firing ball, are out of practice, Colonel Wesley begs that twice a-week at least (if the weather will permit) the commanders may be requested to make a signal to the commodore for leave to fire ball; and that several rounds may be fired by every man, particularly by those who are anyways awkward.

28. Four hundred rounds per man will be on board each ship, and sixty of them may be fired during the voyage in practice.

29. The commanders of the ships have allowed their ship-stewards to take charge of the provisions.

will find that those whose ambitious claims have been complied with will do the same.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your most obedient humble servant,

"A. WESLEY."

On the 8th of August the Governor-General wrote to Colonel Wesley:

"DEAR SIR,

"I return a Private Answer to your Letter of the 5th; * which, from the superscription, I conclude to be Official.

"Nothing could have given me greater concern than the tenor of your Letter; as I am sorry to confess that I have inadvertently been the occasion of the Order issued by General St. Leger, which is conformable to the terms of the instructions given to him and Captain Murray. By what inadvertence it escaped me, I am at a loss to conceive; but I am anxious to impress you with a conviction that inadvertence alone could have occasioned, on my part, any instructions hurtful to your feelings, or to those of the gentlemen under your command.

"No man can be more impressed than I am with a sense of the zeal, alacrity, and spirit shown by yourself, and the officers and men of your regiment; and I had flattered myself with the pleasing expectation of having, as far as depended upon me, done every thing in my power to render the Service agreeable to you.

"I repeat my regret at an occurrence which appears to have afforded you any uneasiness; and add my hope that the Orders despatched yesterday, in revocation of that part of the instructions which has been the occasion of it, will reach the ships before their departure.

"I am, dear Sir, &c.,

"JOHN SHORE."

[*Memoir of Lord Teignmouth*, vol. i. pp. 427-429.]

* Thus in *Memoir*.—ED.

30. An account of the provisions on board each ship will be delivered to the commanding officers of ships, and a statement of the manner in which Government intend the troops should be victualled, according to which provisions have been provided: it is not to be deviated from, excepting in a case of necessity.

31. The quantity of spirits to be delivered out each day is to be a quart for eight men; and if the officers commanding on any particular occasion wish to give the men an additional allowance, they will apply to the captain for it.

32. It is particularly desired that all spirits may be mixed with three waters, and no raw spirits to be given on any account whatever.

33. The regiment is now embarked in the utmost order. The greatest pains have been taken, and expense incurred, to bring it into this state; and it is hoped that the attention which will be shown to the men on this voyage will prevent the falling off usual upon being at sea.

34. These orders are intended for the commanding officers of ships only: such parts of them as they think necessary, they will communicate to the officers under their command, and to the men.

35. In addition hereto, Colonel Wesley begs that every morning and evening, at parade time, the men may be made to break off and fall in their places to different fronts frequently, so as to occasion them to be ready at so doing at all times. This may be of the most essential consequence when they come to land in any place in front of an enemy.

36. A list of the sentries which the commanding officers may think it necessary to post, with the orders given to each, will be communicated to the captains of the ships. This has always been found the most effectual method of preventing disputes between soldiers and sailors, as when the latter know that the former are placed as sentries with the approbation of their own officer, they don't endeavour to force them on their posts.

ARTHUR WESLEY.

[9.] MEMORANDUM ON PULO PENANG.[1]

Pulo Penang, from its position in the Straits of Malacca, and from the advantages which it possesses, is so capable of giving

[1] The troops from Bengal and Madras destined for the capture of Manilla

assistance, and of being of service to the trade between the eastern and western parts of India, that it ought to be encouraged and preserved. It is likewise of considerable importance to the Company in its military operations to the eastward. Upon the expedition to the Philippine Islands, scarcely a ship arrived, either from Bengal or Madras, that, owing to the violence of the S.W. monsoon at the time they crossed the Bay of Bengal, was not in want of repairs. These they all received in a much shorter time than it could be expected so many ships could receive them at a place in noways prepared. The troops received refreshments; and such were the diligence of the governing power, and the capabilities of the place, that not less than 10,000 people, in addition to the inhabitants, were daily fed: above 6000 of these were Europeans. Another advantage which attends Pulo Penang is the stillness of the water, which enables ships to shift their cargo, and to perform numberless operations, which, in other places, are rendered impossible by the violence of the sea. At the time the same troops were there, they were shifted frequently from ship to ship, and all the stores of the army were shifted in a short space of time. This would have been impossible elsewhere, and the necessary communication with the shore was as easy as could be wished. Another circumstance is, that at all times, and with all winds, there is neither difficulty nor danger in getting in or going out of this harbour.

All this being considered, the conclusion is, that it is a most desirable place to retain, and that means ought to be taken to procure an increase of inhabitants, and an addition to those advantages which do not immediately belong to itself, but which it possesses in some degree, and of which the public have already availed themselves.

The inhabitants are Europeans, Chinese, and Malays principally, and there are besides a variety of nations, castes, and colours; but as the former are the cultivators and merchants, and the most useful class, the principles which will apply to them, inasmuch as they will bring after them the others, will apply equally to an increase of the latter. The circumstances

met here in the month of September. The expedition was recalled by Lord Hobart, then Governor of Madras, to whom a discretionary power had been intrusted. That power was exercised in consequence of an apprehension of the designs of Tippoo Sultaun against the Anglo-Indian Government.—Ed.

which must operate principally to deter Europeans as well as Chinese from settling at Penang, are first, the doubts entertained of the intentions of the Company to retain the settlement; secondly, their doubts as to their intentions of providing it with the means of defence.

If it be a benefit to live under the Company's Government, it cannot be expected that any man will spend his time and fortune upon a settlement which they intend to abandon; and as the settlement is, as I have above shown, of infinite advantage to the Company, and as it will undoubtedly be quitted by the settlers if the Company's Government does not declare its intention of keeping it, it is recommended that it should make that declaration in the most explicit terms, and adhere to it faithfully.

If the place is to be kept, means must be taken for its defence, otherwise the intention to keep it will be doubted, and not only new inhabitants won't come, but the old ones won't remain under the daily apprehension of being plundered by a merciless enemy. But in fact, if it is not properly defended, not only the inhabitants will remove with their effects, but the enemy will take possession of it; and although they will not derive all the advantages from it which the Company have, and may derive from it, yet it will be a valuable port to them in the centre of the Company's country trade, where they will be able to repair and refit their ships, and can get all kinds of refreshments.

As the town and fort stand now, it is impossible to defend them; if the Company were to place a larger garrison there than it can be supposed to be worth, an enemy knowing its force would bring a superior one, and must get possession of the place. But although the town cannot be completely defended as it now stands, works may be constructed in such a manner, and so placed, and it ought to be sufficiently garrisoned, to preserve it from the insults and plunder to which it is at present liable, even from one frigate.

The detail of these works can be gone into; but as they apply only to its preservation from insult and plunder by a small force, and by no means to its complete defence in case of a regular attack by a force prepared, it is recommended that they should be considered only in the interim; that the subject should be immediately taken up, and that those means should

be adopted which will give the place a real defence. This in reality is at present its only weak point. As all persons seem to agree that the town cannot be defended as it ought to be in its present situation, the object would appear to be to move it to another, if there were such a one in which it could be defended; but the situation is so admirably calculated for the conveniences of shipping, that it is feared it will be impossible to move it.

The want of a position in the immediate neighbourhood of the town, which could command it and the harbour, is another obstacle in the way of its defence; and the only remedy then is to construct the fortress or other defence in a part of the island where it can be defended, to build it so as that it may be a safe depôt for the goods of the merchants or for those of the public, if the Company should think fit to make it a naval depôt, and leave it to the good sense and the convenience of the inhabitants, present and future, either to remain where they now are, or to move into the neighbourhood of the new position. At the same time that if they preferred to remain where they are, means ought to be taken to preserve them from insult.

There are many positions upon the island which would answer this purpose, but I should particularly recommend one to the southward, directly opposite the small island. There there are fine situations for docking ships, and for watering; the channel is difficult and narrow; and if a battery were constructed upon the north-west end of the small island, no ship could enter it.

I had not an opportunity of examining this position particularly, but it appears a good one: if a better can be found, it ought to be taken; but I should recommend that it be as near the sea as possible, and where it can protect the shipping, which may be brought under it in case of an attack from the enemy.

The garrison ought to consist of 200 Europeans and 500 natives, and if the fortress to be constructed be well placed, it will not require a larger one.

The next circumstance to be considered is the means of paying for this defence.

It cannot be expected that a young colony, such as is Penang, should be capable of paying immediately a very large land revenue. In the Report from the Committee of Merchants, there is an Appendix upon the subject of the revenue which may be expected; but, as the calculation proceeds upon erro-

neous principles, it ought to be adopted with great caution. The proposal is, that the land should be taxed according to the article which it produces; but it is much feared that the collection of that tax would cost more than its produce. It would be impossible to tax all land capable of cultivation at the rate which the best land, that, for instance, which would produce fruit-trees, or cocoa-nut-trees, or pepper, would bear; and as to enter into a detail of the produce of each orlong of each field, in order to ascertain the tax due, would be attended with immoderate expense, it is proposed to tax the land by the orlong, and proportionably according to its quality and its capability of giving the different kinds of produce. It should, therefore, be classed in three classes: Best, Middling, and Worst. The best to pay 10 dollars per orlong, the middling 6, and the worst 3. The leases of the lands ought to be perpetual, and the rent or tax of all to commence only at the end of three years. But as the lands denominated middling and worst might be expected to be improved under the low rent in a short time, there ought to be a revision of them every ten years, and their rent ought to be raised to that of the best land, if it is found that they are capable of giving the same produce.

The number of orlongs fit for cultivation on the island is supposed to be 56,000. One-fourth of them may be reckoned of best land, one-fourth of middling, and half of worst. These would produce 308,000 dollars* upon that low valuation, and, in the progress of improvement, would give much more. That sum agrees nearly with that mentioned in the Report from the Committee of Merchants.

The monopoly of the sale of luxuries ought to be abolished, and that branch of business ought to be left free as any other.

There are several reasons which combine to make this regulation desirable, but the principal one arises from the nature of the people who are the inhabitants of Penang. They are Chinese and Malays; the former come from different provinces of their large empire, and those from each province range themselves under the authority and direction of

* Best .. .. 140,000 dollars.
Middling .. .. .. 84,000 „
Worst .. .. 84,000 „
308,000 „

their own headman. This custom of itself gives a police to the island, but it happens that Government are obliged to give the headmen the monopoly of the sale of luxuries (such as arrack and opium) and the privilege of keeping the gaming-houses; and thus the headmen, instead of being, as they would otherwise be, checks upon the use of what are termed luxuries, such as arrack and opium, and upon the practice of gambling, in their capacities of police-officers are encouragers of drunkenness and gaming, in their capacities of monopolists keepers of public-houses and of gambling-houses. This is an evil for which the greatest revenue would be no compensation; but when the trifling sums these monopolies produce are considered, there will not be a doubt as to the propriety of abolishing them entirely. The question whether it will be proper or otherwise to put the retail sale of arrack and opium and the keeping of gaming-houses under regulation is distinct from that of revenue, and will be canvassed when the police of the island is considered.

The customs at Penang ought to be the same as those in Bengal, and goods having paid duty there, or in any other of the Company's settlements in India, either ought to receive a drawback upon their re-exportation to Penang and there to pay the duty, or they ought to pay no duty at all. It is, however, to be observed, that if the latter alternative be adopted, Penang will have to pay for its own defence, at the time that another part of the empire will receive the advantage of its consumption.

Whether the commerce of Penang ought to be left free and open for all nations, is a question which I shall canvass; but if that plan be adopted, little is to be expected in aid of the revenue from the trade of the place.

Even in the present state of Penang, its situation is so well calculated for commerce, that the products of almost every part of the Eastern world are to be found there, and at a rate almost as cheap as at the place where each is produced; particularly those of China, of the Malay coast, and of the Eastern Archipelago. If then it were encouraged and protected as it seems to deserve, might it not be reasonably expected that it would be the mart of the East? In that case, for the reasons which I am about to detail, it would be necessary to place the trade under certain severe regulations. By the papers which have been published at different times by the East India Company, it appears that as a trading company they are losers upon

their whole concern with India (excepting always that with China) to a very considerable degree; that if they did not possess their immense territories in Bengal,* &c., and if it were not possible for them as merchants to carry on their trade at a cheaper rate, they would do better not to carry it on at all. This arises not from the nature of the trade itself, but from their double character of merchants and governors, together with that of their political character at home, which cause considerable unnecessary expense and extravagance in their mode of conducting their mercantile transactions. The surplus of the revenues over the necessary expenditure, and the profits of the trade with China, however, enable them to pay the expenses attending their government and management at home, their dividend, and the share which Government claims out of the surplus revenues. The Indian trade is carried on with a view to render more easy the transmission of the surplus revenue to Europe, without draining Bengal of its specie, and in order to give that country a market for its manufactured produce, which as its sovereigns the Company are bound to do. The China trade then, and that to the eastward, are those upon which the Company and the nation principally depend; the Company for carrying home the revenue, and the nation for that large sum in Customs which is annually paid by the Company. Owing to the advantages which the East India Company have had in the China market by means of the territorial revenues, and to other causes incidental to them, they have nearly monopolized the trade with China. They supply nearly all Europe with the produce of that country and of India, and thus Great Britain enjoys the advantage of the consumption, not only of its own inhabitants, but of those of the other nations in Europe, the English East India Company having driven them nearly all out of the Chinese and Indian markets. These facts being allowed, I shall now consider them with reference to Penang, and to making that a free port, and the question will then arise whether any and what regulations and duties ought to be imposed upon the passing trade of that island.

I take the assertion that Penang might become the mart of

* Bengal comprises the largest portion of the basins of the Ganges and of the Brahmaputra rivers; it extends from the sea-coast at Cuttack northwards to the slope of the Himalaya, and is situated between 21° and 27° north lat.: length 350, with an average breadth of 300, miles.—Ed.

India and China as granted, and I shall consider the subject under that point of view.

It is certain that if the nations of Europe who are consumers of Indian and Chinese produce take them from Great Britain, they buy them loaded first with the extravagance and expense of the Company's commercial management, and next with the duties which are imposed upon Indian articles in Great Britain; for that reason it is natural to suppose that all would eagerly seize an opportunity to purchase them at a place where they could get them at a cheaper rate, and they would have recourse to any port where they might be found. A free port where the goods of all parts of India would be found, or in other words a mart, would be the place at which they would prefer to purchase them, even although they might be sold rather dearer than at the place of their growth or produce; as ships having resort to it, instead of being obliged to go from port to port to find an assortment, find at once all they can want, and as soon as they can be loaded can set out upon their return. Besides the convenience of such a port, it has the advantage of saving a considerable part of the expense of the voyage, a saving which may more than compensate for the addition of price to the goods, over that which they would cost at the place of their growth. I therefore conclude that a mart in India would be resorted to by all European consumers of Indian goods.

The mart for those goods at present is London; and the question arises whether it will be prudent or otherwise to establish a free port in India, in a most convenient situation, which will be a rival to London, and which will in the end deprive Great Britain of a considerable portion of the revenues it enjoys from the China and India trade. It may be said that in a trade between London and the continent of Europe the returns are more quick than they could be in a trade between Penang and the continent, and therefore that the former will always be preferred by foreigners to the latter; but allowing the truth of that position as far as relates to foreign capital, it does not apply to the capital of British merchants established in India, who, if Penang were well established, would soon abandon their country trade, and embark in that more lucrative one the European trade, as the successful rivals of their patrons the East India Company. I have been informed that some of them have already done so without the assistance of a free port; and I

know that one ship set out from Bengal, went first to Madras, then to Batavia, next to Manilla, then to China, and having procured a proper assortment proceeded to Hamburgh, and that the result of the voyage was a profit of one hundred per cent. upon an average. Upon what scale could the profit be estimated if that ship had had a mart to resort to, instead of being obliged to proceed by a long and dangerous navigation from port to port to collect its cargo? It cannot be prudent to risk the loss of these large revenues; and therefore, if Penang is to be a free port, to what regulations is its trade to be subjected, in order not to deprive London of the advantages which it already enjoys?

When the nature of the Company's commerce is considered, when it is considered what a large stake the nation has in it, any steps which are taken towards the establishment of a free port require the greatest caution, and ought to be adopted only as an experiment. The Company require Penang as a convenience to their country trade, and in order that that settlement may exist at all, it is perhaps necessary that it should be a free port; but if the freedom of that port is to tend to the annihilation of the Company as a commercial body, and to deprive the nation of a large portion of its revenues paid by foreign nations as Customs, it will be better to forego that convenience.

But a plan may be devised by which the convenience may be attained, and the risk of loss not incurred. First, it should be decided that no European flag whatever should have resort to Penang.

Next, means should be adopted to prevent vessels belonging to European merchants residing in India under the protection of the Company carrying cargoes from thence to Europe.

The port for the country trade may then be free, and I imagine that no harm would result therefrom to the interests of the Company or of the nation.

However, it cannot be expected that the small duties which will be paid will do more than defray the expense of their collection, and therefore some other resource must be looked to, towards defraying the expense of the defence of the settlement.

Those which present themselves are:

1. Salt, upon which the inhabitants may be brought to pay a duty in two ways. First, by obliging them to purchase it in

Bengal, they will pay the same duty as that which the Company receive from all the inhabitants of that settlement by means of their monopoly, and next the salt imported may be subjected to a duty upon its importation into the island.

If they are obliged to import it from Bengal paying a duty, they will in that case pay a duty twice, and they will have a claim upon the Supreme Government for assistance towards providing their defence.

2. Opium, which is an article of luxury in great demand at Penang, might likewise be submitted to the same duties, and the reasoning which applies upon salt will equally apply to that article.

It might likewise be advisable either to force the people of Penang to take all their opium from Bengal, or to pay a duty of 5 per cent. upon the passage of that article; either measure would leave a considerable duty to be applied to the purpose of defending the island.

I have now gone more at large than I intended into the subject of the commerce of the island, and have only to make a few remarks upon the measures to be adopted for the police of the island, and for the security of its property.

As the inhabitants consist of people of different nations, and of different provinces of those nations, it is advisable to leave them under the direction of the headman of each province, and to interfere as little as possible in the regulations which may be established by each for the government of his own countrymen. It may, however, be necessary in order to insure the genera tranquillity to have one European magistrate, who might be at the head of the magistracy of the island. He should inform himself of the methods of proceeding, and of the laws which bind the Chinese and Malays, and in cases where either are parties the decision should be according to their own law; where both are parties, according to the laws of universal and natural justice.

With regard to the [landed] property of the island, it ought to be granted in perpetuity, with the reservation of the rent, and of the power of raising it in the case I have above mentioned, and the grant ought to be registered in an office to be kept for that purpose.

It ought to be in the power of any man to dispose of his [landed] property to whomsoever he might please; and the possession of the original grant, with the register of the transfer,

ought to be evidence that it has been made, and entitle the holder of it to possession.

ARTHUR WESLEY.

[10.] MEMORANDUM ON BENGAL.

In the "Remarks upon the Present State of the Husbandry and Commerce of Bengal," several circumstances are adduced in order to prove that that country loses by its connection with Great Britain, as that connection at present exists, through the medium of an exclusive commercial Company.

The grievances principally complained of are the want of due encouragement to the cultivation of its valuable produce; the commercial monopoly of the Company, which, as it raises the price of freight, precludes the possibility of transporting that produce to a valuable market; and the proportion of the revenues of the country which is drawn from it as a tribute to the Company and to the British Government.

Another circumstance of which complaint is made, but which is totally distinct from the abuses of the management of an exclusive Company, is the want of encouragement at home to the raw and to some of the manufactured produce of Bengal, such as sugar, tobacco, raw silk, &c., &c. I shall consider each of these with that impartiality which should always reign in discussions upon subjects of this nature.

The productions of India are grain, indigo, raw silk, tobacco, sugar. It has often been a question whether the total rent which is paid by the inhabitants of Bengal is greater at present than it was during the dynasty of the Moguls or the subsequent government of the native princes; it however seems now to be understood that it is about equal to what it was at those times, and I shall take that for granted.

The sum which is paid to the Government is about equal to that which was paid to the Government of the Moguls, and which appears to have been divided into two parts: the one was applied to pay the expenses of the government in Bengal, the other was sent to the treasury in Delhi. The expenses of the collection of those revenues were about equal to what they are at this moment, and therefore the zemindar or landholder, or under whatever title he might have been known, retained

no more of the rent than he does at this moment under the British Government. If the profits of the zemindar are small now, they were equally so formerly, which, in addition to its being a proof that there were formerly no landlords in Bengal, or, in other words, that the zemindars were not proprietors, is a proof that the British Government gives as much encouragement to the cultivation and improvement of land as was given during the time of the best of the native governors.

But the British Government not only have not taken more rent than the native governments, but they have made an engagement that they will not take more than they do at present, by making a permanent settlement and by giving to the zemindars the property of the soil. Therefore, as far as security and permanency give encouragement to agriculture, more encouragement has been given by the British Government than by the natives.

It seems, however, that there are certain articles which are produced in Bengal which require a superior cultivation and a greater expense, which neither the tenants nor the landholders are enabled to advance. Among these, indigo, sugar, tobacco, and silk are enumerated.

In order that these articles may receive the cultivation which they require, and in order that there may be a body of landholders capable of bearing the expense of giving it to them, it is proposed that Europeans should be allowed to purchase and to become proprietors in India.

The first question is, whether the cultivation would be mended by their interference. The husbandry in India is said to be very defective. The simplicity with which all its complex operations are performed is not supposed to be advantageous to it, and it is therefore imagined that superior ingenuity and management would give a larger product at a cheaper rate, and that, in time, the example set by skilful Europeans would be followed throughout the country. Notwithstanding the objections which the Hindoos have to alter any institution which has been handed down to them by their ancestors, many of which are reckoned sacred, it is believed that if the advantages of European or British management could be made clear to them, it would, in time, be universally adopted. It is also true that the expense of clearing and stocking a farm as it ought to be cannot be borne excepting by an European, and therefore

the Europeans ought to be allowed to purchase, if it is wished that the agriculture of the country should be much improved. There are, however, objections to that measure, which arise partly from the character of the natives, and partly from the effect which the climate has upon European constitutions. The natives hold every European in the greatest awe, and therefore it is imagined that, if these were allowed to settle in such parts of the country as they might think fit, they might be induced to tyrannise over the former, who would fear to complain, and thus the British name and character would become an object of detestation to the Hindoos. However, regulations might be adopted to prevent this evil, of which the natives might be made acquainted; and as they have had many opportunities of witnessing the rigour of British justice, even upon British subjects, when they deserve it, it is believed that they would not fear to complain in case of receiving an injury. The climate is a great objection to suffering the unconstrained resort of British subjects to India. Those who have not been in Bengal are not aware of the effects which its climate has upon the European constitution; but they are so great, and those who have been there for any length of time become so enervated, that it is doubted whether those benefits which are expected would result from their residence. A European cannot with safety expose himself to the sun: how then can he hope to superintend the various operations of husbandry with success? His generation, even supposing him to be married to a European woman, dwindles and falls off to such a degree that the third generation from the original settler is but little removed, in manners and disposition, from the old inhabitants of the country; and therefore, excepting by a constant drain from the mother country, the full benefits of this colonization cannot be expected.

The policy of the Company's Government has hitherto been to prevent, as much as possible, the residence of Europeans in India; and it has been grounded upon the necessity of preserving in the minds of the natives a respect for the British name and character, which, it is feared, an unrestrained intercourse would tend to remove, as well as upon the danger which would result were they to become acquainted with the language and character of the natives in their territories, and then to enter into the service of the native princes. If an unrestrained intercourse hitherto would have produced either of these effects,

it is equally dangerous at the present moment, even although every British subject should become a proprietor; and from some events which have taken place lately, from the language which has been held in the "Remarks," it is more than ever necessary for the Company to prevent the resort of Europeans to Bengal. The circumstance which tended most in the course of the last year to preserve the allegiance of the army to the Company's Government was the desire which every individual had to return to Great Britain, and the certainty that if the violent measures proposed were adopted, or that if encouragement were given to proceed to extremities, the door to his return was shut for ever. To this no individual, particularly none of those who have fortunes sufficiently large to maintain them, could make their minds up; and the consequence was that, at the moment when everything appeared most desperate, all subsided. If Europeans had been settled with their families in India; if these men had, or could have had, their homes in that country, the Company would have lost it, and nothing could ever have regained it.

By the violence of the language and of the sentiments which are held forth in the "Remarks," by the bitter complaints which are made of the British Government and connection, the sentiments of the Company's civil servants and of those who reside in India by the Company's licence are very apparent: how much more violent would they be if they were proprietors of a soil for the commercial advantages of whose inhabitants they now so violently contend! It is to be expected that they would likewise make India their home; and thus Great Britain would lose its strongest hold upon their allegiance, their desire to return to their native country. However desirable, therefore, it may be that the natives of India should obtain the advantage of British skill and management in agriculture, it is not advisable that the Company should suffer its servants, or those who reside in India by its licence, to become proprietors of land.

There are other measures, which, although they might not be equally efficacious, might still tend considerably to the prosperity of Bengal, as far as that is connected with its agriculture. Markets might be established throughout the country, which would enable the cultivator at all times to sell his produce without the difficulty and expense attending upon a long car-

riage. These would likewise insure a uniformity in price, which, above all things, has been found in other countries the most favourable to agriculture; and by enabling one district to profit by the plenty of another, they would insure all parts of Bengal from that worst of evils, with which it has been so frequently afflicted,—a famine.

Good roads should likewise be made at first from the principal place in each district to those in its neighbourhood. These ought to be kept in repair. The inland navigation ought to be encouraged, and every measure ought to be adopted, which, by rendering its use more easy, will make more perfect the communication from one part of this country to the other.

If these measures were adopted, the agriculture of Bengal would not require the assistance of Europeans, in order that it might be brought to a very sufficient state of perfection.

The commerce of Bengal consists at present in an unrestrained intercourse with all parts of India and the Eastern Seas; in the commerce carried on by the Company, and in its intercourse with Europe and America by means of foreign nations, and clandestine trade carried on by the persons resident in India under the Company's licence and by Americans, and likewise the inland trade with the northern parts of India and the Deccan * by the water-carriage, caravans, &c. &c. The amount of the whole is four millions and a half.

The freedom of the trade which is carried on with the different parts of India is highly to the honour of the Company; it has more than trebled since the peace of '83.† It has suffered in some degree for want of naval protection in the course of this war; but a peace will re-establish it again upon its old footing, and it is probable that, with the same freedom, it will increase in a greater proportion than it has hitherto.

The commerce which the Company carries on with Bengal

* The Deccan in its usual acceptation signifies, according to *Thornton's Gazetteer*, the tract of country in Southern India situated between the Nerbudda and Kistna rivers. According to other authorities it implies the whole of the territory extending south of the Vindhya Mountains, which range separates it from Hindustan to the north. In this sense the Deccan consists of the valley of the Nerbudda river, and the wide triangular plateau comprised within the eastern and the western Ghauts.—Ed.

† Tonnage of the shipping employed in the country trade in '83 .. 44,865
" " " '91 .. 175,407

Total number of ships in '83 128
" " '91 575

by means of its monopoly is so little productive, that were it not for the necessity of bringing home the surplus of the revenues through the medium of trade, lest Bengal should be entirely drained of the precious metals, it would be better for them as a commercial body to give up the trade entirely. However, that trade at present amounts to above a million sterling. It consists chiefly in piece goods and saltpetre, and some indigo; but the price of the Company's freight is so high, that the other articles which are produced in India, and which are marketable in Europe, cannot be carried, as their bulk is too great in comparison with their value. Thus, then, the commerce which the Company carries on with Bengal is disadvantageous to itself, and does not tend so much to the advantage of that country as it might were it differently managed, and did the price of freight come more nearly to what it is really worth.

The price which it is fixed the private traders are to pay for the freight they occupy in the Company's ships is 5*l.* per ton out and 15*l.* per ton home, which is liable to an addition in time of war. The Company aver, and, it is believed, with some truth, that their freight costs them more; but what article, besides the expense of insurance, can repay that price? It is certain that the Company have monopolized the exportation of the most valuable articles; but still they are losers; and how much greater must be the loss of the private traders to whom is left the trade in gross produce, and the raw materials of manufacture alone! A considerable trade has long been carried on with Europe from Bengal by American and foreign vessels, and some clandestine trade.

The majority of these American and foreign vessels have belonged to British subjects resident in India, who thus supply Europe with the produce of Bengal without submitting themselves to the control of the Company, and without paying any duties in London. The amount of this trade is supposed to be one million four hundred thousand pounds.*

In order that Government might obtain a control over this trade, that London might become its emporium, and that Great Britain might have the advantage of levying a duty upon the consumption of Europe of Indian articles, the Company were obliged to give 3000 tons, to be increased, when necessary,

* Number of ships, about 30
Tonnage 13,000

to the private trade; but the price fixed for that tonnage is very high, because the Company have retained the monopoly of those articles which by their value were most likely to pay the tonnage; and as shipping could be procured at a rate infinitely lower, the foreign or clandestine trade exists to as great a degree at present as it did at the time when the regulation was adopted that the Company should furnish a proportion of tonnage to private traders. These insist that tonnage might be procured at *3l.* per ton out, and *3l.* per ton home. However, it seems certain that tonnage can be procured at a much cheaper rate than that at which the Company supply it; and although it may still be necessary that the trade with Bengal should be carried on through the medium of an exclusive Company, there is no good reason why the people of Great Britain should pay the extravagant price of this tonnage for the Indian goods they consume, in addition to the price they pay for the mismanagement natural to an exclusive Company in all its commercial concerns.

Bengal and Great Britain both suffer from the high price of this freight: Bengal, as it is deprived of the British market for much of its produce; and Great Britain, as it pays a high price for all the Indian commodities which it consumes, and as it is deprived of much of the Bengal produce which would be useful in its manufactures, but which, on account of the high price of freight, cannot be transported with any reasonable prospect of profit. Therefore, as far as this high price of freight tends to deprive Bengal of a market for its produce, the inhabitants have reason to complain of want of encouragement in their agriculture; but they have not more reason to complain than the people of Great Britain, who, from the same arrangements, suffer both as consumers and as merchants and manufacturers.

Without at present entering into the question whether it would be advisable or otherwise to lay open the trade entirely, or whether it would be advisable to suffer an unrestrained intercourse between Great Britain and India, it may be said that policy as well as justice requires that shipping should be found at the lowest rate, in order that due encouragement may be given to the agriculture and commerce of Bengal, and that the private trade should be left as free as the nature of the Company's government at home and abroad will permit it. If measures are not adopted having these objects in view, it is not

to be expected that the clandestine and the foreign trade will not increase; and thus Great Britain will lose not only the advantage of being the carriers of Indian produce for all Europe, but likewise the duties which she would be enabled to levy upon the consumption of Europe upon Indian articles in their transit.

Measures having lowness of freight and freedom of trade in view may be adopted upon two principles: either the commerce with India may be laid open to all England from the port of London, and every man who pleases may adventure thither, or the Company may be the medium of export as well as import. If the former be adopted, the unrestrained resort of British subjects to India must be the consequence, which in another part of this paper I have objected to, and therefore that measure ought to be laid aside; if the latter be adopted, the Company ought to be obliged to find freight at the lowest rate to as great an extent as private merchants might think fit to call for it. These ought to be confined as to the time of calling for it, and they ought to pay for all they call for, even if it is not used. The exportation of British manufactures, excepting of military stores, ought to be free, and private merchants ought to have it in their option to import whatever they might think fit (subject always to the British revenue laws), and all merchandise ought, as at present, to pay the Company's duty, and be exposed to sale at the India House. These regulations would give perfect freedom to the private trade, with cheapness of freight, at the same time that the commerce of Great Britain and Bengal would be under the control of Government. The consequence would probably be the annihilation of the Company's commerce; but as it has been already said that the Company lose by their connection with Bengal, considering it as a commercial concern, no great evil will arise from that circumstance. The Company will be freed from a considerable expense of establishments both at home and abroad, which is incurred at present merely for their commercial concerns; but when the commerce falls into the hands of individuals, and nothing remains to the Company excepting the government, the expenses of the former will be separate from those of the latter, and both will be better and more cheaply carried on.

It has been already said that the Company neither receive more rent from the lands of Bengal, nor do the occupiers pay

more under the Company's Government, than the old Governments received, or than the occupiers then paid; but the Company's Government, by taking into their own hands the monopolies of salt and of opium, have raised the revenues upwards of a million sterling, and out of that arises the surplus by means of which the Government are enabled to bring anything home to Europe.

In order to ascertain whether the natives of Bengal have any reason to complain that the surplus of the revenues over the expense is carried to a distant country, it is first necessary to ascertain what proportion is applied to purposes in India, in which Bengal has an immediate concern, and next what proportion goes home; and then the question will arise whether the withdrawing these sums from Bengal through the medium of commerce is unfavourable to that country.

The amount of the revenue received under all heads is ..	£5,033,000
The charges in Bengal amount to	3,127,000
Surplus	1,906,000

It cannot be contested but that the establishments at Madras and Bombay, Bencoolen and Prince of Wales Island, are essentially necessary to Bengal; and even if there were no connection between Great Britain and that country, they ought to be supported. The interest of the debts contracted at Madras and Bombay, as they must be supposed to have been contracted in wars in support of the chief establishment, it ought likewise to pay; and therefore the supplies to those settlements, and the interest of their debts, may be fairly chargeable to Bengal itself, and not to its connection with Great Britain.

The surplus, as already stated, is		£1,906,000
Deduct supplies to Madras and Bombay	£350,000	
" Prince of Wales Island and Bencoolen	50,000	
Interest of debts in India	561,923	
		961,923
The surplus will then be reduced to		£944,077

But it appears that the gross amount of the revenue is made up of sums received upon bills and certificates, and of sums received for sales of goods in Bengal, in addition to the land revenue, the customs, the opium, and salt monopolies. The former, as they may be fairly stated to be received for a value

given, ought to be deducted from the amount of the claim, and the account will stand as follows:

Surplus as above		£944,077
Amount of sales	£350,000	
Bills and certificates	126,461	
		476,461
Remaining surplus		£467,616

The amount of sales ought not to be deducted, as it is not included in the gross amount of the revenue:

Surplus as stated	£467,616
Add amount of sales	350,000
Actual surplus	£817,616

Thus then the sum which Great Britain draws from Bengal is 817,616*l.*, and this is drawn away in trade.

If the question were, whether the people of Bengal would not be more happy and comfortable if they did not pay more revenue than is necessary to defray the expenses of their establishments, there could be no doubt upon the subject; and if their own comfort were alone to be considered, the surplus revenue ought to be remitted to them as soon as possible. But, as I shall show hereafter, Great Britain has a right to expect this tribute from them, it is impossible to devise means by which a revenue can be drawn from a people so little to their injury, as that which Great Britain draws is injurious to the natives of Bengal.

If specie were not essentially necessary for all the purposes of commerce, and if a drain to the amount of the surplus above stated would not be felt severely in all transactions of barter and exchange in the country, there would be no harm in sending this revenue home in money. The amount of the demand in Europe of Indian articles remaining the same, the exports from Bengal, the quantity of surplus produce for export, would be precisely equal to what they are at present; with this difference, that they would be paid for in the manufactures or money of Great Britain, instead of in the money raised from the country. As the case stands at present, there is a large revenue raised from this people: it is spent in the first instance in defending them, and in paying the usual expenses of government; in the next, in paying the expenses of their dependencies, which may be called their defence; in the third, in paying the interest of

debts contracted for their defence and security; and in the fourth, in a tribute to Great Britain. The three last may be stated to be laid out in the country in encouragement of agriculture and manufactures. Supposing the sums laid out for the support of Madras, Bombay, &c., for the interest of debts, or for the tribute, were remitted in the revenue, and that the tenantry still continue to pay the same sums as at present, which is more than probable, it is doubted whether the proprietors of land, into whose hands they would go, would encourage the agriculture and manufactures of the country to the degree that they are at present encouraged by the present application of the revenue; and in that case if the demand for the produce of Bengal, upon the coast, &c., and in England were to cease, the country would indeed be in a ruinous condition.

Therefore, upon the whole, although the peasants may complain of the amount of what they pay, and that so little is left to them, they have no reason to complain of the manner in which what is taken from them is applied. There is another question upon this part of the subject which has been treated with a considerable degree of asperity in the "Remarks:" it is whether it is just or right for Great Britain to take any tribute whatever from Bengal? The first question ought to be, whether it is just or right for one country to conquer another? and when the circumstances under which the conquest of Bengal was made are considered, the rights of Great Britain to have made that conquest are very apparent. After a conquest has been made, and the Government is in the possession of the conqueror, it is said in the "Remarks" he has no right to any advantage but the Government. That would be true in some instances, but otherwise in many others.

Some nations when they have made a conquest gain a barrier to their former dominions, as the French did in their conquests of Alsace, &c., towards the Rhine, and there they have no right to claim any further advantages. Others gain a monopoly of commerce, as all nations in Europe do in the conquest of West India islands, and there likewise they have no right to tribute: others, again, gain the advantage of men and provisions for their armies and fleets, the advantage that the country in question is not connected with another power, such as Great Britain enjoys in her connection with Ireland, from

which country, although she defends it, she has no claim to tribute: others get corn at a cheap rate, as Rome did from Egypt, from which country she received no other tribute. But I cannot perceive either a barrier, a useful or necessary monopoly in trade, a connection which gives Great Britain men or provisions for her fleets and armies, or grain at a cheap rate, in Bengal; and therefore I conclude that in return for the protection which that country undoubtedly receives, Great Britain has some right to expect remuneration. In fact, all conquered countries give the conquerors an advantage in some point of view; and Bengal gives none to Great Britain, excepting in tribute, which therefore the latter ought to take.

In the "Remarks" much is said upon the subject of sugars; great complaints are made that Great Britain, by the high duties she lays upon the importation of sugars from the East Indies, gives an undue preference to the West Indies, to the injury of the former. If the question were abstractedly whether it is proper to pay dearer for a certain commodity when you can get it cheaper, there would be no doubt upon this subject; and there is no doubt but that the preference given to the West India sugars raises a great tax upon the people of Great Britain, and is highly injurious to the natives of Bengal, who undoubtedly deserve every encouragement that can be given to them. But the subject involves questions of greater magnitude than the authors of the "Remarks" are aware of, and requires the cool and candid judgment of an unbiassed mind to decide upon it, instead of that of persons who may be fairly stated to be interested in the event.

One leading fact is stated, upon which the whole question turns. It is this: that if the East Indian sugars were admitted at the same rate of duty as the West Indian, even at the present high rate of freight, they would undersell them; nay, it may be stated that, owing to the disastrous war which has desolated the West India Islands for the last * years, the price of sugars has been raised so considerably, that the Company have found it expedient to import sugars from Bengal, paying the advanced duty and the high freight.

These circumstances being considered, the avowed consequence of admitting Bengal sugars at an equal duty must be the annihilation of the West India Islands.

* Blank in manuscript.—Ed.

Before any measures are taken which can have that effect, it will be wise to ascertain the nature and the quantity of property there is in those islands belonging to British subjects there residing, as well as to those who reside in England, all of whom or whose ancestors have purchased, or otherwise obtained and hold them, under the implied faith of the nation that they were to be supported in them at all times during war, and that the commercial policy of the nation in peace was likewise to be directed towards their support.

It will likewise be wise to ascertain what quantity of property and what quantity of shipping are embarked in this trade under the same faith; and after these circumstances will have been nicely ascertained, and that the nation has determined to make good all reasonable losses which individuals may sustain by this change of its commercial policy, it may deliberate upon this question, whether it be more for the advantage of Great Britain to pay this advanced price for the sugars it consumes, and that the natives of Bengal should wait their market for that article; or that it should make compensation to all individuals concerned in the West Indies or in the trade to the islands, for their losses.

Combined with this question there will be others which will claim the consideration of those who are to decide upon the subject. Their attention will be claimed by the importance of the islands in the hands of other powers of Europe at enmity with Great Britain, the importance of the trade to them as a nursery for seamen, and a certain resource to the nation at the commencement of a war. In those points of view, even supposing that the pecuniary considerations were out of the question, they are of the utmost consequence. I have not materials to form a judgment of their political importance to Great Britain supposing them in the hands of other European powers, but as a nursery for seamen, a few facts will show their consequence.

It has been said that the climate of the West Indies is so unwholesome that a residence in it is fatal to most of those who go there.

Without disputing that fact, I may safely assert that it is not more unwholesome or unfavourable to European constitutions than the climate of Bengal. Generally speaking all tropical climates are equally so, and that alone which makes one prefer-

able to another is the difference of the conveniences and luxuries which are in use by the inhabitants to render the climate more bearable. Bengal is more favourable to the higher class of Europeans than other climates, because it is the custom and the fashion there for them to take more care of themselves; but it is not more so to the lower orders of people than other places situated in the tropics, as they have not more means of taking care of themselves, more luxuries and conveniences there, than they have elsewhere. Therefore upon the whole it may be safely said that Great Britain does not lose more seamen in the one country than in the other, considering the proportion of the numbers employed in each.

But the advantage which the West India trade has over that of the East is, that the seamen are a shorter time absent from their own country in the former than they are in the latter. A voyage to the West Indies may be stated at six months, during half of which time only can it be stated that the men are in a bad climate; whereas a voyage to the East Indies always lasts eighteen months, generally two years, and four-fifths of that time are spent in a climate avowedly unfavourable to European constitutions. Therefore supposing the numbers employed in each were the same, it may be concluded that the loss of lives would be greatest in that in which they remained longest. But there is another reason why the West India trade is a preferable employment for seamen. The voyage is so quickly performed that the nation has them always in her power; the fleets can be manned from them in a short space of time: whereas if the seamen from the East India fleet were the only or principal dependence for manning the navy, weeks and months might elapse after a declaration of war before the fleets could put to sea, and the disadvantages thereof might have the most fatal consequences. The seamen employed in the West India trade are generally more expert than those employed in the trade to the East Indies. They navigate seas in which there is a greater diversity of weather than there is in a voyage to the East Indies, during which, if it is commenced at the proper season, there will probably be no occasion to alter the sails once, however long it may be.

Upon the whole, therefore, the West India trade may be stated to be the best school for seamen, and their importance to the welfare, even to the existence of Great Britain, should induce the Legislature to adopt with great caution any measure which

can diminish the West India trade in order to give a preference to that with the East.

It is to be observed upon this part of the subject, that it has no relation to the existence of the Company's exclusive privileges of commerce. It is a subject for the consideration of Parliament, entirely distinct from that of their monopoly. The other articles which are stated in the "Remarks" to labour under the same inconveniences, such as silk, tobacco, &c., as being loaded with high duties on their importation from India, in order that they may not come in competition with similar articles the produce of foreign European nations or of America, must likewise be considered in the same point of view. The necessity of a naval defence for Great Britain causes the necessity of encouraging commerce with all parts of the globe, particularly with those parts which are most contiguous to it. If the commerce of Great Britain were confined to one quarter alone, its sources of wealth might be stopped; the efforts of its enemies, by being directed against that quarter, might at all events do the country the greatest injury in time of war, and in the event of success the country would be entirely ruined. As long as its commerce is directed to all quarters, it must flourish; one source may be cut off, but others will be found.

Having considered the whole of this subject, I conclude, first, that agriculture is considerably encouraged under the administration of the British Government in Bengal; that the measures recommended in the "Remarks," viz. to allow Europeans to become purchasers, are impolitic, and ought not to be adopted; but that other measures might be adopted which would give to agriculture all the encouragement it could require.

2. I conclude that it is not advisable to throw open the trade, but that the Company ought to be obliged to furnish private traders with the quantity of tonnage they might require at the lowest rate at which it could be got. That the import of Bengal articles ought to be as free for private traders as for the Company, and the export of British produce (military stores excepted) ought to be the same.

3. That the tribute is not so prejudicial to Bengal as it is stated, and that it is a matter of right, founded upon the policy usually adopted by modern and ancient nations in regard to conquered countries.

4. I conclude that the protection given to West India

sugars, and to other articles the produce of Europe and America, to the prejudice of the same produced in Bengal, is necessary on account of the want of seamen for the British navy.

ARTHUR WESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to the Adjutant-General upon the subject of the Clothing of the 33rd Regiment for the years 1797-98. [11.]

That the clothing which was ordered for the regiment for the year 1797 is but just now arrived in India.

That the clothing which was issued for the year 1796 is still serviceable.

That besides clothing for 1000 men for the year 1797, above stated to be lately arrived, there is clothing of the year 1796 in store for 200 men.

That as a year has elapsed since this clothing was due, and as the clothing of 1798 will be due in the course of a fortnight, and as the men are in want of several articles of necessaries, it would be more for their advantage to get money than the clothing of the year 1797.

To request, therefore, permission to give them an adequate and fair price in lieu of their clothing for the year 1797, and to issue what is just arrived as the clothing for the year 1798.

ARTHUR WESLEY.

Draft Letter to the Agents on Clothing for the 33rd Regiment. [12.]

The clothing of 1797 and the other articles mentioned in the paper which you enclosed to me are arrived at Calcutta. I have directed Captain M'Pherson to give you credit in his distribution for 108*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.*, being the amount of your bill for the officers' swords and gorgets; for 71*l.* 8*s.* 5*d.*, the amount of insurance paid by you for different articles which you mention; and for 157*l.* 19*s.* 11*d.*, the amount of Mr. Cater's bill for tufts and insurance thereupon.

Captain M'Pherson will likewise give you credit, in his distribution, for the other sums you mention.

This clothing is but just arrived. The clothing for 1798 becomes due on the 4th of June.

I have applied to the Commander-in-Chief for leave to give the regiment money in lieu of clothing for the year 1797.

I enclose a copy of my letter to him upon that subject, which explains my intentions, and his answer.

The sum which I shall give is—

	£	s.	d.
To each serjeant	2	16	2
To each private man	1	8	1

I value the clothing in this manner:—

	£	s.	d.
For Serjeants—			
The coat	0	16	0
Waistcoat	0	9	0
Breeches	0	11	6
Hat	0	4	8
Half-mounting	0	15	0
	2	16	2
For Privates—			
The coat	0	8	0
Waistcoat	0	4	6
Breeches	0	5	9
Hat	0	2	4
Half-mounting	0	7	6
	1	8	1

You will observe that, at all events, the paymaster would have drawn upon you

	£	s.	d.
For Serjeants, &c.—			
Waistcoat	0	9	0
Breeches	0	11	6
Half-mounting	0	15	0
	1	15	6
For Privates—			
Waistcoat	0	4	6
Breeches	0	5	9
Half-mounting	0	7	6
	0	17	9

as the articles of those denominations coming from England do not answer in this country, and therefore that, in fact, the only sum in addition which is drawn for is 10*s.* 4*d.* for each private in lieu of his coat and hat;

	£	s.	d.
and for Serjeant's coat	0	16	0
„ hat	0	4	8
	1	0	8

I mention this because I am aware that there may be a diffi-

culty in passing the clothing account at the War Office, as this clothing was ordered and sent for the year 1798; but even in that case the inconvenience to the Colonel will be only temporary, and I shall have the satisfaction of knowing that I have already saved one year's clothing for the Colonel.

The clothing which was ordered for the year 1798 will answer for the year 1799, and after that is sent no more will be wanting till the year 1801.

I must observe to you that the clothiers have put cloth lining into the soldiers' coats instead of sending them to this country not lined, which is His Majesty's order. I shall be obliged to take out the former and replace it with cotton cloth; and, as it is positively forbid to charge to the soldiers the lining, I recommend that Mr. Chapman should be made to pay for that which he sent notwithstanding His Majesty's regulations.

—— suits of clothing were damaged on the passage: I will take the earliest opportunity of sending the report of the Court of Inquiry which surveyed it, and I leave to you the decision upon the subject of the steps which it may be proper to take in consequence of this loss. The Company's Government here will not pay for it, as they say, with truth I imagine, that, as the Colonel is obliged to pay for the carriage of the clothing and be responsible for all risks, there can be no claim upon them in consequence of the clothing having been in one of their ships, particularly as the Colonel did not pay freight. This reasoning appears to me to be well grounded. You know best whether you can recover from the insurers. Certain accoutrements coming from the coast have been lost.

ARTHUR WESLEY.

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*Draft of a Letter to Mr. Lushington.** [13.]

Fort William, 19th May, 1798.

That I received his letter, and am obliged to him for it.

That Lord M.† arrived here the day before yesterday, and was in good health.

* The Right Honourable S. R. Lushington, at that time Secretary to the Board of Revenue, and Private Secretary to Lieut.-Gen. Harris, Acting Governor of Fort St. George, and Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army. —ED.

† The Earl of Mornington was appointed Governor-General of India on the

That I am sorry that he has not been successful in his negotiation with the Nabob [of Arcot].*

That it appears that he never will consent to give up any part of his country; and, as the policy of the British Government is not to use force towards him, the best way would be to open a negotiation with him upon another footing, and, if possible, to get rid of the disgraceful scene which is exhibited at Madras at the periods when his rents become due, and of the ruin to the resources of his country which attends the method at present adopted of making his payments to the Company.

Compliments to General and Mrs. Harris, and Mrs. Lushington.

That ——— had endeavoured to procure the Advocate's opinion upon the whole of his case, not upon any particular point of law; which he had declined to give, stating that he conceived himself to be the law officer of all the Governments, and that, although he might give opinions upon particular points of law, or even upon entire cases, to individuals, he should always decline to do so when he knew that the Government was a party.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.†

[14.] *Draft of Observations upon Mornington's Minute.*

28th June, 1798.

The reasoning upon the proclamation of the Governor of Mauritius, and upon the evidence of the persons who were there at the time it was issued, is conclusive.

There is not a doubt but that Tippoo offered to conclude,

4th October, and sworn into office on the 6th October, 1797. His Lordship sailed from England on the 7th November following, arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in February, 1798, and at Madras the 26th April. He sailed from thence on the 9th May, and reached Calcutta on the 17th of the same month. The presence of the Governor-General at Madras being found necessary to expedite the negotiations with Tippoo Sultaun, his Lordship proceeded thither in the *Sybille* frigate on the 27th December, and reached that Presidency on the 31st December, 1798. On the 2nd January, 1799, Lord Mornington took his seat in Council at Fort St. George, and remained there superintending the transactions connected with the war in Mysore until its termination in May, 1799.—ED.

* *See* Wellesley Despatches, vol. i., p. 39.—ED.

† Lord Mornington's family adopted the ancient spelling of their name about this time.—ED.

and that he, in fact, has concluded with that Government, an alliance offensive and defensive against the British nation, and that the immediate object of that alliance is to drive us out of India. These circumstances I must, however, say do not appear upon the face of the proclamation, or even upon a cursory and slight view of it; nay, the proclamation itself, unaccompanied by the evidence which has been procured of the conduct of the Ambassadors at Mauritius, would not be sufficient evidence to lead to the two conclusions which I have above stated, neither would the landing of the troops at Mangalore * lead to it; but the evidence of the officers of the *Brish*, which throws a light upon the conduct of the Ambassadors whilst at Mangalore, is what leads to the strong conclusion that the alliance, as stated in the proclamation, was offered, and has been concluded.

The consequence of that alliance has been an addition to the forces of Tippoo of 150 men at most, and a certainty that he can receive no more assistance from the island of Mauritius.

I shall presently inquire what chance he has of assistance from France; but as he stands at this moment, we know that in consequence of his late negotiations and offensive alliance he has got no more than 150 men. If we had not had a long and expensive war in Europe, if our allies were all ready to assist even as they did in the last war, if the Company's resources in this country were in a flourishing condition, or if any resource existed to which recourse might be had in order to carry on the war at all, short of lessening the investment, which must be so severely felt both here and in England, I should not hesitate to declare that the cause of war was sufficient, and that either security must be given that no steps will be taken in consequence of this alliance, or that Tippoo must be attacked, and put in such a state as will secure us against his machinations in future. As, however, we are not in the fortunate circumstances which are desirable before we enter into a war, I have considered whether it is not possible to get rid of this subject without going so deeply into it as to render it requisite to save our honour that we should do that which makes a war almost inevitable.

The consequence of the alliance to Tippoo I have above stated to be an additional force of 150 men. That certainly

* The principal seaport belonging to Tippoo Sultaun, situated in the province of South Canara, on the western side of India, 440 miles south-east of Bombay.—ED.

cannot be very dangerous to us; and whatever might have been his hope and his intentions before he received it, he cannot now have an idea of carrying the intentions of the alliance into execution.

If we are to have a war at all, it must be one of our own creating; a justifiable one, I acknowledge; one which we shall think necessary, not on account of any danger which we may immediately apprehend, but one which we suppose may eventually be the consequence of this alliance with the French, and in order to punish Tippoo for a breach of faith with us.

Here arises the question whether it is probable that the French will or can assist Tippoo with troops, and whether that assistance will be such as to give us any just cause to apprehend much greater danger from delaying the war than we shall certainly derive benefit to our resources by it.

Upon the first question it is useless to say much. The obstacles to the departure of any French force from Europe are obvious to everybody. They must then pass the squadron at the Cape, and, even if their first object were not the recovery of the French settlement at Mauritius, they would then have to elude the vigilance of the squadron here, which would have but a small extent of coast to watch, and it is therefore probable would succeed in intercepting them.

The next question is, what is the extent of the force which France could give and he would receive. In men France could assist him to any extent, provided she could transport them; but I don't believe he would accept, nor do I believe she could transport, a larger number than 3000 men. She certainly could not send them away without the knowledge of our Government, and increasing the chances of their being intercepted. The Governments in India would likewise know of their being sent; the squadron would be prepared to intercept them, and the forces in the field to make the attack upon Tippoo, probably before they were landed at Mangalore.

But even if this force were landed, considering that they would be in the service of a native power who neither can nor will understand the manner in which Europeans must be treated in this climate in order that they may render effectual service, and that they will be for a considerable time at a distance from the scene of action, they would be reduced to half their number before they saw their enemy, and even then the service they

would render would not be equal to that of half their number in the Company's service.

Is there, then, any danger in deferring the war to that period when your resources will have revived, when you will have the benefit of the assistance of all your allies and others which it is not necessary to mention, but the want of which will be most severely felt at present?

In my opinion, if it be possible to adopt a line of conduct which would not lead immediately to war, provided it can be done with honour, which I think indispensable in this Government, it ought to be adopted in preference to that proposed in the conversations. I would, therefore, propose that, in canvassing this question, the evidence of the officers of the *Brish* should be sunk. That, in my opinion, alone proves the alliance to have been concluded, and enables us to prove it from the proclamation and the landing of the troops. Let the proclamation be sent to Tippoo with a demand that he should explain it and the landing of the troops. Don't give him reason to suppose that we imagine he has concluded an alliance with the objects stated in the proclamation; and finding he has derived so little benefit from the alliance, there is every probability that he will deny the whole, and be glad of an opportunity of getting out of the scrape. In the mean time we shall believe as much as we please, and shall be prepared against all events.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING COLLECTING AN ARMY IN THE BARAHMAHAL.* [15.]

[Transmitted to the Governor-General.] July, 1798.

As it is possible that there may not be a war, and as the assembling of the army in the field immediately, and its continuance there until the result of the negotiations about to be commenced is known, will cost an immense sum of money, I recommend that

* This district of Southern India occupies the northern extremity of Salem; it is not so elevated as Mysore, but is a wilder region, and was once studded with formidable hill forts. The district was ceded to the British Government by the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792.—ED.

the Europeans may be assembled in Vellore * and Arnee,† and that they may remain there until it is known whether their services will be wanted.

If the negotiations do not take a favourable turn, they may be moved into the Barahmahal towards the end of September, before the commencement of the monsoon in the Carnatic.

The sepoys ought to be collected in the garrisons in the Barahmahal immediately, and (if there is not room sufficient for them there) in Amboor,‡ Vellore, and Arnee. They ought to be assembled in camp at the time when the remonstrance from the Allies goes to Tippoo.

The field train ought to be moved into the Barahmahal immediately; the battering train to Vellore or Arnee.

A battering train and a field train ought to be placed in one of those garrisons, and ought always to be kept complete in all its equipments. Camp equipage ought likewise to be placed there. I refer you to Lord Cornwallis's opinion upon this subject.

The works of Chinroyen Droog must be repaired again.

Those of Sankerry Droog the same.

Kistnagherry § ought to be fortified upon an improved plan, in the same manner as Ryacotta.‖ In this last the works have been much contracted. The consequence is that it is strengthened, and that it would require a smaller garrison for its defence.

Amboor to be repaired.

A plan for strengthening Vellore to be adopted. It is a most important place, and the lower fort is very strong; but it is commanded by the hill fort, which is not tenable against a

* Vellore, a strong fort on the south or right side of the river Palar, lat. 12° 15', long. 79° 11'; west of Madras 79, and of Arcot 16, miles.—ED.

† In Arcot district, 74 miles south-west of Madras, 20 miles south-east of Vellore, and 17 miles south of Arcot town. Elevation above the sea 400 feet.—ED.

‡ In North Arcot, on the route from Madras to Bangalore, 75 miles east of the latter.—ED.

§ In Salem district, 150 miles south-west of Madras. Kistnagherry fort is on a bare rock, rising 700 feet in almost perpendicular height.—ED.

‖ In lat. 12° 28', 90 miles from Seringapatam. A fortress on an elevated rock; its lowest lines of defence are within 250 feet of the summit; and the ascent, by a broad road winding round the mountain, is practicable for horsemen. The ascent to the upper rock, surmounted by artillery, is by steps.—ED.

good European force. I think it might be made tenable at a very trifling expense, and, as it commands the entrance into the Carnatic by the valley of Amboor, it must be kept.

Ordnance and stores sufficient for their defence ought to be placed in all these forts; likewise provisions for their garrisons for * months.

The number of men necessary for the defence of each ought to be ascertained.

A road ought to be made south of the Tapoor Pass † similar to that to the northward of it, in order to facilitate the march of troops, convoys, &c., &c., from the left of the centre division of the army and from the south of the Coleroon ‡ to the frontier.

450,000 maunds of grain ought to be placed in the stores of Ryacotta and Kistnagherry, in addition to that necessary for their garrisons in case of a siege.

100,000 maunds ought to be deposited in Arnee, and a similar quantity in Vellore.

This store ought to be kept complete at all times.

It is impossible to carry on a war in India without bullocks, and yet the expense of an establishment at all adequate to the purposes for which it is intended is so great that I cannot recommend one. You wish, however, to be in such a state as to be able to strike a blow at all times, and I know no means of making you so, excepting you order that the collectors of the different districts under the Company's Government should endeavour to ascertain the number of bullocks they have in their districts, and what number they could collect without doing much injury to the cultivation of the country. They ought to make a report to Government upon this subject occasionally.

In the districts belonging to the Nabob and to the Rajah, the commanding officers of the troops to make the inquiries, and reports above recommended to be required from the collectors.

Thus Government will at all times know where to look for bullocks, and what number can be taken with ease from

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

† A remarkable pass through the mountains, leading from the district of Salem Proper into the Barahmahal, about 28 miles travelling distance north by west of the town of Salem or Chelam.—ED.

‡ A branch of the Cauvery river.—ED.

every part of the country. To collect them afterwards will not be very difficult.

Draught bullocks for the artillery are the most essential, and it takes a great length of time to train them. It might be a question whether you ought not to keep up an establishment of them.

I have not said anything respecting the fortifications of Arnee, as I don't know upon what grounds Lord Cornwallis recommended that it should be made the depôt in preference to Vellore. I should wish to see his opinion.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[16.] MEMORANDUM UPON THE BARAHMAHAL.

18th July, 1798.

The state of the Barahmahal must be considered with a view both to defensive and offensive operations.

It appears that between the Muglee Pass and the Cauvery* there are no less than sixteen passes leading into the Barahmahal and the Carnatic from Mysore,† and therefore it is not to be supposed to be very easy entirely to prevent a body of horse from penetrating in some one or more of them. Besides these, there is the famous Gudjelhatty Pass, which leads into the Coimbatoor‡ country, from whence, as almost every part of the Cauvery is fordable during the greatest part of the year, an irruption into the Salem district§ and the southern part of the Carnatic would.

* The river rises in Coorg, and, including its most northern branch the Coleroon, has a course of 472 miles to the sea on the coast of Coromandel. Seringapatam fort and town are situated on an island formed by the Cauvery.—ED.

† A table-land, in length about 250 miles from north to south, and 238 miles in breadth; of a triangular form, and with an elevation of about 2000 feet above the sea. The province is skirted on its east, west, and south limits by the eastern and western Ghauts. The plateau is studded by huge droogs—isolated rocks, which rise to 1000 or 1500 feet above the plain, their base seldom exceeding 2 miles in circumference.—ED.

‡ A British district, bounded on the north and north-west by the Mysore territory.—ED.

§ A district bounded on the north by Mysore, on the east by North and South Arcot, on the south and east by Trichinopoly, and on the south-west by

not be very difficult. It is therefore necessary to consider what measures can be adopted to render such an irruption of the enemy but little injurious to the country and its inhabitants.

These operations are usually carried on by barbarously bad cavalry, who carry with them the provisions they may want until they can live by their plunder. The greatest injury they do is driving off the cattle and inhabitants, and generally they encourage these last to erect themselves into a body of the same kind, who plunder either their own district or that of their neighbours. Their numbers increase in proportion to the length of time they remain in the country, and to the want of means of defence. If there were a fortress at every tenth mile, this evil would not be entirely prevented, and would not be so in any degree unless these had strong garrisons who would patrol the country. The inhabitants and cattle might take shelter in them and in their immediate neighbourhood; but still the business of the country must be at a stand when such a force as I have described invades it.

General Brathwaite and Colonel Read very justly observe that the numerous rocks, hills, and jungles in the Barahmahal, to which cavalry cannot get access, afford to the inhabitants and their cattle a good security against this species of invasion. Besides these, the pettahs * or lower forts, belonging to the hill forts (which, for this as well as for other purposes which I shall detail hereafter, I recommend should be kept in tolerable repair), the mud forts, and the bound hedges which Colonel Read has made round some of the villages, will give to the inhabitants as much security as circumstances will allow. These bound hedges were found sufficient to save the inhabitants and the cattle of many villages in the Carnatic that had them during Hyder's irruption. In order, then, to prevent many of the evils attending upon this wild invasion, I recommend, first, that wherever there is a pettah or a mud fort, it should be kept in such a state as that cavalry cannot get into it. An old gun or two and a few rounds of ammunition might be put in each, and in time of war it might be advisable to hire a few matchlock peons for their defence. No danger can result from their weakness, as if the enemy in force were to take possession of them

Coimbatoor. Area 8200 square miles. The western part is very mountainous, and some elevations have a height of 5000 feet above the sea.—ED.

* Partially fortified native town adjoining a fort.—ED.

all, there would be no difficulty in getting them again. I never saw a mud fort worth anything excepting against cavalry.

Secondly, I recommend perseverance in the plan of enclosing the villages. Colonel Read has changed his opinion upon this subject: he says that the hills afford the best shelter; that if the villages are enclosed, the inhabitants will remain in them; and that as these are not very defensible, they will be the victims of their confidence, and will be driven off as in the war of '80. This will be true in some instances. Where the main body of the army marches, where a strong detachment of good cavalry with cannon or of infantry goes, the bound hedge will be no defence; but as nine parts in ten of the Native armies are looties* or bad cavalry, as these do nearly all the mischief, and they cannot penetrate the hedge, I am of opinion that they ought to be made, particularly as, if all the villages are open, and the inhabitants fly to the hills, all the villages will be burnt or otherwise destroyed.

In Bengal this would not be a very great evil, but in the Carnatic and Barahmahal it would be a serious one indeed.

I have another reason why the villages ought to be enclosed, which I will mention presently.

Thirdly, besides these defences, the commanding officer in the Barahmahal ought to encourage all the officers under his command to gain an accurate knowledge of all the roads, passes, hills, tanks, fords, and rivers, &c. &c. in their neighbourhood: they ought to know the relative situation of the enclosed villages, mud forts, pettahs, and other positions in which a small force of infantry can defend itself against a large one of cavalry. He ought to require plans and surveys of the different districts: this is with a view of forming partisans. A small corps of infantry, lightly armed and accoutred, with three or four pieces of light artillery, to be used as occasion might require, together with the garrisons in the hill forts, under active and merciless partisans, would do more towards defending the Barahmahal and its inhabitants against looties than a large army.

As no native has ever made an attempt to invade a country possessed by Europeans, and has acted in such invasion upon a solid plan, it is not to be supposed that Tippoo will in any short time be so disposed. The subject may, however, be considered and understood.

* Bands of armed marauders serving as mercenaries and mounted.—ED.

He may invade the Carnatic either by the Muglee and Amboor Passes, by Oudeadroog and Ryacotta, or the Policode Pass, or to the southward of Tapoor by Cauveryporam,* or by Gudjelhatty and the right bank of the Cauvery.

If he advances by the first, he must either go through the Pollams, or pass and leave behind him Sautghur † and Amboor, or he must besiege and take them, which would be a more difficult operation than he could effect.

He then advances into the valley of Amboor, having the hills on each side of him, and the garrisons of Amboor and Sautghur and the corps of light partisans acting upon his flanks and his communications, and the strong fort of Vellore, which he cannot pass, and the Palar ‡ river, immediately in his front. These are difficulties which would puzzle an abler general than he is.

The improvements and strengthening of Vellore I shall mention presently.

An army invading the Carnatic from Mysore cannot pass Vellore. Hyder attempted to take it, and blockaded the lower fort, in the war of '80; but he invaded the Carnatic with his principal force by the Barahmahal, and through the Changama § Pass.

Tippoo then would have to return into the Barahmahal, and try his chance through the Changama Pass; and it is to be recollected that he would still have the garrisons of Amboor and Sautghur upon his flanks and communications.

In advancing from his own country, by Oudeadroog, through the Ryacotta or the Policode Pass, Tippoo would have to take, or he must leave behind him, Chinroyen Droog, Ryacotta, Kistnagherry, Verabudder Droog, all of them places sufficient to stop any Native or even a European power if they are in a proper state of defence. Besides these, there are many mud forts and other posts and positions which must be either forced or passed by.

* A town in Coimbatoor district, on the right bank of the Cauvery, lat. 11° 54', long. 77° 48'; 80 miles north-east of Coimbatoor. The pass of the same name is 30 miles in length, winding between two lofty mountain ranges.—ED.

† A town in the Barahmahal, on the road to Mysore. It is 106 miles west by south of Madras.—ED.

‡ The *Palar* rises in Mysore, lat. 13° 20', long. 78° 2'. It has a course of 220 miles to its mouth in the Bay of Bengal, in lat. 12° 28', long. 80° 13'.—ED.

§ *Changama* town, lat. 33° 1', long. 78° 51', 53 miles south-west of Arcot, and 61 miles north-east of Salem or Chelam.—ED.

He could not hope to pass them all, and to do anything effectual in the Carnatic; and if he waits to lay siege to them, the purpose of the Company is answered, as he is thereby kept away from the Barahmahal and the Carnatic. A blockade would answer their purpose almost as well, as his army would thereby come weakened to the scene of action.

If he advances to the Changama Pass, he there finds new difficulties. I have not seen that pass, but I should imagine that the plan which has been proposed to reverse its defences would answer many good purposes, and would enable a small force to make a serious stand against a large army.

Here I may consider the propriety of adopting a plan which has been proposed for building a fortress on the western side of the Changama, as far as it relates to defence. It is grounded upon a supposition that it is proper to place the depôts in the Barahmahal, which I shall consider presently, and upon an idea that this fortress would stop the enemy effectually.

It appears liable to these objections, viewing it as a defence: First, that it would be difficult to place it in such a situation as that the enemy must either take it or fall back. Secondly, it would be impossible to garrison a fortress placed so forward and attend to other objects in the Carnatic. Thirdly, if it can be passed, and has not a stronger garrison than the hill forts, which at all events must be passed or taken, it answers no purpose that one of them does not equally answer. Therefore I do not recommend a new fortress to the westward of Changama.

If the enemy is obliged to retire from the Changama Pass, his next resource is through the Tapoor Pass into the Salem district, and then into the Carnatic either by Salem and Ahtoor, or by Namkool to Trichinopoly.*

He may equally invade this part by Cauveryporam, and by descending the Gudjelhatty Pass into the Coimbatoor country, and crossing the Cauvery. On this side he will have to take or pass by Sankerry Droog, which is the largest, the highest, and might be made the strongest hill fort of them all.

* In lat. 10° 50′, long. 78° 46′, 190 miles south-west of Madras. The fort is built on the rugged declivity of a rock, the height of which is variously estimated at 330 to 600 feet above the plain. The walls in some places are very thick, from 20 to 30 feet in height, and are about 2 miles in circumference. Within them is a large-sized Native town. The Cauvery river is about 2 furlongs from the fort. This fortress holds a prominent position in the history of Southern India during the early part of the 18th century.—ED.

The country (the Salem district) through which he would have to advance is much enclosed, and by no means fit for the operations of cavalry, and is well calculated for those of the light corps of partisans.

The best plan of invasion which the enemy could adopt would be to remain on the right bank of the Cauvery, and to advance by Caroor to Trichinopoly: this is our weakest point.

Trichinopoly is not in a defensible state: it is entirely open on the eastern side. Tippoo's cavalry might gallop into it; and he might approach to it with his flank covered by the Cauvery in his own country till he arrives within 30 miles of the place. It is impossible, however, that he should be able to move his army towards that quarter, and that the Government of Madras should not know it; and then it will be in their power either to reinforce Trichinopoly from the southward, to make a diversion in Mysore, or to march the army, which I suppose collected, to the quarter where most danger is threatened. The decision upon this subject must depend upon circumstances.

I will now recapitulate the measures, purely defensive, which I recommend, First, with a view to prevent devastation by looties:

1. That the pettahs of the occupied hill forts and the mud forts should be kept in such a state as to prevent cavalry from riding into them. That old guns may be left in them, and a small quantity of ammunition, and that a few matchlock peons may be hired for the defence of the latter in time of war.

2. That the villages may be enclosed by good bound hedges and gateways.

3. That measures may be taken to form good partisans, with a particular local knowledge of those countries in which they are likely to act.

Secondly, with a view to defence against a solid enterprise I recommend:

1. That Amboor and Sautghur may be strengthened.

2. That a good engineer may be called upon for a plan for fortifying and making tenable the hill fort Sasarow, above Vellore. It is commanded by the neighbouring hills, and was in danger of being taken by Hyder in the war of '80. It made an admirable defence.

3. That Chinroyen Droog may be repaired again.

4. That a plan may be adopted for contracting the defences of Kistnagherry upon similar principles to those upon which

Ryacotta has been strengthened. It will then require fewer men to defend it, and will spare more for *la petite guerre.*

5. That Verabudder Droog may be put in a state of defence.

6. That the defences of the Lingarpet and Changama Pass may be reversed.

7. That Sankerry Droog may be repaired again, and its works contracted.

8. That Namkool may be put in a state of defence.

9. That the Nabob may be required to finish the fortifications which he has begun at Trichinopoly.

10. That in all these places, ordnance, stores, and provisions, and every requisite which the necessary garrison may want for a siege of* months, may be placed as soon as possible.

11. That all the other hill forts and strong holds which are not to be kept as garrisons (excepting mud forts, &c. &c., which I have noticed) in the Barahmahal and Salem countries, and in the valley of Amboor, may be immediately destroyed effectually.

With respect to offensive operations, there are two principal measures which must be adopted in order to enable the Government of Fort St. George to carry them on at all, or indeed to give any adequate defence to the Carnatic.

One of these is to have constantly in store a sufficient quantity of grain to keep an army in the field during* months at least.

The other is to have complete and ready at all times a large quantity of camp equipage, a train of battering artillery, and a field train, and an establishment of* bullocks trained to the draught. This number of bullocks will not be sufficient for more than drawing the artillery, and many more will be required for the purposes of carriage; but these do not require so much training as those intended for the draught, and they can be found in the country with greater ease when the service may require them.

With a large quantity of grain in store, with artillery and its equipments, camp equipage, and draught bullocks ready, the Government of Fort St. George will have to collect men and carriage-bullocks only, and the option of going to war or not will then rest with the Supreme Government.

A very material question has been canvassed respecting the

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

choice of the position in which the grain ought to be stored, and of that for the depôt of the artillery and military stores.

In general it is a rule that no part of the equipment of an army ought to be placed too near the enemy's frontier. Whatever advantage there might be in having provisions, artillery, and stores far advanced towards the point of attack, unless the army is on the same spot the enemy might place himself between its equipment and it, might cut them off for a time, or if skilful, might deprive your army of them entirely. The risk is greater than the advantage; and therefore in general the equipments of an army ought to be placed in a centrical spot, where the largest part of the army may collect, and from whence it may commence its operations. Applying that general rule to the circumstances of the army in the Carnatic, I recommend that the equipments, such as artillery, military stores, &c., may be placed eastward of the Changama Pass or in Vellore. I shall presently notice the position for the grain.

In the Carnatic the army may be wanted for other purposes besides that of an attack or defence against Tippoo. It is, therefore, not right to place it very forward in the Barahmahal; its principal force must be in the centre division and in the Carnatic, and therefore the stores and artillery must be there likewise.

Upon this principle, Arnee, though a weaker fortress, is better calculated for a depôt than Vellore, as it is more centrical. If the army should be wanted for operations to the southward, or against an European power, it would be more ready at Arnee than at Vellore. It is equally near to the frontier of the Barahmahal, and more so to the Changama Pass; and on those accounts I should prefer Arnee to Vellore.

Where the artillery and stores are, there the disposable part of the army ought to be. At Arnee, barracks have been built for two battalions of Europeans, and a large cantonment for Natives. There ought to be two regiments of these last always in that place; and with that force, together with the cavalry in the cantonments in the neighbourhood and at Arcot, and what might be collected from the other posts in the centre division, there would be no difficulty in making a forward movement almost immediately.

Arnee, however, must be strengthened, at least sufficiently to be defended against the attack of any Native power.

The principles which apply to the equipments, and which induce me to recommend that they should be placed in Arnee,

do not apply equally to grain. The advantage of placing the grain near the frontier is certain, and I shall endeavour to show that the inconvenience which might result from it would not be very great.

If the enemy should, by a rapid movement, place himself between the army and its grain, or if the operations should be towards a quarter different from that in which the grain is stored, there will not be much difficulty nor fatal delay in drawing a fresh supply from the rear, either from the Carnatic, from Tanjore,* or the seacoast. Waiting till it arrives cannot be so fatal as being deprived of your equipments. On the other hand, if the grain is not placed very forward, as an establishment of carriage-bullocks cannot be kept up, and these must be provided at the commencement of a war, which will always create a certain delay, but little advantage will be derived either from the establishment of the depôt or from storing the grain at all. If the grain is stored at Arnee, the advantage gained will be just the difference of time between that which is necessary for procuring draught-bullocks and carriage-bullocks and grain, and that for procuring carriage-bullocks only; and as I believe that the three operations might be performed at the same time, the advantage in point of time would be very small.

I therefore recommend that 450,000 maunds of grain may be stored in Kistnagherry and Ryacotta.

100,000 maunds might be stored in Arnee with advantage in case of operations to the southward; or in the Carnatic; or to feed the army upon its assembly until it arrives in the Barahmahal.

Another measure, which relates more immediately to offensive operations, is the making the great communications and roads towards and along the frontier.

Colonel Read has made the finest road I ever saw through the Barahmahal from Vaniambaddy† to Ryacotta, and to the Tapoor Pass. I believe a similar one has been made from the Changama Pass by Policode: if not, one ought to be made. When I was in the country I thought that the road from Vellore to Tripatore might be shortened and removed from the

* Tanjore district lies between 9° 52′ and 11° 23′ lat., has a length from north-east to south-west of 120 miles, a breadth of 75 miles, and a seacoast of 165 miles. It is a low, level, and highly cultivated plain, irrigated by the Cauvery.—ED.

† A town 78 miles to the N.N.E. of Salem, lat. 12° 41′, long. 78° 40′.—ED.

frontier by carrying a line through the Agarum valley. I was informed, however, that it would want water.

I recommend that any plan which can shorten the roads to the frontier, whether by Vellore or by the Changama Pass, may be adopted; also that the roads to the southward of the Tapoor Pass may be repaired, and made in a manner similar to those to the northward. Nothing facilitates the march of convoys, and consequently tends so much to success, as good roads.

Under this same head I again recommend that the mud forts and pettahs may be kept in decent repair. They afford, to an officer proceeding to the army with convoys or small parties, a secure halting-place for almost every march, and enable him, in case he hears of the approach of a force superior to his own, to place his convoy in safety until the enemy have retired or he is reinforced. The enclosed villages will answer the same purpose to a great degree, and it is of the greatest consequence, in a warfare with a power who has looties, to put your convoys in safety every night.

The measures, then, which I recommend with a view to offensive operations are:

1. That 450,000 maunds of grain may be stored in Kistnagherry and Ryacotta, and 100,000 maunds in Arnee. As I find that for certain reasons a contract for the grain for cattle is preferred to an agency, a smaller quantity would be necessary. In that above mentioned I include grain for cattle, rice for followers, &c. &c.

2. That Arnee may be made the depôt for battering-train, field-train, and their equipments; for camp equipage and military stores of all kinds.

3. That that place may be properly fortified.

4. That an establishment of* draught bullocks for the artillery may be constantly kept there.

5. That the disposable force of the army may be stationed there.

6. That the communications and roads to and along the frontier may be shortened as much as possible, and perfected.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

N.B.—I have said nothing about Dindigul, as I have not seen it, and don't understand everything relating to it. I have been informed that it is very strong. It is a hill fort.

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

[17.] OBSERVATIONS RESPECTING SCINDIAH'S POSITION AT POONAH.*

It appears by the letters from Major Palmer that Scindiah is inclined to prevent any arrangement which, in consequence of our interference, may be made to restore to the Peshwah his power, and therefore a question arises whether this Government is legally entitled to make war upon Scindiah, in order to force him to suffer the Peshwah to reassume such power in the Mahratta State as will enable him to render us assistance in case of a war with Tippoo Sultaun.

The Act of Parliament† says that war is not to be declared

* A city of the Deccan, 74 miles E. from Bombay, and 1823 feet above the sea. Poonah became the seat of government when the Peshwah (A.D. 1750) obtained supremacy in the Mahratta Confederacy.—ED.

† The Act of Parliament referred to is the 33rd of George III., c. 52, A.D. 1793, which enacts that, "forasmuch as to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of this nation, it shall not be lawful for the Governor-General in Council of Fort William, without the express command and authority of the Court of Directors (of the East India Company), or of the Secret Committee (of the said Court), by the authority of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, in any case, except where hostilities have actually been commenced or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities against the British nation in India, or against some of the Princes or States dependent thereon, or whose territories the said United (East India) Company shall be at such time engaged by any subsisting treaty to defend or guarantee, either to declare war, or to commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war against any of the country Princes or States in India, or any treaty for guaranteeing the possession of any country Princes or States; and that in any such case it shall not be lawful for the said Governor-General in Council to declare war, or to commence hostilities, or to enter into any treaty for the making war against any other Prince or State than such as shall be actually committing hostilities, or making preparations as aforesaid; or to make such treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any Prince or State, but upon the consideration of such Prince or State actually engaging to assist the Company against such hostilities commenced or preparations made as aforesaid: And in all cases where hostilities shall be commenced or treaty made, the Governor-General and Council shall, by the most expeditious means they can devise, communicate the same unto the Court of Directors, or to the said Secret Committee, together with a full state of the information and intelligence upon which they shall have commenced such hostilities, or made such treaties, and their motives and reasons for the same at large." By the same Act, the subordinate Governments (Madras and Bombay) were not to make war or peace, nor to conclude a treaty, except in cases of emergency or danger, but under orders from the Governor-General in Council of Fort William, or Court of Directors, or Secret Committee; every treaty, if possible, to contain a clause subjecting it to ratification or rejection by the Governor-General in Council. The subordinate Governors to obey orders of the Governor-General in Council concerning such matters. In case of refusal or neglect, Governors, Councillors, and other officers to be liable to be removed or suspended by the Governor-General in

nor hostilities to be commenced against any native Prince or State, excepting where preparations are made against the British nation, or against one of their dependents, or against one whose territories the Company have guaranteed or are engaged to defend; nor is any treaty of guarantee to be made, nor any treaty for commencing hostilities, excepting in the cases above mentioned.

The Company is bound by treaty to defend the dominions of the Nizam and of the Peshwah against Tippoo, as these are to defend it against him; but there is no treaty which binds the Company to defend the Peshwah against Scindiah; and therefore to make war against him upon the grounds of his attack upon the Mahratta States, is against the words and spirit of the Act of Parliament.

The next question is, whether, if Scindiah have made a secret engagement with Tippoo Sultaun, and in consequence thereof by his position prevents the Mahrattas from rendering the Company the assistance for which they are bound in case of his meditated attack, he is not to be considered as an enemy, and is not to be attacked. If he be secretly in alliance with Tippoo, and makes his attack upon the Peshwah in consequence thereof, we are bound to assist the Peshwah against him, as much as we should be if Tippoo himself made the attack; but it must be clear that the alliance exists, and must not be a mere surmise. In consequence of the meditated attack of Tippoo, it is in the power of the Government to make a new alliance with the Peshwah. In that treaty a stipulation cannot be made that Scindiah shall be attacked by the English if he does not quit Poonah.

The Act of Parliament allows the Government to make treaties for guaranteeing the possessions of a country, prince or state, in case of preparations of hostilities against the Company. But the Act says that a treaty shall not be made to guarantee possessions, or to make war against any other prince or state than that which has commenced hostilities, or made the preparations. Therefore, even in case of hostilities commenced by, or in contemplation of, Scindiah against the Mahrattas, the Government cannot in a new treaty make an engagement to attack him. It is true that this almost entirely annihilates the power of making

Council and sent to England, and to be subject to such further pains and penalties as should be provided by law.—Ed.

treaties; but I imagine that to have been the purpose and intention of the Act of Parliament.

The insertion of an article that the Company shall attack Scindiah in a treaty of defensive alliance against Tippoo, will make the treaty a double one; and it cannot therefore be argued that, the Act not pointing out what stipulations shall be made in a treaty, the Governor may subscribe such articles as he may find necessary.

Upon the whole then, I consider that in any case the Government cannot attack Scindiah excepting he be secretly allied with Tippoo to attack the Peshwah, and that in a new treaty an article against Scindiah cannot be inserted excepting upon the grounds that by the old treaty the Government was bound to defend the Peshwah against him in consequence of his (Scindiah's) alliance with Tippoo Sultaun.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[18.] ON THE STATE OF THE CARNATIC AND DECCAN.

MY DEAR SIR,* Fort William, 28th July, 1798.

Before you receive this you will have heard that the 33rd are going to the coast, and I hope shortly to have the pleasure of seeing you. Although I have long wished to be upon that establishment, thinking it for many reasons a preferable one for a soldier, I lament the occasion which takes me there. For many reasons it is unfortunate that my brother should have to begin his government by an armament which, in any event, must be the cause of considerable expense, and that the first intelligence he received upon his arrival in Bengal was of an alliance between our enemies in Europe and in India for the purpose of driving us from hence. I cannot however believe that we shall not be able to surmount the difficulties of the present moment without going to war; and particularly I cannot believe with some of the Madras politicians that the act of collecting an army, or in other words, providing for our own defence under the present circumstances, can cause an invasion of the Carnatic.

I have no doubt but that Tippoo will invade it whenever he has a fair opportunity, and, as well as I recollect, that is the universal opinion at Madras, and has been so for a number of

* The name not given in the manuscript.—ED.

years; but can any man pretend that the best opportunity is that at which we are in a state of preparation to receive him? I believe the wildest politician in India will not state that to be his opinion. You must have been made acquainted with the plans of my brother for the reestablishment of the British alliances in India, the execution of which is so particularly called for at this moment. If we could put the transactions at Mauritius out of the question, and all the evidence that has been received of them, and if there were no suspicion of Tippoo's general disposition towards hostility, I say that the execution of those plans would be impracticable without collecting an army in the Carnatic; that, as an independent power, Tippoo could not sit quiet and see us take possession almost of the Deccan, if we were not in a state of forward preparation in the Carnatic. If it had not been for his aggression (and I call his alliance with the French one), there would have been a difficulty in justifying the collecting of the army; but this has afforded a plea, and has made it necessary, to do that which must have been done at all events; and even if the consequences should be those which are foreseen by the Madras politicians, it is better that we should meet them now than at the moment when Tippoo will be assisted by, not only the French from Europe, but also all those which are established in the courts and armies of the different country powers, even in those of our own allies.

You perceive that I take for granted the necessity of freeing the Nizam from his French, and the Peshwah from Scindiah and his Frenchmen. The question is, are we or are the French to have the superiority in the Deccan? Upon that I believe all are agreed. I remember that at Madras some very strong opinions were held upon this subject, and I don't think that anything has occurred to occasion a change of sentiments. The only doubt would be as to the time.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM ON THE FRENCH FORCE AT HYDERABAD. [19.]

For some time past a very extraordinary, and, to the Company's interest in this country, a very dangerous influence has existed at the Court of Hyderabad. M. Raymond, a Frenchman, who,

I am informed, was originally encouraged to go there by the British Government, in the view of getting the command of a small body of troops, increased it to the number of 14,000 well-disciplined infantry, commanded by European officers, and paid by the produce of a country given over to the collection of M. Raymond. In proportion as the number of his troops increased, he shook off his allegiance to the British Government; and he latterly adopted all the violent republican doctrines of his countrymen. Of these sentiments there are several signs, viz. the use of the national colours and cockades; and from these, as well as from his conduct at the durbar of the Nizam, there does not remain a doubt of his enmity to the English interests, nor of his wishes to gratify it if an opportunity offered. He uniformly acted in a contrary interest at Hyderabad: he held communications with Tippoo, with Scindiah, and even with Zemaun Shah.

The weakness of the Nizam's government has suffered this power to grow up in the heart of his state, and his ministers have been at a loss in what manner to get rid of it, or, at least, to counterbalance it. For this purpose they have had in the Deccan two battalions of the Company's sepoys. These, however, notwithstanding their insufficiency effectually to oppose and counteract the views of M. Raymond, have been sent away, and then again demanded, according as the influence of M. Raymond or of the Nizam's minister became most powerful. These are there at present, and are alone what the Nizam has to depend upon.

M. Raymond, whom I have above described as being at the head of that system, which has by degrees been introduced into the Deccan, is now dead, and it is reported that the officers under him have elected ——————* to succeed to his command. The Nizam has nominally appointed him to the same situation. This man is a violent democrat, and one who, it is imagined, from his violence and folly, will overturn the system established by his predecessor; but whether he does so or otherwise, the existence even for a short time of such a power as Raymond established in the Deccan may be fairly stated as almost incompatible with the existence of the British power in the Carnatic. It is more fatal to it than if the Nizam were

* Blank in manuscript. Piron was the name of the successor to M. Raymond, who died in March, 1798.—Ed.

inimical to us. It might be expected that his enmity might be qualified by motives of personal interest, by the recollection of former defeats, by the chance of his being attacked by the Mysoreans, or Mahrattas, whilst engaged with us; and, above all, by the ruin to his country attendant upon a state of war: but such a man as ———————— at the head of such a force, when supported by the opinions and advice of his countryman established at Pondicherry,* would be actuated by no such considerations, or indeed by no considerations excepting such as regarded his personal interest, his own glory, and the interest and glory of his countrymen. The chance of defeat would not be considered, as it would not be his loss, but that of the Nizam; and even if it were considered, it would be more than balanced by the certainty of ruin to the British interest from being involved in a war at all.

All this leads me to the conclusion that it is essentially necessary to annihilate this power as soon as possible. It appears that this cannot be more an object to the Company than it is to the governing power at the Nizam's Court. They (the prime Minister Azim ul Omrah in particular) have long been desirous that the detachment of sepoys should be increased, and since the death of M. Raymond, have anxiously pressed for British assistance to remove those dangerous troops which he had collected and disciplined. There cannot be a doubt of the propriety of granting it; and the only question is, in what manner.

The question whether Raymond's power is to be annihilated is entirely distinct from that of the propriety of establishing a similar one in the Deccan ourselves. I shall canvass that by and by.

The first step must be to enable the Nizam to dismiss this force without danger to himself or to his court. This must be done by sending to his assistance such a body of sepoys as must keep them in awe, and which may be afterwards withdrawn or otherwise, as may be found necessary.

The question then arises, whether it will be proper to keep in the Deccan a force which will answer all the purposes which it was intended that that of Raymond should answer. The Nizam's

* *Pondicherry*, the chief settlement of the French nation in India, has a fortress on the Coromandel coast, 86 miles S.S.W. of Madras. The total area of the district now attached to the city is about 200 square miles.—Ed.

states, being surrounded by Tippoo and all the tribes of Mahrattas, are liable to invasion on all sides. If the Company furnish a force to defend him on all sides, they must be paid in the same manner as that of Raymond is; by the assignment of the revenue of a certain district, to be collected by themselves: otherwise their payment will become uncertain, and they will in that case be involved in every war which the ambition, either of the Nizam or of any one of his restless neighbours, may occasion. I consider that the territory which might be assigned to pay these troops would soon be considered as part of the general dominion of the Company; its produce would be considered as part of the general revenue, instead of something to be applied particularly to the payment of this force; and the Company's Government would think it as necessary to involve itself in a war in its defence as in the defence of any other portion of their dominions. For this reason I object to taking territory as a security for the payment of the troops employed in the Deccan. On the other hand, there will be no reason why the Nizam should be involved in our wars; and thus we shall gain a long defenceless frontier to preserve, without the advantage of assistance in the moment when those territories in which we are most interested may be attacked. It is, therefore, not advisable to assist the Nizam in the way of sending him sepoys to a much greater extent than he has been assisted already; I mean, if territory is to be taken by the Company as a security for their payment.

If it were possible to extend the influence of the Company to the Mysorean, it might become a question whether it would not be advisable to hire our troops to the Nizam, and to hire, or, in other words, to make them subsidiary to the Company's Government; but as that cannot be expected, and considering the topographical as well as the political situation of the Nizam's country, to run the risk of involving the British nation in all the wars to which he may be stated to be liable cannot be advisable. If the Company do not give him the assistance of their own troops, is it advisable to encourage any British or other adventurer, under the protection of the Company, to raise a body of troops for the service of the Nizam, upon the same footing as those of Raymond?

The Nizam's country is more exposed than that of any of his neighbours; his own great age, and the consequent intrigues

and divisions in his durbar, have occasioned a weakness in his government which has pervaded all departments of the state. His troops are the most wretched of Hindustan, and he depends for his preservation upon that force of Raymond's and upon the assistance which the Company has afforded him. If, then, he is deprived of that, and another is not substituted in its place, it may be said that he will fall an easy prey to some one of his ambitious neighbours.

Necessary as the preservation of the independence of the Nizam's power is to the Company, I cannot recommend that encouragement should be given to any British adventurer to raise and discipline a force for his service. It must be recollected that Raymond went to Hyderabad originally under the British protection; and although it may be said that he was a Frenchman, it cannot be said that similar danger is not to be apprehended if an Englishman were employed in a similar situation. Those to whom that confidential situation might be given would not be men of the best character, and it is well known that none but men of the best character could be trusted with the species of power which must be given.

The question then arises, is the Nizam to be abandoned to himself? From what I have above stated it appears that I am fully aware of the danger and impolicy of such a measure, and therefore I decide that question in the negative, and proceed to state the nature and extent of the assistance which ought to be afforded to him.

Raymond's force consisted of 14,000 men: that was employed partly in the defence of the country, and partly to oppress the Nizam's durbar, and to oppose the English interest. A corps of 5000 sepoys, and a small body of the Company's artillery, would be fully adequate to the defence of the country, which is all that could be wanted. These ought to be in the Company's service: they ought to be relieved occasionally, and be removed entirely if the Government thought it necessary. They ought to be paid by, and be under the orders of the Nizam; and it should be stipulated, that in case they are suffered to fall in arrear, they are forthwith to be withdrawn.

The practices of the country governments are so unsafe where troops are concerned, that I fear that it would be necessary, in order that the troops may receive their pay regularly, and consequently be always in a sufficient state of discipline, that the

revenues of certain territories should be assigned for their payment. The danger which I have before stated of taking territory as security is, that the Company's Government may consider it as part of the general dominion, and may think it necessary to involve themselves in a war in its defence, in the same manner as in the defence of the other territories more immediately belonging to them. But I cannot see the danger or the impropriety of taking the revenues of certain districts as security for the payment of troops, if it can be clearly understood that they are for this purpose only; and that the jurisdiction of the Company's Government, and consequently the necessity of protecting them, does not extend to them.

This force I presume to be sufficient to repel any attack which might be made by any one of the powers which border upon him; and if it is not, or if he should be the object of any combination, it will become the interest of the Company to support him in the same manner as it is their interest at this moment. Thus, however, it will not be necessary that they should be involved in a war whenever he, or the Mahrattas, or Tippoo, think fit; nor will they be deprived of his assistance when their dominions may be attacked by either of those powers. On the other hand, his government will be entirely under the control of that of the Company: the threat to withdraw troops, or the more forcible one, to make them act in his country, must keep him in awe at all times. For this purpose the revenues ought to be assigned to the commanding officer of those troops, who ought to be personally responsible for their regular payment, in the same manner, and at the same times, as if they were within the Company's provinces. This commanding officer ought to be removable at the pleasure of the Company and of the Nizam. It should be particularly understood that the Company have not over him, in his capacity of collector of these assigned revenues, any control, excepting that which is necessary to insure the payment of the troops and of the military services. For this purpose he ought to be obliged to send a monthly account to the Government, and a certificate that the amount has been paid. If it should be clearly made out that the produce is not equal to the expense, to get the assignment of more territory must become the subject of a future negotiation.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

REGIMENTAL RANK IN THE ARMY OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY. [20.]

The Company's army was formerly but small; it consisted of but few corps, and it was therefore perhaps necessary that all the officers belonging to it should be liable to be removed from one to the other as the service might require; and that the promotion of each should not be confined to one corps only, but be general throughout the whole of their service. This was perhaps the more necessary, as the establishments at the different Presidencies were subject to great variations at different times; and, if the promotion of the officers upon each establishment had not been general, individuals would have suffered considerably.

In the process of time, and in consequence of the acquisition of extensive dominions by the Company, and of the improvements in the discipline of the armies of the Native powers, larger establishments have become necessary, and there is at present at each of the three settlements a very large army. These have required a different organization. At first, the European battalions only were organized as the King's regiments are: the Native corps were commanded by captains or by majors, assisted by an adjutant and about ten subalterns; and several (five or six) of these corps were put in a brigade commanded by a colonel and other field-officers. Still, the promotion of these officers continued to be general. In consequence of the representations made by several officers of the Company's army, subsequent to the peace of '83, of the grievances under which they laboured from serving with the King's regiments in India, such as, that the Company's officers of each rank were commanded by those in the King's service of the corresponding rank, notwithstanding that the dates of the commissions of the latter might be subsequent to those of the former, it was agreed to give to every officer holding a commission under the Company on the day of the cessation of hostilities at Cuddalore,* a similar commission from the King, dated on that day; and upon the promotion or appointment of any officer in future, a commission from the King of the same date as that which he received from the Company. It was likewise promised to them

* A town on the Coromandel coast, on the estuary of the river Panar, 100 miles south of Madras.—Ed.

that the King would not grant to any officer in his army brevet commissions *for India only;* and that such officers who then held them, and who should refuse to give them up, should be ordered home. The army still remained organized as before, and the promotion general instead of regimental.

The last war with Tippoo Sahib proved, that notwithstanding what had been done for the army at different times by the Company, and immediately previous to it by the King, the officers in the Company's service, in proportion to the length of time they had served, were, comparatively with those in the King's service, in a very inferior situation; and the justice of Lord Cornwallis* induced him to form a plan for their relief, and to take the opinion of different officers at the head of the Madras and of the Bengal armies respecting its efficacy and propriety.

It is needless to enter into a statement of what that plan was, or to notice all the improper and unnecessary violence to which it gave rise. In my opinion it would have been more advantageous to the Company's army than the present arrangement, which, after the discussion of two years, has been adopted. The Company's infantry are now organized as the King's are, with this difference only: that a Native regiment, consisting of two battalions (2000 men), has the same number of European officers only that one battalion of Europeans has; but the former has, in addition thereto, its Native officers.

This has occasioned a considerable promotion to the higher ranks, and to that of captain. Besides this promotion, the officers of the Company's army are included in the brevets which are granted to those in the King's. The rank of captain has likewise been given to all those who were in the army previous to January '81, who have not been promoted in consequence of the new regulations. The most essential part, however, of those arrangements, that in which, in my opinion, the public as well as the officers are most interested, has not been adopted, as Sir Robert Abercromby gave his opinion in a minute against it: this part is the promotion of officers in regiments as far as the rank of major † instead of by seniority, throughout the whole of each establishment.

* Governor-General of India previous to the administration of Sir John Shore.—Ed.

† Something is here omitted in the manuscript. It may be the words, "by merit;" or the words, "by purchase."—Ed.

Notwithstanding the liberality with which the regulations have been framed, the extensive promotion which has been given, and the great expense which has been incurred, it has been impossible to place every individual in a situation as high as from the length of his services he deserves. In all the armies several officers, with the brevet of captain, are still subalterns. In the Bengal army there are 140 or 150 subalterns of fourteen or fifteen years' standing in the service, whose prospect of promotion is very distant. This must create a certain discontent, and, in the course of a few years (particularly if the promotion in the King's army should ever again be as rapid as it has been lately), it may be expected that it will again break out in the same dangerous manner that it did upon the late occasion. If the promotion by regiments were adopted, it might be expected that, as these officers would be placed as the senior subalterns of each corps, in a short time they would be promoted; but even if they were not promoted so soon as I expect, if some were unfortunately superseded by officers junior to themselves with better fortune in other corps, and that they should still remain subalterns after a length of time, the grievance would be that of an individual instead of that of a whole army: if there were more of these instances than is by any means probable, they would be of individual grievances, which would be felt by those alone whom they affected at the moment, and would not interest the army.

The fact is, that the arrangements have not given satisfaction, in Bengal particularly, and among the lower and more numerous ranks. Under the former system, the captain or major of a battalion of sepoys, by defrauding his men, and by keeping his corps incomplete, made a fortune in a few years. Every officer who was detached, in proportion to the size of his detachment, made a sum of money; and these advantages, together with others which they received from the public, they have necessarily lost. The number of old officers was so great that it was impossible they should all get rank; and even those who have got rank, have lost very considerable emoluments. This must in the end create great discontent. The army at present act as one body; the benefits and grievances of one are the same to the whole, and they are irresistible: their discontents, therefore, are more dangerous than those of other armies. If they were permanently placed in regiments, every individual, instead of

feeling the grievances of the whole body, would feel those only which affected his own corps, or perhaps his own person: besides that, from the size and extent of the army and of the country in which it is placed, it is reasonable to expect that, however extensive any particular grievance (such as that of want of promotion) might be, some corps would not feel it, or would enjoy other advantages to compensate for it; and even one such would be sufficient to prevent the bad effects of any discontent.

Besides this benefit, it is certain that if the officers, when once posted to regiments, knew that they were not to expect to be moved from them, the army would be better disciplined. An officer never takes pains with a corps from which he knows that he can be removed when he pleases; his credit does not depend upon the state in which it is found. The difference in the state of discipline of the army upon the coast * and in that of Bengal is a strong confirmation of this fact. At Madras it is not the practice to remove officers from one corps to another, excepting when absolutely necessary, and the army is in very high order; in Bengal, from circumstances which I shall mention hereafter, they are moved when and where they please, and there is no army that lays claim to the title of *disciplined* that is in such a bad state.

The conduct of the Coast army will illustrate another part of this subject. Although their rise is not regimental, the officers are permanently posted to corps; and notwithstanding that their grievances were heavier than those suffered by the officers in Bengal, there was not the same violence of complaint, nor any reason to fear for the consequences of discontent. The grievances were not less felt than in Bengal; but as they were regularly organized, and each corps commanded by an officer whose credit depended upon its state of discipline, and who was responsible for its allegiance, the complaints were never so loud: the army never acted as one body, as in Bengal. To their credit it may be said, that if it had been necessary, they would have gone to Bengal and quelled a mutiny for the redress of grievances, in the success of which they were more interested than those who mutinied.

From the promotion being general throughout the line in Bengal, and from the consequent practice of removing officers from one corps to another whenever they please, not only the

* The troops employed on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar belonged to the Madras and to the Bombay Presidencies.—Ed.

army is not disciplined, but it is much more expensive than it would be otherwise. The infantry there consists of three regiments of Europeans, and, at present, fourteen regiments of sepoys. These are distributed almost equally in six stations; whereby three are in Bengal and Bahar,* where the troops get half batta; one in Benares,† where they get full batta; and two in Oude, where they get double full batta. The stations in Bengal and Bahar make detachments to different places where full batta is likewise given. The staff of every army is taken indiscriminately from its line, and every corps gives a part of it. In every army each corps has a number of officers absent from ill health or on furlough, or for other causes. In the Bengal army, from the practice of removing officers from their corps when they desire it, the regiments in Bengal and Bahar have all the staff posted to them; all the sick, and all those on furlough. Those in Benares and in Oude have nearly all the effective officers of the army; even those who remain posted to a regiment within the provinces are detached; and it is not uncommon to see a regiment at one of the lower stations without an officer excepting the commanding officer, who always receives full batta, and the adjutant and quartermaster, who receive very large allowances: so that, upon the whole, it may be said, with but few exceptions, that every officer in the Company's service present in Bengal receives either full or double full batta, or is upon the staff. The expense, therefore, is enormous. If they were permanently posted to their regiments, and if the promotion were regimental, the staff, the sick, and the furlough would fall equally, or nearly so, among them all; there would be a certain number of officers present with the corps stationed within, as well as with those stationed without the provinces; and thus not only would the army be better disciplined, but nearly one-third of the expense of batta would be saved. Two of the regiments of sepoys were detached to the Northern Circars, where they receive full batta; I believe they are lately returned.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* *Bahar* or *Behar district*, west of Bengal, is traversed from E. to W. by the Ganges. Length from N.E. to S.W. 165 miles, breadth 68 miles. Area 5694 square miles.—ED.

† *Benares district*, contiguous to Bahar, 55 miles long by 30 miles broad, is also traversed by the Ganges.—ED.

[21.] MEMORANDUM ON THE DEFENCES OF OUDE.

[Forwarded to the Governor-General.]

I send a memorial, which I have received from Colonel Kydd, upon the defences of Oude, which, I believe, is the only paper which exists upon that subject. The plan appears to be well calculated to answer the purposes for which it is intended, and the principal part of it has been already put in execution: I mean that we have obtained possession of Allahabad and the fort at Futtyghur,* and that a plan has been formed for strengthening both those posts. It requires a local knowledge of the country lying between the Jumna and the Ganges, † and of the positions at Calpee, Etawa, and Anopsheer,‡ to be able to decide whether the part of the memorial which relates to them be as well grounded as the first part. As, however, the attack which is to be apprehended is from cavalry, generally speaking, there is no method of annoying them and of preventing them from doing mischief so effectual as the establishment of the small fortified posts which Kydd recommends. I don't mean that they should be made so strong as to stand a siege, or in case of our omitting to occupy them, or if we should lose any of them, that we should find any difficulty in retaking them; but that they should be of the nature of the mud forts in the Carnatic, which afford protection to a small body of infantry against a large one of cavalry, and enable officers proceeding with convoys to put them in security almost every night. As an attack upon the north-western frontier may be looked for, and as it appears that nobody has any notion of acting either upon the offensive or defensive in that quarter, I recommend that your attention and that of the principal officers of the army should be turned towards it immediately; that Sir James Craig, in particular, should be called upon for his ideas upon the subject.

* On the left bank of the Ganges, in 27° 22' lat., 79° 41' long. Elevation above the sea 550 feet; 703 miles N.W. of Calcutta, and 184 miles S.E. of Delhi.—Ed.

† Termed the *Dooab*, which extends from Allahabad to the hill region north of Delhi.—Ed.

‡ *Calpee* is built among rugged ravines on the right bank of the Jumna, 130 miles S.E. of Agra, 46 S.W. of Cawnpoor, and 153 N.W. of Allahabad.—Ed.

Etawa, to the N.W. of Calpee, stands also on the banks of the Jumna, 73 miles S.E. of Agra.—Ed.

Anopsheer is situated on the Ganges, 68 miles E.S.E. of Delhi.

In the mean time Allahabad should be filled with stores and grain. Some of both should be thrown into the fort at Futtyghur. Kydd says that Allahabad can now defend itself, and the proposed alterations will make it very strong indeed. The post will not be weakened while they are making. A plan should be devised for procuring carriage-bullocks.

The Nabob of Oude ought to be called upon either to regulate or dismiss his force.

If three regiments are sent into the Carnatic, or, indeed, if only two are sent there, one or two regiments must be raised here. The reduction of the Nabob of Oude's army will supply the funds; but, whether it is reduced or not, the measure is equally urgent. I do not conceive, however, that it presses upon you immediately. There are two events which are not impossible, either of which will make it necessary immediately. One of them is the certainty of the war with Tippoo: this will oblige you to send a force into the Carnatic, which must be replaced immediately. The other is the advance of Zemaun Shah, which, although it would not oblige you to strengthen yourself here if it stood alone, as it will certainly encourage Tippoo to go to, will oblige you to detach to the Carnatic, and the detached force must be replaced.

As there is not much money in the treasury, unless the Vizier can be brought to disband his force, I think it will be prudent not to raise any force until towards November, when you will be able to decide as to the necessity of sending a force to the Carnatic, or as to the probability of Zemaun Shah's invasion. Without a greater knowledge of the country than I have, it is impossible to pretend to point out any plan of operations. I may, however, venture to say generally that the British army must be kept together in one body, providing garrisons only for Allahabad and the fort at Futtyghur; that the Nabob's troops ought to occupy the inferior posts; that the main object should be to keep the enemy from Lucknow. As I want local information, I can't tell whether it would be possible, by moving forwards, to place the army in such a situation as that an action must be fought with it before the enemy can cross the Jumna.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[22.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

My dear Henry, . *Fitz-William,** 19th August, 1798.

The ship struck this morning at about five upon what is called Saugor Reef,† and remained fast until about one, when she was got off, I may almost say, by the bodily strength of the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment. She struck with great violence several times in almost every minute, and now leaks much. However, as I am aware of the consequence it is to have the troops and the saltpetre at Madras as soon as possible, and as we have more men than we want to pump her out, I have recommended that she should proceed upon her voyage rather than return to Calcutta, particularly as a pilot is to come with us, who, if we should be obliged to return, will be able to take us up the river immediately, and thus we shall not be obliged to look or to wait for one in Balasore Roads. Inform Mr. Robb of these circumstances, and tell him that I recommended that 1000 bags of saltpetre should be thrown overboard, as I thought it better to have a chance of saving some for the purposes of the ships at Madras than certainly to lose all, and probably the lives of many people.

If the weather had not been more moderate than it is usually, we must all have been lost.

Tell ——— that I conceive it to be very inconsistent with the principles of the Christian religion to give people bad water when he had notice of the probability that it would be so. We have, however, let it almost all loose. You may likewise say that a Gentile could not have done worse than give us a bottle of good rum by way of muster, and fill the casks with the worst I ever saw. I have written him a public letter upon the subject.

20th August.

The pilot did not leave us last night, and I did not therefore close this letter. The ship leaks less than I at first imagined, and we have fine weather, and every prospect of a favourable passage.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

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* Name of the ship in which Colonel Wellesley embarked from Calcutta to proceed with his regiment to Madras.—Ed.

† A shoal off Saugor Island, near the entrance of the Hooghly river.—Ed.

To the Earl of Mornington. [23.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort St. George, 15th Sept., 1798.

I arrived here the day before yesterday, and should have written yesterday only that I had not had an opportunity of seeing those persons about whom you had given me instructions.

I enclose you a letter which I received immediately upon my arrival, and which certainly followed me from Bengal. I called upon Webbe * yesterday, and asked him upon what subject he had written to you, and I find that it was upon that of supplying the Hyderabad detachment from the centre division of the army which was intended by you either for offensive or defensive purposes against Tippoo, instead of sending it, as we imagined, from the Circars, where a sufficient force was stationed. I told him that I was certain you would not take ill any information that he gave you. The fact is as he represented it: as matters now stand, the army in the centre division is weaker in Native infantry than it was thought it ought to be for defensive purposes only by above 3000 men, and remains now at about these numbers:

Native Cavalry	1600
„ Infantry	5000
European Cavalry	700
„ Infantry ..	2500
Artillery	500
	10,300

This is a rough estimate. The arrival of the 33rd, and sending away the 36th, adds about 400 European infantry. I have proposed to Lord Clive† to send away the French prisoners, which will free the Native part of the garrison of Madras, and will give 1000 more Native infantry; in this he has acquiesced, provided the Admiral thinks that they can be sent with safety under the convoy of the Indiaman and under charge of the non-commissioned officers of the 36th, who are going home. I should have proposed to him to keep the 36th, only that Henry states in his letter to me that there is a prospect of Zemaun

* Josiah Webbe, Secretary to the Government of Madras.—ED.

† Governor of Madras. His Lordship arrived from England on the 21st August, 1798, and replaced Lieutenant-General Harris, who had been Acting-Governor from February, 1798.—ED.

Shah's advancing; and that in your private and public letters you have given the most positive orders that they should be sent away as soon as the 33rd should arrive. They will go immediately.

I make no remark upon Webbe's letter. I think that, considering the importance of the points to be gained by sending the force to Hyderabad, and the small chance of an immediate attack from Tippoo, the General would have been unpardonable if he had not detached the force from the centre division, although you certainly meant that it should go from the Circars; and probably Webbe was right in letting you know that this detachment was thus made. It is very clear that he meant no offence.

I have had a long conversation with General Harris. He has kept me in Fort St. George in order, as he says, to co-operate with him in keeping Lord Clive in the right road. I think that we shall succeed in that object. He has already stated his determination to enter into no discussions with your Government.

I was with him for five hours this morning. We read over first your private letter to General Harris, and I explained all those parts which had any reference to your plans at Hyderabad and Poonah, and those which you have for the defence of the Carnatic in future. We then read over those parts of the instructions to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah which explain the connection between the negotiations there and the offers from Tippoo; and I took much pains to make him understand the reasons why it was necessary that the negotiation at the one Court should be known by, approved of, and go hand in hand with, that at the other. When I left him he was strongly impressed, first, with the necessity which existed of taking the steps which have been taken to drive the French party out of the Deccan; secondly, equally so of that of forcing Scindiah back into Hindustan; and thirdly, he is perfectly reconciled to the measure of weakening the army in the centre division, in order to insure the first, and to enable the Resident at Poonah to proceed with the second. He is convinced that these measures could not have been taken without assembling an army in the Carnatic; and he sees clearly that it is not your intention to precipitate the country into a war; but that even after you will have obtained the objects at Hyderabad and Poonah, the question of war or peace with Tippoo will depend

upon your state of preparation, his state of preparation, the state of your finances, and the other considerations which must ever have weight in such decisions. He was very anxious to know what your plan of operation for the Bombay army was; what for that in the Carnatic; the strength of the detachment you intended to send from Bengal; when it was to march, and when likely to arrive; what money he was to expect. I could give him no certain information upon any of these points. I told him generally that your idea was, that the Bombay army should begin by an attack upon Mangalore, and afterwards proceed up the Ghauts; that for the present the operations of the army in the Carnatic were to be merely defensive, and as such must depend upon the nature of the attack; that I believed you intended two regiments of infantry for the service of this Government, and that they were to march through Berar from the north-west frontier towards November, and that it was supposed they might arrive here by the end of January. I told him that you intended to send him money as soon as you knew what were his monthly expenses. I have requested him to send you a copy of a memorandum he has received from Colonel Close * upon these subjects, upon which I shall make no remark, excepting that you will perceive it is written upon a very erroneous notion, as he presumes that the necessity of chastising Tippoo is more urgent than that which exists of sending the detachment to the Nizam. In some other points it is remarkably well done, and worthy of your attention.

I think that some pains had been taken to mislead Lord Clive and to frighten him. He is a mild, moderate man, remarkably reserved, having a bad delivery, and apparently a heavy understanding. He certainly has been unaccustomed to consider questions of the magnitude of that now before him, but I doubt whether he is so dull as he appears, or as people here imagine he is. He communicated with me very freely upon all these points, but he did not say one word about any of the persons who are about him. I can see plainly that they have magnified the difficulties of the undertaking to him, and so I

* Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, who, in 1784 and 1787, was employed in political negotiations with Tippoo Sultaun for the adjustment of territorial disputes. In the attack on Seringapatam by the Marquess Cornwallis in 1790-2, he served with distinction as Deputy-Adjutant-General; in the Mysore war of 1799 he rendered great service as Adjutant-General, and was subsequently appointed to the civil office of British Resident with the Rajah of Mysore.—ED.

told him. As he is convinced of the necessity of the measures in which you are embarked, and as he will soon be so of the exaggerated style in which everything has been stated to him, I shall have an advantage over them of which I shall not fail to profit; at all events, you may be convinced that he will give you no trouble. I encouraged him to open his mind to you without reserve.

I have seen the Admiral, who told me that Mangalore is dismantled, and that Tippoo has sent his stores, &c., to Onore. This ought to be inquired into. He said that in case of a war with Portugal he wished you would turn your mind to an attack upon Goa, which he thinks might easily be taken. I told him that you had considered the subject, and in case of peace between France and Portugal, that it was probable you would write to him about it.

In case it should be attacked, and troops should be sent from hence, there is no service upon which I should so much wish to be employed.

Malcolm* is going to Hyderabad as Persian interpreter to the detachment: he has been of use in keeping Lord Clive right. If anything should occur, I'll write again to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[24.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort St. George, 19th Sept., 1798.

The French prisoners are to be sent away to Europe, under charge of the non-commissioned officers of the 36th. The men of that regiment are to go to Bengal in the *Fitzwilliam* and the *Henry Dundas*. One battalion is to be drawn from the Northern Circars immediately, and to be added to the centre army, and another as soon as it can be collected in one body: these, with the battalion which will be enabled to quit Madras in consequence of sending away the prisoners, will increase the centre army to 8 battalions of Native infantry, or about 8000 men.

Some apprehensions are entertained for the safety of the

* Then Captain, afterwards Major-General Sir John Malcolm.—ED.

Southern provinces when the monsoon will draw towards a close. I refer you to the paper I gave you some time ago for my opinion of the practicability of any plan Tippoo may have upon these countries, and of the means of repelling him. The passage of the Cauvery, if advisable, will be impossible for us at that season; and as Trichinopoly, and indeed all the southern garrisons, are out of repair, I am rather anxious upon this subject. Nothing which can be done at present can give security in those quarters; but if the Bengal detachment can arrive early in January, or, indeed, in any event, the only thing to be done in case of his making an irruption there is to make a movement towards his capital. This must oblige him to fall back. I hope that the Bombay army will be ready to operate on the Malabar * towards the end of the year, or early in January. When they are even assembled, he will be afraid to make any serious movement towards the Southern provinces.

There are only two battalions of Natives and a company of artillery in Trichinopoly, one battalion and some European invalids in Tanjore, and a weak garrison in Dindigul. More troops cannot be spared; and even if they could be spared, they could not be sent there. There was an idea of bringing a regiment of Europeans from Ceylon, but the posts on that island ought to be kept as strong as possible, lest the French should steal out. I am very anxious to hear of the conclusion of your negotiations with the Peshwah and the Nizam, that you may make your proposition, whatever it may be, to Tippoo as soon as possible, and that he may see that you are not bent upon annihilating him.

He is well aware of the bad consequences which resulted in the last war from his suffering us to make our preparations at our leisure and to attack him; and you may depend upon it that if he is not convinced that we do not mean to go to war, he will endeavour to strike the first blow at the time I have mentioned to the southward of the Cauvery. Our great strength, to which an addition will have been made by the re-establishment of our alliances, and the total failure of his allies the French, will induce him to grasp at any favourable opportunity which a moderate proposition from you will give him of settling this difference.

* The *Malabar district*, on the western side of India, has a sea-coast of 143 miles in length.—ED.

This is no new opinion of mine; I held it before, and never departed from it; and, from what I have seen and heard since my arrival here, I am more than ever convinced that the proposition, whatever it may be, ought to be made without loss of time. There is one circumstance, however, of which I was not aware till lately, which has had great weight upon my mind. It is this: unless you can march from hence early in January, you can't expect to do any good, as the Malabar monsoon in May will oblige you to retire from Seringapatam. Will you be able to march in January? Certainly not, as the Bengal troops will not arrive till the latter end of that month. If, then, you cannot expect to do anything effectual this year, it is not worth while, by keeping back your proposition, to risk to engage in hostilities in which everything short of the most complete success (viz., being able to invest Seringapatam with a good prospect of taking it) is ruin.

Therefore, as it is probable that it will prevent him from commencing hostilities, which, from circumstances, must be ruinous to us, I think your proposition ought to be made as soon as possible.*

* The Governor-General was desirous of sending Colonel Wellesley to Seringapatam, and wrote the following letter; but the refusal of Tippoo to receive an ambassador prevented the mission.—ED.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Fort William, 17th August, 1798.

Kirkpatrick[a] has so blundered the business at Hyderabad, that although *he* thinks it will succeed, I am resolved to send a person to conduct the negotiation to its issue. I am extremely desirous on every account that *you* should be that person: you will therefore return hither immediately, and as soon as I can give you full instructions you shall take your passage to Masulipatam,[b] and thence proceed to Hyderabad. My intention is that you should afterwards, with the aid of either Doveton, Read, Macleod, or Malcolm, be the bearer of my propositions to Tippoo Sultaun. You may join your regiment whenever this business shall be concluded, or in the event of war. I have ordered proper boats to bring you and your baggage to Calcutta, and you can live in this house. I think this a fine opportunity of distinguishing yourself: I therefore entreat you to come without delay.

Ever yours most affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

The Residency at Hyderabad is now vacant: you will receive the salary of that office (8000 rupees a month) during your mission.

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[a] Captain Kirkpatrick, then Political Resident at the Court of Hyderabad.—ED.

[b] A port on the Golconda coast, Bay of Bengal; 215 miles north of Madras, and near the mouth of the Kistna.—ED.

Lest, however, those hostilities should be commenced, the Bengal detachment ought to be ordered to march as early as the weather will permit; and if it were possible to get a detachment down by sea, a great object would be gained.

Harris has shown me the letter in which he presses you to come here. It will annoy you terribly; but if there be a war, and the north-western frontier of Bengal be quiet, I don't think that anything excepting your presence at Madras can insure success. When I come to know more of Lord Clive, I shall be able to form a better judgment upon this subject. I will let you know what I think. I mention it now merely to apprise you that it may be possible that you will be obliged to come.

Lord Clive asked me yesterday whether you had not desired that the Nabob should go to Arcot, and he said that in his negotiations with him he wished to be guided entirely by your opinions. I told him that I believed you had had a wish of that kind, but that I had not heard you express it very lately. There has been less intrigue than usual at the durbar lately. The Nabob paid his last rent in part in advance. I attribute these good symptoms partly to the measures taken with the Rajah, partly to the dismissal of Paupiah. People in general are of opinion that he will not pay much longer. In the course of our conversation, Lord Clive asked me whether you had formed any plan for the future government of the Carnatic? whether you wished to get it for the Company, to be held as Bengal is? and whether you had determined whether any one and which of the descendants of Wallajah should succeed to the musnud? I told him that I knew that you had not a very good opinion of the generality of the Company's servants upon this establishment, and that you did not expect that any great benefit would be derived immediately either to the Company or to the inhabitants from their having the management of the country, should it fall into our hands; that I never heard you deliver an opinion respecting the rights of the Nabob's family; but I said that I was convinced you expected from him a full confidential communication of his opinions upon those or any other subjects relating to this country.

I think him rather inclined to get hold of the country, but determined to do nothing without your orders.

As a proof of his zeal to do what you wish, I mention a circumstance which he told me yesterday. The Nizam's detach-

ment having crossed the Kistna,* was detained for want of money. He heard it yesterday, and immediately embarked a large sum in a ship for Masulipatam, where she will arrive this night, and they will get the money in three or four days. I'll write in a day or two about Tanjore and other subjects which are interesting.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[25.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort St. George, 20th Sept., 1798.

An account has arrived from the commanding officer at Dindigul, stating that a rabble from Tippoo's country, consisting of 350 men, had attacked a polygar in the Dindigul country. I think it more like the consequence of a difference between neighbouring polygars than the commencement of hostilities on the part of Tippoo: or, as the opinion that there will be a war between the two powers is very prevalent along the frontier, this attack, if it can be so called, may have been occasioned by the zeal of some of Tippoo's managers in the Coimbatoor country. I wish that something could be done to strengthen you to the southward. I understand that the Rajah of Travancore has 6 battalions of good infantry and 300 cavalry: could you not call upon him for assistance? If he sent only two battalions, they would be of service in giving garrisons to your places; and if he sent the cavalry, they might annoy an enemy making an attack in that country considerably. I visited the Nabob this morning at his own desire. I told him that you were much displeased with him for not doing that which you had desired him for his own benefit and that of the Company. His answer was rather comical; † and he then desired me to tell you that you had forgot some memorandums which

* A river of Southern India, 800 miles long; it rises in the Western Ghauts, at an elevation of 4500 feet above the sea, and flows into the Bay of Bengal. In its south-east course it marks the boundary of the territories of the Nizam. —ED.

† In the draft letter book of Colonel Wellesley, after the words "that of the Company," the sentence runs as follows: "He then insisted upon having my coat and sword, and said, 'I am very angry because you won't give me all I ask for.'"—ED.

he had given you, but that he had not forgot the promises he had made you; that he had dismissed Paupiah, and that he was ready to go to Arcot as soon as it became certain that there was to be no war. He said that he should do everything in his power to comply with the desire you expressed in your last letter.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.** [26.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 23rd Sept., 1798.

I told Mornington, in a letter which I wrote to him some days ago, that I should let him know the result of my inquiries respecting Tanjore. They were particularly directed to find out the reason why this Government recommended that the country which the Rajah had offered should not be taken. I did not see the letters sent by this Government to Bengal upon that subject, but all those with whom I have conversed agree in opinion that the country should be left in the hands of the Rajah. I have desired Cockburn, who is, as usual, better informed than the others, to write to Mornington, and to state the grounds of his opinion. This will answer his purpose better than if I were to write either to him or to you upon a subject which it is impossible I should understand. I will tell you, however, what Aston† says respecting the manner in which the Rajah offered to give up the country. It is true that his story is contradicted by the advocates for keeping the country, by Cockburn, and by Torin's‡ friends; but there is no reason why Aston should not tell the truth, and it is more than probable that the Rajah had great objections to giving up his country even for a day.

He says, in the first place, that the paper from which he read the speech which declared his intention of giving up the country to the Company's Government was written at Torin's house. That he said, the first time, that he would give up the

* Afterwards Lord Cowley, then Private Secretary to the Governor-General.—ED.

† Colonel Aston, then commanding the troops in Tanjore.—ED.

‡ Mr. Torin, then British resident at the Court of Tanjore.—ED.

country for *two days*, although the words *two years* were written.* That afterwards he said he was willing to give it up for two or three months; and even after he said that he would give it to the Company's management for two years, he said that he intended still to be Rajah, and to have all the powers of government in his own hands, and that Torin should be *seskeel*. Aston says, that notwithstanding this, he appears well satisfied with his situation, and he does not think that he would complain if Government were to avail itself of his offer.

I think, however, that, (putting the manner of giving up the country out of the question,) as all those who know anything about the matter declare that it is most for the interest of the Company not to take it, as nobody will ever believe that our Honourable employers consented to the revolution with any other view than that of getting the country from the new Rajah if it is taken; and as, if it is not taken, the powers of India will give us some credit for our moderation and honour in this transaction, it ought to be left in the hands of the Rajah, care being taken to strengthen the power of the resident, as first of the commission, as much as possible.

Malcolm is gone to join Roberts's detachment† as Persian interpreter, and he hopes to be made assistant at Hyderabad, in case old Kirkpatrick should not return there, and that the young one should be made resident. I told him that I knew Mornington wished him well, and I advised him to write to you. I am glad that he is gone to join the detachment, although I think his presence here would have been very useful. Only conceive

* The following is a copy of the letter from the Rajah Sirfojee, the pupil of the celebrated missionary Schwartz:

To Benjamin Torin, Esq., Resident of Tanjore.

SIR, Tanjore, 2nd July, 1798.

I request the favour of you to represent to Government, that my youth, and the distracted state of the country, make me sensible that I am unequal to govern it. Therefore it is my humble request to the Honourable Company to assume the management of the country for a year or two, only not to keep me at a distance, and to enable me to see business transacted, and make me fit to govern the country to the satisfaction of the Honourable Company and the happiness of my subjects.

I am, Sir,

Your very obedient humble servant,

SIRFOJEE.

† Sent to disarm the sepoy regiments at Hyderabad which were officered by Frenchmen.—ED.

the folly of their sending Roberts to command the detachment, when it was well known that there was an old quarrel between him and Kirkpatrick, which had originated, when the former was before in the command at Hyderabad, and the latter his aide-de-camp, in the pompous and, I am told, overbearing manners of the latter.

Roberts is well calculated for the situation; but, if there is not the most cordial communication between him and the resident, it is impossible to expect that he will be able to effect all the important objects of the service upon which he is employed.

I wish that Mornington had named Close for that situation. He is by far the ablest man in the Company's army. I have not seen him since I arrived here.

I intend to write to Malcolm to tell him that I have heard of these old quarrels between Roberts and Kirkpatrick, and to express a wish that he should endeavour to reconcile them, and, if he cannot succeed in that, that he should at least prevent their disputes from doing an injury to the service.

Coleman is going to Bengal with the men of the 36th. I am convinced that, for the sake of his brother, you will be inclined to show him every civility in your power, and I shall be obliged to you if you will introduce him to Dashwood, Burrowes, Ross, Fleming, &c., in case I should not have time to write to them by him.

I am likely to remain here, at least until a regiment arrives from Europe. It is said that the 10th and 61st are coming, but they may be as long on their passage as we were; and if the army takes the field, I shall not much like to be kept in Fort St. George, after having been a year and a half in Fort William, merely because there is a chance that endeavours may be made to set Lord Clive against the measures which the Supreme Government have thought necessary.

In case any ships should come down the Bay in the course of this season, I shall be much obliged to you if you will send me some Bengal sheep, some potatoes, some smoked humps and rounds of beef. Let Lamette * send me the bill. Canning will let you know when a ship sails.

Mrs. Mitchell has written to me to desire that I would recommend Captain Mitchell to Mornington. She is the sister

* *Maître d'hôtel* to the Governor-General.—ED.

of an officer of the 33rd, and a great friend of mine. Captain Mitchell is an officer in the Company's army of some standing, and a good kind of man, and I shall be glad if anything is done for him.

I hope that Mornington has been introduced to the ladies of Calcutta, and that you give dinners frequently.

Eight companies of the 33rd are arrived, and nearly every man of them has had the flux upon the passage; among others, I have had it. Fifteen men have died of it. It is to be attributed entirely to the neglect of Captain ———'s office in supplying the water. Instead of sending up to Hooghly * for it, it was taken into the casks at Calcutta, and was brackish. It is unpardonable, as I warned him of it, and I am afraid that I must make a public complaint of him.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[27.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort St. George, 25th Sept., 1798.

There is an account from Calicut,† stating that a force consisting of 300 Frenchmen had been landed and was encamped at Mangalore. It is impossible to say whether credit is to be given to this account, but we ought to get forward with our preparations. The great object is to get the detachment from Bengal: I am much afraid that it will not arrive till it becomes too late to do anything effectual this year. If the proposals which have been made to the sepoys induce any to come by sea, they may arrive in time; and if their numbers should be sufficient, they may still be able to do something. Here the battering-train ought to be got in readiness, and sent forwards at least as far as Arnee. Grain ought to be stored as far forwards as possible, a plan of operations ought to be determined upon, and all the efforts of this country directed to place the battering-train and grain in an advanced position upon the road which may be thought most advisable. I have recom-

* A town 27 miles N. of Calcutta, on the river Hooghly, situated beyond the reach of the tides.—ED.

† A seaport town in Malabar, 50 miles S.E. from Cannanore, and 170 miles S.W. from Bangalore.—ED.

mended these measures, and I hope they will be adopted: in the mean time money from Bengal is essential.

I don't think it will be advisable to make the projected attack upon Mangalore, and I'll tell you my reasons why in a letter which I will write to-morrow. I have not time to say much at present.

This is the third or fourth letter I have written to you or to Henry since my arrival; so that you see I have not been idle or inattentive to the objects which you recommended to me. I will write to-morrow more at large about the expedition to Mangalore.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [28.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort St. George, 26th Sept., 1798.

I wrote you a letter yesterday, in which I told you that an account had arrived from Calicut stating that 300 Frenchmen had landed and were encamped at Mangalore. As the gentlemen at Calicut had received this account from natives, it may not be true; but all accounts, intercepted letters, &c. &c., tend to prove the hostile intentions of Tippoo at this moment, and therefore nothing ought to induce us to relax in our preparations. I have recommended that the battering train should be sent forward to Arnee, or Vellore at least; that some general plan of operations should be determined upon; and that the grain and other stores should be placed upon the line which it may be intended to take. Lord Clive agrees in opinion with me, and therefore I hope that immediate measures will be taken to put every thing in a state of forward preparation in case hostilities should take place.

I mentioned these and other circumstances in my letter of yesterday (excepting the last, as I did not know his sentiments till this morning); and I mention them again now, as this letter goes by sea, and it is just probable that it may reach you before that which went last night by the dawk.

I also told you that I did not think it advisable to send the expedition to Mangalore, for reasons which I am now going to state.

All parties seem to agree that the only chance of saving this country from plunder in case of hostilities is to advance against Seringapatam, and that there cannot be any reasonable prospect of success unless the efforts of both coasts are directed to that one object. If the expedition to Mangalore can interfere with that object, of which I don't think there is a doubt, it ought certainly to be laid aside, particularly as the place is dismantled, and the fleet will be better able to prevent a French force from landing than the army, if one were stationed there. The question, however, does not stand exactly upon that ground. It is possible, nay probable, that, on account of the want of troops on this side, the siege of Seringapatam cannot be undertaken this year, and we must take a different view of it, though the result will be the same. The object in the attack will be to make a diversion, and oblige Tippoo to retire from the Carnatic should he have determined to invade it.

The first question which presents itself is, will the expedition to Mangalore be a diversion? It certainly will not, if the army remains upon the sea-coast; it may if it is pushed so forward up the Ghauts into the Bednore country* as to affect Tippoo's supplies drawn from thence, and thus render it an essential object to him to attempt either to oblige it to retire, or to destroy it as he did that of General Matthews. If it advances thus far, as it will be but weak, and particularly as it will want cavalry, unless the attack be made in conjunction with a large body of Mahrattas, its safety is endangered. Here another question presents itself: whether is it wise to engage in an expedition which depends upon the co-operation of the Mahrattas, not only for its success, but for the safety of the army employed? My opinion of the allies, Nizam and Mahrattas, is, that it is essentially necessary to have them on our side, that we may not have them against us; and that in a grand operation, such as is that of attacking the capital of Tippoo, they are of great use in aiding us with our supplies, and keeping our rear and flanks clear from the enemy's plunderers; but that the means of success in every expedition ought to be provided and insured independently of their exertions, and that

* *The Bednore country* is a densely wooded plateau, situated on the summit of the Western Ghauts, more than 4000 feet above the sea. The town and citadel of Bednore or Nuggur are 150 miles N.W. of Seringapatam.—ED.

it would be almost as wise to leave everything to chance as to rely for safety upon their co-operation.

As therefore it will not be safe to advance without having the co-operation of the Mahrattas, and as that cannot or ought not to be depended upon, the Bombay army ought not to be risked in the Bednore country; and as, unless it enters that, it will not succeed in creating a diversion, it is better that it should not be sent to Mangalore at all. I acknowledge that, under the present circumstances, Tippoo is likely to be jealous of our getting possession of the sea-coast; but he will not be sufficiently so to be induced to withdraw from the Carnatic, where he knows he can do us the most essential injury. In my opinion, the Bombay army would create a more powerful diversion if it were assembled at Tellicherry* or Cannanore,† and advanced by the Poodicherum Pass into the Coorg country.‡ Tippoo would then perceive that our object was his capital. The natural strength of the country would insure the army against the efforts of his cavalry, and it might remain in safety until the time when the army from the Carnatic could advance to co-operate with it in the siege of Seringapatam.

The Admiral intends to sail in a day or two. He ought to watch that Malabar coast very narrowly during the whole of this next monsoon.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [29.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 29th Sept., 1798.

I enclose a newspaper, which was printed this afternoon. I have not seen the newspapers from England, but I understand that there was no other intelligence of any consequence excepting that the Swiss had driven the French out of Switzerland with great slaughter.

There were no letters either for Mornington or you in the

* *Tellicherry*, a port on the Malabar coast, 95 miles S.W. of Seringapatam.—ED.

† *Cannanore*, a seaport and military cantonment, 615 miles S.E. of Bombay, and 79 from Mangalore.—ED.

‡ The Coorg country is a very mountainous tract, extending 65 miles from north to south, and 35 from east to west; bounded on the north and east by Mysore. Elevation 3000 to 6000 feet above the sea.—ED.

packets which I saw opened. As the dawk will reach Calcutta at this season before the ships will, I'll endeavour to have the Bengal packets opened (if there should be any), and will send your letters. If they won't open the packets, I'll take care that they shall go in the *Walpole*, which will sail on Monday or Tuesday.

Sir Thomas Strange * is arrived in the *Walpole*.

There is but little country news. The accounts from the Malabar coast, that 300 men were encamped at Mangalore, have been contradicted in the most satisfactory manner. There is also a shocking story from the southward respecting a murder by a polygar, which will occasion the removal of five companies of Company's European infantry from Colombo into the Ramnad † district. Tell Mornington that this appears to me to be necessary, whether he intends to coerce the polygar or to act upon the defensive to the southward against Tippoo; and as I did not know these troops were in Ceylon when I said that that island ought not to be weakened; my reasoning could not apply to them, but to the 19th and 80th Regiments, which will still remain there, and are fully equal to its defence, with the assistance of the Native and Malay corps.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[30.] MEMORANDUM UPON SUPPLYING BULLOCKS AND GRAIN FOR THE ARMY IN THE LAST WAR. ‡

Lord Cornwallis established two principal agents for supplying bullocks, grain, &c., and for settling all accounts, &c., with bullock-owners, &c., and four subordinate ones (1. Stores; 2. Grain; 3. Provisions; 4. Camp equipage). Commissaries of stores and grain. Provisions; agents for the carriage of them. Captain Sandys for tents.

One of the principal agents was established in camp, and had the superintendence and arrangement of everything relating to the supplies there, and one (Mr. Cockburn) was below the

* Judge of the Supreme Court at Madras.—ED.

† A sea-coast town in the district of Madura, 275 miles south-west of Madras. There is an easy communication between Ramnad and Ceylon across the Straits of Manaar.—ED.

‡ The war with Tippoo Sultaun in 1791-2.—ED.

Ghauts. This last had received particular instructions, first to forward to Amboor and Vencatagherry * everything which was provided in the frontier garrisons for the purposes of the army and to forward it to the siege of Seringapatam; next, to ascertain what quantity of bullocks there were belonging to the Company fit for service for which drivers could be procured and what quantity of bullocks could be hired; thirdly, to forward to Bangalore 6,000 bags of rice after the army should have advanced from thence, taking care to concert with Colonel Read the times at which his detachment in the Colar and Ryacotta districts could protect the march of the convoys.

The price to be given for each carriage-bullock was 1 pagoda 21 fanams per month, provided with a pack-saddle, and one driver to three bullocks.

For every draught-bullock 2 p. 8 f. per month, provided with one driver to two bullocks. The weight which each Carnatic bullock is able to carry is 72 purca seer. Shot carried on the backs of bullocks in gunny bags.

Mem.—It was hoped that the first convoy would leave Amboor for Bangalore between the † and 10th of October, and the second between the 10th and 15th.

Principal objects of Cockburn's attention after the two grand convoys would have left Amboor: 1st. To increase the stock of rice at Vencatagherry to 5000 or 6000 bags. 2nd. To increase the stock at Bangalore as much as possible.

To send up all the draught-cattle for which he could provide drivers, and as many carriage cattle as the maistries ‡ would receive charge of and provide with drivers.

To provide the cattle in the Carnatic with drivers to answer any future call, and to render them useful in supplying Vencatagherry and Bangalore.

Departments which remained under the management of the principal agent in camp, besides those under the subordinate agent:—

The carriage of engineers' stores not carried by the Ordnance department.

The medical stores for the Surgeon-General, those for the table of the Commander-in-Chief, and General Meadows.

A bullock to carry 1000 ball cartridges, 8 twelve-pounder

* A town in North Arcot.—Ed. † Blank in manuscript.—Ed.
‡ Head men in charge of the draught-cattle.—Ed.

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shots, 5 eighteen-pounder ditto, 2 barrels of gunpowder: 6 mercalls, equal to 72 seer.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[31.] *Draft of a Letter to the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

There are accounts from the Malabar coast which do not confirm, but rather contradict, those which came last respecting a French force which was stated to be encamped at Mangalore.

A polygar, under the Collector of Ramnad, having behaved improperly, was summoned, and did appear before him, and having taken fright at something that he was saying to him, he desired leave to quit the room. He ran to the gate of the fort, and killed an officer (Lieutenant Clarke) who endeavoured to prevail upon him not to go off. A scuffle ensued, and 2 sepoys and some of the polygar's people were wounded.

It appears that a force, with battering cannon and cavalry, will be required to reduce this polygar. There is no cavalry to the southward of the Coleroon, and I deem it impossible to do anything against him till after the monsoon, which will set in in about ten days. Lord Clive talks of bringing 5 companies of the Company's European infantry over from Colombo, for the purpose of keeping that country in awe at present, and of defending it hereafter, if it should be requisite. I did not know they were there when I said, in a former letter, that nothing could be spared from Ceylon. They certainly can be spared; and whether there be a war with Tippoo or not, they ought to be brought over immediately. The punishment of the polygar will be a question to be decided hereafter, according to the means possessed, consistently with attention to other objects, as soon as the proper season comes.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[32.] *Draft of a Letter to Colonel Cliffe.**

Madras, 1st Oct., 1798.

Till I received your letter, I did not know that there was such a person in the 33rd as Mr. Ponsonby. A gentleman of that name was appointed to it, in the year '95, from the 35th

* Adjutant-General of H. M.'s Forces in India.—Ed.

Regiment, and joined it; but he was afterwards removed into the 53rd, and his vacancy was filled up. Mr. Grey certainly is not in the room of any of those eight who have made vacancies, as you will see by the enclosed paper.

I shall be happy to have Mr. Grey in the 33rd, as the Commander-in-Chief has thought proper to appoint him to it.

I expect a large number of recruits (I am told above 100) by the *Lord Duncan* East Indiaman, which, I am sorry to say, is bound to Bengal and Bencoolen. I am well acquainted with the manner in which recruits are looked after and taken care of in Fort William, and I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will take measures to send them to me as soon as possible. In a few days I shall send you an official complaint against Captain ——'s office, for having sent bad water on board the ships in which the regiment embarked to come to the coast. The neglect upon this occasion has been the cause of the death by dysentery of 15 as fine men as any we had, and of the sickness of nearly the whole regiment, myself not excepted. I do not yet know the loss of the *Busbridge*, but I dare say it is not less than that in the other ships. I shall be obliged to you if you will warn him not to send bad water with these recruits, in case the report and complaint which I intend to make should not arrive before the time when they will be sent away.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Lieutenant-General Harris. [33.]

Fort St. George, 3rd Oct., 1798.

I consider that sending away the prisoners is an object of the greatest importance; that an opportunity so good will not offer again for some time; and, therefore, that there is nothing which so well deserves your attention and exertion. Lord Clive has spoken to me upon the subject, and seems very anxious to send them away, but the difficulties of clearing and preparing the *Osterly* have been misrepresented and magnified. It was reported to him that —— said she could not be ready till the 26th; and —— told me that she could be ready on the 20th; and you know that, when the labouring oar is to fall upon him, he is not over sanguine. I wish you would have some inquiries

made into this business; at all events, press Lord C. (as I have) to endeavour to have the *Osterly* got ready.

If the fleet should be detained two or three days beyond the usual time, it is better than that the prisoners should stay. The advantages of sending them away are seen by those whose aim, one would almost believe, is to throw impediments in the way of every thing that is to be done for the public service at the present moment; and, accordingly, endeavours are made to prevent the possibility of their going.*

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[34.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 7th Oct., 1798.

I have received your letter of the 19th September, for which I am much obliged to you.

Everything here goes on quietly. You may tell Mornington that Clive becomes every day less reserved with me. I do not think that Webbe has any improper influence over him. He acts much from his own opinion, after having heard what is to be said on all sides of a question. As often as he consults me, I press him to ask Cockburn's opinion, which is always well founded, and, if Webbe agrees with him, there can be no danger in his advice.

A conversation which Lord Clive had with ——, in which he stated his determination to support the Board of Revenue, has concurred, with other circumstances, in inducing him to offer to resign his employment. Lord Clive spoke to me about it two nights ago, having heard it in the morning, and stated the embarrassment he should labour under if he lost his assistance at this moment, when the new settlement of the jaghire is to be made, particularly as he is the only person in the Company's service who has any information upon the subject, the Board of Revenue having none. After having canvassed the subject with him for some time, and having shown him that he must either sacrifice the Board of Revenue and submit to ask Mr. ——, as a favour, to remain in office, or that he

* The French prisoners consisted of those who had surrendered to the British Government in India on the capitulation of Pondicherry, and who were to be conveyed to Europe.—ED.

must support the Board and suffer Mr. —— to resign, or that he must insist upon Mr. ——'s remaining in office until the settlement is made, and that afterwards he may turn him out for having withheld from the Board all information, by which conduct he had rendered his own services necessary, Lord Clive seemed determined to adopt the last measure: at all events, he was determined to support the Board of Revenue.

I am sorry to tell you that the prisoners do not go home. There have been difficulties in the execution of this most desirable measure which have been deemed insurmountable, and they remain. I cannot pretend to say whether it was possible to send them away or not; but it is so necessary that they should go, in order that anything like a sufficient force may be put into the field in case of necessity, that I anxiously entreat Mornington to take the earliest steps to send ships to carry them away as soon as it is possible for them to lie in safety in Madras roads.

I have this instant received your letter of the 21st September, enclosing some for me which arrived in the *Princess Charlotte*. My former letters will have made known to you my opinion upon the subject of which you have talked to Kirkpatrick. Lord Clive is well disposed towards Mornington's Government, and his abilities are better than Kirkpatrick represents them to be, or than people in general imagine.

It is unfortunate that there should be such a want of talents here, that he is forced to leave the government in the hands of —— and ——; but, as you see by what I have above mentioned, he is not under their influence.

I wish that M. would not notice them in his letters. Let him send his orders in the manner he would send them if they were not in existence; and let him make Lord Clive responsible for failure or miscarriage in the execution of his measures. He will shortly find that here, as well as everywhere else, they will be forward to promote his views.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

The polygar to the southward has offered to submit, and I think it appears that the Collector of Ramnad has behaved towards him in the most tyrannical manner.

[35.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

My dear Henry, Fort St. George, 12th Oct., 1798.

Within these few days, letters have been received from the Court of Directors, by which they have ordered that Webbe, Close, Richardson, Allen, and some others, should be deprived of certain additional allowances which Lord Hobart had given them.

This has not added to the popularity of our Honourable masters, and I think that in the cases of Close and of Richardson it is likely to have bad effects. Close has now, for being Adjutant-General, only 75 pagodas per month, and certainly not so much as he would have if he were in the command of his regiment on full batta. I don't know whether Richardson's allowances are better, but I believe they are not. Close has informed Lord Clive of his intention to desire to resign his situation of Adjutant-General, and to join his regiment. This will create considerable embarrassment, and Lord Clive told me this morning that he intended to ask for Mornington's permission to increase Close's allowances, so as to make him no loser by remaining in office, until the answer to a representation to the Court of Directors could be received.

The orders of the Court of Directors must have been framed under a misconception of the amount of Close's allowances. If they were not, they are unjust and impolitic, and, like all similar orders, the execution of them ought to be suspended. Mornington has the power of doing an act of justice in this case, as he has in every other.

There is really no reason why he should not interfere, and there are many very essential ones why he should. It will tend to conciliate a man whose talents he must use in the execution of his measures. Lord Clive is very anxious upon this subject, and it will do him a favour. He will be convinced that although M. thinks that Close is one of a faction who have, perhaps, endeavoured to thwart his measures, probably from not understanding them, his sense of the injuries they have done him does not prevent him from interfering in his favour when it is just and necessary.* It will tend to make

* Barry Close, Josiah Webbe (then Secretary to the Government of Madras), and others, were opposed to any immediate hostile proceedings against Tippoo, on the ground that the Madras army was barely adequate to

him very popular in this settlement, which is always a good thing.

I say nothing about Richardson, as Lord C. did not mention him, and I don't know anything about his situation. As I have, upon former occasions, mentioned Close to M., I beg that, in talking to him, you will particularly tell him that I have no motive whatever in writing this letter, excepting a desire that he should do what will certainly gain for him great credit.

Close has not spoken to me, nor have his friends. Indeed, I have not had five words of conversation with Close since I arrived at Madras.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [36.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 14th Oct., 1798.

As I think it probable that we shall take the field, and as in that case I shall be obliged to keep a table, I must get some plate, which is the only certain method of having anything to eat off, and in the end it comes cheapest. If Mornington has bought that plate of Hunt's, and does not want it, I shall be glad to have the soup-tureen and dishes at the price which he paid for them; and I shall be obliged to you if you will order for me at Raitt's as many dishes of the same pattern, in addition thereto, as Lamette will think necessary for a camp dinner for twelve people. If Mornington wants Hunt's plate, order for me, at Raitt's, a soup-tureen and dishes for twelve people, and desire him to make them of the pattern of the two plates which I got from him before I left Bengal.

Send them to me by the first ship. I shall not want plates, knives, forks, nor spoons, as everybody in an Indian camp brings those articles for himself: the host finds eatables and dishes only.

I have read Mornington's minute of the 12th August,* which

the defence of its own Presidency, and that any movement towards Mysore might provoke Tippoo to lay waste the Carnatic, as he had previously done. —ED.

* *See* Wellesley Despatches, vol. i. pp. 159-208.—ED.

I think very satisfactory. Tell him that his representation ought to arrive at Seringapatam towards the middle of November, so that the army may move immediately after the monsoon, if it should be necessary. Tippoo knows, as well as we do, that we can do nothing this season if we don't leave the Carnatic early in January, and therefore the negotiation ought to be pressed forward as much as possible, or it will fail.

Matters will stand thus:

The fleet on the Malabar coast, and the Malabar army in the field, in November.

The army in the Carnatic in cantonments in the centre division; the battering-train in Vellore; and the whole ready to join as soon as the monsoon will cease. This, with the readiness of the Allies, will be sufficient to awe Tippoo.

The army to encamp as early as possible, and, if the negotiations do not take a favourable turn, it ought to move forward immediately. If the negotiations do not commence till the army is in the field, Tippoo's territories must be invaded at nearly the same time that the message is sent to him. Will that answer?

M. must come here, or he must empower somebody to conclude the new treaty with Tippoo; otherwise, even supposing negotiations to commence in November, the time for invading his territories will have passed by before Mornington's consent to the terms can arrive, and then probably Tippoo will no longer grant them; or else the invasion must go on, at all events, until orders come from Calcutta to stop us.

The difficulty turns upon the necessity of attending to the Malabar monsoon, which commences in May; and we must, therefore, leave this, so as to have a reasonable probability of finishing our business before that period, otherwise Tippoo will do nothing.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[37.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

My dear Henry, Fort St. George, 19th Oct., 1798.

I hope that my letter (I believe) of the 19th September arrived at Calcutta before that public letter was sent away, which you

tell me, in yours of the 3rd instant, it was intended should be written upon the subject of the want of money for the Hyderabad detachment. That will have shown that the want was occasioned by accident, and that when it was known here every effort was used to relieve it, and, in fact, it was relieved before the detachment was ready to march.

I am anxious upon this subject, because I am afraid that anything like a harsh letter may do harm. Lord C. opens his mind to me very freely upon all subjects. I give him my opinion, and talk as I would to M. The truth is, he does not want talents, but he is very diffident of himself; and now that he has begun to find out that there is no conjuration in transacting the business of Government, he improves daily, takes more upon himself, and will very shortly have less confidence and reliance than he must have at present upon the opinions and abilities of those who have long done the business of the country. A violent or harsh letter from Fort William would spoil all. The conduct which I recommend is, perfect confidence with him upon all subjects, and I would extend it even to his government when it is safe to do so. There should be no jealousy, as there is really no danger, of an interference in the duties or prerogatives of the Supreme Government; and if by chance either should be assumed by this Government, upon an occasion not very material, it would be better to pass it over, and not to notice any excepting upon an occasion when the invasion of either may prove detrimental to the service. My idea in this is to avoid disputes upon petty subjects, which have one effect only, that of erecting little men, such as ——, who are to manage them, into great ones. Small faults and omissions in the obedience to the orders of the Supreme Government, provided they do not lead to bad consequences, ought, for the same reason, to be passed over. It may be depended upon that perfect confidence, refraining from noticing faults such as I have mentioned, and from naming or alluding to the persons whom M. thinks adverse to him, will have the best effects. I have seen the cyphered despatch of the 19th June from the Directors, which must give M. the greatest satisfaction. I will give him the opinion he requires in a letter which I will write to him either to-morrow or next day. Harris has got the minute, and I should like to read it again before I give any opinion.

With regard to my staying here, I am perfectly satisfied to

remain here as long as my presence may be necessary, although I consider my situation a very awkward one, and without remedy. I should not, however, wish M. to know that I feel it at all.

As far as my stay regards my pecuniary matters, I don't mind it. As the war in Europe is likely to last, I shall certainly be made a Major-General in the course of a year, and I must then return. Whether I return 500*l.* richer in consequence of having been in a command, or poorer in consequence of having been in Fort St. George, is a matter of indifference to me.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sturt is arrived.

[38.] *Draft of a Letter to Admiral Rainier.**

Fort St. George, 20th Oct., 1798.

Admiral Rainier, to inform him that M. will attack Goa, should circumstances permit, if France gets a footing in Portugal. That he will send him some information upon that subject which he has received from General Stewart.†

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[39.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort St. George, 21st Oct., 1798.

I have considered the question upon which Henry informed me you wished to have my opinion. I conceive that your demand upon Tippoo must depend upon your means of enforcing it, or, in other words, upon the prospect of speedy success in a war in case it should be refused.

I still think, as I always have, that the want of a Commander-in-Chief, the scarcity of money, the war in Europe, are strong reasons to avoid a war here if possible; and that the re-establishment of the alliance, forcing Tippoo to receive an ambassador, and placing the army in the Carnatic in a respectable state of preparation permanently, might be considered as

* Commander-in-Chief in the Eastern Seas.—ED.

† Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army.—ED.

taking as great advantage of the circumstances of the times as any man could expect.

There being, then, these difficulties in the way of carrying on a war, I recommend that nothing should be demanded which is not an object of immediate consequence; and therefore, although I acknowledge that a great object would be gained if the French were sent away, and if Tippoo were prevailed upon to engage not to take them or others into his service again, I would confine the demand to his receiving an ambassador from us.

I think that he will agree to that, but the personal interest which the French have in remaining in his service will induce them to endeavour to prevent him from signing a treaty so prejudicial to them and the avowed objects of their government in Europe. Considering how late the message from you will go, his conduct upon the last treaty at Seringapatam, and his disposition to hostilities, no additional inducement ought to be given to him to break with us. If his reception of the ambassador be attended by all the good consequences which may be expected from it, if he become impressed with a just sense of his own interests, if he see that the Company's Government wish for nothing but that every man should retain what belongs to him, that all India is kept at peace by their interference, and if he should in consequence become desirous of strengthening the union between him and them, he will of his own accord send away the Frenchmen, who will no longer be of use to him, as he will no longer have an intention of attacking the Company whenever an opportunity offers.

At the same time I am aware of the advantages of the terms which you propose in your minute.

Perhaps it is not so necessary that he should send away the Frenchmen which he has now, as that he should agree to take no more. We must expect that at the close of this war in Europe hordes of Frenchmen will come out here. They are not to be considered hereafter in this country in the same light in which they were formerly. They were then under some regulation, as are the subjects of Great Britain; but now not only they will be under no regulation, but they will come here for no reason excepting to make mischief; and if Tippoo does not become cordially our friend, his durbar will be a perpetual scene of French intrigue against the British nation. It is true that that is an evil which may bring its own remedy; he may

become jealous, and tired of their constant *tracasseries;* but if it were possible, without risking a war, to insure, as far as a treaty could, that they should never return there, or if a speedily successful war were probable, by which the same object might be attained, much would be gained. However, as I said before, there are so many persons whose private and national interests will induce them to endeavour to persuade him not to agree to the terms which you propose, that I am afraid it is not reasonable to expect it without a war, which must be a long one, and the issue of which may be doubtful.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[40.] *To Colonel Cliffe.*

SIR, Madras, 21st Oct., 1798.

I have the honour to enclose a report of a court which sat by my order, on board the *Earl Fitzwilliam* East Indiaman, to inquire into the state of the water sent for the use of the troops, and to compare the rum and vinegar with the muster of those liquors which had been received from the storekeeper of Fort William. I must likewise inform you that Colonel Sherbrooke, Major Shee, and Captain Quin, who commanded the detachments embarked in the *Camden*, *Busbridge*, and *Dundas*, made complaints to the same purport, although they did not order a court of inquiry upon them; and that the consequence of having used this water has been, that nearly every man in the regiment has had the flux, of which disorder 15 men died upon their passage between Saugor* and Madras.

I must inform you that, having upon a former occasion been sent upon an expedition to the eastward from Fort William, and having received from the storekeeper at Fort William water so bad, and so detrimental to the health of the soldiers, that many died in consequence of drinking it, and I was obliged to have it thrown away, and fresh taken in at Prince of Wales's Island, I gave the storekeeper information thereof upon my return, and when I knew that the regiment was to be sent to Madras; and I fortunately warned him to order his

* Anchoring station near the entrance of the Hooghly river.—ED.

people to be very cautious respecting the water: a circumstance which he has acknowledged in a letter to me.

It gives me much concern to be obliged to make a complaint of any gentleman in Bengal, particularly of one for whom I have a great respect and regard; and at the same time that I do so, I must inform you that the other provisions were excellent of their kind, and that even those articles which were not equal to the muster were not bad.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

REMARKS UPON MR. JOSIAH WEBBE'S MEMORANDUM.* [41.]

22nd Oct., 1798.

Mr. Webbe grounds his whole argument upon the certainty of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, and says with great truth, that if that war were certain, it is the indispensable duty of this Government, and of the Supreme Government, to provide in the first instance for the defence of the Carnatic against him; that the state of the Mahratta power and the political situation of the Nizam's court are but secondary objects compared with that. In answer to that assumption, and to those arguments, it is necessary only to state the fact. Tippoo Sultaun sent ambassadors to the French to offer to make an alliance, offensive and defensive, with them against the English, the avowed object of which should be to drive these from India; as a means of doing which these ambassadors were empowered, and did enlist men. These ambassadors returned to India with the men; and when the Supreme Government heard of the transaction, they first ordered that the army should be assembled in the Carnatic. This was done, not because they feared the Carnatic would be attacked in consequence of Tippoo's having received the small reinforcement which came to him from Mauritius, but because they were not aware what other force might come to him, or what steps he might be induced to take in order to accomplish his avowed design of driving the English from India. It was, besides, necessary that Tippoo should explain, or rather that he should make a concession for, an act of open hostility, such as is

* *See* Wellesley Despatches, vol. i. p. 72.—Ed.

that of making an offensive alliance with our enemies. Under these circumstances orders were given to assemble the army.

When a war with Tippoo Sultaun became probable, it was necessary to consider the means of bringing it to a speedy and successful termination. For this purpose the assistance of our allies was desirable, if not absolutely necessary; and however aware the Supreme Government might always have been of the state of the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, it was at that moment that they were most forcibly struck by it.

The question then arose whether it was not advisable to send them the assistance which would enable them to fulfil their engagements with us.

It may not be necessary to defend the Supreme Government for having sent the 4000 men to Hyderabad from the centre division of the army, as in fact the orders given upon that subject were issued under an assurance given by Sir Alured Clarke* that they could be collected and spared from the service of the Northern Circars, an assurance which was afterwards confirmed by Major Beatson, who had come immediately from those countries to Calcutta; but as the measure of sending them from the centre division of the army, although originating with General Harris, has been approved of by the Supreme Government, it is fair to state the grounds upon which it really stands, and upon which it can certainly be defended. When General Harris received the order to send 4000 men into the Guntoor circar,† he was apprised of the importance of the service upon which they were to be employed. He was at the same time acquainted with the designs of Tippoo, his means of carrying them into execution, and his own means of defence. Offensive operations were out of the question according to his own opinion, and that of every well informed person here. The designs of Tippoo were obvious from the proclamation at Mauritius; but fortunately for us, the means of carrying them into execution failed him entirely; and although it was not improbable but that he might get them thereafter, in the month of August, when the orders for the assembly of the force in Guntoor were given, there was no probability of his getting them, and, from the numbers and disposition of his army, there was none that he would attack

* Commander-in-Chief in India.—Ed.

† The southern portion of the maritime tract known as the Five Northern Circars. Guntoor town is 225 miles north of Madras.—Ed.

the Carnatic before a force equal to that which had been sent away could come from Bengal, or be otherwise provided.

It is not necessary to enter into the statement which has been made by Mr. Webbe, of the force which remained after the detachment was made, as I defended its being sent away upon other and stronger grounds: but I could prove, 1st, that it is erroneous; 2ndly, that it is not full; and 3rdly, that the comparison which has been made between the situation of the army at present in the centre, and that under Floyd, or that under Maxwell, does not hold good.

1st. The numbers of the army are misstated; they are larger by nearly a thousand men. 2ndly. The whole army even in the centre division, exclusive of Fort St. George, are not included. The corps at Pondicherry is omitted, which, instead of being ordered to retire upon Cuddalore, is ordered to be in readiness to march upon Sadrass* at the shortest notice, and there to cross the Palar. The garrison at Fort St. George might be weakened by one, probably by two battalions, in case of exigency, by putting the prisoners in ships moored under the guns of the fort. 3rdly. The numbers of the corps of Floyd and of Maxwell are overstated; but even supposing them to have been equal in numbers to that at present in the centre division, the description of the troops was totally different, and the relative situation of those two corps with respect to the enemy was very different from that in which the corps at present assembled would stand. It must be recollected that Floyd's corps was pushed forward to collect grain in a particular spot for the army, which it was intended should follow after certain very tedious operations were performed in the Coimbatoor country, and towards the Malabar coast. Tippoo and his whole army very unexpectedly came down the Ghauts. It was impossible for Floyd to remain in his position on account of the want of supplies; the enemy would have attacked him to great advantage; and if he had attacked the enemy, the consequence of which would probably have been a victory, he would have been equally obliged to retire upon the main body of General Meadows's army, lest his communication should be cut off by that swarm of cavalry of which no victory can get rid. His victory would have been followed by a retreat, as were all those of Sir E. Coote for the same reason.

* *Sadrass*, a town on the Carnatic coast, 42 miles S.W. of Madras. One of the earliest Dutch settlements.—Ed.

Besides, as soon as the enemy appeared in the country, it became impossible for Floyd to accomplish the object for which he was sent, and therefore the sooner he retired to his main body the better. Every military man knows the disadvantage to which an army is exposed which retreats, having an enemy in its neighbourhood, particularly an Indian army, which is always incumbered with baggage, and whose opponent is well provided with cavalry. Accordingly Floyd's retreat was much harassed. But is his situation to be compared with any one in which it is probable that Harris will be placed? Harris will post himself near some strong place, with his cattle ready to carry for him his thirty days' provisions; he will not want to keep up his communication. If Tippoo undertake any operation of consequence, such as that of laying siege to an important garrison, Harris will attack him, and Tippoo will either retreat or will fight under the same disadvantages that Floyd fought in the last war. He will have a long communication with his country, with our garrisons in his rear; Harris will be in the centre of his own country and garrisons. Therefore the situation of the two British armies cannot be compared.

Now for Maxwell's case.

Maxwell commanded an army which was intended to join General Meadows.

He was pushed forwards into the Barahmahal, then Tippoo's country; he had only three days' provisions when Tippoo appeared in his front; and he had no cavalry, as the only regiment he had was cut up on the day before Tippoo came near him, when it was out reconnoitring.

Under these circumstances it would not have been very prudent in him to fight, and certainly his situation cannot be compared with any one in which it is possible for Harris to be placed. But Tippoo did not dare to attack a British army of that number, even in his situation.

Having now stated the situation of Floyd's and Maxwell's armies, it appears that it is not possible that Harris's can be placed in one at all similar, and therefore that in considering the means of defence for the Carnatic, the example of those armies cannot be reasonably held out.

But, as I said before, the defence of Harris does not rest upon those grounds: he knew that he would not be attacked till a time when a reinforcement would arrive; he knew that if he

were attacked, he could defend himself well with the numbers left in the centre division; he knew that there was no prospect of a speedy and successful termination to any war which might be carried on against Tippoo, if we had not the assistance of the Nizam, which assistance could not be obtained without sending the force ordered to Hyderabad; and therefore sooner than that it should not go, or which is the same thing, than that it should not arrive in time, he sent it from the centre division.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to General Harris. [42.]

23rd Oct., 1798.

Upon sending up the battering train immediately; my concern that the Military Board, by their interference, should have stopped it; that they will not be held responsible for the want of it, and will be loudest in their complaints at its being kept: the advantages of sending it immediately.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Captain Malcolm. [43.]

23rd Oct., 1798.

Respecting the Hyderabad negotiation. That I believe all will end peaceably yet: that I think the resident has suffered Azim ul Omrah to infringe rights given to him by a separate article in the treaty.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [44.]

23rd Oct., 1798.

I enclose Webbe's paper, which I had not seen before. When I have an opportunity of speaking to him, I'll tell him that M. has no objection to his writing to him, and giving him any information he thinks necessary.

What do you think of their having omitted to send away the battering train? It was to have gone last Tuesday. The monsoon has not set in yet, and it would have been very nearly

at Vellore at this time if it had been sent. —— is really not equal to the management of that cursed institution, the Military Board, by whose interference it has been stopped, and is not to be sent till after the monsoon, notwithstanding that in the last war it was taken up even to Bangalore, together with all kinds of military stores and equipments, in the middle of the most violent monsoon ever known. I did not hear of it till the day before yesterday, and have since been at work to get it sent immediately: whether I shall be successful or not, I can't tell. They begin to suspect me, and they keep everything secret. I hear nothing excepting from D. C. or H., and it is quite impossible to be always at the ear of one of them. Not being in office, I am obliged to proceed with great caution. I don't think that it is advisable to let M. know that the Military Board have caused the delay in sending the train, as it will serve only to exasperate him still more against people here, which I don't think necessary. The fact that the train is not gone must come to his knowledge; but as he never desired that it might be sent forward, and as the intention of sending it originated with this Government, upon a suggestion of mine, I don't think that he can well attack them for it as a disobedience of his orders, although he may for stupidity. I leave it to you to do what you please about it.

I find that the letter which I dreaded so much is arrived. I cannot say that it has yet had the effect I apprehended. Lord C. told me that he had received it, but did not show it, which he usually does, and said that the same post brought an account of the arrival of the detachment * at its destination.

Arthur Wellesley.

[45.] *Draft of a Letter to the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

24th Oct., 1798.

I have gained a complete victory: the battering train is to go off to Vellore immediately. They are at this moment getting it out of the fort. If I can only get intelligence of what is going on, I shall be more than equal to the Military Board. I am, however, heartily sick of the business, and wish I was anywhere else. It is reported here that De Meuron is desirous

* The detachment under Colonel Roberts, sent to Hyderabad for the purpose before stated.—*See p. 94, Note 2nd.*—Ed.

of leaving Ceylon: if there be no war, would it not be possible to send me there? I don't wish that this should be mentioned to M.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

REFLECTIONS UPON THE PLAN FOR HAVING THE ARMY IN THE CARNATIC AT ALL TIMES IN A STATE OF PREPARATION. [46.]

26th Oct., 1798.

The first question to be considered is, whether, with any preparation, the greatest army which it is possible for the Company to maintain in the Carnatic can, in co-operation with the army on the Malabar coast, take the field with any prospect of success without assistance in men from Bengal. The object which these armies must have is the siege of Seringapatam, and can they undertake it with any reasonable prospect of success, with the numbers which it is possible for them to bring into the field?

Cavalry:		
Native	1,600	
European	800	
		2,400
Artillery		400
Native infantry		9,000
Europeans		3,500
		15,300

These numbers are according to an enlarged calculation of General Harris, which provides for leaving in Fort St. George, and other necessary garrisons in the Carnatic, a sufficient number of troops to defend them. What the army from the Malabar side would be, it is impossible to say; but I will suppose it 5000 men, composed as usual of European and Native infantry, and of European artillery. Thus the army destined for the siege of Seringapatam would consist of 20,000 men.

It is impossible to decide absolutely whether this army would be sufficient for the siege of Seringapatam without having been at that place, and knowing not only its former but its present situation. We must therefore have recourse to conjecture upon this subject, and must be led by probabilities founded upon the experience of the former war; and we must at the same time take into consideration the circumstances which bear upon the question, and which have occasioned an alteration in

our situation since that time. When Lord Cornwallis made his attempt * he had about 20,000 men. He had, it is true, a larger number of Europeans than the army would have at present, and a larger proportion of artillery; but I believe the total numbers of his army were not greater than what I have above stated that we should have under the arrangement proposed by General Harris.

There are some circumstances, however, in the relative situation of this army and Tippoo's which are considerably advantageous to us. The first of these is, that we have now a considerable body of regularly disciplined cavalry: at that time we had none. Another is, that he had at that time the frontier: we have it now. He had parties which acted constantly in our rear, which obliged Lord Cornwallis occasionally to detach large bodies not only for the immediate protection of his convoys, but for the safety of the Carnatic, and probably that of his own army: as we have now that iron frontier, the fortresses of which we never had in our possession in the last war, there is no reason to expect that the same detachments which were then necessary will be equally so in any war that we may have in future.

Another consideration is, that in the former war the operations from unavoidable causes took two campaigns. One of these was the necessity of reducing Bangalore. At present Bangalore is destroyed; and although that may by some be reckoned a disadvantage, yet as it is not absolutely necessary to adhere to that route to Seringapatam, the disadvantage of wanting the place as a depôt is more than counterbalanced by the advantage of not being obliged to wait to take it. Either by the route of Cauveryporam or Ryacotta, the communication between Seringapatam and one of our own fortresses is nearly as short as it is between that place and Bangalore; and there is this additional advantage by using one of these last routes, that there will be no necessity to take many of those large and strong hill forts to which Lord Cornwallis laid siege and took in the last war. This will save much time.

Another circumstance of advantage in the destruction of Bangalore is, that, as probably the operations will not linger out to two campaigns, there will not be so much necessity for a junction with the Allies as there was in the last war, and time will

* Mysore war in 1791-2.—Ed.

not be lost in effecting the junction, and time and troops will be saved in taking the places of which it was necessary to have possession in order to insure their communication with their own country, and all the benefits which we must expect to derive from their co-operation. In every future war the possession of our present frontier will enable us to commence our operations more from the southward, and the measures taken to secure a supply of grain upon the scene of action will enable us to proceed without the immediate assistance of our Allies.

Under these circumstances, then, it appears not only that the army would be as large as that which Lord Cornwallis had, and with which he succeeded, but that this country has many advantages at present which it had not at that time, and which would enable the Government to undertake the operation with a better prospect of success than it had formerly, and of success in a shorter period of time.

Those, however, who know most upon this subject, at least whose official situation enables them to be the best judges, say that this number of men is not sufficient, and that it is impossible to commence the operations against Tippoo Sultaun without assistance in men from Bengal. It becomes therefore necessary to consider the question relating to the state of preparation of this army with a reference to that assertion, supposing it to be well grounded.

The march of a detachment, say of six thousand men, from Bengal, may be supposed to take six months at least. Whether the number of men is six thousand or eight thousand, it is a matter of indifference; but it is certain that, whatever the number may be, it cannot take less than six months, and probably it will take more, to bring them down by land.

If then it will take six months to bring down that which will alone enable the Government to undertake anything effectual against the enemy, why may not the preparations be making during the time that the reinforcement is on its march? Why should the Company be put to the expense of keeping up an immense army of 15,000 men constantly in a state of preparation for the field, when those who are in the command of it, and who propose that it should be kept up to that extent, are of opinion that even then it can do nothing?

The question then is, is it advisable to incur this large expense under these circumstances? Those articles of preparation

which will occasion expense are, 1st, an establishment of bullocks for the train; 2ndly, one for carriage; 3rdly, a depôt of grain; 4thly, an augmentation of the Native troops, in order to make the number of those in the centre division in readiness equal to 9000; 5thly, camp equipage for the officers.

There is no doubt but that bullocks might be provided for the train during the time that the Bengal detachment would be coming down, if it is to come down by land; and therefore that it may be said that the expense of keeping up draught bullocks in time of peace, with a view to their use in war, would not be necessary. However, in answer thereto, it may be said, 1st, that the measures which I shall propose presently may bring the Bengal detachment here in a shorter period than six months; 2ndly, that the draught bullocks which will have been trained for a certain time, will be better than any which are provided just at the moment when they are wanted; 3rdly, not a military, but a political object will be gained by having some bullocks, as it will not be necessary that foreign powers should know the full extent of our preparations, and probably they may have the effect of preventing the execution of any hostile design. I therefore think that at all events it is advisable to have always 1500 draught bullocks ready.

2ndly. The carriage bullocks.

I understand that these are to be had in any number by making advances to the bullock owners or maistries in proportion to the number wanted; that two months will give any number that the army may want; and that any permanent expense, however great (short of the expense of keeping at all times the entire number wanted), would not produce them in a shorter time. If this is the case, it is not advisable to incur any expense under this head.

3rdly. The expense of a depôt of grain is so trifling, it gives so much ease to all the first movements of the army, and renders its operations so certain, that it ought certainly to be incurred.

4thly. The augmentation of the army.

General Harris proposes that* regiments should be added to its present numbers, even supposing that all the regiments were in the Carnatic, &c., and that other means of defence were found for Ceylon and the conquests to the eastward. According to his distribution, there would then be 9000 disposable

* Blank in manuscript.—Ed.

Native infantry in the centre division, and all the garrisons would be amply provided for. Here will be the great expense; and as even that number of men will not enable this Government to make a forward movement, and as a reinforcement from Bengal must still be waited for, I recommend that no part of it should be incurred.

The number which I think sufficient is from 4000 to 5000 Natives in the centre division; and the number of regiments which therefore ought to be struck off General Harris's account is two. The manner in which I propose to provide the remainder of the men is, 1st. To put the Bengal marine battalion upon the establishment, and make it a regiment of two battalions, or 2000 men, all to be raised at Chittagong. 2ndly. To turn the Calcutta militia into another marine regiment of 2000 men. 3rdly. If the Nawab-Vizier will consent to reduce his establishment of troops, and to take our troops in lieu of them, to raise at Chittagong and upon the sea coast all the regiments which must be added to the establishment in consequence thereof; but at all events to add a third marine regiment of 2000 men to the establishment, even if you should be obliged to reduce one of the high caste regiments at present in the service. These marine regiments should always be kept at Barrackpoor,* Midnapoor,† Burhampoor,‡ &c. &c., in the neighbourhood of Calcutta: they would answer equally well with the others for doing the duty of those places; and they would not only enable the Supreme Government, in addition to volunteers, to send to this country a large body of troops in a short time at short notice, but they would be a body of troops which might be employed in all parts of India, and would therefore add infinitely to the power of the Company, which is cramped by the prejudices and habits of the Bengal Native troops.

If it should be necessary to add any regiments to this establishment in consequence of the arrangements with the Nizam, they ought to be raised here; as the sepoys of this country are

* A town with a military cantonment on the left bank of the river Hooghly, 16 miles N. of Calcutta.—Ed.

† A town on the route from Calcutta to Cuttack, 68 miles W. of Calcutta. —Ed.

‡ Burhampoor, or *Barhanpura*, a town and military station of Lower Bengal, is situated on the river Bhagruttee or Cossimbazar, a great offset of the Ganges. It is distant from Calcutta by land 118 and by water 161 miles, and lies five miles to the south of the large city of Moorshedabad.—Ed.

cheaper, and I must say better, than any that can be got in Bengal. It may then be said, why not raise in this country any force which must be raised avowedly for the purposes of its defence? It must be observed, however, there will be no additional force, at least a very small one: it will be only an arrangement, making a battalion a regiment, turning militia into regulars, and making a high caste regiment one which will go to sea.

4thly. Camp equipage for the officers.

What has been said upon the subject of carriage bullocks applies equally to the means of conveying camp equipage. It can always be got ready before the army is ready to take the field, but a sufficiency for a very large body of troops ought to be kept in the stores in the centre division.

Having noticed those subjects which General Harris has mentioned, I come now to the consideration of one of which he has taken no notice. It is the repair of the garrisons upon the frontier and in the Carnatic. Both require it, and it will cost some money immediately, as well as annually a certain sum.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[47.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 28th Oct., 1798.

When ——— went to Bengal, I forgot to mention him to you or to Mornington, and I am afraid that your wish to be civil to a relation of Lady Anne's will induce you to attend to him more than he deserves. He has been more concerned in the dirty business of this country than any man that ever was in it. He has more Durbar jobs * than anybody (a very enormous one, I believe, now takes him to Bengal), and he is a disgrace to the King's army, to which, I am sorry to say, he belongs.

Ten eighteen-pounders and a large quantity of shot went away yesterday. Ten more will go to-morrow. There was a little rain last night, but nothing which can spoil the roads or impede the progress of the guns. The weather is now very fine, and appears settled.

* Pecuniary arrangements with the Ministers of Native courts.—ED.

I wish you joy of the fortunate conclusion of the business at Hyderabad, of which I have just heard.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [48.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 31st Oct., 1798.

I have been endeavouring to have means taken to provide a sufficient number of bullocks for the army in case it should take the field immediately after the monsoon. They have now about 12,000, which could with ease be augmented to about 20,000, and the number wanted will be about 40,000. There is but one method of getting them, that is, to make advances to the bullock owners and head maistries, who will furnish them at the time wanted with their drivers and pack-saddles, &c. &c.: these advances go in part payment of the monthly hire if the bullocks are used; the money is lost (I believe) if they are not used. However, as this is the only method in which bullocks can be got, I don't conceive that money thus laid out can be said to be thrown away, as having the bullocks will tend to the preservation of peace. There is one difficulty in the way of the execution of this plan, and that is, that the Government-General have given authority only to make such preparations as would not lead to expense, but have not given authority or orders to hire bullocks or to lay out money upon the preparations for war. I have not seen the orders from the Government of Bengal, but I am told that they are as I have above mentioned. I have urged the necessity of making the advances to the bullock owners for the whole number of bullocks wanted, notwithstanding the orders of the Government of Bengal, which I conceive to be grounded upon an opinion (certainly an erroneous one) that measures can be taken without expense to furnish bullocks at a short notice. The spirit of all the public and private letters has been *to make preparations*. If there are no bullocks, or not a sufficiency of them, there is no effectual preparation; and as nothing can procure them when they will be wanted excepting making the advances immediately, I have urged the propriety of doing so, and of adhering to the spirit rather than to the letter of orders which evidently must have

been written when the Government of Bengal were not aware of the methods in which bullocks can be procured in this country.

I mention this, because I hope I have succeeded, and that the advances at least for those bullocks which are to be furnished by the southern countries, and from the northward, will be made directly. For those to be furnished by Madras and its neighbourhood, and to the westward, perhaps, there need be no advance immediately. If the Government do wrong, let the blame be laid to my charge. In my opinion I have acted for the best.

Speak to Mr. George Robinson upon this subject: he can give you the best information.

I have likewise prevailed upon Lord Clive to appoint a commissary of stores, and I think he will appoint a commissary of grain and provisions.

Matters will then be brought into some shape, and we shall know what we are about, instead of trusting to the vague calculations of a parcel of blockheads, who know nothing, and have no data.

I have been working at these objects ever since my arrival, and have only now in part succeeded.

Lord Clive writes to Mornington this day, I believe, and will state these matters to him.

He has had a message from Meer Saduck, Tippoo's dewan, desiring leave to come into the Carnatic and to throw himself under the protection of the English. I have advised him to give a general answer: 1st, because I don't see what end it will answer to have Meer Saduck in our possession. 2ndly, because if he come, either we must give him up when we settle matters with Tippoo if he require it, or we must keep him contrary to his inclination, which is not unlikely to throw a great difficulty in the way of the negotiation. If he come for safety, without encouragement, he must expect to be given up if it suits our interests.

The news from Hyderabad has had great effect here.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

The weather still fine. Some appearance of the monsoon. I ought to have written some of this in cypher, but I really had not time.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [49.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 6th Nov., 1798.

I have no news for you.

The monsoon has set in, but not very violently; it has rained, however, incessantly for these last four days. The first division of the train was to have arrived at Vellore this day; it will now probably not arrive till the 10th or 12th, even if the weather should clear up.

The advances for 40,000 bullocks are made, and everything going on well, I believe. I have not seen Lord Clive, or anybody, these five days, as the weather is so bad that we all keep our houses.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [50.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 9th Nov., 1798.

I enclose you a letter, and an extract of another, from Lieutenant Sydenham, of the Engineers, to his father, which gives a good account of the nature of the French force at Hyderabad, and has had great effect here. I think that from that it appears very clearly, not only that it would have made our situation in the Carnatic a very unpleasant one in a short time, but that at the moment it was destroyed it was more firmly established than we are at Madras, and that it had means of preservation, independently of its connection with European powers, which we here want entirely; these were, magazines, founderies, arsenals, armouries, &c. &c.

Send back Sydenham's letter, and let me know what you and Mornington think of it. It is the only account that I have seen that mentions the establishments which he notices.

The battering train is arrived at Vellore: it got there even sooner than we expected if the weather had held up. The second division crossed the Palar on the 5th. There are accounts of Tippoo's preparations, which we certainly had reason to expect. However, we are as forward as he can be, and I don't fear him. He may go to the southward, which will annoy us a little; but if our army were in the field on its

march to his capital, we should not be able to stop him in any other way.

I hear rumours of Zemaun Shah's approach. The plot thickens.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[51.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 10th Nov., 1798.

An overland despatch is arrived with some very good news, of which I wish you joy. It is particularly good at this moment, and, in my opinion, will have the greatest effect upon the mind of our neighbour at the top of the hill.

I understand that there is a secret despatch, which, however, I have not yet seen, as I have not been with Lord Clive since its arrival.

I see that Major-Generals are made. This promotion brings me to the top of the list of Colonels, and I shall certainly be a Major-General upon the next. That may be in January, or perhaps not till the following year, but at all events I shall be a Major-General at or before the peace.

The rules of the Company's service, and the custom of the King's, will then oblige me to go home.

I hear that Zemaun Shah has advanced to the Attock,* but I scarcely believe that he can be at Delhi in six weeks from thence, as it is supposed he will. You will have ample time for preparation.

So little is known of the north-west frontier, notwithstanding that it has been so long in our hands, that it is impossible to give even a general opinion of what line it would be best to pursue; whether to confine ourselves to the defence of Lucknow and Allahabad, or to prevent the enemy from crossing the Jumna. I should prefer the latter as the most certain method of defence; and it must be recollected that Abdallah† beat the Mahrattas by driving them from the Dooab over the Jumna.

* *Attock* (from Atac, a limit) is the name of a town and fort on the Indus, near the junction of the Cabool river, formerly called *Taxila*. Alexander the Great here crossed the Indus to invade the Punjab, B.C. 327-8.—ED.

† As chief of the Abdalli tribe, *the Abdalli* was the frequent designation of the Affghan invader who so signally defeated the Mahrattas at Paniput in 1761.—ED.

It is a most fertile spot, and ought not to be given up in a hurry.

Whatever plan is followed, Allahabad must be secured, and quantities of stores and grain must be thrown into it. If the passage of the Jumna be prevented, as long as the Ganges is navigable the army in the Dooab can be supplied with ease from thence by means of boats.

A corps de réserve ought to be formed somewhere about Chunar,*—I don't mean to weaken Sir James Craig's army, but in case Zemaun Shah advances, all the corps and force in the lower provinces should rendezvous thereabouts; and in case of accidents, which may happen, they will be ready to apply the remedy. In case of insurrection or rebellion by any of the great jaghiredars in Oude, they will be of great use.

Besides, an army of cavalry acting against infantry in an extended country is so likely to give its adversary the slip and get to his rear, that I should not think Benares and our own provinces secure from plunder, if there were not a good corps de réserve somewhere in the Zemindary. The Rajah of Berar is a good mark for a body of cavalry, if the Nabob of Oude has none. If Zemaun Shah advances only as far as Lahore this season, and waits till the next for his attack upon Hindustan, Tippoo ought to be attacked and reduced if possible in this year, or he ought to be made to give the most undoubted security for his future good behaviour.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft Letter to the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [52.]

Madras, 13th Nov., 1798.

To mention that the Bengal rice sent down is so bad that it is feared it cannot be used. To recommend that care should be taken that the 30,000 bags are good and of a proper kind, and in general that all the departments should be desired to pay

* A strong fortress, built on a rocky eminence which rises about 150 feet on the right bank of the Ganges, 16 miles S.W. of Benares, and 437 miles N.W. of Calcutta.—ED.

particular attention to their duty during the wars which may be expected.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[53.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Fort St. George, 22nd Nov., 1798.

I am glad to find that a letter for Tippoo is arrived here, and that you intend to depute Doveton to him. His answer to this letter will probably enable us to judge whether we shall have a war or not; but as you must remain armed during the negotiation, I am still very anxious that you should come here. It is probable that many little points will arise, upon all of which it will be necessary that you should decide; and it is therefore impossible to expect that the negotiation will be concluded in any reasonable time if you remain at Calcutta. Your being here or there will make a difference of one month upon every point which it may be necessary to refer to your decision. The monthly expense of keeping the army in the field, and of 50,000 bullocks, is enormous; and if the saving of that for a few months is the only object gained by your coming, it deserves the trouble and inconvenience which you will suffer by the voyage. But not only you will accelerate the negotiation, but Tippoo and the Allies will believe that you are much more in earnest if you come here than if you remain at Calcutta; he will be the more induced to grant what you will require; if he refuse, they will be the more ready to come forward with their assistance, and every body will be strongly impressed with a sense of your determination to suffer no personal inconvenience to prevent you from moving when the public interests require it.

So that you see, even if peace is probable, I think you ought to be here. I'll now state my sentiments upon that point under the supposition that Tippoo will be inclined to go to war.

His plan in that case will be to linger out the negotiations until the season will be so far advanced that it will be impossible to attack his capital until after the next Malabar rains.

There are two plans of operation, either of which may be followed in this season, if everything is ready, and from either of which success might in the end be expected.

In order to obtain it, however, the army ought to march from Vellore by the 20th of January.

According to one plan, which might be adopted in this campaign, independently of the Allies, if a sufficient number of troops come from Bengal by sea, the army would advance by the Cauveryporam Pass and the right bank of the Cauvery. It is supposed that by this route a cavalry army would not be so necessary, as the Cauvery and the enclosed country through which the road passes would give great security to the convoys. The army might arrive at Seringapatam in the beginning of March, and the months of March and April would be left for the operations of the siege.

According to the other, the army would enter the Mysore country to the northward of the Cauvery: until a junction is formed with the Nizam's force, it would be obliged to operate towards the northward, as his cavalry will be necessary to cover the supplies of grain, &c., coming from the rear.

If this last plan be adopted, it is hardly reasonable to expect to arrive before Seringapatam in this season, even if the army should march at the time I have before mentioned, not only on account of the probable slowness of the Nizamites, but on account of the number of places of which it will be necessary to have possession in order to insure the safety of the convoys.

But if the army does not march, whether by the one route or the other, in the month of January, certainly nothing effectual can be done in this year; and if war should be necessary, there will be left for us only to advance into his country by one of the northern passes, to clear the way for the Nizam's forces and ourselves by taking the places of which I have above mentioned it will be desirable to have possession, and to have everything prepared to advance upon his capital in the beginning of the next season. In the mean time Tippoo will descend the Gudjelhatty Pass and overrun the southern countries.

He knows all this as well, if not better, than we do, and I'll now consider it in reference to your coming here.

The earliest day on which we here can expect Tippoo's answer to your letter is the 20th of December.* It then goes to

* The expected reply of Tippoo to the letters of the Governor-General of 4th and 8th November was dated 18th December, and reached Madras on the 25th of the same month. The Sultaun, whose sole object was to gain time to secure efficient co-operation against the English, assured Lord Mornington that the

you; and, if your instructions and letters are ready written, it will be the 20th of January before we can receive them. Doveton may arrive at Seringapatam in the first week in February.

However, the time for the campaign will then be gone by; nothing can be done in this season for which Tippoo will care; he will know that if we enter his country he can do the same with ours, and that although he may suffer for it in the end, we shall be the greatest sufferers immediately; nay, that he may cripple our resources to such a degree as to make his suffering at all very problematical. In this I suppose only one (the first necessary) reference to you; but it is probable there will be many: many points may be started in his answer to your letter which it will be necessary for you to consider maturely, and all these will create a delay which must be fatal to the speedy success of your military operations, should they be necessary.

There is not the same chance of misfortune if you are here. Doveton will arrive at Seringapatam in the first week in January. He may be able to judge from the state of preparation in which he will find Tippoo's army, and probably at his first interview with him, whether or not he is disposed to peace. Your army in the mean time may advance to the frontier, which will not a little tend to the success of the negotiation; and even if Tippoo should succeed in deceiving you, if the time should pass away, and, hostilities being necessary, it should be too late to do anything effectual in this season, you will be on the spot to provide a defence for the southern countries, either by weakening Ceylon, by detaching from the main army, by forcing the Nabob to fortify his places, or by such other means as may be advisable. No person in India, excepting yourself, has the power to move a soldier from Ceylon, if it should be necessary.

intelligence of the complete victory obtained by the English fleet over that of France on the shores of Egypt had given him "more pleasure than could possibly be described in writing;" and expressed "the firmest hope that the leaders of the English and the Company Bahauder, who ever adhere to the paths of sincerity and are the well-wishers of mankind, will at all times be successful and victorious; and that the French, who are of a crooked disposition, faithless, and the enemy of mankind, may be ever depressed and ruined."

At this very time Tippoo was engaged in negotiating an alliance with the French Republic for an auxiliary force to assist "in driving the English into the sea;" and he had already received from the Mauritius a volunteer corps of about 100 Red Republicans, raised under proclamation, by Governor Malartic. —(*Wellesley Despatches*, vol. i., pp. 381-82.)—Ed.

In short, there is every reason why you should come, and none why you should not, excepting that you will suffer a little personal inconvenience, which I put out of the question. You have the *Bombay* frigate, the *Sybille*, and some Indiamen in Bengal; these could bring yourself, your secretaries and family to Madras in five days, and you might return in or after the month of February in the same space of time. I don't conceive that anything in Bengal can require your presence so much as it will be required here pending the negotiation with Tippoo.

I am so anxious upon this subject, that I shall send this letter by express, in hopes that you will receive it so as to be able to prepare to come away by the 15th of December, if you should agree with me that it is desirable that you should be here.

I don't think it improbable but that what I have above mentioned may have occurred to you or to Henry, or some of your friends in Bengal; but I have been so much accustomed to give you my opinion, that I cannot forbear doing it upon the present occasion, which I think the most interesting of your Government.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Upon reading over my letter, I find that I have omitted one circumstance which has made a great impression upon my mind. Whether Tippoo be peaceably inclined or otherwise, his grand object will be to gain time till he can see the event of what is going on in Europe and in Egypt. For this your being at Calcutta will be favourable. When he hears of your arrival here, his whole plan will be overturned, and he will be obliged immediately to take a determined line either for peace or war. That is all you can desire.

If you should determine upon coming, send off a pilot schooner to let us know it, that I may prepare for you.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [54.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 26th Nov., 1798.

I have just received your letter of the 12th.

I have not seen Lord Clive's minute which you mention, but I will endeavour to get a sight of it.

I hope that this letter will arrive before Mornington will have written to Lord Clive, after the perusal of the general letter which you mention. It is of the utmost consequence to the success of all his measures that they should remain upon good terms, and that Mornington, in conformity to his own determination, should refrain from all discussions with this Government: those alone can occasion any unpleasant difference, the inevitable consequence of which must be to bring into notice and increase the influence of —— and others, who must manage the discussion on this side; as, whatever I may think of Lord Clive's abilities, I don't deem him equal to cope with Mornington. He will, therefore, call in the assistance of those who he thinks most able, and thus will his dependence upon and confidence in them be increased.

My opinion is, that when Lord Clive was signing the general letter, he did not know whether everything was put into its proper department; nor did he know that it was not his duty to sign to every part of the letter. This is to be attributed to his inexperience in business, and not to opinions which he may be supposed to have formed inimical to the measures of the Supreme Government; as, notwithstanding his extreme reserve and caution in delivering his opinions, I have got out of him what he thinks of the measures of that Government, and he has unequivocally stated it as his opinion that Mornington could not do otherwise than he has done, both with respect to the Allies and to the enemy. Indeed this opinion is very general in the settlement. If he has done an improper thing in writing in the public department upon a subject which had been before the Council in the secret department; if, contrary to the usual forms of office, business which ought to have remained for some time longer in the latter was improperly removed to the former, I think that it would be advisable that Mornington should write him a private letter about it, and warn him of the bad consequences of such a departure from the rules of office. He might particularly state the bad consequences it will have in the instance alluded to, and that as his name will convey his sanction of opinions which he had not adopted, it ought not to have appeared to that part of the letter which mentioned the acts of General Harris' Government.

I hope Mornington will come here: his presence is really necessary on many accounts.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I have just seen General Harris, who says that he recollects the minute of the 14th October in some degree; that he believes it was in general terms, stating Lord Clive's sentiments upon the situation of the Government when he came to it; and that he particularly mentioned in it that although he signed the whole letter, he could not be supposed to be concerned in any of the acts or sentiments of the former Government.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [55.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 28th Nov., 1798.

I am happy to find that Mornington is pleased with Lord Clive: I am convinced that he means well upon all occasions, and if he ever goes wrong, it is to be attributed to his inexperience in business, and not to his want of inclination to do what will be of service to the public, and agreeable to Mornington's wishes. He has not shown me the letter of the 14th which you say Mornington wrote to him.

I have received a letter from the Admiral, dated off Tellicherry, 14th November, in which he says that he had received a report, to which he gives credit, stating that Commodore Blanquet was arrived in the Red Sea. The Admiral was going to Bombay, I believe.

Montgomery,* who has been on the Malabar side of India for some time in search of horses for the cavalry, has contrived to pick up a large lot which Tippoo had purchased in the Guzerat country.

It is reported here that the family of Gholam Mahomed and a large treasure belonging to him have been taken. The amount of the treasure is stated to be three crores of rupees. If this is true, Mornington is certainly the most fortunate man that ever governed a country.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I hope to see you soon. Lord Clive and everybody here agree

* Captain, afterwards Sir Henry, Montgomery, M.P.—ED.

that it is absolutely necessary that Mornington should come, and yet they don't know enough to be aware of the extent of the necessity.

I am sorry to inform you that, excepting on the four first days of the monsoon, we have not had a drop of rain. Rice has risen much in price, and there are very alarming appearances of a famine. At all events the season is so far advanced, that even if there should be a good fall of rain, which may still be expected, grain will be scarce. I give timely notice of this, not only because a scarcity of grain will be fatal to our military operations, but because I am convinced that if the necessary measures for relieving the scarcity are taken immediately, they will cost less money, and will have three times the benefit that might be expected from them if they are delayed.

[56.] *Draft of a Letter to Colonel Cliffe.*

29th Nov., 1798.

In the monthly return which I shall send in on the 1st of December, it is my intention to return Captain MacDowall absent without leave. This gentleman left the 33rd Regiment on account of bad health in the month of September, 1796, upon leave from General Craig for nine months, which leave has since been renewed by his Royal Highness the Duke of York for three months from June, 1797. When he went away from the Cape he promised that he would either come out at the expiration of his first leave, or that he would sell to, or exchange with, some person of whom Lord Cornwallis should approve; and not only he has not adhered to his engagement, but he has stayed away nearly fifteen months beyond the term of his renewed leave of absence, and has not once written either to his commanding officer or to any officer in the regiment.

The 33rd are much in want of captains. There are but six with the regiment in India, of whom one, Captain Quin, is captain-lieutenant and adjutant; another, Captain Norcott, is in so bad a state of health that it is impossible to retain him in the country; and two others, Captains MacPherson and Anderson, are in such a state of health as certainly to be unfit for active service. These circumstances induce me to request that the Commander-in-Chief will order Captain MacDowall's commission to be sold, which, it is to be observed, he promised should

be done in case he did not return to the regiment at the time he promised he would.

Captain MacDowall purchased a Captain-Lieutenancy, but he did not purchase his company; and I therefore presume to suggest that, according to his Majesty's regulations, he should be allowed to sell only what he purchased. I am the more anxious upon this last part of the subject, because it will bring the price of the commission within the means of Lieutenant West, the oldest lieutenant of the regiment, a most deserving young man, who has been some time a subaltern, was adjutant of the regiment, and of a battalion of grenadiers, and has been fairly commended by those under whom he served.

I shall write an official letter upon this subject when I send in the return; in the mean time I write this that you may be prepared upon it, and that you may have an early opportunity of speaking to his Excellency about it.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Draft of a Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton.** [57.]

30th Nov., 1798.

That I beg to know what he thinks of Mr. Guthrie, his serjeant; that in general I have an objection to making officers of people from the ranks. That I can't go to him.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Cliffe, Adjutant-General. [58.]

SIR, 1st Dec., 1798.

I beg that you will draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to that part of the monthly return of the 33rd Regiment in which Captain M'Dowall is returned absent without leave. That officer left the regiment at the Cape on account of his health, by leave of Sir James Craig, for nine months; and when he went away he left with Colonel Sherbrooke, the then commanding officer, the letter which I have the honour to enclose.

After his arrival in England, His Royal Highness the Duke of York extended his leave for three months, from June, 1797;

* Now Field-Marshal Viscount Combermere, G.C.B., &c.—ED.

and therefore since September, 1797, he has been absent without leave, and he has not written to his commanding officer, nor has he held any communication whatever with his regiment.

The 33rd are much in want of Captains, three of those who are with the regiment in India being in such a bad state of health as to render it very probable that they will not be fit for active service, and one, the Captain-Lieutenant, is Adjutant.

I therefore take the liberty of requesting His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to permit Captain M'Dowall's commission to be sold, which he will observe he engaged should be done by his letter in nine months if he did not return to the regiment, or if he did not effect an exchange into another corps serving upon a different establishment.

It is my duty to inform His Excellency that Captain M'Dowall purchased only a Captain-Lieutenancy; he received his company for nothing; and therefore I presume that in case His Excellency should permit his commission to be disposed of, he will order it to be sold at the regulated price of a Captain-Lieutenancy, in conformity to His Majesty's regulation. In that case I take the liberty of recommending that Lieutenant West, the oldest Lieutenant of the 33rd, should be promoted to be Captain vice M'Dowall; and that Ensign Warren, the oldest Ensign with the regiment, should be promoted to be Lieutenant vice West. In aid of my recommendation, it is but justice to Mr. West to mention that he has been above five years a Lieutenant, during three of which, the campaigns on the Continent included, he was Adjutant of the regiment; that he was afterwards Adjutant of a battalion of grenadiers, and he has always conducted himself to the satisfaction of myself and of the officers under whom he has served.

The money for this promotion is lodged in case His Excellency should approve of it.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[59.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 4th Dec., 1798.

I have had an opportunity of mentioning to Lord Clive that Mornington was not pleased that the discussion between this

Government and that of Bengal was placed in the public department in the general letter. Of course I told him that it was not imagined that it was done with his knowledge. He declared that it was not; that he conceived it to be very improper; and I think it made more impression upon him against ———, if that be an object, than anything that could be done. If Mornington writes him the kind of letter I recommended, and does not mention ———, I think it will have a good effect.

Lord Clive thinks that it would be a good thing to send a regiment of European infantry to the Nizam's army, in order to enable them to join ours in Tippoo's country. This will save the time that it will take to bring them into our country to form the junction, and the destruction which they will cause in it. I should like to go there if the plan be adopted; but it is to be recollected that I am an older officer than Roberts, and indeed so are the commanding officers of all the King's regiments upon this establishment.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [60.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Fort St. George, 14th Dec., 1798.

As Mr. Cockerell recommends Mr. Briscoe, I have no objection to taking him. Let me hear that 400*l.* are lodged in the hands of Lambert and Ross, and I will recommend him for an Ensigncy in the 33rd Regiment.

I rather imagine that Lord Clive intends to appoint his aide-de-camp Captain Brown regulating officer of the Madras militia, and I shall not, therefore, recommend Coleman to him.

I hope that the rice which is about to come from Bengal will be good. I fear that this country is in a most alarming situation. The tanks are none of them full, and many of them have no water at all; the whole country is burnt up, and to-morrow is the day on which, in general, in former years the monsoon has ceased, and that the flagstaff has been hoisted. It is true that we may still have some rain, but so much of the season has gone by, that, even in that case, we shall have a scarcity, and, if we have no more rain, a famine. There has been no rice in the bazaar

at Madras or in the neighbourhood for some time. I hope that Government have represented all these things; but in a letter which I wrote you some time ago I prepared you for them, and of course Mornington will have turned his mind to the means of supplying this country from Bengal if it should be necessary.

I am much obliged to Mornington for having recommended me to Mr. Dundas for the Staff in this country. There are so many people above me on the list who are desirous of being on the Staff that I fear I shall not be put upon it. If the war lasts in Europe, and that it becomes rather more active than it has been for some time past, I should prefer serving there; but as that may not happen, and as I am obliged to serve in some part of the world, however disagreeable this country is, I don't know whether I may not as well remain here as go to any other place. I have been perfectly well in India, and I don't much care about being in a disagreeable place.

I have shown to Lord Clive the extracts of Mornington's letters to the Court of Directors and Secret Committee which you sent me. I told him that, although I was convinced they were not intended for his inspection, yet they gave me so much satisfaction, and were likely to be so satisfactory to him, that I could not refrain from showing them to him, and I particularly requested that he would not mention to Mornington that he had seen them. I enclose his answer to my note, which shows how much pleasure they gave him.

I think it right that he should know Mornington's opinion of him, and it would be impossible to make it known to him in any other manner.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Arthur Wellesley.

MY DEAR SIR, 12th Dec., 1798.

I thank you most cordially for your obliging communication, and for the very kind interest you take in what must be so pleasing to me. Though I am not to express to Lord Mornington how sensible I am to this mark of his approbation, it will operate as an additional impulse to the inclination I have always felt to promote the views of his Government.

I am, &c.,

CLIVE.

To Cornet James Bowles. [61.]

SIR, Fort St. George, 14th Dec., 1798.

Mr. Wellesley has enclosed to me your letter, and thinking that you were at Madras, he desired me to deliver a message to you, of which, however, as you are absent, I write the purport in this letter. When Lord Mornington was here, in consequence of what Lord Downshire had said to him, he recommended you to General Harris; the consequence of this recommendation has, I believe, been that you are appointed adjutant of a regiment of cavalry, which it is probable is all the General has had in his power to do for you. Lord Mornington supposes that when a person recommended to him has merit, which is requisite in officers in high situations upon the staff of the army, General Harris will appoint them without any further interference on his part, and he therefore never interferes in the disposal of military patronage. He has, however, referred your letter to me, and has desired me to lay it before Lord Clive if I thought it advisable. Although I have not the honour of being much acquainted with you, I take the liberty of giving my opinion upon the subject. I am afraid that Lord Clive and General Harris would not receive a very favourable impression of an officer of your rank and standing in the service, who should desire to be appointed deputy-quartermaster-general a very few days after he has been appointed adjutant to a regiment of cavalry; and I am also afraid that if I were to make the proposal to either of them, he would think either that I was not in earnest, or that I made a bad use of the liberty which he might allow me to take in talking to him upon these subjects.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to General Harris. [62.]

20th Dec., 1798.

That Colonel Aston * is very ill, but not in immediate danger, although it is very great. That I have taken the command of the troops.

* Then in temporary command of the troops assembled at Arnee preparatory to the formation of the grand army intended for the attack on

In the conversation I had with you, it appeared that you understood that the officer in command here communicated with Colonel Read, and that, upon information from him of any movement of the enemy, the force under my command could be assembled at Wallajah-Nuggur, or wherever it might be deemed advisable. I beg to refer you to the letter from Colonel Close to Colonel Aston, of the 23rd November, by which it does not appear to be your intention that the troops should move until Colonel Aston received orders from head-quarters, nor is any other place of encampment mentioned excepting Wallajah-Nuggur. I wrote to you *privately* upon this subject, as I may have misunderstood you in conversation, and that the letter from Colonel Close, which is perfectly clear, is intended as my only instruction. I shall be much obliged to you, however, if you will look it over and let me know whether you intend that I should communicate with Colonel Read, and in case of intimation from him of any movements by the enemy I am to assemble the force under my command immediately.

Mr. Webbe is here, and I have communicated to him my doubts respecting my powers of assembling the force without receiving further orders from head-quarters. He tells me that he sent directions to Colonel Read to communicate any intelligence he might receive of the enemy's movements to the officer

Seringapatam. Colonel Aston was senior to Colonel Wellesley, and the latter was nominated to the command when the former became incapable of attending to its duties, as shown in the following letter.—ED.

To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.

SIR, Fort St. George, 18th Dec., 1798.

In the present state of Colonel Aston's health, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council judges it expedient to furnish you with conditional orders to assume the command intrusted to that officer. If, therefore, upon your arrival at Arnee, Colonel Aston should be incapable of carrying into effect the arrangement for assembling the troops destined for field-service, and if any movement of the enemy, or intelligence of any intended movement, should render it necessary to carry that plan into immediate execution, you are hereby authorised and empowered to take upon you the command of the troops, according to the orders with which Colonel Aston has been furnished by the Commander-in-Chief.

The Governor in Council is desirous that no use may be made of this order unless the situation of Colonel Aston should render it necessary.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. WEBBE,

Secretary to Government.

in command here, with the intention that the troops might be assembled in case of necessity without a reference to the Presidency. Therefore, in case of such necessity before I receive your further directions, I shall assemble the troops, as I should imagine that the letter from Colonel Close to Colonel Aston giving him such powers must have been mislaid.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM ON BAZAARS. [63.]

20th Dec., 1798.

1. As it is probable that the bazaars of the army will be formed upon the same principle as they were in the last war, it is desirable that those of the corps under the command of Colonel Wellesley should be so formed as soon as possible.

2. For the present the bazaars are put under the direction of Quartermaster of Brigade Kelly, and all the dealers in the different bazaars will be under his direction and control.

3. The bazaars will be established as follows: First, there will be for the present one grand bazaar, which will be placed in the rear of head-quarters; secondly, one regimental bazaar to each corps of European and Native cavalry, and each corps of Native infantry.

4. Those corps of European artillery and infantry which bring bazaars with them to camp will send their dealers to the grand bazaar, taking care to take a list of their names and trades, of which they will give a copy to Quartermaster of Brigade Kelly. This is ordered, lest, when the whole army joins, it should be thought advisable that the regiments of European infantry should have regimental bazaars.

5. No duties whatever to be levied in any of the bazaars, excepting on spirituous liquors and the articles sold in the bhangarah shops.*

6. Those duties to be applied as ordered hereafter.

7. There is to be one shop for the sale of spirituous liquors in the grand bazaar; it is to be situated in the most conspicuous part of it, and is to be under the inspection of the cutwal,† who

* Bhangarah, a seller of bhang and other intoxicating substances.—ED.

† Or kotwal, the chief officer of police in a city or town; also a superintendent of markets.—ED.

is to see that due order is maintained. He is to be assisted by the bazaar guard; he is not to suffer liquor to be sold to Europeans, nor any to be carried away from the shops, nor drinking to excess.

8. There is to be no shop for the sale of spirituous liquors in the regimental bazaars, and only one bhangarah shop in each.

9. A proportion of shopmen and dealers in various articles will be attached to the grand and to each regimental bazaar.

10. The establishment of servants of the grand bazaar is to be for the present as follows:

One head cutwal.	Two writers.
One head chowdrie.*	One peon.†
One dubash.†	Five dundeahs.‡

11. The establishment of servants of each regimental bazaar is to be as follows, with the salary as set opposite the denomination of each:

One head chowdrie	5 pagodas.	
One writer	2 „	
Two dundeahs	1½ „	each.

12. The regimental bazaars will be under the directions of commanding officers of battalions for everything which concerns their detail. They will appoint those whom they think most proper to be the chowdries and other servants. Each chowdrie will report to his commanding officer daily, who, in case of dispute or any matter which concerns his own regiment or bazaar, will decide; but in case anybody of any other regiment or bazaar, or of the grand bazaar, or any other person, is concerned in any dispute, the matter is to be referred to the decision of Quartermaster of Brigade Kelly.

13. The chowdries of the regimental bazaars are to obey all orders they may receive from Quartermaster of Brigade Kelly through the head cutwal or head chowdries which may relate to their supplies, and they will report such orders to their commanding officers.

14. The duties to be levied on the sale of spirituous liquors are § on each bhangarah shop, and they are to be paid to

* Head-man of a market.—ED.

† See Glossary, *Wellington Despatches*, Vol. I.—ED.

‡ A Mahratta term for a petty officer in a market.—ED.

§ Blank in manuscript.—ED.

Quartermaster of Brigade Kelly, who will keep an account of what he receives.

15. These duties to be applied in the first instance to pay the salaries of the servants of the general and regimental bazaars, and all the bazaar expenses. The remainder, if there should be any, to be disposed of in such manner as the Commander-in-Chief may think proper when he joins the army.

16. The salaries of the regimental bazaar servants will be paid to them by the commanding officers of the regiments to which they belong, who will apply for the same to Quartermaster of Brigade Kelly.

17. The public nerrick * will be lodged with the cutwal, from whom the chowdries of the regimental bazaars will receive authenticated copies of it for their guidance.

18. Estimate of ducans and bullocks for a regimental bazaar:—

	Ducans.†	Bullocks.
Rice and doll ‡	8	16
Sweetmeats	1	4
Ghee § and oil	2	8
Betel nuts	2	4
Tobacco	3	3
Bhangarah	1	1
Massaulah ‖	2	8
Shroff	1	2
Cloth	1	3
Greens	1	2
Breadman	1	2
Butterman	1	2
Cookshop	1	1
Butchers	1	1
Bar boonjah	1	1
	27	58

19. Although the establishment of that number of ducans and bullocks was thought in the last war sufficient for the supply of the followers of each corps of cavalry and infantry, yet it was then, and is now, the wish of the Commander-in-Chief of the army to make the bazaars so extensive, that the fighting men as

* *Nerrick*—Tariff of prices.—ED. † Shops.—ED.

‡ *Doll*, *Dhol*, or *Dal* (from the Sanscrit to divide), is the name applied to a species of pulse, the pea of which is much used by the natives.—ED.

§ *Ghee* is butter clarified and rendered liquid by boiling; it is generally prepared from the milk of buffaloes.—ED.

‖ *Massaulah*—Spices, condiments, seasoning.—ED.

well as the followers may be supplied from them. It is to be considered, that now the corps are stronger than they were in the last war, and probably the followers more numerous. Colonel Wellesley, therefore, although he has fixed the number of ducans and bullocks for each regimental bazaar to be the same as that each had in the last war, requests the commanding officers of corps will increase their bazaars as much as possible, particularly in ducans for the sale of provisions.

20. No sutler is to join the detachments without the permission of Colonel Wellesley, who will give orders for the regulation of sutlers' shops.

[64.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, Arnee, 21st Dec., 1798.

I have received your letter of the 19th instant,* and a detachment of artillery. The 1st Regiment of Native Cavalry and the

* *To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, commanding at Arnee.*

SIR, Fort St. George, 19th Dec., 1798.

The Commander-in-Chief, at the desire of Government, has directed me to signify his commands as follows:

It is resolved that a detachment, consisting of the 1st Regiment Native Cavalry at Caunetoor, His Majesty's 73rd Regiment at Poonamallee,[a] the 1st battalion 6th Regiment at Vellore, and the 2nd battalion 9th Regiment at Wallajahbad,[b] shall assemble at Wallajah-Nuggur, near Arcot, with all convenient expedition, and be equipped with ten pieces of field-ordnance, with their complement of artillery, from Arnee; and this force is to continue encamped at Wallajah-Nuggur, under your command, until further orders. His Majesty's 73rd Regiment and the 2nd battalion 9th Regiment will be directed to march immediately; and, as you have succeeded to the authority formerly vested in Colonel Aston (at present much indisposed) for enabling him to encamp the several corps in readiness for the field at Arnee, Arcot, Caunetoor, and Vellore, you will be pleased to take the necessary measures for encamping at Wallajah-Nuggur the 1st Regiment Native Cavalry and the 1st battalion 6th Regiment, completing also the several corps with ordnance and the necessary complement of artillery, agreeably to the arrangement above mentioned.

You will observe, that placing under your command the force thus ordered to be assembled is not to interfere with the authority which you have succeeded to as above in consequence of Colonel Aston's illness; and that accordingly, after the force in question encamps, you are still to continue in command of Arnee as at present, dividing your time between that post and Wallajah-Nuggur, as you may judge most convenient for performing the duties with

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[a] A military station in the district of Chingleput, 13 miles west-south-west of Madras.—ED.

[b] A town and military cantonment in the district of Chingleput, on the left or north side of the river Palar, 38 miles south-west of Madras.—ED.

1st battalion of the 6th Regiment will be encamped with ten pieces of cannon at Wallajah-Nuggur on the 23rd.

I am sorry to inform you that I am afraid the Commander-in-Chief will be disappointed in the hopes which, you state, he has formed, that the regimental bazaars of the corps which he has placed under my orders will be able to supply them with rice for a time. 1st, some of them have no bazaars; the artillery, the 2nd battalion of the 5th, and probably others whose deficiency in that respect I shall find out when I shall have communicated with them: 2ndly, the scarcity of rice in the country is so great, that I fear the corps best provided with bazaars will not find them able to give them a sufficient quantity of rice for any time. I have written to Colonel Read to inform him that the corps ordered by the Commander-in-Chief are to be encamped at Wallajah-Nuggur, to state to him the general want of grain in the Carnatic, and to suggest the propriety of his prevailing upon some of his brinjarries to supply that force

which you are charged, leaving, when you are absent, the command of the encampment to the next senior officer.

Intimation is given to the several stations to which your authority extends that, in consequence of Colonel Aston's illness, you have succeeded to the power formerly given to him for encamping the troops. The officers commanding His Majesty's 73rd Regiment and the 2nd battalion 9th Regiment are desired to communicate with you when they begin their march, informing you of the day on which they severally expect to reach Wallajah-Nuggur. It is left with you to select the spot on which the detachment is to encamp, preferring that, however, which seems best supplied with water and forage.

You will perceive from the instructions formerly sent to Colonel Aston that the several corps placed under his orders were directed to arrange for being able to move, when ordered, with good camp-bazaars: the 73rd Regiment and 2nd battalion 9th Regiment are now warned in this respect; so that the Commander-in-Chief is hopeful that, for a time, the troops to be assembled at Wallajah-Nuggur may be supplied with rice from the camp-bazaars, without the necessity of supplying them from any public store.

You will have further observed from the instructions formerly sent to Colonel Aston that Mr. Skardon at Vellore is to victual the European troops that may be ordered to encamp under your command, and you will accordingly inform him of the European force which is now to encamp at Wallajah-Nuggur, that he may be prepared to supply them with arrack and provisions until further orders.

The destination of the force above mentioned will be communicated to you hereafter; meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief will be happy to hear from you on any matter which may occur to you as calculated to further the public service.

I have, &c.,

BARRY CLOSE,

Adjutant-General of the Army.

from the Barahmahal, which, it is probable, may not be in such distress for grain as we are in the Carnatic. In the mean time I have thought it necessary to suggest to Colonel Sale the propriety of supplying the 1st battalion of the 6th Regiment and its public followers with six days' rice from the public stores at Vellore, making them pay for the same at the usual rate if he should find it necessary.

I hope the Commander-in-Chief will order the commissary of grain to send somebody to assist me. Being absent from my regiment, I am much in want of assistance, and should wish to appoint the usual staff during the time that I remain in command of the detachment.

The corps are still in want of many parts of their equipments.

I have ordered Colonel Murray to leave his sick horses and men (the regiment has no doolies) at Caunetoor till further orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[65.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, Arnee, 22nd Dec., 1798.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have been at Arcot, and have fixed upon the ground for the encampment near Wallajah-Nuggur.

I am concerned to inform you that we shall find some difficulty in procuring grain. It does not appear that there is at present a scarcity of it; but as soon as it was known that there was a scarcity at Madras, it became dear and difficult to be got in the country bazaars. Colonel Pater suspects that the Nabob's managers at Arcot and Chittoor,* and the polygars of the neighbouring pollams, have given orders to their people not to supply the troops. I have desired the manager at Arcot to meet me this morning at the cantonment, and I shall urge him strongly to supply us as much as he can. Orders from the Nabob to him and the manager at Chittoor, and from Government to the polygars, upon this subject, might have a good effect.

* *Chittoor*, a town and fort 28 miles N.W. of Arcot, 1,100 feet above the level of the sea. The tract of country in which it is situated, together with that then known as the Pollams (or Estates) of the Western Polygars, is closely surrounded by ranges of hills.—ED.

Colonel Sale informs me that his bazaar is but ill-supplied with grain, and he has therefore thought it necessary to furnish the battalion of the 6th Regiment and public followers with six days' grain from the stores of Vellore.

It may be a subject worthy the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief whether it would not be better, and in the end tend more to forward the views of the campaign, if he were now to order the store in Vellore to be used, and depend upon the Barahmahal for his future supply. I mention this, as you have desired that I should suggest whatever I thought would forward the service; but it is a question, the decision upon which must depend upon the degree of security which can be given to the grain in the Barahmahal until the army can reach that country: upon that I am not competent to decide.

I have received your letter of the 20th instant, and

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [66.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Arnee, 22nd Dec., 1798.

This letter will probably find you at Madras.

You will learn the circumstances which have prevented my meeting you upon your arrival (for I was certain you would come). First, the illness of poor Aston, who has been shot in a duel; he will recover, however, I hope: and next, the necessity that I should take the command of the troops which are assembling. I shall have some in the field to-morrow.

General Harris will be able to tell you whether I can go down to Madras: if he thinks I can, I will; only take care that when you send for me, you have bearers posted upon the road.

When you write, direct to Arcot, near which place I am assembling the troops.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[67.] *Draft of a Letter to Colonel Close.*

23rd Dec., 1798.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will send me a copy of the plan which the General has framed for the bazaars in this war, as I should wish to have those of the corps under my command in proper order when the whole army joins.

I have many irons in the fire for grain, and, if there be any in the country, I think it will be hard if some of them don't succeed. I will let you know what my prospects are in a day or two. I have now about five days' grain in advance, including what was taken for the 6th Regiment out of the store at Vellore, which I wish had not been touched.

It appears to me that, if we are forced to live upon the grain in the Barahmahal, it would be better to go there to it than to bring it here. The corps which I can assemble in one day, with those coming from Wallajahbad and Poonamallee, are equal to anything we have reason to believe the enemy has ready to bring against us. We should cover the junction of bullocks, stores, troops, &c. &c., more effectually in a forward position than we can where we are; and if there be a large quantity of grain in the Barahmahal, we should collect it for the use of the army, and as long as we remained in the country it would be safe.

These are general ideas which I throw out to you. There may be political objections to moving us forward, but I don't see any of a military nature, which may however exist.

Certainly when Nizamites and all meet in the Barahmahal there will be a most terrible consumption. I must either take Colonel Aston's tents, or indent upon the stores at Vellore.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[68.] *Draft of a Letter to Lieutenant-General Harris.*

Arcot, 27th Dec., 1798.*

I have been out this morning to see the 25th Light Dragoons, and I think I never saw a finer regiment in my life. It

* The following was the answer to this letter.—ED.

To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.

MY DEAR COLONEL, Madras, 29th Dec., 1798.

I have to thank you for yours of 27th instant, and to assure you that the hint on 25th shall not be thrown away. No doubt there are difficulties in the

is a pity that they are not all mounted. Cotton only wants 40 horses to be able to bring into the field 400 men; and as the two regiments of Native cavalry which are here have more horses than they have men to ride them, I should think that it would be better to give their supernumerary horses which are trained, than any of the young horses which may come from Hyderabad or the Malabar coast.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [69.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 28th Dec., 1798.

The plot thickens so quickly, and I am so anxious to go with the detachment, which I understand is to be sent from my camp to meet the Nizam's army at Tripetty, that I should rather prefer not going to Madras until we return from that trip. Tell Mornington of this, and that I expect to send off the detachment by the 10th of January. If there is anything particular about which he wishes to know what I think, either I will write to him or you can come here. By posting bearers you will not be more than twenty hours upon the road, probably not so much. You will never have a better opportunity of seeing an Indian camp, which is a curiosity of its kind.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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proposal, but on the spot (which I trust will be on or before the 20th of next month) those and many others will, I hope, vanish.

You will oblige me by your constant communications, in the fullest and freest manner. In your opinions I am sure of honest zeal, not to flatter on ability;[a] and anxiety to gain a point goes a great way, by keeping the mind constantly employed towards its accomplishment. I foresee many delays, and much inconvenience now occurs from your brother's protracted arrival.

Every hour till his arrival is a great disadvantage. Our situation, till we get together, will be very critical, and very much so if the detachment you are forming should march; and, if it should not march, still more so for the great event of the siege, as, should not Roberts's detachment join in all January, we are too late, I fear.

May Fortune favour us. Adieu!

Believe me, &c.,

GEO. HARRIS.

The cash only delays me.

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[a] As in manuscript.—ED.

[70.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 1st Jan., 1799.

I am not to go with the Tripetty detachment,* and I rather believe that General Floyd is coming to take the command of my camp. In that case I think it probable that I shall be ordered to join my regiment.

I should prefer not to go with the Tripetty detachment if I am to keep the command.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Send all my things as soon as you can, particularly my potatoes.

[71.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 2nd Jan., 1799.

What I have to say respecting the propositions † I shall state very shortly, as I really have not time to write much.

* It had been arranged that the contingent furnished by the Nizam for the Mysore war, consisting of 6000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, under his Prime Minister Meer Allum, was to march from the vicinity of Hyderabad on the 26th December, 1798, to cross the Kistna on the 6th of January, 1799, and to be joined at Tripetty by a detachment from the army of the Madras Presidency, under the command of Colonel Wellesley. By the desire of Meer Allum, the whole of the Nizam's troops, namely, the British subsidiary force, 6500 strong, under Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple, the Sepoy regiments recently officered by Frenchmen under Captain John Malcolm, and the Native cavalry under Meer Allum himself, were placed under the immediate command of Colonel Wellesley, and remained so until the campaign terminated with the capture of Seringapatam.—ED.

† In the event of the Sultaun's receiving Major Doveton, certain propositions were to be made, the acceptance of which was to be the indispensable preliminary to a new treaty, to replace that which had been so flagrantly violated by the hostile negotiations of Tippoo with France and other powers.

At first the Governor-General would have been satisfied with the complete renunciation by Tippoo of his French alliance and auxiliaries, but subsequently, when warlike preparations became more advanced and the intrigues and faithlessness of Tippoo more apparent, new conditions were deemed necessary, and the propositions, on the advisability of enforcing which Lord Mornington now consulted his brother, were to demand from Tippoo, first the cession of his remaining maritime territory below the Ghauts on the coast of Malabar; secondly, the admission of a permanent British resident at the Court of Mysore; and, thirdly, the perpetual exclusion of all Frenchmen, both from his army and dominions.

In the event of Tippoo's making overtures for peace after actual hostilities should have begun, a stipulation was to be added to the above for indemnification to the East India Company and its allies for the expenses of the war.

(Vide *Wellesley Despatches*, vol. i. pp. 82, 83, and Beatson's *Mysore War*.) The

Your propositions to Tippoo ought to be moderate, at least so much so as to make it probable that he will acquiesce in them, because I am of opinion that our war cannot be success-

following Draft Instructions, prepared by the Governor-General in the event of the intended mission being carried out, throw some additional light on the history of this period.—ED.

"I enclose the necessary credentials to enable you to proceed upon your mission to the presence of the Sultaun, if he should agree to receive you.

"I shall now communicate to you my instructions with regard to the important negotiation intrusted to your management.

"You will lose no time, after the receipt of a permission from Tippoo Sultaun, in proceeding to the place which Tippoo Sultaun has appointed for receiving you.

"Respecting the forms of your introduction and reception, I think it sufficient to say that, wishing your negotiation to be brought to an immediate issue, I rely on your prudence that you will not allow that important object to be retarded for a moment by any unnecessary discussion. No sacrifice of time ought to be made to the consideration of form, and the dignity of the embassy will be sufficiently maintained by the tenor of your commission.

"You will commence the negotiation by an unequivocal declaration of the sincere desire of the Company, the Nizam, and the Peshwah to cultivate peace and friendship with Tippoo Sultaun, and you will enumerate instances of the pacific disposition invariably manifested by the Allies since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam. Your own observation and knowledge will have furnished you with proofs of the just and amicable views of the Company's Government; and you will particularly refer to the kind and honourable treatment which the hostage Princes received during their detention at Madras, and to my recent orders, under which the district of Wynaad has been ceded to Tippoo, after a deliberate and impartial examination of the justice of his claim to that possession. You will also recall to the observation of the Sultaun the inquiry which I have agreed to institute into the foundation of his claim to the districts of Amrah and Solea; and you will declare my intention to decide that question with the same attention to the principles of justice and good faith which regulated my determination of his right to Wynaad.

"The strict union and concord subsisting between the Allies require that you should be careful, in every stage of your negotiation, to use the joint names of the Allies as frequently as possible; never speaking of the Company separately, excepting where the nature of the case shall render such a discrimination necessary. On the same principle you are to resist and discourage every attempt, direct or indirect, to treat on any basis which shall not equally and impartially embrace the interests of the three allied powers, the Company, the Nizam, and the Peshwah.

"Although you have not been furnished with credentials from the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah, if Tippoo Sultaun should attempt to protract the negotiation by demanding the production of your powers from those Courts, you will declare that the Allies are engaged in a common cause, and you will not suffer any such attempt on the part of Tippoo to impede the execution of my instructions.

"You will represent that the conduct of the British Government towards Tippoo Sultaun has been the natural result of those principles of justice,

ful in one campaign. First, there is a general scarcity of grain in the country, which will greatly impede our military operations. Secondly, there is a want of money, which must be

moderation, and good faith, by which the Legislature of Great Britain and the Company have directed the Governments in India to regulate all transactions with the Native princes of India; and you will add, that the most attentive examination of the conduct of the Nizam and of the Peshwah towards the Sultaun enables me to declare my satisfaction that the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad have uniformly been directed by the same principles since the conclusion of peace at Seringapatam.

"After these preliminary communications, you will proceed to state to Tippoo Sultaun that although I have, for some time past, been apprized that he had engaged with several powers of Asia in various negotiations of the most hostile tendency to the interests of the Company and of its Allies, and although his continued military preparations corresponded with the spirit of his negotiations, I still hoped that a sense of his own interests, and a regard to the acknowledged maxims of prudence and good faith, would have induced him to relinquish projects of aggression so inconsistent with his own professions, as well as with the character of his wisdom and discretion. But I had scarcely formed that decision on the Sultaun's claim to Wynaad (by which I had afforded an unquestionable testimony of my disposition to render impartial and ample justice to his rights, and to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace with him), when I received from the Isle of France an authentic copy of the Proclamation [by Governor Malartic], a copy of which, printed at the Isle of France in the French language, accompanies this letter.

"You will state that, in addition to this Proclamation, I possess full and accurate information of all the proceedings of the Sultaun's ambassadors during their residence in the Isle of France; that the whole of their conduct in exercising the powers delegated to them by their Sovereign is perfectly well known to me; that from the Proclamation itself, as well as from the conduct of the Sultaun's ambassadors in the Isle of France, and from his own conduct since their return, I formed several conclusions which I deemed it necessary to declare to the Allies through the British Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, and that, the Nizam and Peshwah having entirely concurred with me, you are empowered to make to his Highness the following explicit Declaration, in the name of the Company, of the Nizam, and of the Peshwah:

"1st. That the ambassadors despatched by Tippoo Sultaun to the Isle of France did propose and actually conclude an offensive alliance with the French, for the express purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company, and consequently against the Allies, the Peshwah, and the Nizam.

"2nd. That the ambassadors of Tippoo Sultaun demanded military succours from the French for the purpose of prosecuting the said war; that the ambassadors declared Tippoo Sultaun to have already completed his hostile preparations against the Company (and consequently against the Allies); and further that he only waited the arrival of effectual aid from the French to break out into open hostilities.

"3rd. That the ambassadors of Tippoo Sultaun levied a military force in the Isle of France, under the conditions of the Proclamation, and for the avowed purpose of carrying into effect the offensive alliance contracted in the name of their Sovereign with the enemy of the Company and of the Allies.

fatal. Thirdly, there is a chance that the Nizam's troops will not join us in time to enable us to advance together to the siege of Seringapatam. Fourthly, preparations do not appear

"4th. That the ambassadors (who had concluded an offensive alliance with the enemy of the Company and of the Allies, and who had levied a force under that alliance) were received by Tippoo Sultaun, on their return from the Isle of France, with public marks of honour and distinction; that Tippoo Sultaun suffered the French force, raised for the purpose of making war upon the Company and the Allies, to be landed in his country; and finally, that he admitted the said French force into his army.

"5th. That Tippoo Sultaun, by these several personal and unequivocal acts, has ratified the engagements contained in the Proclamation published in the Isle of France, and has taken the preliminary steps for fulfilling those engagements according to the tenor of that Proclamation; and that he has thereby precluded whatever hope might otherwise have been entertained that the proceedings of his ambassadors were unauthorised by his orders.

"6th. That Tippoo Sultaun has for some time past been employed in military preparations, conformably to the hostile spirit of his engagements contracted with the enemy of the Company and of the Allies.

"7th. That by these several acts Tippoo Sultaun has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between him and the Allies.

"To enable you to state these points more particularly, as well as to refute any cavil or evasion which may be attempted on the part of the Sultaun, you will receive with this letter an extract from a minute recorded by me in the Secret and Political Department of the Government of Bengal on the 12th of August. In this paper you will find a review of the arguments and evidence which leave no doubt of the authenticity of the Proclamation in question, and of the unqualified participation of Tippoo Sultaun in that extraordinary publication.

"Having fully explained by verbal communication the joint opinion of the Allies, you will, in the name of the Company, of the Nizam, and of the Peshwah, formally deliver to Tippoo Sultaun the Declaration, together with the French copy of the Proclamation.

"You will take occasion to call the Sultaun's serious attention to the rashness and impolicy of the connection which he has thus formed with the French nation, in contempt of the most sacred obligations of public faith towards the Allies. In pursuing this topic you will advert to the suggestions in my letter to Tippoo Sultaun of the 8th of November, and you will particularly urge every argument which can afford any prospect of producing a favourable impression on the religious prejudices of Tippoo Sultaun, endeavouring at the same time to revive his former aversion to the admission of any considerable French force into his dominions.

"In order to furnish you with materials for stating these arguments with greater advantage, I enclose an extract of a letter from the Government of Bombay, together with a Persian translation of a paper received from Constantinople by that Government.

"Copies in Persian of the Declaration of War against the French by the Ottoman Porte, and of the Porte's subsequent manifesto, also accompany this letter, and may be delivered by you to the Sultaun and to his principal Ministers.

"These documents will serve to prove the sense which the Grand Seignor

to be sufficiently advanced on the Malabar side of India to make it certain that we shall have the co-operation of the Bombay army. Fifthly, we have no General. I have repeated

entertains of the treachery and violence of the French nation, as well as of the good faith and power of Great Britain.

"You will endeavour to ascertain whether the Grand Seignor has actually despatched a letter to Tippoo Sultaun, according to the intimation of Mr. Smith; and if such a communication should have taken place between Tippoo Sultaun and the Porte, you will avail yourself of the advantages which it presents of enforcing the arguments to which I have adverted in this letter.

"You will declare, in my name, to Tippoo Sultaun my astonishment that a prince of his discernment and character should have abandoned himself to the mercy of a power whose ambition, treachery, violence, and impiety, after having disturbed all the Christian states of Europe and America, are now directed against the head of the Mussulman faith, against all the thrones of Asia, and against that territory which contains the most revered monuments of the Mohammedan religion.

"You will not fail to combine with these observations such remarks as may be justified by the actual state of the French army in Egypt, by the consequences of the late victory at Bekir, and by the acknowledged and unrivalled superiority of his Majesty's naval force in every part of the world.

"Under this head you will not omit to mention the large reinforcements, both of ships and men, which are now arriving from England, and the station which has been taken by a squadron of our fleet on the coast of Malabar, and by another in the Gulfs of Arabia and Persia. You will also advert to the dangers to which the Nizam's person and authority had been exposed by the introduction and growth of a French party at the Court of Hyderabad, and you will explain the manner in which that party has been subverted by the aid of the British power.

"You will then proceed to state that, according to every principle of justice and self-defence, the Allies would have been warranted in attacking the dominions of the Sultaun on the first notice either of the conclusion of his offensive alliance with the French, or of his admission of a French force into his country. But the anxious desire of the Allies to avert the calamity of war has induced them to offer to the Sultaun, in the first instance, an opportunity of establishing and improving the relations of peace and amity with them by renouncing engagements so incompatible with the obligations of the Treaty of Seringapatam, and by affording to the Allies an equitable indemnity for the expense occasioned by his unprovoked violation of treaty, as well as an adequate security against any future interruption of the general tranquillity.

"My anxious wish is that the proceedings of the Allies in this important conjuncture should be made known not only to the Court of the Sultaun, but to the whole world: you will, therefore, use every endeavour to be permitted to make all your communications in open durbar. A public statement of the conduct of Tippoo and of the Allies would preclude all misrepresentation. But in this respect you must necessarily conform to the pleasure of the Sultaun, and you must deliver the declaration and the other papers at a private audience, if he should choose to receive you in that manner.

"But whether your reception be appointed for a public or a private audience, I think it necessary to direct that you shall not suffer more than one day to elapse from the time of your arrival at the place which Tippoo Sultaun

some of these objections to hostilities so frequently, that I am afraid I shall be accused of boring Mornington; but some of them are new, and have been occasioned by the circumstances of the present time.

shall have appointed for your audience before you communicate to him, or to such commissioners as he may nominate for that purpose, the several papers already enumerated, together with the counterpart of preliminary articles of a treaty of peace and friendship. These articles comprise the basis of the ultimate demand of the Allies. To this counterpart of the articles you will require the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultaun within five days from the time of delivering the papers to him or to his commissioners. In the interval you may afford any explanation which the Sultaun may require of the nature and objects of the several articles. But you will give him to understand distinctly that, having fully considered the articles now proposed for his signature, I am firmly resolved not to depart in the slightest degree from any of them; and accordingly, on this part of your commission, your power is limited to the single point of obtaining the assent or refusal of the Sultaun to the articles in their present form, without alteration, addition, or diminution.

"In the event of the Sultaun's acceding to the articles of the treaty, the treachery of his character will require that you should demand his two sons to be delivered up as hostages for the due execution of the stipulations of the treaty on the part of the Sultaun. The Princes, when delivered into your custody, must proceed to the nearest station of the British army, and must be placed in the custody of the Commander-in-Chief.

"If Tippoo Sultaun should refuse to receive the Declaration and articles, or if he should not return the articles signed and deliver up the hostages within the time prescribed, you will immediately return, with all possible despatch, into the Company's territories; and you will instantly, by express, communicate the failure of your mission to the Commander-in-Chief on the coast of Coromandel, to me, and to the Commissioners and commanding officer on the coast of Malabar.

"You will make the same communications in the event of your success. But as artificial delay might serve the views of the Sultaun, and as any delay must defeat the operations of our army, you will inform the Sultaun that I have ordered the army to advance into his dominions at all events, and that it will not retreat until the treaty shall have been signed and the hostages shall have arrived in the British camp.

"You will obtain from Tippoo the requisite letters to the several managers and to the commanders of the fortresses included in the districts to be ceded under the new treaty, in order that the whole may be delivered, without delay, into the possession of such persons as the Commissioners in Malabar shall appoint to receive charge of the territory in the name of the Company, and you will forward those letters to the Commissioners in Malabar.

"If Tippoo Sultaun should agree to receive a permanent Resident at his Court, my intention is to appoint you to that situation. You have no other recommendation to me than your character and your knowledge of the Court at which I propose to employ you. On these grounds I have formed my expectation that in executing the commission now intrusted to you, you will overcome every difficulty which can be surmounted by diligence, activity, firmness, or address.

"If the happy termination of this negotiation should fix you at Seringapatam, a new scene will be opened to your talents. I am thoroughly prepared

There are three demands which can be made upon Tippoo. First, that he should receive an ambassador. Secondly, that he should dismiss his Frenchmen, taken into his service under his offensive treaty. Thirdly, that he should give up to us his sea coast. I think still that the first would give security, but I see that preparations are very forward, and I know that our war must in the end be successful, and therefore I would demand the second. As to the third: first, I don't think it absolutely necessary for our security, as, in consequence of having a resident with him, we shall be able to watch his transactions with the French, and can guard his coast by our cruisers when we find it necessary to prevent his communication by sea with European powers. But I think it will be difficult hereafter to prevail upon any French to adventure in this country when it will be known that Tippoo has sent away those whom he took into his service under the terms of the most solemn treaty. In the next place, I don't think that we have any right to expect that he should give up territory without a war, which even the most successful war might not enable us to gain. If that be true, we must give him something in exchange, and I don't see anything that we can give him to lose which would not be a greater disadvantage than we can possibly reap benefit from the acquisition. If the Allies would give up a portion of their territory for what we now demand, and would take compensation from us in peshcush or remission of subsidy for our troops they have in their service, it might answer; but I imagine it will be as difficult to persuade them to do that as to persuade Tippoo to give up his coast.

Thirdly, there is another view of the question which relates to the Allies. How are we to divide with them what we may acquire? The fairness of the division in the last war is the cause of the ease with which they are prevailed upon to join us at present; and no division at all, which must be the case if we get the sea coast, or a division disadvantageous to them, may occasion jealousies which will eventually do us more harm than anything we can gain will do us good.

to instruct you in the general principles which should govern our intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, if he shall ever substitute the wise policy of cultivating a connection with the British Government, in place of attempting to pursue visionary projects of impracticable revenge by an alliance which can never injure the British power without destroying the independence of Mysore."

I have written this in a hurry, and there are many people waiting for me in my tent, and probably I have not paid so much attention to the subject as I ought. You have, however, the result of my reflections upon the subject for some time past, and if you'll come here we can talk it over.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

You may give what interest you please, but you will get no money at Madras.

Draft of a Letter to the Adjutant-General. [72.]

3rd Jan., 1799.

I have the honour to inform you that two companies of Lascars went to Vellore this morning to put themselves under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Carlisle.

Much inconvenience has been occasioned in the general and regimental bazaars in consequence of the orders of Government of the 27th December relating to the exchange of money. This morning only one shroff appeared in camp, and all the business of the bazaars was stopped.

I beg leave to observe to you that, as a rupee is exchanged at Arcot, about three miles from hence, for 12 fanams 6 cash, and in Wallajah-Nuggur, about one mile from camp, for 12 fanams 10 cash, it appears to be hard upon the camp shroffs to insist upon their exchanging the same rupee for 12 fanams 68 cash.

The nerrick in camp is regulated by that of the neighbouring bazaar at Wallajah-Nuggur, and it appears not to be very reasonable that a rupee in camp should be worth more fanams than in Wallajah-Nuggur, and yet that it should not purchase more either of the necessaries or conveniences of life excepting when it is exchanged for fanams in camp, and then it will purchase more of both. One of the consequences of enforcing the order of Government would be that I must immediately alter the nerrick, and be liable to all the impositions of cutwals, &c. &c. Another would be, that all the rupees in the country would be brought into camp to be exchanged, and in the end I should be obliged to alter it from the general want of fanams.

I am afraid that, until his Highness the Nabob fixes the rate of exchange in the districts under his management at the same

rate that it has been fixed at by Government, it will be impossible to enforce it in the army bazaars. The want of the shroffs this morning has been so great an inconvenience, and has been a subject of such general complaint, that I have found myself obliged to suspend its execution until I could hear from you, and I beg that you will be so kind as to make known to me the Commander-in-Chief's pleasure upon the subject.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[73.] *To Mr. Greenwood.*

SIR, Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 6th Jan., 1799.

I am concerned to have to inform you of the death of Colonel Aston. Yours, however, will be a more severe task, as you will have to acquaint his numerous friends with the loss they have sustained. I hear from Madras that it is Lady Clive's intention to write to Lady Hertford and Lady W. Gordon, and to desire that they will break to Mrs. Aston her misfortune. But I have recommended it to her Ladyship that they should consult Lord Charles FitzRoy before they told her anything about the matter, and I particularly request that, if he be in England, you will desire him to see Mrs. Aston as soon as possible. In a letter * which Colonel Aston wrote to me immediately previous

* DEAR WELLESLEY, Arnee, 13th Dec., 1798.

The Major having intimated a wish this morning to avoid a public discussion, I did not write to you, as I intended, in hopes of being able to inform you of the result of his propositions. He sent for Cragie, and requested him to call on me to express his desire that some means might be devised to settle our difference of opinion in any other way than in a court martial; in answer to which I desired Cragie to deliver to him the following message.

"Colonel A. desires me to inform you that he is willing to consent to the adoption of any means that can be devised, and which you prefer to a public discussion, to settle the difference of opinion on a military subject, with credit to himself in his public and private capacity."

Nothing further has yet transpired, but whatever occurs between now and bed time I will inform you by to-morrow morning's tappall. I am convinced, notwithstanding the Major's vapouring, that he would willingly adopt any other mode in preference to a court martial. He proposed writing me an explanatory letter, and such a one as would enable me to relieve his mind, without discredit to myself as an officer and a gentleman: I have sketched out something that I think may answer the above purpose, if the Major can be persuaded to think so; but in my opinion it will end in his proposing to refer our military squabble to the Commander-in-Chief, which I do not conceive there could be any objection to on my part, as the proposition will come from the Major in the form of a request to me. I hope my dictation to my Secretary

to the events which occasioned his death, he desired that I should acquaint you, Lord Charles FitzRoy, Mr. Eccleston, and his friends in general, of everything that had passed. It is impossible by the overland despatch to do more than give you a general outline of the circumstances; and, as I am in the command of the troops here, I have not time to write to the other persons whom he mentioned. I beg, however, that you will communicate to them and to his friends in general what I shall now write to you; and, as I have sat upon a court of inquiry to investigate the origin and circumstances of the duel in which he

Sturt whilst dressing for dinner, and his writing, will be sufficiently plain to make you understand the state of affairs at Arnee at this period.

½ past 5 P.M.

Since I wrote the above Cragie informed me that the Major had tacked, and, he understood from Crawford, was intent upon single combat. Finding that to be his determination, I thought the sooner it was over the better, and therefore desired Cragie to take such steps as he thought best to inform the Major what he had done before this morning, that I was perfectly ready and willing to meet him on private grounds whenever he chose. As Cragie, Macpherson, and I were talking the business over, up came Paddy Crawford, and I returned with him from the fort towards my own house. After a short pause he informed me that he had a letter from Major Picton, that he must read to me. Being nearer the fort than my own house, I proposed going there immediately, and getting a candle in Cragie's room. He said that was impossible, as he could not impart the contents of the letter but in private to me. I said I had no objection; but that if the letter contained any thing improper for one gentleman to say to another, I should make him answer for it personally, in my private capacity; that I had no secrets, and that every part of my conduct should be perfectly open, and that I would not be concerned in any transaction that wore a different aspect. He then talked of explanations, but I put a stop to all conversation on that head, as I knew the Major's demands to be perfectly inadmissible. When we arrived at Cragie's room I repeated that I imagined he had some improper message to deliver to me, which was not the way of proceeding amongst gentlemen, particularly as the Major had been told that I would meet him whenever he pleased upon private grounds; that I was perfectly ready and willing to go out with Crawford that moment, and requested to know if he had any demands upon me. After hearing his negative, and a kind of excuse or apology from him, the conversation ended, and I left him with Cragie with little more to do than to fix a time and place. The deed is done, and to-morrow morning the Major wreaks his vengeance on me. The result of our meeting you shall know, either from me or my friends, but I hope from the former. Should any accident happen to me, I have requested Cragie and Macpherson to explain every part of my conduct in this affair to you, and I trust you will do me that justice you think I merit. I particularly wish that my conduct may be placed in its true light to my friends in England. I shall now say no more, but God bless you,

And believe me yours most truly and sincerely,

Arnee, 13th at night,
or 14th in the morning.

HENRY HERVEY ASTON.

was engaged, by the first opportunity I will send you a copy of the proceedings and of a narrative of the circumstances which has been written by Mr. Webbe at Madras, which I beg may also be communicated to such of his friends as you may think fit.

Colonel Aston found it necessary in the month of November to give out a regimental order, by which he disapproved of the conduct of Major Picton, who had ordered a regimental court of inquiry to investigate a complaint which had been made to him in September by Lieutenant Hartley of the 12th, upon a matter of account against Major Allen, the paymaster. Major Picton wrote him a letter to desire that he would cancel the order, the receipt of which Colonel Aston acknowledged by a short answer. Major Picton challenged him to fight. Colonel Aston refused to fight on account of any act in his situation of commanding officer of his regiment. After several messages had passed between them, they at last went out to fight on account of the short letter which Colonel Aston had written in answer to Major Picton. Major Picton's pistol missed fire. Colonel Aston fired in the air. The seconds interfered, and the business was amicably settled, and much to the credit of our poor friend.

In answer to the complaint which Lieutenant Hartley had made of Major Allen, Colonel Aston had written him a private letter, in which he said that he could not conceive how Major Allen could act so illiberally. This letter was inadvertently shown, and Major Allen heard what it contained. In September Colonel Aston, being then at Madras, had written a letter to the regiment, in which he said that the letter was a private one, and was never intended to be seen by anybody; that if from a misstatement of Lieutenant Hartley he had used an expression which hurt Major Allen's feelings, he was sorry for it. All this was in vain. The day after he had fought Major Picton (the 16th of December), Major Allen called upon him, and wanted him to recall the expression. Colonel Aston explained to him again what he had written before. Major Allen then challenged him; they fought in an hour, and the Major shot him in the side. He lived a week in the greatest agony, and died on the 23rd of December, lamented by all good men in this country. The ball entered on the right side, penetrated the liver, and went through his backbone, turned, and lodged near his left hip-bone.

On the ground Colonel Aston's second offered that he should say that he had never intended the letter to be seen by anybody.

I cannot conclude this sad story without expressing my regret that I was not at Arnee to do everything in my power to prevent what happened, in which however it is probable I should have failed. If anything can give Colonel Aston's friends consolation, it must be to learn that his moderation was as conspicuous as his coolness, and that this misfortune was not occasioned by his fault.

I remain, Sir, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM ON THE DUEL AND DEATH OF COLONEL ASTON. [74.]

In the month of September Lieutenant Hartley, who is acting quartermaster of the 12th, wrote a private letter to Colonel Aston, stating that Major Allen had charged to his account certain articles which had been ordered from Europe for the use of the officers of the regiment, and which still remained in the quartermaster's stores.

This information drew from Colonel Aston two letters: one to Major Picton, in which he mentions the circumstance, and his opinion that the charge ought not to have been made against Lieutenant Hartley; another (a private one) to Lieutenant Hartley, in which it is said he expressed his surprise that Major Allen should have acted so illiberally. Major Picton, immediately after he had received this letter, ordered a regimental court of inquiry, to inquire (as he says himself) into the merits of a complaint, made by Lieutenant Hartley to Colonel Aston, that the paymaster had stopped money out of his account for different regimental articles in store, "and in consequence of a letter he (Lieutenant Hartley) has been showing to different officers of the corps which he said he received from you" (Colonel Aston).

This court of inquiry proceeded, and Colonel Aston in different letters from Madras to Major Picton expressed his opinion of its irregularity. The Major proposed several methods of concluding the business, such as referring it to the Commander-in-Chief, &c., to all of which Colonel Aston answered that he would have nothing to do with anything which had been so irre-

gular. At last Major Picton called together the officers of the regiment, and submitted the proceedings of the court of inquiry to them. They would have nothing to do with it, and a committee of officers was appointed to take it into consideration. On the 25th September they came to certain resolutions.

On the 23rd September Colonel Aston wrote a letter to Major Picton, in which he mentions his reasons for having refrained from interfering in the business till then, and his disapprobation of the whole of Major Picton's proceedings, to which he would have put a stop if it had not been for his desire to uphold in the regiment the authority of the Major; but at last matters had gone so far that he found it necessary to interfere, in order to prevent the harmony of the corps from being any longer disturbed.

Thus everything remained until Colonel Aston went to Arnee in the month of November to join the regiment. It was impossible for him to suffer what had passed to be unnoticed. A regimental court of inquiry had been ordered upon a complaint which had been made to him, and in fact upon him, as it was ordered to take into consideration a private letter of his; and afterwards their proceedings were referred first to the whole corps, and afterwards to a committee of officers, who passed a decision upon them. He waited two days to give Major Picton time to explain his motives for a proceeding so irregular, and then found it necessary to give out an order.

Major Picton left Arnee the next day, and went to Madras, from whence he wrote to Colonel Aston to desire that he would cancel the order, without stating any reason upon which he grounded that request.

Colonel Aston acknowledged the receipt of his letter, and gave him no further answer.

If Major Picton conceived himself aggrieved by the order, there remained for him two lines of conduct: he ought either to have endeavoured to persuade Colonel Aston to cancel the order, and if he could not succeed in that, he ought to have desired to stand a court martial, or he ought at once to have asked for a court martial.

He adopted neither, but went down to Arnee and challenged Colonel Aston for an offence which he stated him to have given him as commanding officer of his regiment.

Colonel Aston refused to fight him on that ground; at the

same time he said that he should not avail himself of the advantage which the Major had given him by challenging him for an act done in his military capacity.

After several messages had passed, at last Major Picton challenged him to fight him for having written him the letter, in which he acknowledged the receipt of his, written from Madras. Upon that account they went out to fight. Major Picton's pistol missed fire: Colonel Aston desired him to try again. The seconds interfered, and declared he could not. Colonel Aston fired in the air, and said that he had no objection to declaring that he had no intention of offending Major Picton in that letter, and that he was ready to shake hands with him. He then said, that their difference of opinion respecting the order remained as it had been before; that the Major was at liberty to take such steps as he thought necessary to free himself from the imputation he supposed had been thrown upon him; and that what had then passed should not prevent it, or ever be mentioned.

The parties then went home. It must be observed that Major Allen was upon the ground, and saw every thing that was done. On the same morning he called upon Colonel Aston, and, after some time, desired to speak with him. He lamented, as Colonel Aston said, the unfortunate circumstances which had happened, and stated his wish to leave the corps. Colonel Aston recommended it to him to consider well before he took that step. After a conversation, which lasted about an hour and a half, about Lieutenant Hartley and different subjects, in the course of which he urged Colonel Aston to recall the expressions made use of in his letter to Mr. Hartley, he at last said, "Colonel Aston, what is your private opinion of me?" Colonel Aston said, "I am not obliged to give you my private opinion upon any subject." "Then," he says, "will you give me a private meeting?" "Yes!"

Upon the ground an offer was made to him, that Colonel Aston would say that he had not intended that his private letter should be seen by him or by anybody excepting the person to whom it was addressed: but with that he was not satisfied; and he fired the shot, the consequences of which, on public as well as on private grounds, are ever to be lamented.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[75.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 6th Jan., 1799.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Montgomery, which is worthy of Mornington's attention. I understand that ——— is coming to Madras: if that be the case, he would make an excellent bully for the Travancore Rajah, having been heretofore in his service.

Colonel Close has written me word that I am to go to Tripetty if a detachment be sent there. I am sadly afraid that the Nizamites will be late. It appears to me to be impossible that they should reach Tripetty till the 28th of this month, and in that case I should like to know whether it would not be better for them to enter the Mysore country by the Dalmacherry Pass, and join the main army at Bangalore. When reinforced they will be strong enough to fight for themselves, if it should be necessary. It is probable that it will not be so, as Tippoo is very likely to be afraid to move northward, leaving General Harris' army behind him.

There is one advantage in making them go by the northern road, which is, that they will not then draw their subsistence from the countries which must supply the army during the whole course of the war; but there may be many reasons of which I am not now aware why the whole should join in our territories. In my opinion we shall be run harder for time than for anything, and whatever can save that ought to be well considered.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Do you intend to come here?

[76.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 7th Jan., 1799.

As I think it probable that ——— may be displeased at my desiring him to stop ———, who was sent to me by his orders, I enclose you a letter which I received from him yesterday, with a copy of my answer.

When I left Madras to take the command of the troops, which, with their followers, are above 30,000 men, I had

not even a servant with me, and I came away at an hour's notice. There was not a grain of rice to be got in the bazaar at Arcot, and, after bullying and writing day and night, I have got plenty in my camp, and have been able to go on for a fortnight without drawing upon the public stores, contrary to the expectation of everybody, and without putting the public to the expense of a single shilling. This I shall continue to do as long as the army may remain here. I asked for assistance, and he sent me two Company's officers; one of them, a brother of ———, so stupid that I can make no use of him, and the other such a rascal that half of my occupation consists in watching him, lest under the authority of my name he should play tricks in the country. At all events, they are not my personal staff; they have their own duties, and can't assist me in doing mine; and if they had not, I cannot trust them even to copy a letter for me, as they would reveal its contents. Besides this, they neither of them understand one syllable of the language; have never been even in a camp, much less on service; and I may say of them, as I do of ———, that they are an incumbrance.

I mention these circumstances to you in order that if ——— complains to Mornington, you may know what to say to him. There is no officer in the army excepting myself to whom he would dare to behave as he has done to me; and if I did not believe that he would be glad to seize an opportunity of sending me away from hence, and if I had not particular reasons for wishing not to appear to hang back upon the present occasion, I should desire to join my regiment. I assure you that during two nights, whilst Colonel Aston's court of inquiry was sitting, I was in bed only two hours; and had black grain merchants teasing me almost the whole time that I was employed upon other business.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I have opened this, as I forgot to put up the letters.

To H. Skardon, Esq. [77.]

MY DEAR SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 11th Jan., 1799.

Colonel Richardson has informed me that you have received 15,000 pagodas of the money for the payment of the troops, &c.,

but that you wish not to send any over here until you receive a sum which will enable you to discharge the whole month's pay.

I have been under the necessity of advancing all the money I had, to enable two detachments to move out of camp, and to pay the Lascars and followers of the Artillery. The bamboo coolies, and other necessary followers, have had no rice for these two days: I therefore request that you will immediately send over to the camp the money which you may have received, and let it be divided equally among the corps. I will take care that it is paid to such persons as are most in want of it.

I can easily conceive that it would be more convenient, and more consistent with official arrangement, to pay the whole sum at one time; but at the present moment the distress is very great, and if something is not paid immediately to the bamboo cooly and other common followers, I expect they will desert, which will be the cause of much difficulty hereafter.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[78.] *To Major Dallas.*

MY DEAR MAJOR DALLAS, Camp near Laulpet, 11th Jan., 1799.

I am sorry to inform you that I found the draught bullocks of the field-pieces so bad yesterday that they were scarcely able to draw the guns five miles from Wallajah-Nuggur to this place: they had been upon the ground at Wallajah-Nuggur for nearly three weeks: there was plenty of fodder there, and no want of straw, and I therefore conclude that their bad condition was to be attributed to want of care in the people who had charge of them. I ordered an inquiry to be made upon the subject, and I find that there has been no maistry in camp since the detachment has joined; that the bullock people have not been paid for these two months, and that they have not a farthing of money to pay for the straw which they may want for their cattle. Many of the drivers have deserted: the Lascars were obliged to drive the bullocks of some of the guns and tumbrils. I find that the maistries are all at Madras with you. I wish you would send some of the principals here, and money to pay the drivers, otherwise hereafter great inconvenience will arise at the moment perhaps when it will be most severely felt.

I have ordered the commanding officers of regiments to use the draught bullocks belonging to the field-pieces attached to their camps daily, and to report to me if they should find that they are not perfectly taken care of and fed. As I look upon myself to be in some degree responsible for the good condition of the draught bullocks here, at least for their being able to draw the guns off the ground, I shall order straw to be bought for them if I find that the commanding officers think that they are not properly fed and taken care of; and I should now advance money to the drivers, only that I have been informed that you directed Mr. Skardon not to pay any to people of your department.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

ORDERS TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING A DETACHMENT TO PROCEED TO POONAMALLEE WITH MAJOR ALLEN, OF THE 12TH REGIMENT, IN CLOSE ARREST. [79.]

Camp near Laulpet, 12th Jan., 1799.

You will receive from Brigade-Major Colebrooke Major Allen's sword, which you will deliver over to the officer commanding at Poonamallee.

You will parade with your detachment in the lines of the 12th Regiment in the morning, at the réveillé beating. You will receive Major Allen from the officer of that regiment, at present in charge of him, and will proceed upon your march immediately.

You will pass through Caverypauk,* and from thence to Perambaucum, leaving Conjeveram † on your right, and from thence to Poonamallee, leaving Tripasoor on your left.

You will fix upon such halting places as may be most convenient to yourself, keeping in mind that it is necessary that you should arrive at Poonamallee as soon as possible. Upon your arrival at Poonamallee you will deliver over Major Allen to the commanding officer at that station, taking his receipt for him, and will return to camp as soon as possible by the same

* An old town, enclosed with a mud wall, between Madras and Arcot.—ED.

† *Conjeveram*, 27 miles E. of Arcot, and 42 miles S.W. of Madras. It is surrounded by a bound hedge, and takes its name from a pagoda dedicated to Vishnu Conjee.—ED.

route. Major Allen is in close arrest, but you will allow him every freedom which you may think consistent with the safety of his person.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[80.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Camp near Laulpet, 12th Jan., 1799.

I applied to General Harris some days ago to appoint Lieutenant Dickson, of the 2nd battalion 12th Regiment, to the cavalry as a cornet, there being about twelve vacancies. He had before promised me an adjutancy for him, and gave it to somebody else. I shall be much obliged to you if you will speak to Mornington about it, and ask him to mention Mr. Dickson to General Harris. He is now in my camp, and is one of the finest young men I ever saw.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

We are sadly in want of money. I was informed that it had left Madras at the beginning of the month; but out of 89,000 pagodas the paymaster has received only 15,000, and has not heard of any more upon the road.

Between ourselves, the Paymaster-General has too many mercantile concerns.

[81.] *To Lieut.-Colonel Close.*

MY DEAR COLONEL CLOSE, Camp near Laulpet, 13th Jan., 1799.

Captain Grose is arrived, and gives a very favourable account of the new road from Vellore to Vaniambaddy. I shall receive Captain Orr's report of it in a day or two.

In consequence of what you say in your letter of the 11th, I'll keep Captain Grose here for a few days, and will take care that he shall commence his repairs, so that they may be completed by the time that Colonel Roberts approaches Tripetty.*

I despair of being able to give much assistance to Mr. Skardon in beating paddy until the Paunjal † is over: I'll try, how-

* 51 miles N. by E. of Arcot.—ED. † A religious festival.—ED.

ever, what I can do. I am told that it is a business which the natives in general don't like, and which they leave entirely to the women.

I have plenty of grain for General Floyd, when he chooses to send for it.

I am still thirteen miles from Vellore.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Orr. [82.]

DEAR SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 13th Jan., 1799.

I received a letter from Colonel Close yesterday, in which he says that you may take your own time about repairing the road from hence to Tripetty by Chandergherry: I shall, therefore, keep Captain Grose here until you return from Vaniambaddy, when we may decide as to the propriety of commencing the repairs which may be wanting. In the mean time I shall desire Captain Grose to look at the road between this and Wallajah-Nuggur, on which there are some bad places. I think it probable that the main body of the army will come this way.

Let me know how soon you will return here; also the state of the direct road from Vellore to Vaniambaddy, about which the General is very anxious.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Dallas. [83.]

MY DEAR MAJOR DALLAS, Vellore, 14th Jan., 1799.

I received your letter last night in camp, and I write from hence, lest I should not get back before the tappall goes out.

There certainly must be something bad in the regulations for the bullock department, as I have nearly one-half of the army at Laulpet, and there is no person who has any charge of the bullocks, or has anything to say to them. Since I wrote to you last, not only the commanding officer of the artillery has repeated his complaint that the draught bullocks in the service of the artillery have not been paid for for more than two months,

but the commanding officers of all the regiments have made similar complaints respecting the bullocks for the carriage of the tents; and many of the drivers have deserted.

I write to you *privately* upon this subject, and shall be obliged to you if you will apply some remedy. As we are now situated, we are supposed to be in readiness to move at short notice; and I know that if I wanted to march, I should not be able to get the bullock drivers to move.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[84.] *To Major-General Floyd.*

MY DEAR SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 15th Jan., 1799.

It would have given me great pleasure if, upon my first military communication with you, I could have sent you the supplies you wanted in the manner you desired; but the fact is, that the grain merchants who attend my camp are nearly all in the country in search of grain at this moment, and that although in a few days (probably one or two) I may have it in my power to send you six or seven hundred loads, I have not now in camp more than thirty or forty which I could send away. By sending that I should in reality render you no service, although probably I might have the reputation, which I should not deserve, of having given you assistance. Whenever any quantity arrives, you may depend upon my sending it to you, and that I will give you the earliest notice of its departure from hence; and at this moment, if you could send the bazaar bullocks of the corps in your division of the army, I could let them have about twenty garce of rice, which I can command in this country at very short notice. Part of it is stored in Wallajah-Nuggur.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[85.] *To Lieut.-Colonel Close.*

MY DEAR COLONEL CLOSE, Camp near Laulpet, 15th Jan., 1799.

I send herewith a letter from the commanding officers of the Native battalions, upon which I think it right to give you a little

information. First, rice in Vellore (where in general the sepoys wish to send their families) is so scarce, that it is not possible to get it, even in the bazaar, without an order from the commanding officer; and then it is very dear, although there is plenty of it, and it is cheap in my camp, which is only 13 miles from thence. Secondly, there is no reason to expect that after the army will have advanced the rice will become more plentiful or cheaper; and therefore if the General consents to the proposal of the commanding officer, that half of the amount of the certificates should be paid in rice from the public stores, he must expect that immediately after the departure of the army there will be a very considerable drain from them upon this account.

I have represented this to the commanding officers, and their answer is, if the families of the sepoys have not this indulgence held out to them at Arnee, Vellore, or some other strongholds, they will disperse in different parts of the country, and the sepoys will desert; or their families will accompany the army; either of which will be attended with inconvenience.

The question is, whether it will be a greater inconvenience to open the public store to them immediately, than to suffer them to accompany the army, or than that a few sepoys should desert.

I have not been able to send my merchants to General Floyd; there has been only one of them in camp since yesterday, and he had only thirty or forty loads which I could spare. I expect, in a few days, to be able to send him six or seven hundred loads; and I could now let him have twenty garce of rice, if he could send his bullocks for it. I have written this to him.

Captain Grose shall begin upon the road immediately.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut.-Colonel Richardson. [86.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp near Laulpet, 15th Jan., 1799.

I am sorry to inform you that I have found it necessary to dismiss the cutwal already. Notwithstanding the orders which I read in your presence, and which were explained to him, a man employed by him was found making pariah arrack in the lines of the 25th Dragoons, and he had a sentry from the grand bazaar guard over him for his protection.

This same man was before caught in selling arrack to the 25th Dragoons, and was punished by Colonel Cotton in consequence of the sentence of a regimental court martial. Major Paterson likewise informs me that he sat on two court martials upon the cutwal while he was attached to the 19th Dragoons; in consequence of one of which he received five hundred lashes; of the other, three hundred.

The crime of which he was guilty the other day, viz. authorizing pariah arrack to be made in the lines of the 25th Dragoons, is sufficient to induce me to dismiss him, and, I should imagine, will be sufficient to prevent you from taking him again. At all events, his former character, his having been punished twice while in the service of one of the regiments which will compose the army, and his connection with another man who was punished lately by another of the regiments, make him an unfit person to be trusted as a cutwal.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[87.] *To Lieut.-Colonel Read.*

MY DEAR SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 16th Jan., 1799.

There is a man by the name of Nagapah Chitty in my camp, who informs me that he has been employed by you to collect for you 20,000 brinjarries. He says that you had given him a letter to the jaghiredar of Arnee, with whom he has some unsettled accounts, and that, finding a division of the army encamped in this neighbourhood, he joined it. He has been of great use to me in procuring supplies of grain, &c. &c.; and I have written to the commanding officer at Arnee, to desire that he will take his family under his protection, and send them here to him. He proposes that one of them should go into the Barahmahal and collect together the brinjarries which he furnished you, a large proportion of which he says are already collected. If you have no objection, he will in that case remain here with me; and as he has been of the greatest use, if you can spare him, I shall be obliged to you if you will write him a few lines, and desire him to remain here.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General. [88.]

SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 17th Jan., 1799.

I have the honour to enclose copies of two letters which have passed between Colonel Murray and myself upon the subject of some horses which I have thought it necessary to order to be shot, as there is already an infectious disorder in camp which has carried off the horses of some officers. I hope the Commander-in-Chief will approve of my doing so.

Captain Grose proceeds to-morrow upon the repairs of the road to Tripetty. At his request I have ordered forty sepoys to accompany him.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Dallas. [89.]

MY DEAR MAJOR DALLAS, Camp near Laulpet, 17th Jan., 1799.

Many thanks for sending down a head maistry and conicopoly ;* they will certainly make everything smooth.

I did not mean to say that anything that was wrong in the bullock department was to be attributed to you : what I complain of is, the regulation which allots only a head maistry to 2000 bullocks, and leaves a division of the army such as I have to be without the means of coming to any settlement with a large proportion of its most useful followers.

In justice to the commanding officers of regiments I must say that, if all the owners are at Madras, it is impossible for them to be responsible for their drivers. If the owners were on the spot, the commanding officers of regiments could force them to have the proper number of people, and pay them their due, which it is clear by your statement they have received, but which they have not paid to their servants.

However, your conicopoly will soon settle everything.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* A store clerk.—ED.

[90.] *To Major-General Floyd.*

MY DEAR SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 18th Jan., 1799.

In consequence of your letter of the 16th instant,* which I received yesterday evening, I this morning sent off to your camp one hundred bullocks loaded with rice, and I hope to be able to furnish you with a similar quantity every day. You may depend upon my sending you everything that I can spare. I have not been hitherto so well supplied with gram as with other grain, and I have therefore sent none of that: you shall have your share of the first that comes in.

My merchants expressed a wish that at least a part of this grain should be paid for here, and I have given directions to the gentleman who superintends the bazaars here to gratify them in this particular, as they are rather capricious. By to-morrow's post I will let you know what he has paid them, to which you will have to add the price of carriage from hence to your camp, which I will likewise state to you to-morrow.

Grain sells here in the bazaars at about 11 or 12 seers for a

* *To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp near Wallajahbad, 16th Jan., 1799.

It is with particular pleasure I find myself connected with you in the public service, but how much to be lamented that poor Aston is no longer amongst us!

I admire your delicacy in being unwilling to have the reputation of assisting me unless upon the grand scale. Pray let me beg of you to lay aside your scruples, and be assured that thirty or forty bullock-loads of rice and grain thrown into our bazaar, or even half the number, would have a very happy effect. The smallest donations of this nature will be most thankfully received.

Our bazaar is but imperfectly formed as yet, and neither bullocks nor bags abound; but I have given notice that they may be supplied at Wallajah-Nuggur, and request that you will give orders for that purpose as they appear.

Mrs. Floyd (a thousand thanks) and the children are all well, and just arrived on Choultry Plain. Mrs. Floyd has got a chair she had made by your desire, and wishes to know to whom she may deliver it. I marched *en famille* from Trichinopoly; a pretty sort of a job. I, that have been used for many years to secure all my property in a single portmanteau, had a train that reached from one stage to another.

I never was in better health, many thanks. Pray take care of yours. I was very ill for ten days at Trichinopoly from something I had eaten, but the physic, &c., has made me as good as new.

I hope to find a moment to pay my respects to the Governor-General, but till the day dawns upon our supplies I cannot, with propriety, stir.

I have, &c.,

J. FLOYD.

rupee, and no duty is levied upon it. The expense of carriage from hence to your camp will probably bring this grain in your bazaar to about the rate of 9½ or 10 seers for a rupee upon a rough estimate.

I hope that you will have an opportunity of going up to Madras to see my brother, who, I am convinced, will have great pleasure in seeing you. I have not been able to go there yet, and I think it probable that I shall not have an opportunity of going.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Bengar Polygar. [91.]

18th Jan., 1799.

One of the grain merchants attached to my camp has informed me that you have detained in your country 800 bullocks loaded with grain which he was bringing here, for duties of transit which you want to levy upon them. As you value the protection and friendship of the Company, I desire that you will suffer this grain to pass without taking a duty for it; and if you refuse to do this, I have ordered a force to escort it in safety to my camp.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Grose. [92.]

DEAR SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 18th Jan., 1799.

The bearer hereof is a grain merchant attached to my camp, who informs me that there is a large quantity of grain belonging to him in a pollam in the neighbourhood of Chittoor, which has been stopped by the polygar Bengar Chander Secar Naig for duties of transit which he wishes to levy upon it. I enclose you a letter (and a translation of it) which I have written to him; and as you pass at no very great distance from the place where it is described that the grain is detained, I expect that you will send the polygar the enclosed letter, and that you will at the same time take such measures as you may deem necessary to secure the grain, and carry it to some place where it will be in safety against any attempt the polygar may make upon it in order to levy his duties.

I beg that you will let me know as soon as possible what steps you may take in consequence of this letter, and where you may place the grain, in order that I may send an escort to bring it to camp.

This business may probably impede your progress to Tripetty; but as you have much time to spare, and as this will not take much, your being stopped for a day or two upon it will not signify, and you will render us an essential service.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[93.] *To Lieut.-Colonel Richardson.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp near Laulpet, 18th Jan., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 16th, and when you come down here I will show you the proceedings of the court martial upon the two men who were caught by Colonel Cotton in the lines of the 25th Dragoons, by which it is clearly proved that they acted under the authority of the cutwal. I shall not appoint any person to his situation unless I find it absolutely necessary, as I think it more than probable that I shall not be allowed to walk alone much longer, and any appointment of mine might hereafter throw difficulties in your way, which I am anxious to avoid.

When you come here I will have a little conversation with you upon the subject of a communication made to me by Captain Kelly.

We are getting on with our supplies as well as you could wish. I have this morning sent General Floyd a hundred load, with the intention of repeating the dose daily, if possible: of this I have but little doubt.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[94.] *To Mr. Place.**

MY DEAR SIR, 18th Jan., 1799.

I have every reason to believe that Lord M. will feel the loss of your services at a moment when they might be most

* A civil servant in the Board of Revenue.—ED.

useful to the public, and that he will regret that any thing should have happened which could induce you to think it necessary to resign your situation at such a moment. This will not prevent him from receiving from you every information which you think proper to give him, nor from paying it that attention which it will merit.

I have not communicated to him your letter, or your offer of giving him information, because you state in it that you have some (which must be of consequence) which you don't intend to communicate to any person here, but which you intend to lay before the Court of Directors. Your reason for doing this you state to be, that you expect that they will duly value your past services; that you have been ill-used at Madras, and that you find a strong prejudice against you on all sides there. As I know that my brother belongs to no side, that he had nothing to do with any ill-usage which you may conceive you have received, and that he values your services, I cannot send him a letter which makes known an intention of withholding some information for the reasons above mentioned.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Floyd. [95.]

MY DEAR SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 19th Jan., 1799.

I sent off from hence to your camp 100 bullocks loaded with grain this morning. For this grain nothing has been paid.

For the grain which went to you yesterday, Captain Kelly paid on account 483 rupees, which I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions to have sent here to him. He paid for the hire of the 100 bullocks 150 rupees, and 333 rupees for 4000 seers of rice, being 12 seers for a rupee, and the people intended to sell the remainder of the rice at the current price in your bazaar; but as Captain Kelly has paid them part of the value, viz. the hire of the bullocks from hence to your camp, the best and clearest method of settling the account will be, to buy all the rice from them at the price of your bazaar, and to withhold 483 rupees as being part of payment which they have received here.

I am concerned to be obliged to give you so much trouble in settling this account, but we must allow these people to receive payment in such manner as they please (and indeed to do what they please in every respect), or we must relinquish all hopes of deriving any benefit from their services.

I shall send you a hundred load again to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[96.] *To Lieut.-Colonel* ———.

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp near Laulpet, 20th Jan., 1799.

Captain Kelly has communicated to me a paragraph in a letter from you, which makes it necessary that I should write you a few lines upon a subject about which I intended never to have any communication with you. He informed me some days ago that the person who had the contract for selling arrack to the bazaar was a man of yours, and that you intended that the profit, after paying the price of the contract, should be your own. To this arrangement there appeared to me to be three objections: first, that it might be said that as you had made the contract with your own man, you had not made him pay what it was worth. To this objection, however, there was this answer, that the contract had been offered to the highest bidder, and that your man was to give for it the largest sum that had been offered. But although this first objection was removed, there still remained two others which were sufficient to induce me to impart to Captain Kelly my disapprobation of the measure. First, I conceived that, as superintendent of bazaars, it would be your duty to regulate and check the consumption of arrack, at the same time that it would be your interest, as having the contract for the sale of it, to increase its consumption as much as possible. This clashing of duty and interest I conceive it to be desirable to avoid whenever it is possible. The other objection which I have to it is one which relates purely to yourself. I am convinced that as superintendent of bazaars, as well as in every other situation, you would do your duty; but it is impossible to expect that you would be successful in checking abuses in the sale of arrack. If you have the contract, whenever the word *drunkenness* is mentioned in the army, you will be abused; in short, there will be

no end to the unpleasant things which will be said of you. It is impossible for any man to suppose that you or your man had anything to do with the sale of the arrack some days ago in the lines of the 25th Dragoons; but I leave it to yourself and your friends to judge whether, if it were known (which it is not, excepting to Captain Kelly and myself) that your man had the contract, many unpleasant things would not be said on the subject. No man despises things of this kind more than I do when they are undeserved; but in this case, unfortunately, every man must agree that it is improper that the superintendent of bazaars should have the contract for the sale of arrack. After the army will have collected, I shall have nothing to say to bazaars or anything else, and, as far as I am personally concerned, I don't care who has the contract. What I said to Captain Kelly, and what I now write to you, is dictated solely by motives of friendship for you; and as I am aware that Allan is in your confidence, let him see this letter and take his opinion upon the whole subject. At all events I request to have no answer, and that as this letter was occasioned solely by the paragraph in yours to Captain Kelly, here it may end.*

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut.-Colonel Close. [97.]

MY DEAR COLONEL CLOSE,* Camp near Laulpet, 20th Jan., 1799.

Many thanks for your letter, which I received yesterday, and which has given me much information.

I believe that, as far as depends upon Colonel Carlisle, he will be ready to move his department as soon as he receives his

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* *To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Fort St. George, 21st Jan., 1799.

Although you request to have no answer to your letter, I cannot avoid requesting of you to accept my thanks for the trouble you have taken on the occasion, and to assure you that it is unnecessary to consult any person on the subject of your letter; for if I had not been most perfectly convinced of the impropriety of having anything to do with the concern in question before I received it, your arguments would have been conclusive. When I have the pleasure of seeing you, I doubt not but I shall be able to satisfy you with respect to my intentions.

Believe me to be very sincerely yours,

bullocks; but I will take measures to obtain particular information upon this subject. He told me the other day at Vellore that some of the carts were very bad, and broke between Madras and that place; and he likewise mentioned (which I think very material) that he could curtail his department considerably if the bullocks should fail, and that he could do so without injury to the public service, as he could show by statements which he should make out. I pressed him to prepare them immediately, to have them ready for the General's inspection when he came down; and he did not appear to have a doubt but that he should be able to move off immediately after the General should decide what should be carried forward and what left behind.

I wrote to you yesterday that I was sending grain daily to General Floyd.

I am afraid that Captain Kelly will not be able to do much in the way of getting lascars. If he get any, they will be mere coolies.

There is nothing about which I am personally so much interested as the proper equipment of the 33rd; and knowing perfectly well that if they were not provided with good lascars and good carriage for their tents, not only they would themselves be very uncomfortable during the campaign, but that they would be unable to render all the service which would be expected from them, and which in another case they would be capable of rendering, I applied above two months ago to two members of the Military Board to have the lascars and carriage allotted to the regiment, and proposed that they should remain liable to other public service until we wanted them. This was promised; and if I had been in Fort St. George with the 33rd, I believe I may safely assert that it would now be as well equipped, at least in those particulars, as any regiment in the service. It is hard upon them that they should suffer because I am employed upon other duty; and what I have, therefore, to request is, that a proportion of the newly-levied lascars may be sent to other regiments, and that the 33rd may get some of those who have been some time in the service. I request the same respecting their tent bullocks.

I hear good news respecting money.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut.-Colonel Close. [98.]

MY DEAR COLONEL CLOSE, Camp near Laulpet, 21st Jan., 1799.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have seen Colonel Carlisle. He says that after all the carts for his department arrive, it will take two or three days to load them; so that his being ready will depend upon the time at which the carts will arrive at Vellore, and their state of repair.

There will be no delay in loading the carriage-bullocks: all his arrangements are made.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut.-Colonel Carlisle. [99.]

Camp near Laulpet, 25th Jan., 1799.

MY DEAR COLONEL CARLISLE,

I enclose an extract of a letter I received yesterday from Colonel Close, in answer to one which I wrote to him the day you were here, which I believe I showed you; but lest I should not, I now enclose a copy of it.*

From your letter of yesterday, I should judge that your greatest difficulty will be to know what, in the intention of the Board, is to be carried on carts, and what on the backs of bullocks. It is necessary that they should determine that, before you can tell them the number of carts you will want.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* *To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Madras, 23rd Jan., 1799.

By your last the Commissary-General's arrangements appear to be in greater forwardness than we could have imagined. Every day will now bring him a certain number of bullocks. He will find the carts remaining to be delivered to him of a better kind and better fitted up than those which he has already received. The Military Board have written to him on this subject, and yesterday General Sydenham wrote him a few lines, which I think will be useful in letting him know the number of carts which we reckon upon as already in his possession, the number of different descriptions which are on their road to Vellore, and the number which will be despatched from hence in the course of a certain period. His reply, therefore, I hope will bring us mutually to a clear

[100.] *To Captain Grose.*

DEAR SIR, Camp near Laulpet, 26th Jan., 1799.

By your letter to Captain Colebrooke of the 25th instant from Chandergherry, I perceive that you cannot have received one which I wrote you on the 18th, of which I now enclose a copy.

As the grain-merchant who was to have delivered you the original, of which the enclosed is a copy, is absent, it will probably be impossible for you to find out either the polygar or the grain. If that should be the case, or if there should be any other difficulty in effecting the object with which I troubled you (and which I don't now foresee), I beg that you will not undertake it.

Colonel Roberts has passed the Bodwal Pass, and is on his march, by Colway and Rampoor, to Tripetty. You will, therefore, do well to order back the pioneers, whom, it appears, you have sent towards Cuddapa. I rather believe he has with him some heavy guns (four or six), and I mention this as you report that the road from Tripetty to Laulpet is repaired for light guns only. Lieutenant Fitzpatrick is arrived, and it is probable that your pioneers will not be wanted here for some time. I wish that you would make some intelligent person look at the road from Tripetty to Rampoor, and have your pioneers in readiness

understanding on the point. It is of importance that we should know his demand on carriages precisely and soon.

General Floyd marches to-morrow. The 33rd moved out to the Mount[a] this morning. They will leave this well supplied with doolies, and, from Hyaree, with lascars. The Mount division, consisting of a party of artillery, your regiment, and the Bengal Volunteers, are now under Major-General Popham, and will march, I hope, in three days.

About 350 dooly bearers are coming to us from Tanjore. They will conveniently equip the 12th Regiment.

The 19th Dragoons marched this morning, Major Bladen having in charge two gallopers for the 25th Regiment and two for the 1st Native Regiment. You can mention this to Colonel Cotton. The remainder of the gallopers will leave this soon. Roberts comes on fast. By a despatch of yesterday, the Nizam's infantry had been reconciled to their duty and were coming on. I am not minutely informed as to the amount of specie in hand, but I understand there will be enough to put us properly in motion.

On hearing that General Floyd has marched, General Harris will send you instructions to take up a position near Vellore.

I am, &c.,

BARRY CLOSE.

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[a] *Mount St. Thomas*, 6 miles from Fort St. George.—ED.

to proceed at a moment's warning to give it the repairs which may be necessary. I don't, however, wish that they should begin before you hear that Colonel Roberts is well advanced towards Rampoor, and that his march is so decided as to make secrecy no longer necessary.

If you find no difficulty in getting the grain from the polygar, and that you can do it and attend to other objects, you will render us a material service.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Floyd. [101.]

MY DEAR SIR, Camp near Vellore, 27th Jan., 1799.

I arrived here this morning, and I am happy to hear that you are to be near us to-morrow. I should go over to see you, only that I expect General Harris on Tuesday morning, and I have many things to arrange preparatory to giving up my charge. I believe, however, that Major Paterson will go over to you, and let you know how we have been going on.

I must recommend to your notice the Nabob's manager at Arcot, and a deputy, by name Meer Ali Khan, who was employed by him to communicate with me. I certainly wanted and took but little from their districts; but I found them willing to do what they could, and really doing it when they found I was determined. I conceive that in this I have said as much as can be said in favour of any natives.

You will find in Wallajah-Nuggur ten garce of rice, and about as much more in the Begum's jaghire, which I had ordered to be prepared and kept in case I should want it. I have never had occasion to call for it, and it is now there (as they inform me) ready at your call. If you should want any further supply, I will send it from hence.

I intend (with your permission) to draw gram for the supply of the cavalry here from Arcot, and will accordingly send over the gram bullocks either to-morrow night or next morning, if I don't hear from you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[102.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Camp near Vellore, 28th Jan., 1799.

I enclose a letter from Montgomery, which gives but a bad account of the state of preparations upon the Malabar coast.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.

MY DEAR COLONEL, Bombay, 8th Jan., 1799.

I have been here since the 31st ultimo, and, having settled all my business, only wait for an opportunity to return to Cochin.

The order for assembling the troops on this establishment was received here some days ago, but how it is to be complied with I can't imagine. As far as I can learn, there are not more than 2000 bullocks in readiness, and this number is not more than sufficient for the *ordnance* department of a *field* equipment.

About 4000 men only, I believe, can be assembled; for it is not here judged safe to take any of the troops at present doing duty in Bombay. There are, I understand, provisions, tents, &c. at Cannanore; but I fancy it will not be practicable to collect lascars, drivers, dooly-bearers, or bullocks sufficient to be able to move in any reasonable time. The officers are all perfectly unprepared, nor have they even got any intimation that it was likely they would be called on; and as they furnish their own camp equipage on this side of India, and on an allowance paid only during war, it is not to be supposed that one in ten of them will be covered from the inclemency of the weather. In short, I am of opinion that no important assistance can be got from this establishment unless they join the Mahratta army, and it is now almost too late for an arrangement of this kind: in that country cattle and followers can be got; the *coast* of Malabar furnishes neither.

I heard with very great grief of Colonel Aston's affair! Report says here that his life is despaired of; I trust in God he will recover!

I shall have my commission completely executed by the end of this month, and I hope to be in good time to join before the army enters the enemy's country.

The springs have been so low that it is not practicable to get the *Suffolk* into dock this time, so that she must remain here till the next; at which both Malcolm and the Admiral are furious. The Admiral will go from hence on a cruise in a day or two in the *Trident*.

Webbe will have told you that the Court of Proprietors, by a majority of 7, decided against Lord Hobart's pension: the number present did not consist of above 70.

Believe me, &c.,

H. C. MONTGOMERY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [103.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Camp near Vellore, 29th Jan., 1799.

I have just received a letter from Henry, in which he has desired that I should give you my opinion respecting the propriety and utility of your joining the army and accompanying it during the campaign.

I am entirely ignorant of the objects which you may have in view in coming, which may certainly counterbalance the objections I have to the measure; but it appears to me that your presence in camp, instead of giving confidence to the General, would in fact deprive him of the command of the army, and that scene would be acted over again, probably in the presence of the enemy, which, to my annoyance, I have so often witnessed at Madras. Every thing which the General might think necessary will be thwarted and canvassed, not by you probably, but by those whom you will naturally wish to consult; the General's own staff, and the principal officers of his army, who ought to think of nothing excepting how his orders are to be carried into execution, instead of their propriety, and in what manner they shall thwart them if they should not approve of them. All I can say upon the subject is, that if I were in General Harris's situation, and you joined the army, I should quit it.

In my opinion he is at present awkwardly situated, and he will require all the powers which can be given to him to keep in order the officers who will be in his army. Your presence will diminish his powers, at the same time that as it is impossible you can know any thing of military matters, your powers will not answer the purpose, which even those which he has at present may, if you or Lord Clive are not in the army.*

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The General arrived in camp this morning.

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* Lord Mornington thus replied to the above:—

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Fort St. George, 2nd Feb., 1799.

You will not be surprised at my long silence under all the circumstances of the late crisis. Nothing has given me more pleasure than to hear from all

[104.] *To Major-General Floyd.*

MY DEAR SIR, Camp near Vellore, 31st Jan., 1799.

Owing to the caprice of the brinjarries, I am obliged to trouble you again about grain.

My head merchant, Nagapah Chitty, informs me that the person who was sent with the first grain which left my camp at Laulpet on the 18th, by name Mooda Chitty, is confined in the choultry of the cutwal of your bazaar, and that he is so because that instead of 8000 seers of rice, which he ought to have brought to your camp, he produced only about 7000. He states that this deficiency arose from two causes: first, from the waste which commonly attends the transport of grain from one place to another; secondly, from some of the bullocks having knocked up on the road. This is his story; and if there is no other charge against him, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order that he may be released.

In my letter of the 19th January, I requested that you would order 483 rupees of the payment for this rice to be stopped, and to be sent to Captain Kelly. I did so at the desire of the head brinjarry, who wished that the account might be so settled; and now, as he has changed his mind, I request that the money for the whole quantity of rice which he brought to your camp may be paid to the man in confinement, and Captain Kelly and the head merchant will settle their accounts here.

quarters such unqualified commendations of your arrangements in your late command. I wish to God the whole were under your direction; but even as it is, I think our success is certain: and I found my opinion on the united sentiments of Close, Beatson, Macaulay, and Agnew.

I entirely concur in your opinion respecting the impropriety of my taking the field with the army: my judgment was always the same as yours; but certain persons made such a clamour on the subject, that I wished to learn how you thought upon it. Your observation with respect to military counteraction in this place is perfectly just: it is with the utmost difficulty that I can restrain the Council (I except *no one*) from interference in the Commander-in-Chief's arrangements; but I have now plainly declared war against every attempt of the kind, and I trust that Harris will now find no impediment to the prompt execution of such orders as must be carried into effect here. Henry means to proceed to the army in a day or two: he will communicate fully to you all my sentiments and intentions.

Ever yours most affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

I am concerned to give you so much trouble upon so trifling a subject, and I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The 19th Dragoons arrived in camp this morning.

To the Earl of Mornington. [105.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Camp near Vellore, 2nd Feb., 1799.

As General Harris and I were talking over a letter which he was writing this morning to General Stewart upon the subject of his rank relatively with General Floyd's, it occurred to us both that there may be more difficulty and inconvenience attending that question than anybody is aware of at present, and that it is one worthy of your consideration. The occasion of General Harris's letter to General Stewart is the possibility of his being obliged to detach General Floyd to effect the junction with the Bombay army: if upon that occasion there is any chance of a difference of opinion respecting their rank (which I think there is), it is a sufficient reason for not sending the detachment under the command of General Floyd, and for not suffering him and General Stewart to meet until they are under the immediate orders of the General, when their difference respecting rank will have no bad effect upon the public service.

Therefore, as far as the question has been viewed hitherto, as the possible inconvenience can be easily avoided with great propriety, there is no necessity for calling for your decision; but the General and I have considered it in another point of view, that is, in the possible event of the General's death. Who is then to take the command of the army? who to exercise the extensive powers with which you have intrusted General Harris?

He and General Stewart were made, one a Lieutenant-General on the coast of Coromandel, the other a Lieutenant-General on the coast of Malabar, where they were appointed Commanders-in-Chief at the two Presidencies: General Floyd is an older Major-General than General Stewart, and therefore when the army quits the coast of Malabar he will give him orders. The question is, when will the army quit the coast of Malabar? Upon that the whole will turn. It cannot be sup-

posed to quit the coast of Malabar when it leaves the Company's territories, because its operations may be in territory strictly speaking upon the sea-coast; and therefore some other line besides that of the Company's boundary must be drawn, upon which your decision may be necessary.

If you should be of opinion that this question, which may eventually be important, ought to be decided according to what might be most expedient for the public service, instead of according to what may agree most with the rights of the individuals, it would perhaps be advisable to make General Harris and General Stewart Lieutenant-Generals south of the Toombuddra, which will place the matter beyond dispute, and will put the latter relatively to General Floyd where it appears the Company and Government intended he should be in the army in India. I acknowledge that, having a great regard for General Floyd, and knowing how necessary it is to keep him, as well as everybody else, in good humour, in order to get from them all the service they can render, I regret the necessity of taking this step; but it must be recollected that the public service requires that something should be decided, and that if this decision does not accord with Floyd's rights and interests, it must be attributed to what was done when General Stewart was appointed Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, and not to any desire of yours to pass him over at the present moment, or to any opinion you may have formed to his disadvantage.

Another idea has occurred to me which I will state to you. However desirable General Stewart's services may be, it does not appear that at present they are so essentially necessary as those of General Floyd. An injury was certainly done to the latter when the former was put over his head, at the same time that his advanced rank was so guarded, that it appeared at that time impossible that it should ever become a matter of dispute, or that General Floyd should ever feel the inconvenience of it. By appointing General Stewart a Lieutenant-General south of the Toombuddra, you will in fact give him rank over General Floyd in this part of India as well as on the other side of the peninsula, by which you would go farther than perhaps was intended; and therefore it is desirable to find out another method of settling this question. I propose to you, then, to let General Stewart know the difficulties attending it, and to desire that he should either waive the claim he may have to rank above

General Floyd in consequence of his local commission, if they should meet upon service out of the Company's territories, or that, if he has an intention of claiming it, he should remain below the Ghauts, and send General Hartley up with the army. The question will then be decided in this manner: if they meet above the Ghauts, General Floyd will give orders; if below, General Stewart.

I have shown General Harris this letter, who agrees with me that it is necessary you should decide this question in one way or the other. I have stated two methods of doing it, and you have only to make your option between General Floyd and General Stewart in case of any accident to General Harris, recollecting that if you decide in favour of the latter you will probably lose the services of the former entirely, whereas a decision in favour of General Floyd will not deprive you of General Stewart's services, as he in fact will have nothing to complain of. If there were any probability of General Harris' death, perhaps General Stewart might be deemed the most proper person of the two to take the command of the army; but as we can consider that event only as possible, and as the willing services of General Floyd are very necessary, it is not right to deprive the public of them entirely in contemplation of such an event, particularly as by the contrary decision you will in all probability have the benefit of the services of both.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [106.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Camp near Vellore, 4th Feb., 1799.

I am very glad that you have yourself found out the disposition at Madras to impede the General's arrangements. If I had imagined that he was to have the command of the army, I should have acquainted you of it long ago; and I hope that before you return to Calcutta you will take measures to put his authority (which in this country, where not one in ten comes excepting to make money, depends upon his patronage) upon the proper footing. The rules of patronage ought to be the same at Madras as they are in Bengal, where the Governor-

General, although probably the most powerful subject in the world, cannot in the ordinary course of business make a corporal. Here the Commander-in-Chief, by the encroachments of Lord Hobart, first upon General Brathwaite, and lastly upon Sir A. Clarke (and by the operation of throwing all the business of the army into the Military Board, where he debates with the officers who ought to execute his orders), has no more power over the army than if he were a common soldier. The whole establishment look to the Governor for favour and promotion instead of to their legal head; and thus it is that the Commander-in-Chief becomes contemptible to the army which he is to lead. I told Lord Clive all this long ago, and particularly stated to him the necessity of giving the General credit at least for the appointments of the different Commissaries, if he did not allow him to make them. It was impossible to make him too respectable, or to hold him too high, if he was to be placed at the head of the army in the field.

This want of respectability, which is to be attributed in a great measure to the General himself, is what I am most afraid of: however, I have lectured him well upon the subject, and I have urged publicly to the army, in which I flatter myself I have some influence, the necessity of supporting him, whether he be right or wrong. The ponderous machine is now nearly prepared, and all we have to do is to put and keep it in motion. The General has three or four people about him very capable of it, if he can only keep them well together. I have spoken to him about that, and I shall make it a particular object of my attention. He has confidence in me, and I don't fail to give him my opinion upon every subject.

I am afraid that you think that even in my own opinion there was no foundation for the fears I expressed respecting money, &c. I knew nothing, nor do I now, of your arrangements. I was aware that the distress was great at Madras, and that you had brought with you no relief; and the want of money in my camp was so great, that I was obliged to borrow from the officers of the army and to sell my own horses to find money to send off two detachments to Chandergherry and Vellore.

You may depend upon it that I shall do everything in my power to insure the grand object, and I hope we shall succeed. Lord Clive ought to be kept at Madras; and I know of no

method of doing that so likely to succeed as your giving him some occupation there.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [107.]

Camp, 3 miles west of Goriatam,
16th Feb., 1799.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

After considering the subject which you have referred to me,* my opinion is that you ought to send Doveton to Tippoo immediately, and give him notice at the same time that you intend to march an army into his country in order to enforce the propositions which you will make to him.

There is but one objection to this mode of proceeding; it is that there is a risk of the safety of Doveton's person: but I put that out of the question, as, if the measure be a good one in other respects, there is no more reason for not risking Doveton's person than there is for not risking that of any private soldier in the army.

You have stated in your letter two other objections to it: one, that the Allies will no longer be cordial in the cause; the other, that you could no longer properly avail yourself of the defection of any of Tippoo's subjects.

* MY DEAR ARTHUR, Fort St. George, 14th Feb., 1799.

I recommend the letter which I received yesterday from Tippoo, and which General Harris will communicate to you, to your particular attention; and I wish to know whether you think that it requires any change of system. In order to judge of this point, you must read the whole of my correspondence with Tippoo (now at head-quarters), and my orders to General Harris of the 3rd instant, connected with my declaration to the Allies.[a]

Tippoo's silence was evidently designed for the great purpose of gaining time; his present compliance with my repeated request is founded on the same principle. If Doveton were now to be sent to Tippoo, the Allies would no longer be cordial, and we could not properly avail ourselves of the defection of any of Tippoo's subjects: even if Doveton were to be sent, the army must march to Seringapatam, otherwise we leave the whole game in Tippoo's hands.

You will observe that my letter of the 9th of January demanded an answer from the Sultaun within the space of one day, for the express purpose of precluding procrastination.

Send me your opinion on the whole subject as soon as possible. I conclude that Henry is on his return, and therefore I have not sent him any of his letters.

Yours ever most affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

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[a] For correspondence with Tippoo, vide Wellington Despatches, vol. i.; Wellesley Despatches, vol. v.; and Beatson's History of the Mysore War.—ED.

The question is, what are the objects of the alliance? If they are to punish Tippoo for his aggression, to get indemnification for the expenses incurred, and security for the future, they may be obtained without annihilating him: and considering that the army still advances into his country, there is no reason to believe that the Allies would want cordiality only because means were taken, in conformity with your first plan, to obtain immediately the objects of the alliance in which they are to share. If the objects of the alliance are to annihilate Tippoo and to divide his country between the three powers, it is probable that the Allies will not be satisfied when they find that you have sent a person to treat with him.

Whether you can with propriety avail yourself of the defection of any of Tippoo's subjects depends upon the same question. If the objects of Cummer u Deen, and of the disaffected sect of Mussulmans, are his annihilation, and that the country should be divided amongst the three powers and them, and if that has been made the basis of the negotiation which has been opened with them, it will be impossible to send Doveton to Tippoo immediately, as that will be at once a departure from a principle which they must understand has been adopted: but if the basis of the negotiation with Cummer u Deen is his discontent in the service of Tippoo, and his desire to pass over to the service of the Nizam, and of that with the sect of Mussulmans is their disaffection to his government, and their desire to live under the protection of the British Government, there is no reason why you should not treat for peace with Tippoo, at the same time that you hold out to Cummer u Deen and others, engagements that their views will be gratified if they assist the Allies, and to the discontented Mussulmans promises that they shall be taken under British protection.

Having now considered the two objections to the measure which you have stated, I'll give you my reason for wishing it were adopted. I have observed so much incapacity in the persons who lead this army, such a want of decision and of attention to those objects which are absolutely necessary in order to enable us to get on at all, that I am really apprehensive that the best that can happen to us is to have a fair prospect of making the siege of Seringapatam in the next season instead of in this. Others, however, are of a different opinion; particularly those about head-quarters still believe that we shall

succeed in one campaign. The propriety of sending Doveton immediately depends upon our chance of success. If we are certain that we shall succeed, there is no necessity for it; although, as I said before, there is no objection to it, and it will not in any way diminish our means of carrying on the war. But if we should fail, you will stand higher with the public, both here and in Europe, and you will have a better prospect of making a good peace by having sent Doveton to treat, than if you send an army into Tippoo's country and hold no previous communication whatever with him, particularly as he has consented to receive the person whom you have repeatedly pressed upon him.

Henry goes as soon as he can have bearers posted upon the road.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [108.]

Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur,
27th Feb., 1799.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

In a letter which I received from General Harris yesterday he informed me that you had appointed me one of a Commission * with Colonel Close, Colonel Agnew, and Captain Malcolm; but I have not yet seen the instructions, nor any of the papers relating to the objects with which you have intrusted us, to which you have referred me.

I expect General Harris in this camp to-morrow, when I will read all those papers.

I am glad that you are prepared for a failure, and that you have framed instructions accordingly, which I will give at the proper moment. Considering the lateness of the season, and that we are run almost to a day, it is possible for the enemy to throw such impediments in our way as to prevent us from laying siege to his capital in this year; and as matters have been already in some degree mismanaged, I should be sorry to

* The Governor-General being desirous of relieving the General commanding the Mysore army from the conduct of negotiations which might interfere with his important avocations, directed a Mysore Commission to be formed, consisting of Colonels Wellesley, Close, and Agnew, and Captain Malcolm, who were to receive and consider overtures from the subjects of the Sultaun, and to transact various civil business under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.—ED.

see our future operations and the safety of the army committed to the dictates of ——'s judgment.

My despondency goes thus far, and no farther; and as it has induced you to think it possible for us to fail, and to provide for such an event, I think I have done better to make it known to you, than to tell you that it was impossible that we should not succeed.

It is better to see and to communicate the difficulties and dangers of the enterprise, and to endeavour to overcome them, than to be blind to everything but success till the moment of difficulty comes, and then to despond.

No force which the French * can land on the Malabar coast must prevent us from following up our object. I understand

* The following is a translation (found among the Wellington Papers) of the treaty proposed by Tippoo Sultaun to the French Government.—Ed.

Proposals from the Circar Khoodadad [the Government of Tippoo, or the *God-given Government*] *to the People of the French Nation as follows:*

"Proposition the 1st. That while the sun and moon last; while this globe of God, that is to say, the earth, exists; while water remains in the sea; while by the favour of the Almighty the tribe of Koreish, the Circar Khoodadad, and the Circar of the French people last, let union and friendship be so firmly fixed and established, that in no circumstance dissatisfaction or breach of friendship may happen; and if from any unforeseen events, or by means of the servants of the two nations, discontent should arise between them, let the chiefs and officers on either side investigate, and whoever may have committed offences, let him be punished by the chiefs of his own nation; but by no means let dissatisfaction arise between the officers of high rank, but let them continue firm in friendship. And in all affairs, great and small, let both nations act in concert; let them communicate with each other by letter and embassies, and bring them to a happy conclusion. And the servants of either must by no means have the power of disturbing the happiness subsisting between the two Circars. And should any other nation make war upon either of the contracting parties, both nations—that is to say, the Circar Khoodadad and the French Circar—must join; and should they be more powerful, they must punish the offender. And though peace should be concluded between the French and the English, a French army must always be kept in this country; and whatever places may have been taken by either party may be kept. But should any factory be given in Hindostan, it does not signify, only that it will be the means of keeping up contention. And in treating for peace, the name of the Circar Khoodadad must be included, as the Circar Khoodadad is a party in the war. And in all affairs relative to peace or war between the French nation and English, the Circar Khoodad is a party in either peace or war; and to this purport the French people must conclude, sign, and seal an agreement, and send it to the Circar Khoodadad. By the blessing of the Almighty, in the same manner we will conclude, sign, seal, and deliver a treaty to the same purport; and as the Dutch are at present in amity with the French, they are therefore the friends of the Circar Khoodadad.

"Proposal the 2nd. Ten thousand Europeans, fighting men, must first be landed at Tellichery [on the Malabar coast], and notice must be sent to the

that our stores and provisions which are to come from the Malabar side will be in safety at the top of the Ghaut under charge of a small force, and a garrison must be left in Canna-

Circar Khoodadad that the army of the Circar may also be ready, and come to their assistance; and all manner of provisions, &c., will be furnished by the Circar Khoodadad; and the fort of Tellichery must be taken and destroyed; and from thence, Our Majesty having taken the French army with us, by the road of Cochin, and the country of Ram Nair, Madura, Tinnevelly, and Trichinopoly, to Pondicherry, and thence to Madras, we will, with the blessing of God, lay strong siege to that place; and the ships must occupy the sea opposite to the army, and the people of the ships will be furnished with provisions by the Circar Khoodadad. With the assistance of the Almighty God, having taken Madras, it shall be destroyed, in revenge for Pondicherry; and the water of the sea shall cover the place where it stood; and the forts of Trichinopoly, Tanjore, and Vellore, with half the country on the border of the sea, shall be given to the Circar Khoodadad; and half the country on the seashore shall be given to the Commander of the French. By the favour of God, after accomplishing this matter, Our Majesty, with the French army, will proceed to Bengal; and having taken Calcutta, and all the forts and country, we will divide the same equally between us; and from thence to Bombay. If Our Majesty cannot attend in person, we will despatch an army of the Circar Khoodadad with a French army; and having taken Bombay, it shall be delivered to the Commander of the French army. To take Bombay is no mighty affair.

"3rd Proposition. Strict orders must be given to all officers of the army who may come, that in matters of war, of marching or halting, they must be under the control of the Circar Khoodadad, because the enemy, who has been a long period of time in this country, understands the art and system of war of this country; and the French, from the deceit and treacheries of the enemy, and for want of local knowledge, may commit some blunder and be ruined, and be unequal to the conducting of business, and may fall into distress. For which reason it is recommended that the conduct of the war shall be committed to the Circar, that the French may not be ruined, and that affairs may be brought to a happy conclusion.

"Proposal the 4th. Wherever I shall think proper to post 1000 French cavalry, I shall also attach 5000 men of the Circar Khoodadad, to aid and afresh each other in battle; and in this manner, whatever number of French shall be engaged in the war, the people of the Circar shall be openly employed with them.

"Proposal 5th. Until the junction of the French army with that of the Circar Khoodadad, the naval and land forces of the French shall be amply supplied with provisions; also doolies for the transport of the sick and wounded shall be supplied by the Circar Khoodadad.

"Proposal 6th. It is certain the Moghul [the Nizam] and Mahrattas will assist the English, and make war on the Circar Khoodadad. In that event, the army of the French must join and assist the army of the Circar Khoodadad; and all affairs relative to peace or war with them must be entirely at the disposal of the Circar Khoodadad.

"Proposal 7th. On account of the friendship subsisting between the Circar Khoodadad and the French, and in consequence of the intercourse of embassies between the Circar and the French, the English, from envy and malignity, became enemies of the Circar's; and having brought over the Moghul

nore. Not another man ought to be sent even to watch them, if he can be usefully employed at the siege.

Tippoo is the main spring of their means of annoying us in India; and their arrival on the Malabar coast ought to have no effect upon us, excepting to induce us to accelerate our operations against Seringapatam. Till they join him they cannot move, and will probably subsist with difficulty: they will depend upon him for everything, and I think that we can contrive to occupy his attention sufficiently to prevent him from moving towards them.

If we succeed in our attempt upon Seringapatam, their destruction is certain; as the Malabar monsoon, the climate, their intemperance, their want of Native allies, and consequently of everything, will nearly effect it for us before the season comes round in which we can operate against them. If we fail in our attempt, the question will be, whether we shall retire to the Malabar province, or towards the Carnatic, or what portion of the army ought to go to the one, and what to the other.

If the French land, it will certainly be necessary to send a part of the army back to the Malabar side; but as in the next season we shall have to carry on a very extensive warfare, for which the

and Mahrattas, came and took 3 crore and 30 lacs of rupees, and half the territory of the Circar Khoodadad, and divided it between them. All this happened in consequence of my friendship to the French. In the event that the above affair, that is, the arrival of the French army, and the conquest of the country of this enemy, should not take place, at the time of concluding peace between the French and English you must treat and compel the English to restore the 3 crore and 30 lacs of rupees, and half the country of the C. K. taken by them, and the French will thereby acquire a good name and glorious character all over the world; also that the English must not prevent or interrupt the intercourse of embassies between the French and the Circar K. either by land or sea.

"Proposal 8th. Ship carpenters, and gunfounders in brass and iron, and of bombshells, are required by the Circar K. You must send 30 workmen of each description; also paper makers, glass blowers, makers of looking glasses; you must also feed 30 persons of each description. The mark with which Pierre Monnerou, French Feringy, will sign his petitions in this shape: and at the bottom of our perwannahs to Pierre Monnerou ya Hafiz — O Protector [must be written], in a flourish, thus



Carnatic is best, or indeed alone, able to furnish the supplies of troops, rice, and cattle we shall want, I should imagine that the largest part of the army ought to retire towards this part of India.

I don't think that anything can be done at present excepting to desire that the Admiral will remain upon the coast as long as he possibly can, and even leave something there during the monsoon.

General Harris has sent me an extract of a letter from Mr. Webbe to him, written by your desire. I am much obliged to you for the notice you take of what I did for the public service, and I wish for several reasons that you had a Commander-in-Chief under you, who, when he approved of the conduct of an officer, would have a sufficiency of spirit to make known his approbation. The fact is that when I went to the army there was not a grain of rice to be got in the country: I bustled through the difficulty, and in a short time had plenty in my camp; and not only I took nothing from the public stores, but if what I desired had been done, I should have thrown a large supply into them which I did not want; and, notwithstanding all opposition, I did form a small store, which, if they had known how to use it, would have been of essential consequence in the moment of difficulty and scarcity. Besides that, I paid a sum of money into the General's hands for the public service which other officers had always heretofore taken to themselves.

The General expressed his approbation of what I had done, and adopted as his own all the orders and regulations I had made, and then said that he should mention his approbation publicly, only that he was afraid others would be displeased and jealous. One of these others, General Floyd, had been in a similar situation with mine, but his army was starving: he had been supplied from the public stores at Madras, Vellore, and Arnee, and latterly by me from my own camp.

As in fact there is nothing to be got in the army but credit, and as it is not always that the best intentions and endeavours to serve the public succeed, it is hard that when they do succeed they should not receive the approbation which it is acknowledged by all they deserve. I was much hurt about it at the time, but I don't care now, and shall certainly continue to do everything to serve General Harris, and to support his name and authority.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Pray don't show this letter to anybody but Henry, and tell him that Mons. de Meuron has just been here about *du ris au bazar*.

Upon reading over my letter, I find that in stating my own grievances I have omitted one thing, which is, that the moment General Harris came to the army, and relaxed or altered the system which I had adopted, he began to want, which want increased to distress, and I assure you was at last very near famine. It is now, however, all over; we have plenty, and not too cheap.

[109.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Camp near Anchitty Droog, 9th March, 1799.

I can tell you very little, for fear of accidents. We are going on well; have got Oodeadroog, Batingerry, Anchitty-droog, and Neilgherry. About thirty thousand brinjarries are with the army.

You have read Dumourier's account of his organising the Poles; I am employed in a business of much the same kind. My Poles fight too, and that not badly, I assure you; and if I can give them some mark to distinguish them from the enemy, I don't despair of their being very useful. Malcolm is indefatigable, and leads the life of a canister at a dog's tail.

I have received your letter, but I have not seen Connolly.

I am very well.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[110.] *To Lieut.-General Harris.*

MY DEAR SIR, Camp, 11th March, 1799.

There are a few points upon which I must trouble you, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give me your answers in the margin.

1. Am I to make up any establishment for my baggage-master? The difficulty I had yesterday in getting the baggage out of the way of the enemy, even after I had formed for their

protection, would seem to render something of the kind necessary.*

2. Is it possible to let me have a havildar and twelve pioneers of the pioneer corps, who will show Meer Allum's bildars the nature of the work they are to do?

3. I sent ten tumbrils loaded with ammunition and stores for the 24-pounders to the Grand Park the day before yesterday, under the idea that, as the park goes upon the only road in the country, they would be better there than with my corps. You approved of this measure by a letter from Colonel Close to me; but yesterday the tumbrils were not allowed to proceed with the park, and I sent back to order them to get on with the baggage as well as they could; and this day again I have had a complaint from the people in charge of them, that they have been ordered out of the park. Will you be so kind as to give directions about them, and either send them to me, or let them be kept in the park?

4. The agent for bullocks of this detachment has received orders from the Auditor-General to have only one spare bullock to every 6-pounder; the regulations give two: we have a sufficiency of difficulty in getting them on with two. Is he to adhere to the letter of the regulations, or to the principles adopted by the Auditor-General in some retrenchments he has made in his accounts?

* *Answers of Lieut.-General Harris.*

1. Certainly a *Deputy* baggage-master, to avoid discussion with *ours* when they meet.

2. Yes, a havildar and 12 pioneers shall be sent.

3. The tumbrils will be ordered immediately to be received in the park.

P.S. They are there, and *did* march on the road with the park, by order of Colonel Smith. They will be taken care of. The chowdry, or whoever is in charge of them, has only to tell Colonel Smith the number of them, show them to his conductors, and they will be paid every attention to.

14 of sorts, besides the forage hackeries (which were ordered to march on the flank), are now in the park.

4. The allowance is one spare to every six bullocks, and to that extent the agent may be authorized to furnish bullocks, and his accounts shall be passed.

The Ordnance Regulations say (*vide* printed form, p. 132):

Bullocks for 6 pounder:		Tumbrils:	
In the yokes	8	In the yokes	10
Spare	2	Spare	2
Total	10	Total	12

5. Very right; but no bullocks are yet arrived.

6. A plan of *our* march can be sent. The head of Colonel Wellesley's line should dress nearly with the head of ours at *not above* two miles distance. The Nizam's Horse *must not* come on in front: a less distance might be better.

5. I have sent for the bullocks from the village to which cowle was granted, and they shall go to head quarters immediately. Our bullock agent wants some, and I have desired him to send his men to head quarters.

6. Don't forget to send me the plan of the march to-morrow.

I give you much trouble, but it is better to settle all little points at once than to defer the consideration of them to the last moment.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[111.] *Draft of a Letter to Major* ——.

Camp, 21st March, 1799.

I received your letter at so late an hour last night that it was impossible then to answer it.

If I had passed a censure upon your conduct for a circumstance which no exertion of yours could have prevented, I should probably have been as unreasonable as you have represented me in the epithets which you have applied to it; but the fact is, I passed no censure. I sent you directions; and if Mr. Gaff told you otherwise, he is not fit for the situation to which I have provisionally appointed him. There is no necessity for referring to the authorities which you have quoted upon the subject. I saw and spoke to the men at a distance in front of their regiment on the forming flank of the line, at the distance of about 200 yards from it. Some of them had arms, others had not; and I sent them all back, with orders not to quit their regiment again; and in the evening I sent you directions to prevent it if you possibly could: but in the most distant manner I never alluded to the manner of marching of the regiment, excepting in approbation of it, as so many men were brought under arms every day when it took up its ground.

I conceive that I have a right, and that it is my duty, to interfere in any matter of detail in which the 33rd are concerned; and that being the case, it was my duty to send to you when I thought something had escaped your notice.

This is not the first time that I have had occasion to observe, that, under the forms of private correspondence, you have written me letters upon public duty, couched in terms to which I have not been accustomed. It is impossible to believe that you mean

to use those terms; and yet I cannot but reflect that no sensible man ever writes a letter in a passion; that he inquires and considers, and, in the end, finds, as you would have done in this instance, that he had no reason to be displeased. However, it is necessary that I should inform you, that the next letter of that kind that I receive I shall send to the Commander-in-Chief, and leave it to him to give such answer to it as he may think fit.

It will be much better, and it will make both your situation and mine more comfortable to both, if you will understand one thing, that I have no intention whatever of doing anything which can have any effect unpleasant to your feelings, and that the best method of coming to such an understanding as we ought to live upon is, to inquire before you act in consequence of anything that passes. Of this you may be certain, that however my attention may be engaged by other objects, whenever I find it necessary I shall interfere in everything which concerns the 33rd. I have written more than I intended; and in hopes that I shall hear no more of it,

I remain, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

DRAFT OF THE DESCRIPTION OF OUR MARCH TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. LEGER. [112.]

The British grand army and the Nizam's army had joined previous to our entering Mysore, and marched together. The former consisted of about 3000 excellent cavalry, five strong regiments of European infantry, all good, and eleven battalions of sepoys, with about fifty pieces of cannon.

The Nizam's army, under my command, consisted of the 33rd, six excellent battalions of the Company's sepoys, four rapscallion battalions of the Nizam's, which, however, behaved well, and really about 10,000 (which they called 25,000) cavalry of all nations, some good and some bad, and twenty-six pieces of cannon. These armies marched in two columns parallel to each other; one from its right, the other from its left, at the distance of about three miles from each other.

The British cavalry generally led the British column, about 500 of the best of the Nizam's led that of the Nizam; these two generally closed towards each other.

One regiment of British cavalry was generally in the rear of the British column, the whole of the cavalry of the Nizam in the rear of mine, and these rather closed to each other, so that the march of these two armies was almost in the form of a square or oblong, of which the front and rear were formed of cavalry, and about two or three miles in extent; the right and left (owing to the immense space taken up in the column by field-pieces drawn by bullocks) about six or seven miles. In this square went everything belonging to the army, and the whole space was filled excepting what lay between the leading brigade of infantry of each column, which was left clear, lest it should become necessary to form.

You will have some idea of what there was in that space when I state to you the number of bullocks that I know were in the public service, and in the employment of brinjarries or grain merchants, which did not compose one-half of the whole number that were with the army. There were in the department of the commissary of stores about 25,000, in that of the commissary of grain about 20,000, in that of the commissary of provisions about 5000, in that of the camp equipage department about 5000, making in all in the service of the British grand army about 60,000 bullocks, of which about 15,000 were draught, the others carried loads.

The Company's bullock department in the Nizam's army had in it about 3000, divided among different departments. Besides these there were with the grand army about 20,000 bullocks loaded with grain belonging to the brinjarries, about 8000 loaded with gram for the cavalry horses belonging to the gram agents. The Nizam's army (to my constant daily annoyance) had with it 25,000 bullocks loaded with grain belonging to the brinjarries. Besides all these, the number of elephants, camels, bullocks, carts, coolies, plunderers, &c. &c., belonging to individuals in the army, particularly in that of the Nizam, was beyond calculation; but as upon one occasion I had an opportunity of seeing one wing of the British army, and the whole army of the Nizam, move light to attack the enemy, that is to say, without anything belonging to the public excepting what was necessary for the field train, and a few days' provisions for the Europeans, I was able to form a judgment of the quantity of private baggage in the army, and I have no scruple in declaring that the number of cattle and people in the employment of individuals was double that in the employment of the public. Yet on that day

it is fair that I should mention to you the Nizam's army marched above twenty miles. You may have some idea of the thing when I tell you that when all were together, there was a multitude in motion which covered about eighteen square miles.

We brought forward from Madras to Seringapatam a battering train, and in fact a moving arsenal. The former consisted of 50 pieces of iron cannon, for each gun of which were brought forward 1200 rounds of shot and immense quantities of powder, and every kind of small stores which are used in an arsenal.

Our march was usually as long as those made by large armies in Europe, from ten to twelve miles; we always started at six, and we arrived at our ground about twelve, sometimes later, if there were difficulties on the road. We encamped in two lines fronting different ways, and this heap of baggage between us. What is most extraordinary, by the order of march and encampment above described, we did not lose anything to signify during our whole march, notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy's light troops who constantly attended us, and who are certainly the best troops of that kind that I have ever seen.*

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* *Return of Tippoo Sultaun's Army at the commencement of the Campaign of* 1799.

Names.	Number of Fighting Men.	Monthly Expense.
		Cant. Pagodas.
Meer Meerans (Generals)	26	2,800 0 0
Meer Suddoors (Officers in general superintending of Forts)	9	750 0 0
Buckshees, or Commanders of Brigades	101	4,840 0 0
Stable Horse	3,503	25,799 3 0
Silladar Horse (a horse the property of the rider)	9,392	86,800 0 0
Infantry, Regulars	23,483	132,884 9 2
Geish (Armed Militia)	6,209	25,518 8 0
Ashâam (Matchlockmen and Peons)	4,747	12,956 6 8
Total Fighting Men	47,470	292,349 6 10
Mootsuddies, Lascars, Pioneers, Artificers, Establishments, &c. &c.	22,392	67,971 5 12
Total of every description of Persons attached to the Army	69,862	360,321 4 6
Out Garrisons, 27 Principal Forts	14,947	43,338 1 14
„ 113 Lesser Forts	14,981	14,955 1 14
Total	29,928	58,293 3 12

Return

[113.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Camp near Allagoor, 25th March, 1799.

An opportunity of sending a letter having offered, I write to inform you that we are going on now as well as you could wish. There is not *now* a doubt but that we shall bring that monstrous equipment to Seringapatam, and, in that case, we shall certainly take the place. The whole army will be across the Maddoor river to-morrow. Tippoo was on the other side of it yesterday, but quitted a strong position on our approach, and is now gone towards Seringapatam. I write such good news that I don't put my letter in cypher. You will have heard many reports about us, but you may depend upon what I have above mentioned.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I am very well, but not a little fagged.

[114.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

Camp, 2 miles west of Seringapatam, 5th April, 1799.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

We arrived here this morning, and I take the opportunity of writing to you which is offered by General Floyd going to

Return of Killed and Wounded Sirdars, from the 6th March, 1799, to the 4th May inclusive.

Rank.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Jaghiredars[a] (Noblemen of Rank)	2	..	..
Meer Meerans[b] (Generals)	5[c]	4	9
Meer Khazuns (Lords Treasurers)	1	1	2
Meer Asufs (Members of the Revenue Board)	3	..	3
Buckshees (Commanders of Cutcherries)	7[d]	3[e]	10
Sepahdars and Mokubdars (Commanders of Cushoons of Foot and Horse)	14[f]	7[g]	21
	32	15	47

[a] Hussein Ali Khan, on the 6th April, at the Sultaunpettah Tope.
[b] Seyd Sahib, on the 4th May, wounded during the assault, and since dead.
[c] 2 killed at Sedaseer, on the 6th March.
[d] 1 wounded at Mallavelly, since dead.
[e] 2 wounded at Sedaseer on 6th March, since returned to Seringapatam.
[f] 2 killed at Mallavelly, 1 at Sedaseer.
[g] 2 wounded at Sedaseer.

meet General Stewart. I wrote you two letters before: one to inform you that we should cross the Maddoor on the 26th; the other to let you know that we had had an action with Tippoo, in which his troops had been driven and defeated by ours.

We had much difficulty to contend with after the army entered the Mysore country. The bullocks in the department of the Commissary of Stores failed almost entirely, notwithstanding that there were quantities of forage in the country, of which they might have had their share. This failure of the bullocks increased in so alarming a manner by the time that we got in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, particularly on the last march towards that place, that I had serious apprehensions that we should have been obliged to take post there, and defer our further operations to an ensuing season. However, upon inquiry, it was found that the root of the evil lay in a parcel of absurd, impracticable, shopkeeping regulations which had been made for the bullock department, under which no great undertaking could ever prosper, and the first step taken was to abolish them all. The spirit and zeal of the army were then called forth with the greatest success. Many stores (absolutely useless excepting as lumber, and which I had pressed the General to leave behind him at Vellore) were destroyed; and, in short, we have contrived to bring on the largest useful equipment that ever was known in this country. We have plenty to take this place, which appears to me at present to be strong only from its situation. I have great satisfaction in informing you that the Nizam's sirdars exerted themselves, as well as the rest of the army, in carrying stores. Above eight thousand shot have been brought here from the neighbourhood of Bangalore by Meer Allum and the people immediately belonging to the Nizam alone, without counting what have been brought by the Company's servants.

We shall commence all our preparatory operations to-morrow, and probably we shall break ground before General Stewart arrives. It is the General's intention to attack, from both sides of the river, the western angle, and I think that we shall contrive to have such a fire upon it as will make it impossible for the Sultaun's troops to remain long in the place.

I reckon that we have forty days before us from this time, and even more, if we can contrive a passage over the river when it swells. However, five days will make a breach for us

after we once begin to batter, out of which his troops will not be able to keep ours.

In the action of the 27th of March, at Mallavelly, his troops behaved better than they have ever been known to behave. His infantry advanced, and almost stood the charge of bayonets of the 33rd, and his cavalry rode at General Baird's European brigade. He did not support them as he ought, having drawn off his guns at the moment we made our attack, and even pushed forward these troops to cover the retreat of his guns. This is the cause of the total destruction of the troops he left behind him, without loss to us, and of the panic with which we have reason to believe all his troops are now affected. His light cavalry, looties, and others, are the best of the kind in the world. They have hung upon us, night and day, from the moment we entered his country to this. Some of them have always had sight of us, and have been prepared to cut off any persons venturing out of the reach of our camp-guards. We came by a road so unfrequented that it was not possible to destroy all the forage, which would have distressed us much; but they did as much, even in that way, as could be expected from them. If Tippoo had had sense and spirit sufficient to use his cavalry and infantry as he might have done, I have no hesitation in saying that we should not now be here, and probably should not be out of the jungles near Bangalore.

We have had much blundering and *puzzling*, and I have been present at many strong and violent discussions in the cabinet. However, all parties are apparently well together, and we are now here with a strong, a healthy, and a brave army, with plenty of stores, guns, &c., &c., and we shall be masters of his place before much more time passes over our heads.

The fatigue and heat of the weather (which is greater here than even at Calcutta) and bad water had given me a bowel complaint, which did not confine me, but teased me much. I have nearly got the better of it, and I hope to be quite well in a few days.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I omitted to mention to you that we have thirty-three days' rice for thirty thousand men at full allowance, besides what the

brinjarries have, so that there is no danger of our feeling want. General Harris does not write, trusting to my giving you an account of our state.

To the Earl of Mornington. [115.]

Camp before Seringapatam,
18th April, 1799.

My dear Mornington,

Since I wrote to you on the 5th instant, we have, by the junction of the Bombay army, been enabled to take up such a position as makes it as certain as these things can be that we shall very shortly be in possession of Seringapatam.

On the night of the 5th we made an attack upon the enemy's outposts, which, at least on my side, was not quite so successful as could have been wished. The fact was that the night was very dark, that the enemy expected us, and were strongly posted in an almost impenetrable jungle. We lost an officer killed, and others and some men wounded (of the 33rd); and at last, as I could not find out the post which it was desirable I should occupy, I was obliged to desist from the attack, the enemy also having retired from the post. In the morning they re-occupied it, and I attacked it again at daylight, and carried it with ease and little loss. In the course of the night of the 5th and the day of the 6th the General was enabled to occupy a line of posts which gave complete security to his camp till the Bombay army joined, at the same time that they enable him to commence his operations for the siege with advantage.

I got a slight touch on the knee, from which I have felt no inconvenience, on the night of the 5th; and I have come to a determination, when in my power, never to suffer an attack to be made by night upon an enemy who is prepared and strongly posted, and whose posts have not been reconnoitred by daylight. We remained in the posts which we occupied on the 6th till the Bombay army joined on the 14th. It crossed the river on the 16th, and yesterday occupied a post close to the fort, which gives us every reason to believe that we shall carry our object without much difficulty.

I cannot write with common temper about our rice concerns. The last time I wrote to you I had reason to believe that we had plenty: you will probably hear that we have now rice for

only eighteen days at half allowance. This is unpleasant, and, considering the quantity of rice we brought with us, and the pains taken upon the subject, it is shameful. However, if Read comes we are still safe, and we must only redouble our exertions to get the place before the 4th of May, up to which day we have rice.

The brinjarries who go down to the Barahmahal at present ought to be loaded without delay, and prepared to move to us again by the first opportunity. With this view, the magazines at Vellore and Arnee ought to be sent forward as fast as possible. Every exertion should be made to do this.

I hope that Read marched on the 17th, and that he has been joined by Colonel Brown. If we can't take the place, our salvation depends upon that; but I trust we shall have the place.

Believe me, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[116.] *To Maurice Fitzgerald, Esq.*

My dear Sir, Camp before Seringapatam, April, 1799.

It is with the most unfeigned regret that I sit down to acquaint you of the melancholy event which is the subject of this letter.

In an attack which was made upon the enemy's advanced posts on the night of the 5th of April, your brother, Lieutenant Fitzgerald, of the 33rd Regiment, received a wound from a rocket which nearly carried away his arm, and another from a bayonet of which he died in the course of that night.

I can offer you no consolation upon this melancholy occasion. To inform you that your brother distinguished himself in the affair in which he lost his life; that in others, in which I have seen him engaged during this war, he had conducted himself to my satisfaction; that as an officer I had always, and particularly that I had latterly, reason to be pleased with him; will only add to the grief with which you and his family must naturally be affected.

However, whatever may be the effect, it is but justice to the late Mr. Fitzgerald to make known to you and his friends my sentiments of him.

I have given directions to Major Shee, the officer immediately in the command of the 33rd Regiment, to take care of his effects, an account of which shall be transmitted to you by the earliest opportunity.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM ABOUT THE COWLE. [117.]

The army have a right to have as prize what may be found in those houses over which sentries were placed before the cowle flag was hoisted. They have no right to what may be in houses over which they did not place sentries till after the cowle was granted.

The inhabitants or owners of these last ought not to be molested, excepting that they have been servants of the late Government, in whose hands it can be clearly proved there is public property.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING CAPTAIN MACLEOD'S BEING APPOINTED SUPERINTENDENT OF BAZAARS. [118.]

It is not necessary to enter into any general reasoning upon the relative situations of collector and commanding officer, and I shall only state my opinion of what arrangement will tend most to forward the public service.

The whole regulation of the police (properly so called) should be in the hands of the commanding officer. The objects of police are the prevention of crimes, the preservation of the peace, the regulation of the markets, &c. &c. The person who is answerable for the safety of the place must have these in his hands, or he is answerable for it without having the means of insuring it.

He ought to have the regulation of these matters not only in the fort, but on the island.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[119.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 8th May, 1799.

I wrote to you on the 18th or 19th of last month, and sent my letter by General Floyd. A series of successful attacks upon the enemy's posts, particularly one which I made upon his posts close to the river and within about 400 yards of the fort on the 26th of April, enabled us to erect our breaching batteries at a very short distance, and to complete our breach in the place where it was thought most advisable to have it by the 4th instant. On that day, as you will probably have been informed by General Harris, the place was stormed, and was in our possession in about two hours after the troops first began to move out of the trenches. Tippoo was killed in one of the gateways, and to complete our good fortune his body was found among about 500 others piled one upon the other in a very narrow compass. All his family and treasures fell into our hands that night, excepting Futteh Hyder and Abdul Kaliz. The latter came in and gave himself up the next morning. It was impossible to expect that after the labour which the troops had undergone in working up to the place, and the various successes they had had in six different affairs with Tippoo's troops, in all of which they had come to the bayonet with them, they should not have looked to the plunder of this place. Nothing therefore can have exceeded what was done on the night of the 4th. Scarcely a house in the town was left unplundered, and I understand that in camp jewels of the greatest value, bars of gold, &c. &c., have been offered for sale in the bazaars of the army by our soldiers, sepoys, and followers. I came in to take the command on the morning of the 5th, and by the greatest exertion, by hanging, flogging, &c. &c., in the course of that day I restored order among the troops, and I hope I have gained the confidence of the people. They are returning to their houses and beginning again to follow their occupations, but the property of every one is gone. Many of Tippoo's principal sirdars were killed in the storm: Meer Saduck, Seyd Sahib, Seyd Ghoffar fell upon that occasion, and others of some consequence had fallen in the different affairs which he had with our troops since the commencement of the war. Cummer u Deen, Purneah, and Ali Reza are out with

troops which had been sent either to intercept the convoy coming under General Floyd, or to annoy the rear of the army employed in the siege. We have sent cowle to Cummer u Deen, Purneah, and Futteh Hyder. The former (before he received the cowle) sent in Ali Reza to propose to give up himself and his troops (about 4000 horse) without terms, at the same time stating claims which he had to a certain jaghire, which I presume will be made known to you by General Harris. I expect that Purneah and Futteh Hyder will come in likewise with Cummer u Deen in the course of a day or two, and then I may congratulate you upon having brought the war to a most fortunate conclusion in the course of about two months, and of having destroyed the greatest enemy the British nation ever had in India, and one whose powers were most formidable.

The question respecting what is to be done with the Mysore Empire at the present moment is certainly a most important one; and although it is impossible that I should have been able to turn it over sufficiently in my mind to have formed any decided opinion upon it, and although even the discussion of it requires more information than I possess of the political views and interests of our Allies, particularly the Mahrattas, I shall communicate to you what has suggested itself to me since I have been in the command of the place.

From the conduct of Meer Allum at the time the species of negotiation with Tippoo was going on, it appears to me to be very clear that the Allies will expect more than half of the dominions of Tippoo to be divided among them and the Company. After the total destruction of Tippoo and his government, and its means of annoyance and defence, by our capture of this place, I am afraid that any government which you might establish here, with the remaining half or rather third of Tippoo's revenues as its support, would fall an easy prey to either of the other two which might think proper to attack it; unless the Company either take it under their protection, as they have the Rajah of Tanjore and the Nabob of Arcot, or unless they bind themselves to support the government, which I suppose to be established, in all cases of war either with the Nizam or Mahrattas. In short, this new government must be dependent upon the Company for its support; and the question is, whether that dependence may not weaken the bonds of alliance between us and one or both of our Allies, may not draw us into a new

war, and whether upon the whole it will not be more safe and better, and more creditable, to keep Seringapatam ourselves as a check upon both, and to make such a division of Tippoo's country as will satisfy them and all parties concerned. In order to decide this question, I must have more information than I have at present of the views and interests of the Mahrattas; but from the unfavourable impression I have already received of the system of (what may be called) a divided government in the Carnatic, in Tanjore, and even in Oude, I am inclined to prefer the latter, not only as most creditable, but as most safe, and not so likely to lead us into new wars.

Every man who has had an opportunity of gaining any knowledge of the politics of these times has framed a system which he thinks will answer best for the future government of these countries. My system is to take it all as a conquest, subject to the following restrictions. 1st. The family of Tippoo ought to be provided for. His women and those of his father ought to have suitable jaghires. Each of his sons ought to have a large jaghire. 2ndly. The great sirdars in his service ought to be provided for. Cummer u Deen asks for Gurrumcondah, which probably for many reasons cannot be granted; but he, Budder u Zeman, Ali Reza, Gholam Ali, Purneah, and others of different ranks in this government, ought to have jaghires given to them for their subsistence. These jaghires ought not to be sufficiently large to enable them to keep up troops, nor ought they to have upon them any strongholds to tempt their owners to rebel against their superiors. After giving these jaghires, the jaghiredars ought to have the choice under which of the three Governments they would live, and ought to hold from that Government which they prefer; but their choice ought not to alter the proportions of the remaining territory which each of the Allies would divide. 3rdly. The remainder of the territory (after deducting these jaghires) to be divided into three parts, either equal or otherwise, as you may think fit, and taken by each of the Allies. We must have Seringapatam and a safe communication with it from the Carnatic, likewise the sea-coast. What part the Nizam ought to have, and what the Mahrattas, must depend as well upon their own choice as upon the line of frontier which you might think it advisable to take for yourself; but I should imagine with our superiority there would be no difficulty in settling their respective shares.

There is every reason to believe that the country in the possession of Tippoo is worth annually about 70 lacs of Canterai pagodas. I have my information from Captain M'Leod, who is most usefully employed in ascertaining the amount of the revenues, and who is giving me every assistance in settling the neighbourhood of this town, which is of course our first object. As I have mentioned his name, I cannot avoid expressing a wish that he may remain here, particularly if I keep the command.

Many persons in camp, and particularly those about the General, are exceedingly anxious that you should come here to settle everything. I am (as I was upon a former occasion) of a different opinion. That which is to be settled is a political question, of some consequence certainly, viz. whether you will at all, and in what manner, and in what proportion, take possession of the territory which has been conquered; but there is no information to be got here which can aid you in deciding that question: it can be done equally well, if not better, in your closet at Madras, and we here can execute your orders. I mention this because I know that you must have been pressed by them to undertake a most fatiguing journey here, and yet when I give the above-mentioned reason why you should not be asked to come, there is no answer to it. Your presence cannot be necessary to induce a set of persons in our power to take what will enable them to live in the manner to which they have been accustomed, and, excepting to be teased by them to increase that stipend, I don't see what other end it can answer.

General Harris ought to go away as soon as he can, as the plunderers of his army and of that of the Nizam still occasion great confusion and terror among the inhabitants, and tend to obstruct our settlement of the country.

Before the General goes, I intend to come to a thorough understanding with him respecting the nature of my situation here. I certainly wish that he would give me all the power which he has himself till you can give your orders upon the subject. Whether I have that power or not, I shall be considered, and probably shall be really, responsible for everything that happens: but I have felt so sensibly my disagreeable situation in the Nizam's army for which I was responsible, although another man by a political manœuvre in fact commanded it (particularly latterly), that I should have resigned it

if it had not been for the fear of displeasing Meer Allum. I do not mean to insinuate that ———— and I are not upon the very best terms; but what I mean is, that upon one or two occasions he sent me orders which he said came from Meer Allum, and which never could have entered his head excepting from his own suggestions, and which if I had obeyed I should probably have lost part of the detachment. This is of course between ourselves. I intend to ask to be brought away with the army if any civil servant of the Company is to be here, or any person with civil authority who is not under my orders, for I know that the whole is a system of job and corruption from beginning to end, of which I and my troops would be made the instruments.

Allan has desired me to remind you of a conversation he had with you before he left Madras, in which he expressed his wish to be sent home either with the colours or despatches in case this place should be taken. It seems that you intend to send home Beatson with your despatches, and the General wishes that his son should carry home the colours. Allan and Beatson are great friends, and I believe the latter would be happy that by any arrangement the former could be sent home with credit. Allan has been very useful indeed during the campaign; Beatson particularly so during the siege.

9th May.

Since I wrote the above I have seen your letter of the 23rd (I think) of April. I am happy to find that in our negotiations with Tippoo we did so exactly what you wished, and that everything has ended so much to your satisfaction.

The Mahrattas having failed in the performance of their engagements, and as there is reason to believe that they have entered into some with Tippoo, of course nothing will be given to them. The country will be to be divided between us and the Nizam; and in my opinion there is now more reason than ever for not suffering any part of the family of Tippoo to have any power.

There was some doubt this morning whether Cummer u Deen, Futteh Hyder, and Purneah would come in; but within this hour I have heard (only as a report) that Cummer u Deen was coming in, and that Malcolm had been sent to meet him. Of course you will hear of it by this post if it is so.

I think it very immaterial whether Futteh Hyder and Pur-

neah come or not. At all events I have got the family of the latter, which is tolerable security for his behaviour.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [120.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 13th May, 1799.

Since I wrote last, Cummer u Deen and Purneah have come in, and Futteh Hyder is expected in to-morrow. General Floyd and his convoy have joined the army.

General Harris has not informed me of his plans, nor of the proposals which have been made to him by Purneah. I have altered my mind respecting Cummer u Deen; he has behaved so well, and by coming in so early has rendered us so great a service, that, coûte qui coute, we ought to give him what he wishes for. If he had remained in arms, we never could have settled this country unless we incurred the enormous expense of keeping our army in the field, and even then the operations to be carried on would be liable to all the hazard of protracted military operations. He has saved us this at least, and has thereby rendered us a service almost as great as any of those rendered by His Highness the Nizam. But the Nizam *may* be satisfied by another part of the territory, and in that case there can be no doubt of the propriety of rewarding Cummer u Deen.

I wish that the army were gone; we should then soon settle every thing.

I hope that you mean to punish ————.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM OF WORK WHICH HAS BEEN DONE OR IS NOW IN HAND IN SERINGAPATAM. [121.]

Seringapatam, 15th May, 1799.

1. Sheds repaired on the glacis, for the use of the Native sick of the army. Roof completed.

2. Covering choultries to make barracks for the Scotch brigade. In hand.

3. Repairing the aqueduct on the large bridge, and the wells and channel in the fort. In hand.

4. Clearing out the barracks for the 33rd Regiment. Nearly completed.

5. Carrying powder from the glacis to the magazines in the fort. Completed.

6. Collecting arms from the ramparts and different stations in the fort, where they had been left. Completed.

[122.] MEMORANDUM OF WORK PROPOSED TO BE DONE IN THE GARRISON OF SERINGAPATAM.

Seringapatam, 15th May, 1799.

1. Windows to be opened in the barracks occupied by the 33rd Regiment.

2. Necessaries and cooking-places to be made in those barracks, and in those occupied by the Scotch brigade.

3. The street in front of the barracks of the 33rd Regiment to be levelled, in order to prevent the water from lodging.

4. The street going to the westward from the palace to be levelled for the same purpose.

5. A bridge for foot-passengers and horsemen to be made at the Mysore Gate. Q. for carriages?

6. The small bridge leading from the southward to be repaired.

7. A communication across the north river during the monsoon to be made.

8. The breaches to be repaired.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

All to be done excepting the bridge at the Mysore Gate.

Geo. Harris.

[123.] *To Captain M'Intire.*

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 18th May, 1799.

I shall be very much obliged if, in the course of this morning, you will take an opportunity of looking at the two enclosures having sheds on each side of them, in which Tippoo's guns and carriages are placed at this moment, and report whether you think they will answer for cover for the carriages of the army.

I observed, in the enclosure which is outside, that several guns were laid on the ground, and it appeared to me that they being there, it would be impossible to place our carriages under the shed. You will be so kind as to notice that circumstance, as if it be true that they will prevent our using the shed as I propose, I know of no means that we possess of covering them. The inside shed has not as many guns under it as the other, but it requires much repair, and I do not think it will give good cover to our carriages.

Another circumstance which I wish you would consider is, where the old gun-carriages and tumbrils are to be placed when we remove them from their present situation. I had some thoughts of putting them in the enclosures in the rear of the place where you live, but I find that the entrance to it will not admit a gun-carriage, and it is impossible to break another entrance into it without increasing the distance which these carriages are to be transported to a great degree, and, of course, the labour of transporting them. This has suggested to me the propriety of erecting a gunshed immediately in the arsenal-yard, on three sides of the pagoda in which the arms are now placed. The gun-carriages would then be placed where they ought to be, immediately under your eye, and there would be no necessity for removing the old carriages from the enclosures in which they are now placed.

Let me know your opinion upon this subject as soon as possible, and

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

You will observe that in the arsenal-yard there is a choultry, which is on three sides of it, and would hold your stores well. Thus you would have everything belonging to you in one enclosure.

To the Earl of Mornington. [124.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 23rd May, 1799.

I trust that the letter which I wrote to you immediately after we took the place will have induced you to lay aside all thoughts of coming here, and that if you should have left Madras, you will not have proceeded farther than Ryacotta. As it appears that you intend to revive the Commission, and as it is probable that you will have given full powers to Henry

and Colonel Kirkpatrick for that purpose, as well as instructions how to proceed, your coming to this scene of confusion can tend to no purpose excepting to annoy yourself.*

* *To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley and the Members of the Army Commission.*

GENTLEMEN, Fort St. George, 20th May, 1799.

I have received your letter, dated 10th instant, with its several enclosures. I have great pleasure in expressing my entire approbation of the manner in which you have hitherto exercised the powers intrusted to you. Unexpected circumstances, for which I could not make a particular provision, not only justified your deviation from the letter of my instructions, but would have rendered an adherence to their letter inconsistent with their spirit. You very properly considered that my first objects must be (as I had expressed it) in all cases "the safety of the army and the success of the expedition," and that these important considerations must always be paramount to the strict execution of any special instruction.

I was greatly surprised to be informed of the very alarming deficiency of grain which was discovered in the camp on the 16th of April. The situation of the army at that crisis became such as to render indispensably necessary the measures which you adopted.

I entirely approve the nomination of Captain M'Leod to superintend the civil administration of the fort of Seringapatam and its vicinity, &c., and I shall expect to receive much valuable information and assistance from his abilities, activity, and integrity.

I am desirous of learning the nature of all the steps taken to conciliate the various leaders of troops dispersed in Mysore. Effectual measures of conciliation are absolutely necessary to the restoration of tranquillity in the country, and to the establishment of a final arrangement. I am aware of the importance of conciliating Meer Cummer u Deen Khan, to whom I have addressed a letter, which I trust may prove satisfactory. I have already recommended his application to the Nizam, and I desire that you will consult upon any further measures to be adopted for the satisfaction of this chieftain with my Private Secretary the Honourable Mr. Wellesley, and my Military Secretary Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, who are now on their way to Seringapatam, and who are fully acquainted with my sentiments, not only upon that subject, but upon the general arrangement of affairs in Mysore.

I desire that you will immediately ascertain and report to me the condition of the late Sultaun's family, and the characters, dispositions, and views of his sons respectively, and their connections with parties and politics, either foreign or domestic. This inquiry will naturally lead to the question, how far any of the sons of the Sultaun had either entered into his views of establishing an alliance with France or had disapproved them. The state of the family of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, and the characters and description of the persons composing it, must also form an immediate object of your investigation to be reported to me. It is also my wish to receive the opinion of the Commission with respect to the most eligible settlement of the country of Mysore in every possible view of that extensive and intricate question. I request, therefore, that you will immediately take this important subject into deliberation; that if unanimous in your opinion, you will report it collectively; and that if you should differ, you will each of you report your opinions separately in writing on the question, and transmit them to me for my consideration. As you may be assured of the most liberal construction on my part, I shall expect that you will be perfectly unreserved in your communications and sentiments upon this momentous subject. My judgment is perfectly without prejudice

I don't think that any additional information has been obtained since I wrote to you last, at least none which can enable you to judge what it would be best to do. I think that the persons about the General now seem to be of opinion that it would be best to restore part of the country to one of the sons of Tippoo, keeping garrisons in its forts and strongholds, or taking from him annually a certain sum as tribute. This is one of Purneah's proposals, upon which it must be observed that they were all framed with a view to his own interest, and the future management of the revenues of the country to be restored by himself. Although I don't think that there is any reason to believe, as he states, that the country cannot be settled unless part of it is restored in some manner to one of Tippoo's sons, that, on the contrary, I am certain that it can be settled under any arrangement that you think proper, it is not quite clear that the most politic and most proper measure, and certainly the most generous one, would not be to place one of them in the Government of part of it. This is a question of policy, which however has no relation whatever with the settle-

on every part of the question, and I am anxious to learn the result of your observations with a view to assist me in forming a correct opinion.

I will, however, state a few general points which may serve to explain the considerations requiring immediate attention in the examination of this question:

1. That mode of settlement is to be preferred which shall unite the most speedy restoration of peace and order with the greatest practicable security for the continuance of both.

2. For this purpose not only the interests of the Company, but those of the Nizam, of the Mahrattas, and of the leading chieftains in Mysore, must be conciliated.

3. The military power of Mysore must be broken, or absolutely identified with that of the Company.

4. Seringapatam must be in effect a British garrison, under whatever nominal authority it may be placed.

5. The Company must retain the whole of the Sultaun's territory in Malabar, and also in Coimbatoor and Daraporam, with the heads of the passes on the table land.

The 4th and 5th of these points are properly matters of detail, but I consider them to be so essential to the stability of any new settlement, that I have stated them here as fundamental articles in every possible view and modification of the question.

I consider Lieutenant-Generals Stuart and Hartley to be now members of the Commission. If they should have departed for the coast of Malabar, I desire that you will transmit a copy of this letter to them, with my request that they will forward to me their opinions on the questions herein stated.

I also desire that you will call, in my name, upon Lieutenant-Colonel Read, Captain Macaulay, Captain M'Leod, and Captain Munro to deliver in their opinions in writing on the same questions.

I am, &c.,

MORNINGTON.

ment of this country, and one upon which you might decide with as much propriety in Calcutta as you could in Seringapatam.

Between ourselves the General has contrived to involve himself in some awkward situations with the army respecting their prize money. There is nothing about which an army is in general so jealous (particularly an Indian army) as its prize, and by awkwardness he has given them a suspicion that it is not intended to let them have the prize. Nothing can be more absurd than such an idea, as I believe that there is no man in the army who is more anxious to get his share than General Harris; and as, whether the money is taken by Government and securities given for it, or given to the army, it is equally certain that the greatest part of it will find its way into the public treasury, it cannot be worth the while of Government to do anything so unpopular as taking it would be. I think it would be a good thing, and would add to your popularity with the army, if in one of your letters to General Harris you were to express a hope that the prize might be divided as soon as possible, or something to prove that it is not the intention of Government to interfere in the business. A successful army which has nothing to do is very inflammable, and I never saw one so near a ferment as they were a few days ago upon a most trifling occasion, which however I must say was given very indiscreetly.

The General is talking of moving towards Chittledroog immediately. I presume that he has informed you of this movement.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I forgot to mention to you that I have found some capital French letters among Tippoo's papers, likewise some from his vakeels at Poonah, which you might find useful. I gave the former to Macaulay some time ago to have copied for you. They have translated the latter, I imagine, and will send them. If any proof were wanting of his designs against us, these letters afford it amply.

[125.] *To Major-General Floyd, President of the Prize-Committee.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 23rd May, 1799.

I have the honour to submit to you and the Committee for the adjustment of all matters relating to prize-money a claim

which, I conceive, I have to share with the Major-Generals; and the grounds upon which that claim is founded.*

* The treasure and jewels captured were valued at 1,143,216*l.* sterling. The distribution of the prize-money was thus officially stated.—ED.

Scale of the Prize-Money for the Capture of Seringapatam, 4th May, 1799.

26th July, 1799.

Rank of Individuals.	Number of Shares to each.	Amount to each.
		Star Pagodas.
Naigues, Sepoys, Trumpeters, Black Doctors, Pioneers, Gun Lascars, and authorized Puckalies	Two-thirds of one share.	12
Havildars, and Second Tindals of Gun Lascars	1	18
Jemidars, Standard Bearers, and First Tindals of Gun Lascars	2	36
Subidars and Synangs of Gun Lascars	6	108
Corporals, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Private Europeans	1	18
Serjeant Majors, Sub-Conductors, Sub-Assistant Surgeons, and Park Serjeants	3	54
Serjeants	2	36
Warrant Officers, comprehending Quartermasters of Dragoons, Conductors of Stores, and Provost Marshal	15	270
Subalterns, comprehending Lieutenants, Cornets Lieutenants, Fireworkers, Ensigns, Assistant Surgeons, Adjutants, and Quartermasters with Commissions only as such	60	1,080
Captains, Surgeons, Brigade Majors, Aides-de-Camp, and Chaplains and Paymasters of parts of the Army	120	2,160
Majors, Deputy Adjutant-Generals, Deputy Quarter-master-Generals, Judge Advocate-General, Paymaster of the Army, Head Surgeon of the Army, Principal Agent of Cavalry Supplies, Deputy Commissary-General of Ordnance, Paymaster and Commissary to the Bombay Army, Superintending Field Surgeon to the Bombay Army, Superintendent of Supplies, Captain Malcolm commanding the Nizam's Contingent	240	4,320
Lieutenant-Colonels, Adjutant-General, and Quarter-master-General of the Bombay Army	360	6,480
Colonels	600	10,800
General Officers on the Staff	1,500	27,000
Major-General Floyd, second in command of the Army, and commanding the Cavalry	One-third more than the above.	36,000
The Commander-in-Chief one-eighth (1-8th) of the whole	..	324,907

(Signed) JOHN FLOYD, Major-General,
President Committee of Prize.

(Signed) W. MONTEATH, Secretary.

(Copy) JAMES DONALD, late Captain and Paymaster 94th S. B. Reg. Foot, and paymaster of the above corps at Seringapatam in 1799.

On the 7th of February the Commander-in-Chief gave out an order, of which the following is a copy, whereby colonels were put on the same roster of duty with the major-generals: "The detail for the general duties of the line are, in future, to be in charge of a general officer of the day, and the officers for this charge are to be furnished from a roster comprehending the general officers in camp and the officers holding the rank of colonel in the corps of cavalry and infantry."

From that day the colonels continued to do the duty of general officer of the day, in the same manner as it was done by the major-generals and under the same denomination, and no duty whatever of a general nature was done by the latter which was not equally done by the former.

When the Commander-in-Chief thought proper to relieve the duties of the major-generals by placing the colonels on the same roster with them, he stated it to be his intention to give these (who had already the command of brigades) an allowance which has been usually given in this country to brigadiers. This they have been informed they owe to the interference of some of the major-generals, who suggested to the Commander-in-Chief that, as the colonels were to do the duty of general officers of the day, and were to be on the same roster with the major-generals, it was proper that they should be considered in all respects as brigadiers. Since the capture of Seringapatam the colonels have received fresh assurances from the Commander-in-Chief that they are to receive brigadiers' allowances. It appears, then, 1st. That the colonels were on the same roster with, and did the same duty as, the major-generals. 2nd. That they are to be paid as brigadiers. 3rd. That, as far as the customs of the service in this country admit of it, they have been considered as such, and are in fact, brigadiers to all intents and purposes, excepting that they are not called so. In the West Indies, and at the Cape during the present war, and upon all occasions during the last war, brigadiers, whether appointed by his Majesty or by the Commanders-in-Chief upon the spot, have shared prize-money with major-generals.

In the Navy, commodores (whether appointed by the Admiralty or the admiral) who do duty on the same roster with the admirals share prize-money with them. Indeed, where prize-money has been shared by ranks, there is no instance of officers who have rolled in duty with one rank having received the prize-money of another.

Surely it will not be contended that because the customs of the service in this country do not admit of an officer having the title of brigadier, the Commander-in-Chief cannot avail himself of (and relieve others by) the services of a set of officers, by placing them on a superior roster; or that if he does so, the most simple and most universally acknowledged rule for the distribution of prize-money, viz., "that those who roll together in duty shall share together," must be departed from. In that case the reasoning must turn upon the name, and not upon the substance, and I cannot suppose the Committee will listen to it.

Having now submitted my claim to the Committee, together with the grounds upon which I found it, it is necessary that I should inform them that I have communicated upon this subject with three other officers in the same situation with myself, Colonel Stevenson, Colonel Pater, and Colonel Sherbrooke, who have authorised me to make the same claim for them. The decision upon our claim will influence many others, some of them precisely in the same situation with ourselves, others nearly so.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to the Earl of Mornington. [126.]

24th May, 1799.

After I had written to you yesterday I saw General Harris, who desired I would mention to you his wish, that you would as soon as possible send your consent as far as it was necessary for the division of the prize. It is desirable on many accounts that it should be divided soon; although I don't think that there is so much reason as I thought there was yesterday, to apprehend ferment or improper behaviour in the army if it be not divided immediately.

I am glad to find by a letter from Henry, from Vellore, that there is a chance of your not coming here. If they bring full powers, your being here can answer no purpose; and indeed those who were at first most anxious that you should come, now agree with me, that for the sake of your health and comfort, as well as for the speedy conclusion of the business (con-

sidering the length of time that you would certainly be on the road), it is better that you should remain at Madras.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[127.] *To Captain Norris.**

SIR, Seringapatam, 30th May, 1799.

I think it necessary to call your attention in a particular manner to the work which is in progress on the aqueduct of the Mysore bridge. On the day before yesterday you reported to me that 40 feet of masonry was completed, and, since that day, it appears that although the number of people usually employed there has been the same, nothing has been done to the work, nor are there any materials collected. This morning I was there at half-past ten, and the people who mix up the chunam † were then coming to work, in number about 12, and there were no other persons near the work. It would probably be necessary to observe upon the neglect of the work yesterday, if I had not had occasion to observe upon it frequently before, and had not already, in frequent conversations, called your attention to it. I must now inform you that, if I have occasion to observe it again, I shall consider it as my indispensable duty to report my observations to the Commander-in-Chief.

I request that, as soon as convenient after the receipt of this letter, you will report to me the state of the work going on at the large or Mysore bridge, at the south bridge, at the granaries, and at the barracks of the 33rd Regiment; that you will make out a statement, as nearly correct as possible, of the quantity of materials collected, and at what place; and that you will let me know what quantity of tools have been prepared by the artificers belonging to your department. You will be so good also as to send me a report of the same kind daily, in order to enable me to form some judgment of the progress of the works in hand.

It would be very desirable that one of the officers of engineers, or at least that one of the European overseers, should be em-

* Chief engineer at Seringapatam. He belonged to the army of the East India Company.—ED.

† Lime.—ED.

ployed at the Mysore bridge. His particular duty should be to see that the bricklayers and people of the different descriptions employed come to work at the proper hour, and that they remain there all day, as I conceive it to be not only useless but improper that the public money should be laid out in the hire of a number of persons who really do nothing. It would be the duty of this officer to report to you such persons as do not come to work at the proper hour, or do not do the work prescribed to them, and their pay ought to be stopped. The officer employed at the long bridge might likewise superintend the works at the south bridge and Mysore gateway, and he would be responsible for the whole.

This appears to me to be the only plan which can be adopted, under the present circumstances, for checking what is undoubtedly a waste of the public money.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM. [128.]

Seringapatam, 30th May, 1799.

I have seen the paper transmitted by Colonels Close and Agnew, and Captain Macaulay, and those received from Lord Mornington.

In my opinion the Mussulman power is so completely broken that the arrangement he proposes can be made immediately. As, however, there is no reason to apprehend danger from delaying it for a short time, I recommend that it should be delayed until it is known whether the killadar of Chittledroog * will give up that fortress.

There is but little difference in the arrangement proposed by

* *Chittledroog*, 128 miles N. of Seringapatam, is situated on the northern extremity of one of those ridges of hills which run in a continued direction N.N.W. along the midland parts of the Ballaghaut, and separate, and indeed in some measure cut off, the communication for about 120 miles between the two principal parallel routes from Seringapatam and Bangalore to the northern frontier of Mysore. At Chittledroog there is a considerable opening in the range, and several collateral roads unite with the great trunk road, and form a central point of communication for the surrounding country. The space occupied by the whole of the lower and hill forts resembles an irregular square, 1350 yards of a side, and about 6400 yards in circumference, of which the whole of the W. side and one half of the S. (or one-third of the whole) are

Lord Mornington, and that by the Commissioners. I prefer the former.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[129.] *To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

DEAR HENRY, Seringapatam, 30th May, 1799.

If you write anything to camp* respecting your proposed arrangements, it will be necessary to caution them particularly to say nothing upon the subject to Purneah until the whole is ready for execution. My reason for this caution is, that it may be depended upon if one black man ever hears of your plan, it may as well be published in the bazaar, and then not only will every Mussulman begin to quake for his own situation, and in consequence intrigue and plot, but it is to be expected that some if not all the Princes will endeavour (or rather will be urged) to make their escape. This would be an embarrassing circumstance. Hitherto they have been kept without restraint: they go where they please, and do what they please. To put them under restraint immediately would give a suspicion of what is intended which would have a bad effect among the Mussulmans. The steps to be first taken in my opinion are: to settle with Cummer u Deen and the other principal Mussulmans that they shall receive jaghires to a certain specified amount under any arrangement of the Government of this country that may take place; 2ndly, to pay to the killadars who have given up forts, and who may still have forts in their possession, their arrears for the month of April, at least their pay for May, and for as great a length of time hereafter as we may leave them in charge of their forts; 3rdly, to announce to the family of the

covered by hills, leaving 3800 yards of rampart on the plain, and 2600 yards in the outline of the hills and their fortifications. To defend this outward line, part of the W. and S. and all the N. and E. face are covered by a good rampart, faced with granite on both sides, but with scarce any flanking defence to this extent, except 46 towers on too narrow a scale to be useful. The ditch, faced with stone, is generally about 10 yards in breadth and 12 in depth, with but little water; the glacis short and high, but not sufficient to cover the rampart altogether. There is an inner fort, also a lower fort, and eight lines of defences, built of stone, with gateways, and enclosing structures of various kinds. (Abstracted from the Reports of Captain Colin Mackenzie on the Forts in Northern Mysore. Wellington MSS., Book I. of 1803.)—ED.

* I have not written anything to camp on this subject. [Note on original letter by the Hon. Henry Wellesley.—ED.]

Sultaun the proposed arrangement of the country* and their future fate; 4thly, to make the proclamation proposed. At

* "The proposed arrangement" was the restoration of the Hindoo dynasty dethroned by Hyder Ali, to a sovereignty exceeding in revenue that possessed by their ancestors before the Mohammedan usurpation.

A liberal provision was at the same time made for the families of Hyder and Tippoo, and for the chief officers of the late Government. Purneah was made Dewan or Minister of Finance to the Hindoo heir Kistna Raj Oodiaveer, then a child six years of age; while Colonel Wellesley as Commander of the Forces in Mysore, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close as Political Resident, were to exercise a general superintendence over the Government of the young Rajah, who, after the departure of the Mohammedan Princes, was publicly installed on the ivory throne of his ancestors in their ancient capital of Mysore.

This arrangement was carried out in conformity with a Tripartite Treaty, concluded on the 22nd of June, between the Allies (the East India Company, the Nizam, and the Peshwah), for the establishment "of a separate Government in Mysore, to be assisted by a suitable subsidiary force furnished by the English."

The subsequent Treaty (of the 9th July) between the East India Company and the newly formed Government of Mysore stipulated for the annual payment by the Rajah of 7 lacs of star pagodas, in monthly instalments, to the Company for the maintenance of the British stipendiary force; and for the further payment of a proportionate share of such extraordinary expenses as might be incurred in case of war being waged against the contracting parties by any other state.

In the event of such payments not being regularly made, the Governor-General in Council was authorized by the 4th Article of the Treaty to enforce them, by introducing such measures as he might see fit for the internal management and collection of revenue to the required amount, or even by assuming the direct control of such portion or portions of the Rajah's territories as might be necessary for that purpose; while the 5th Article provided that in case of such assumption the Rajah's income should never be less than a lac of star pagodas, together with one-fifth of the net revenues of the entire territories ceded to him by the Company.

The 6th and 7th Articles stipulated that the Rajah should hold no correspondence with any foreign state without the sanction of the East India Company, and should apprehend and deliver up to the Company any Europeans found in his dominions without regular passports from the Company's Government.

The 8th and 9th Articles empowered the Company to garrison and strengthen, or dismantle and destroy, any fortress or strong place within the Rajah's territories, and provided that any expenses incurred on this account should be defrayed in equal proportions by the contracting parties.

The 12th Article stipulated that no duties should at any time be levied on provisions and other necessaries brought into Seringapatam for the use of the British garrison.

The 13th announced the intended framing of a commercial Treaty.

The 14th contained a declaration on behalf of the Rajah that he would "pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade,

the time when the family are informed of the proposed arrangement it need no longer be a secret, but till then it ought to remain among ourselves. When they are informed of their fate they ought to be kept under a reasonable restraint, at least until they are removed to a distance from Seringapatam.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Upon considering Mornington's plan for the division of the territory, I think that the territory round Chittledroog ought not to belong to us. That immediately in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam ought, for the reasons I stated to you this morning.*

[130.] MEMORANDA AND QUESTIONS BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, WITH ANSWERS BY THE HON. COLONEL WELLESLEY.

1. To ascertain the amount of treasure taken in the fort, and the expectations of the army concerning it?

Answer.—1. The treasure taken in the fort belonging to the Sircar [state] amounts, I believe, to 16 lacs of pagodas. The army expect that it will be divided among them according to such proportions as their committee shall fix.

The grounds of these expectations can be stated.

2. The value of the Sircar property?

Answer.—2. The Sircar property in jewels already valued amounts (I believe) to 8 or 10 lacs of pagodas.

There are jewels not yet valued, and other goods, which may amount to 4 or 5 lacs more. There is grain to the amount of about 2 lacs (most probably 1 lac of pagodas), and an enormous quantity of military stores, which, as I don't know their state, I cannot value.

N.B. All this the army conceive to be prize.

agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states." (Substance of Treaty found among the Wellington Papers.—ED.)

* These were, that unless we had a sufficient territory round Seringapatam to provide for the sustenance of the troops in the garrison, the Rajah might at any time starve the garrison. Arthur, therefore, is of opinion that Seringapatam should be kept by us.—H. W. [Note on original letter.]

3. To obtain an official report of the manner and circumstances of finding the French papers in Tippoo Sultaun's palace?

Answer.—3. Some of the French papers were found by me in Tippoo's bedroom, others by Mr. Gordon * in what was called the expense treasury.

4. To take great care that no person be allowed to plunder or pilfer the public property or treasure; above all, not to allow the women of the family to be pillaged. Let me know particularly what regulations have been adopted on this subject?

Answer.—4. Guards have been placed over everything, and the prize agents, by General Harris's orders, have got all the property under their charge.

General Harris sent me an order to allow the prize agents to search the zenana for treasure. The ladies were in consequence removed to another part of the palace, the zenana was searched, but no treasure found. I have since had frequent conversations with the eunuchs, and have desired them to give the ladies the fullest assurances of British protection in their properties, &c. They have expressed great confidence in me, and have desired that their wants should be made known to me directly, instead of going through the Princes.

The expenses of the zenana are paid by the public, and amount to about 300 rupees per day.

5. To endeavour to ascertain from Chapuy, or any of the French in Tippoo's service, the precise nature of their engagements with him, and the objects for which they were to be employed, as stated by the Ambassadors in the Isle of France?

Answer.—5. There is one among the French papers which gives an answer to this.

6. To endeavour to discover the Ambassadors employed by Tippoo on that occasion, and to obtain authenticated copies of their instructions?

Answer.—6. The Ambassadors are named in some of the letters, but I have not yet seen them.

7. To ascertain whether Tippoo's letter and note of demands to the Executive Directory, found at Seringapatam, have actually been forwarded by Mr. Dubuc, or by any other person, to France?

* Paymaster of the British troops in Mysore.—ED.

Answer.—7. It appears by a letter from Tippoo to Dubuc that they were not.

8. The palace should be searched in order to discover whether there is any Persian or Malabar copy of Tippoo's letters to the French, or of his engagements with them?

Answer.—8. The palace has been searched frequently, and nothing of the kind found.

9. It is essential to trace Tippoo's connections and spies in India, which probably may be done through the papers in the palace. Zemaun Shah, Vizier Ali, and perhaps others, may be found to have corresponded with him?

Answer.—9. This will be done in time, but it cannot be expected immediately.

All papers that are found are examined.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[131.] *Draft of a Letter to the Military Board at Madras.*

I have the honour to enclose the proceedings of a Committee of Survey on the stores, ordnance, &c. &c., received from the Commissary-General of Stores with the army, and now in charge of the commissary in Seringapatam.

2. Under instructions from the Commander-in-Chief I have appointed a committee to survey and value all articles of military store captured in the place; and as soon as they will have terminated their business, I will have the honour of transmitting to you a copy of their proceedings.

3. The stores are, however, so numerous and in such confusion, that I cannot hope to be able to give you all the information respecting them which you could desire for a considerable length of time.

4. I have given the Commander-in-Chief a plan of the place, executed by Lieutenant Warren of the 33rd Regiment, acting engineer, which he will doubtless communicate to the Board.

5. It is necessary, however, that I should take this early opportunity of communicating my sentiments respecting this fortress, and the alterations and improvements which will tend to its defence.

6. I shall confine myself for the present entirely to the south,

south-west, and northern faces, which are surrounded by the river.

7. On the bank of the river the Sultaun had commenced a stone glacis, which he had intended to carry along the whole of those faces, and which, if completed, would have been an effectual defence to the fausse-braye wall.

8. I should propose, in the first place, that the stone glacis should be completed.

9. In addition to the river, which may be called a ditch, and the ditch and rampart of the* , there is a second ditch and rampart, which is but just begun in many parts, and complete in none.

10. The ditch is so close to the outside rampart that there is some danger that that will fall into it unless it is faced with brick or stone, or unless the ditch is filled up.

11. The outside, or main rampart, is exceedingly narrow; in many parts only* feet broad.

12. The communication between the body of the place and the main rampart is much impeded by the second ditch.

13. What I should propose therefore would be, in the first instance, to throw the second unfinished rampart into the second ditch; and, secondly, when that is filled, to thicken and strengthen the outside or first rampart to the thickness of * feet.

14. The glaring imperfection in the place is its want of means of giving a flank fire in the face at present under consideration; but you will observe, that even in these there are in some places cavaliers; in others, square or round bastions from whence a fire to either flank might be given.

15. It is necessary that I should mention that all these want space; which evil, however, can be remedied by the use of the Gribauval platform and truck carriage, of which there is a pattern on the sea-face in Fort St. George.

16. The improvements which I recommend to the three faces at present under discussion, are, first, to complete the stone glacis; secondly, to throw the second rampart into the second ditch which is to be filled up; thirdly, to thicken the first rampart; fourthly, to prepare Gribauval platforms and truck carriages for the cavaliers, round and square bastions.

17. The place is at present very full of inhabitants, who, by

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

the encouragement they have received, will soon be induced to repair either to the Sheher Ganjam * on the island, or to Mysore.

18. In that case I shall have it in my power to clear away many places for parades, places of arms, &c.

19. The troops are at present in old choultries and buildings of different kinds, which are very unfit for the purpose to which they are necessarily applied.

20. In my opinion, however, it will not be necessary for the Company to incur the most trifling expense to build barracks in Seringapatam.

21. When the families of the late Sultaun and of Hyder Ali will have been removed, the palace will afford ample room for any number of European troops that it may be found necessary to keep here; and there are many buildings and compounds which can be given to the Sepoys, and will answer well for them.

22. There will be some difficulty in finding barracks for the officers; but if the Board should adopt and recommend to Government a measure which I am about to have the honour to propose to them, I trust that it will be attended not only with the saving of the expense of building barracks for the officers at present, but with the still greater saving of replacing all the camp equipage which has been destroyed in the late war, the carriage of camp equipage in all future wars, and by the advantage of having the officers at all times prepared to take the field at the shortest notice.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[132.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 2nd June, 1799.

If you had not mentioned my name, and alluded to a letter from me in yours to Henry of the 28th of May, I should have imagined that you had been informed that the army was in a state of mutiny on account of its prize-money, and that it had been recommended to you to yield to its unreasonable demands rather than to oppose them. I do not recollect to have said that I thought that the army had a *right* to the prize: if I had, however, that opinion would have agreed with Lord Cornwallis's, as given to the army in his general orders. I told you that

* The *Sheher Ganjam* is a suburb of Seringapatam.—ED.

the army was uneasy about the prize, and I recommended that some step should be taken to manifest the disposition which I concluded Government had upon the subject, in order to remove that uneasiness. It was caused partly by the inconsistency of General Harris, and partly by a circumstance which I am going to mention, merely as a proof that I always considered the *right* of the army (if I even mentioned it) to depend upon the customs of the Government. When I took the command of the place, on the morning after the storm, I found that my predecessor and superior officer had given the treasure to the prize-agents of the army; I took it from them, and this was one reason why they believed that Government intended to take the treasure for the use of the Company. The General's inconsistency increased a suspicion which, however ill founded as far as it regards the present Government, is not without cause when the conduct of former Governments is adverted to. Another circumstance which proves that I considered your consent as necessary in order to get the prize is, that I pressed you to give it.

As from the circumstance I have above stated I am an object of suspicion, and it is therefore impossible for me to know what are people's real sentiments upon this subject, I can say but little of them. This, however, I may venture to say, that the army will never render it necessary for you to put them to the alternative of obedience or mutiny upon any point. The consequence of your withholding your consent may be that people will not be quite so well pleased with Government as they would have been if it had been given immediately. As it is certain that at some time or other Government will give their consent to the division of the prize, it appeared to me that it would be best to give it at the time when it would be most thankfully received. All I wanted was to keep for Government a fair popularity, which in my opinion is never useless.

I should not have written again upon this subject only that it appeared to me that you had misunderstood what I meant, and had written with more than usual warmth to Henry about it. I believe it will be found that upon the principal point there is very little difference of opinion between us.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[133.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 3rd June, 1799.

I had determined that I would not write to you again upon a subject which it was very clear you did not view in the same light that I did till I received your letter in answer to mine of the 24th May this morning;* and I think the subject upon

* The following is the letter alluded to:

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Fort St. George, 30th May, 1799.

Henry will inform you of my general views with respect to the arrangement of the country of Mysore, as far as the materials before me have enabled me to form any judgment upon the question. He will also express to you the sincere pleasure which I have received from the view of your distinguished conduct during the late campaign.

The subject to which you have referred in two of your letters relating to the property captured in the fort of Seringapatam is undoubtedly of a very delicate nature. It is remarkable that I have not received a single line from General Harris upon that subject, with the exception of a distant reference to an application from Meer Allum (of which Colonel Kirkpatrick will state the nature to you), and the letter which I now enclose.

Erroneous and dangerous opinions appearing to have been conceived with respect to the whole of this question, I shall state to you, without reserve, the grounds of my judgment upon it; and I request you to become the channel of conveying my sentiments to General Harris, as it is through you alone that he has expressed any idea of a reference to me with regard to the application of this property. Even in his communication through you, he seems to doubt whether my judgment be necessary to decide the question.

The right to all property taken from the enemy in war is originally in the State: this is a principle which no man acquainted with public law will attempt to dispute. This right is sometimes regulated or modified by the British Government under Proclamations from the Crown, or statutes called Prize Acts, by which the absolute right of the State is conveyed, under certain limitations and restrictions, to the captors; but where no such special regulations exist, the right of the State is unquestionable to every species of property taken in war under any circumstances whatever.

An incorrect notion has prevailed, that property taken in a fortress or town which has been stormed is exclusively the right of the captors. In the confusion which necessarily attends an assault of this nature, it must often be impossible either to restrain the soldier from plunder, or to bring him to account for the property seized under such circumstances. From the mere necessity of the case, therefore, and not from any right arising to the army from the nature of the assault, the State cannot come into possession of property actually plundered in an assault. But the claim of the State still remains unimpaired; and wherever an account can be taken of the enemy's captured property, even in a fort taken by assault (unless, as I have before stated, some previous regulation has been adopted on the subject), it must remain at the disposal of the State. The discretion of the Government in disposing of property captured by its military force in war must be governed by a variety of considerations arising out of the particular case. In most cases it has been deemed expedient by the British Government to grant the whole amount

which you wrote so delicate that I should not do as I ought if I did not apprise you of some circumstances which are likely to alter a decision which, in my opinion, will be attended at least with inconvenience at the present moment.

to the captors; but this has always been an act of the Government, where it has been possible for the Government to be consulted. Where the amount of the property taken has been very considerable, a part of it only has frequently been granted to the captors in the form of a donation; and cases might be stated wherein the pretended right of the army to the whole property, taken under similar circumstances to that at Seringapatam, must lead to the ruin both of the army and of the State. If six or eight crores of rupees had been found in Tippoo's treasury, and if the whole of this enormous sum must of right have been distributed among the army, I leave it to you to judge whether such an event would not have produced the immediate dissolution of our military force in this quarter of India.

By express letters patent from the Crown, all booty taken in war by the Company's own land or sea forces is granted to the Company; and by the orders of the Company, one part of all booty so taken is to be given among the captors, and the remaining part to be carried to the credit of the Company (with the exception of all ordnance, ammunition, and military stores taken in operations by land, the whole of which is expressly reserved to the Company).

Where the King's forces by land or sea act in conjunction with those of the Company, the King in his letters patent has distinctly reserved his prerogative to distribute the booty in such manner and proportion as he shall think fit; and there is an express order of the Company, that all such booty must be kept entire, giving an exact account of the same to the Company, in order that it may be distributed according to His Majesty's pleasure.

This is the law of nations, and the tenor of the King's and the Company's orders on the subject of booty taken in war by the combined forces of His Majesty and the East India Company.

My sincere good wishes for General Harris, as well as my anxiety to avoid the public discussion of a very disagreeable question, have induced me to abstain from any official statement of these arguments; but I request you to represent to General Harris on my part, in the most serious manner, the discredit which he will bring upon his own character, and the confusion of which he will be the responsible author, if he should permit the army to proceed to a division of the prize taken in Seringapatam without submitting the whole of the question to the authority of Government. He will occasion a mischief nearly of equal extent if he shall encourage the army to expect that I can, consistently with my public duty, grant the whole amount of the prize to the army without a previous reference to the Company and to His Majesty. I cannot, without a gross violation of my trust, proceed further than to grant one-half of the prize to the captors, reserving the remainder for the determination of His Majesty and of the Court of Directors.

In this private communication I have no hesitation in declaring, that, if the whole of the treasure and jewels found in Seringapatam should not amount to a much larger sum than that which I have heard stated, namely, about a crore of rupees; after granting fifty lacs immediately to the army, I shall recommend in the strongest terms both to the Court of Directors and to His Majesty's ministers to grant the whole of the remaining fifty lacs to that gallant body, whose conduct I shall ever remember with admiration and gratitude.

The

The army (right or wrong is not now the question) have got a notion that they have a right to the prize taken in Seringapatam; that notion is founded upon an order of Lord Corn-

The whole of the ordnance, ammunition, and military stores must absolutely await the determination of His Majesty and of the Court of Directors.

Another question arises with regard to the captured property, which appears to have entirely escaped the attention of General Harris. The Nizam is unquestionably entitled to a share of it, proportioned to the number of his own troops serving in the siege. The plan, therefore, which appears to me the most eligible is this, that an exact account of the whole specie, jewels, ordnance, ammunition, and stores of all kinds taken in the fort and magazines of Seringapatam be immediately made out; that an exact statement be also made out of those entitled to claim shares in the division of the whole property, distinguishing the Nizam's share from that of the British army (the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam will of course be considered as a part of the British army). In these accounts it will be necessary to separate the value of the ordnance and stores from that of the specie and other treasure. It will also be necessary to consider whether the detachments under General Floyd, Colonels Read and Brown, are entitled to share with the rest of the army.

These accounts should be transmitted to me in Council, with a request that I will decide upon them, and direct the disposal of the prize money according to the orders of the Court of Directors, and to the rules and regulations prescribed by His Majesty's charters and letters patent. I shall then direct the Nizam's proportion to be paid immediately, neither the Crown nor the Company possessing any jurisdiction over that part of the prize.

To the army I shall take upon me to grant one-half of the sum remaining after the Nizam shall have received his share. This grant from me will be precisely conformable to the spirit of the King's letters patent in the case of the recapture of Calcutta. I have already said that I shall recommend to the Crown and to the Company to grant all the remaining sum to the army. With respect to the ordnance, &c., I must leave that question entirely to the discretion of Government at home: in the meanwhile, if General Harris should be of opinion that a donation to the soldiers of a part of the prize money would be an advisable measure, I think he might very properly adopt it, stating that he did it by my authority. This letter will sufficiently authorize him to take such a step if it should appear necessary.

I wish you to communicate on all these subjects with General Harris himself, without the intervention of any third person; and as I am confident that you feel the same attachment to him which is the prevailing sentiment in my mind, I rely on you to urge General Harris in the most impressive manner to attend to my friendly cautions contained in this letter, and not to suffer the clamour of any discontented persons in the army to induce him to hazard any proceeding which can cast the slightest shade, in the eyes of his friends at home, on the splendour and honour of his conduct in the field.

Ever, my dear Arthur, yours most affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

Your letter of the 24th has determined me not to set out for Seringapatam, or even for Ryacotta, until I hear from Henry after his arrival with you: at present I am very well. I cannot account for the style of some of Harris's public letters to me: he has passed over my General Order to the Army of the 15th, which I meant to be very civil, as if he were affronted at it. Allan arrived

wallis's, of which I cannot recollect the words, but of which the tenor is given in the enclosed paper, and it is confirmed by the conduct of General Harris in three instances: 1st, in giving the prize over to the prize-agents after I had taken it out of their hands; 2ndly, in the negotiation respecting the loan of the lac and ten thousand pagodas; 3rdly, in his orders respecting the appointment of the committee of officers for the management of all matters relating to prize-money.* Having the notion that the prize belongs to them, they have naturally formed hopes and wishes that it will be divided among them immediately; and if it be not divided, the disappointment will be severe indeed. I do not conceive that they are so nice as to care much whether they receive the prize from Government or as a right, provided they receive it; but of this I am certain, that they will not think themselves very kindly treated by Government if it withholds any part of what they have been accustomed to consider as their own, under an order of a former Governor-General, confirmed by repeated acts of the present Commander-in-Chief.

By your letter it appears that you are determined to exercise your discretion, and immediately to have a division made of half the prize, or fifty lacs of rupees. Nay, you have gone farther, as you have authorised General Harris immediately to make a donation to the soldiers, who, I must inform you, having plundered the town, some of them to an immense amount, are at this moment richer than their officers. You think it, however, your duty to withhold the remainder until the pleasure of Government at home can be known. In deciding upon the extent of the sum which it might be proper to give to the army at present, would it not be wise to take into consideration the (false) notion

to-day. I am afraid that your Commission will not only grow quarrelsome, but presumptuous, and that is my reason for being anxious to arrive on the scene of action myself. Would it not be a good measure, by way of preventing confusion, to appoint Henry sole superintendent of the affairs of Mysore? He might make any use he chose of Close, &c.; and Kirkpatrick might be his secretary. You cannot be in the same situation with Henry, because your military post necessarily places you under the orders of Harris.

Inform Harris, Henry, and Kirkpatrick, that I have again deferred my journey.

* The army of Seringapatam being in want of money, the General, instead of drawing bills on the Government at Madras, took upon himself to contract a loan to Government at a high rate of interest. The loan was rejected as soon as the terms were known to the Governor-General.—ED.

they have entertained of their right, the hopes they have formed, the discontent and consequent inconvenience, or even danger, which the disappointment of these hopes may occasion? When the circumstances of the times are considered, is it not possible that it may be wiser, and of course your duty, to use your discretion in distributing the whole prize immediately rather than to keep back any part of it?

I agree in all your reasoning respecting the right of the state, but in my opinion this is not the time to disappoint the army upon a mere matter of form, as sooner or later it is very clear that the whole prize will come into their hands.

It is certainly not expected by the army that the Nizam's troops are to share (excepting the infantry). There are various grounds for this expectation; but the principal one is, that Lord Cornwallis allowed them to have no share of the prize-money in the last war. Of course they had no donation. I am afraid that you will have an unpleasant decision to make if you divide the treasure, jewels, &c., according to the numbers of each army, and that it will be one militating in principle with the decisions which have always been made in prize cases in this country. First, it is impossible to get any true return of the numbers of the Nizam's troops; and even their greatest advocates will allow that half at least of those whom they return as troops have neither arms nor horses. 2ndly, In all divisions of prize-money in this country, Natives have not been estimated as Europeans; I believe they are reckoned as 4 to 1. How then will the account be made out between the Nizam's army and that of the Company? But the truth of the matter is, that if the money is handed over to the Nizam's Government not a man in this army will receive one shilling, which is probably the reason why Lord Cornwallis gave them nothing in the last war; and that the arrangement talked of in the army, viz., that Malcolm's infantry should divide with the Company's, will be that which eventually may be most advantageous to the troops, although perhaps not so consonant with strict justice. However, the decision in this case as in all others ought to bend to circumstances, and that which I have above mentioned ought to be considered.

In talking of strict justice it may perhaps not be improper to remark that if the Nizam has a right to anything he has a right to half of every thing, and yet no part of some things

will be given to him in any case, and probably not half of anything. Your discretion will guide you in the decision upon these subjects, and I think that what I have above mentioned may have some influence in the exercise of it. I really have not considered the subject sufficiently to say whether the Nizam's cavalry ought to have anything or not, but I know that it will be difficult to decide what they ought to have.

I have one word to say respecting the Commission: I always considered that it was more intended to create union among those who were likely to advise General Harris than to invest them with any authority; and in fact they had no power to act from themselves. Even their existence as a Commission was at an end as soon as the place fell, according to your instructions, and from that time we had no meeting, and I have not been acquainted with what General Harris was doing, or intended to do. If things have gone wrong, it must not be attributed to the Commission as a body, although perhaps every person belonging to it excepting myself was concerned in advising the measures of which you disapprove. I advised Henry to dissolve the Commission on the day he arrived here; but the letter received this morning has altered the case entirely. General Harris might imagine that the superintendence of civil affairs was taken out of his hands on account of his conduct respecting the prize money; the persons about him might imagine that their conduct was disapproved, and Henry would want the co-operation of the one and the able advice and assistance of the others. As things now stand he will have the management of every thing, General Harris will do nothing without his advice, and as I said before, the Commission have no power to do any thing excepting to advise.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I have written to General Harris, and have sent him extracts of your letter. I could not leave the fort this day to go over to him.

Tenor of an order given out by Lord Cornwallis in the month of August, 1791, about six months after the capture of Bangalore by storm.

"Lord Cornwallis being of opinion that property of all kinds in any place taken by storm, or abandoned by the enemy, belongs of right to the army,

desires that proclamation may be made in the army bazaars and in the town of Bangalore, that any person who shall give notice to the committee of prize agents where treasure has been buried or hid, so that they may find it, shall receive half of such treasure when found; the other half to be carried to the account of the army," &c. &c. &c.

N.B.—This order goes even to private property, which I must inform you that I have had no little difficulty in saving.

[134.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 14th June, 1799.

What has been done respecting the prize-money has given universal satisfaction: people have been brought to their senses respecting their supposed rights, and there is no sentiment in the army excepting of gratitude to the Government for the favour received.* No private property has been taken, and in case any more public property is found, it will be the duty of the Commission to take care that it is secured for the public. You need be under no apprehensions respecting the amount of the prize-money; it is true that General Harris's share amounts to three lacs of pagodas, but that is one-eighth of the whole property at present to be divided, and, notwithstanding what has been reported, I am convinced that the remainder will not amount to six lacs, including the military stores.†

* The army caused a star and badge of the Order of St. Patrick to be formed from the prize-jewels, and offered them to the Governor-General. His Lordship expressed regret that he was precluded from accepting this high honour by the regulation respecting presents. The star and badge were forwarded to the Court of Directors, and transmitted by that body to the Governor-General, who then, the legal disability being removed, willingly accepted the tribute of respect and esteem. But his Lordship declined repeated offers made by Mr. Pitt, and by the East India Company, of the sum of 100,000*l.* to be paid out of the produce of the sale of the military stores captured at Seringapatam. The grounds of objection were twofold: 1st, that the army might thereby be deprived of a sum of money which the King would probably otherwise grant to the troops; and 2nd, lest it should be said that as Governor-General Lord Mornington had a direct personal interest in making war upon a Native Prince.—ED.

† MY DEAR ARTHUR, Fort St. George, 10th June, 1799.

If you were to read over your own letter, on which mine of the 28th May to Henry was founded, I think you would agree that it was impossible for me to draw any other inference from it than that the army was in your opinion entitled, as of right, to the property taken in Seringapatam; that it was in

I am in hopes that I shall be able to send away the family of the late Sultaun on the 17th or 18th. I mean his four eldest sons. It is impossible at present to send away the women of

a dangerous state of ferment, under the idea that Government intended to deny or limit that right; and that Government ought not to hazard a discussion on such a subject.

A letter since received from Harris, and your account of the total amount of the prize (a most material consideration in my view of the subject), have saved the question of right, and furnished me with a tolerably accurate rule to guide my discretion in the exercise of a power which, I believe, every rational man, after a calm examination of the subject, must admit to be indisputably lodged in the State. A very awkward question might have arisen from the constitution of the Government, and a doubt might have been entertained of my authority over the Royal part of the army. This is a radical defect, and must some day be cured. My decision at length has been, to order a distribution of all the treasure and jewels, reserving ordnance, stores, &c., for the pleasure of the King and of the Company. I hear that this decision has satisfied head-quarters; I suppose it will not satisfy the army, where it will be termed illiberal; and I know it will not satisfy the Court of Directors, nor the Company, who will term it profuse, if not corrupt. Yet I think on the whole it is the best possible course which could be taken, because, while it saves the right of the State, it gives a handsome reward to the army, limiting that reward within the bounds of discretion, and preserving for the Company (if the King should choose to grant it) a valuable property in stores, &c. But I should not be surprised if this very transaction were to occasion my speedy return to England, for the Court will scold in their usual tone, which I know I have not temper to endure.

With regard to the Nizam's troops, I perceive a difficulty of which I had not seen the full extent. I was always aware that the Nizam himself would insist on representing the captorship of his troops, and that very reason rendered me more anxious to preserve for him an equitable proportion of the prize. On this point may turn the jealousy or cordiality of the Court of Hyderabad; and after all it cannot be denied, under my own argument, that the Nizam may *of right* pocket every ana of the money allotted to his share. He must have a rateable share of the ordnance and stores; but I do not agree with you that his right is to one-half of whatever may be taken. That article of the treaty of Paangul is not at present in force. The question of his cavalry is certainly difficult: a composition with Meer Allum is the best remedy. My new Commission will, I imagine, solve all questions of authority in Mysore.

I cannot think that it will be safe to intrust Purneah with the Rajah's affairs after the proofs he has given of a disinclination to the new settlement. Why do we exclude any persons, but because we apprehend they cannot be well affected towards the stability of our arrangements, and will therefore endeavour to subvert them? I shall write fully on this subject to Henry and Kirkpatrick. By remaining at Madras I shall probably see General Stuart, who is coming here with the Admiral. This is a great object.

Ever yours most affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

Some reports have reached me to-day which alarm me with respect to the amount of the prize-money. It is said that Harris's share of the first division

the family on account of the total want of carriage, and it would be improper to send away his younger sons until they go. Indeed it appears to me that it would not be proper to send away the women (amounting to 600) until some place in the Carnatic is provided for them. I have already given orders that the masters who formerly attended the younger part of the family should continue to attend them, which I presume will be approved of.

Colonel Kirkpatrick will have written to you yesterday respecting the 6th article of the Subsidiary Treaty. We all agreed that that ought to be modified in some manner. As it now stands, it will give ground for the belief that we give the Rajah the country at the present moment with the intention of taking it away again when it will suit our convenience. Supposing that the candid and generous policy of the present Government should weaken that belief as far as it regards them, it must be allowed that the conduct of the British Government in India has not at all times been such as to induce the natives to believe that at some time or other improper advantage will not be taken of that article. They know as well as we do that there may be a change of government immediately, and that there certainly will be one in the course of a few years, and the person then appointed Governor-General may not have such enlarged systems of policy as those by which we are regulated

will be three lacs of pagodas, and that the second division will be nearly as great. I am afraid the army will be dissolved by such an extravagant influx of money. Any property now found should absolutely be appropriated to the State, and you Commissioners should appoint proper persons to take charge of it.

It occurs to me that Kirkpatrick and Malcolm might easily induce Meer Allum to compromise the Nizam's share of the prize for a handsome sum.

If Tippoo's throne could be put together again, it ought to be purchased by the Company for the King. I shall be willing to make the purchase.

A propos, I hear that there is a fine library in the palace: this the captors ought to give to the Company, who have lately established a Persian library in London. I am sorry to hear that Seyd Saheb's books were mostly destroyed: such as are valuable of those remaining ought to be given to the Company also. If the captors will not give, I will purchase on account of the Company. Mention this to Close. I wish all possible materials to be collected for a history of the campaign, siege, and assault. Set all hands to work to compile journals, and collect anecdotes directly. Kirkpatrick will be very useful as a compiler, but he has an iron pen. A true account of Tippoo's death and conduct during the war and siege would be excellent. Let me know who would be the best man to write the history under authority. Talk to Close, Agnew, and Macaulay on this.

at the present moment. This induces me to believe that they will object strongly to that article, and I don't think that it will be very creditable to us to insist upon it.

Henry and I went over to Old Mysore yesterday, and I am sorry to tell you that not a single house is standing in it. In New Mysore there are some houses, but very bad ones, and the water is at the distance of half a mile from the fort. These are embarrassing circumstances, and I am at a loss to say where the Rajah ought to be *musnuded*. Bangalore would answer till a palace could be built for him at Old Mysore, which would soon bring a town there; but Colonel Kirkpatrick says that Bangalore is in a corner of his dominions, whereas his residence ought to be in the centre of them. If that is any objection, it holds good only for a year, before which time a palace at Mysore could be built. It is impossible to musnud him at Seringapatam, because if we do we must fix him in Tippoo's palace along with Tippoo's women, which would be cruel as well as improper. Besides, if he fixes the seat of government at Seringapatam, he must keep with him a crowd of people, which will delay, till he leaves it, the measures to be taken for clearing it and making it a proper military post. I wish you would consider this subject, and let us know your determination. There is another objection to moving him to Bangalore, which is its distance from the Cauvery. I think that it would be advisable to give over to the Rajah's Government the management of the countries which it is intended eventually to cede to the Mahrattas, because they will fall more naturally under it, and will be more likely to be productive immediately than if we take possession of them. Our gentlemen must have new establishments of all kinds suited to their systems, which, however they may excel those of the natives in the long run, are not so likely to suit the people of the country immediately. I think it is to be apprehended that if we take those countries, it will create a jealousy at Hyderabad. This ought to be avoided, particularly as nothing can be gained by taking them.

My share of the prize-money, amounting in jewels to about 3000 pagodas and in money to 7000, will enable me to pay the money which you advanced to purchase my lieutenant-colonelcy, and that which was borrowed from Captain Stapleton on our joint bond. I will put it into the 8 per cent. loan, and will send you the securities with a statement of the account as

accurately made out as possible from my memory. It is better that I should put it in the 8 per cent. loan than endeavour to send it to you in any other manner, as I conceive that my example may have some influence over the conduct of other officers in the army.*

I have often spoken to General Harris about my situation here, and he has as often said that he should represent it to Government, but has done nothing. In case he should move to any distance from hence, I intend to state it to Government publicly, and it is as well now to apprise you of what I intend to represent.

Since I went into the field in December last, I have commanded an army with a large staff attached to me, which has not been unattended by a very great expense, particularly latterly. About six weeks ago I was sent in here with a garrison, consisting of about half the army and a large staff, and I have not received one shilling more than I did in Fort St. George. The consequence is that I am ruined.

* MY DEAR ARTHUR, Fort St. George, 19th June, 1799.

To your letter of the 14th I answer, that no consideration can induce me to accept payment of the sums which I have formerly advanced for you. I am in no want of money, and probably never shall be: when I am, it will be time enough to call upon you. In the meanwhile, I should think that through Henry you might easily convert your 8 per cent. Bonds into Decennial paper at Calcutta.

I think the case of your appointments quite scandalous: at the same time it would be better that the application for the increase should come to me regularly through Harris, and I wish you would urge him immediately on the subject. I am very happy to hear that you have got through your painful duty so well.

A propos, try to get Tippoo's small seal or ring for me, and some swords and handsome guns for the Prince of Wales and Duke of York: any sword known to have been used by Tippoo would be curious.

Do you, together with the whole Commission (in order to have the benefit of Close's opinion), send me, in a private letter, your sentiments with regard to the Mahrattas.

The questions are these:

1. Will any concession which we can now make satisfy their avarice, or mitigate their jealousy?

2. Will not the proposed concessions be an augmentation of their resources and means of mischief, and a proportionate deduction from our strength and from that of our real Allies?

3. Is it not more likely that the efficiency of our power and its vicinity will awe than irritate them? I have supposed that we cannot possibly grant enough to them to satisfy their avarice and ambition.

Ever yours most affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

General Harris has told me that he intended to propose that the situation of commanding-officer at Seringapatam should be put upon the same footing with that of Trichinopoly. He receives 1000 or 1200 pagodas a month from the Nabob. I should be ashamed of doing any of the dirty things that I am told are done in some of the commands in the Carnatic, as I believe I proved sufficiently at Wallajah-Nuggur; but if Government do not consider my situation here, I must either give up the command or submit to be ruined for ever. I assure you that since December I have in some months spent five times, in others four times, more than I received; and an extraordinary circumstance, which could happen in no other country, is that I have frequently signed the bills of officers under my command who were living upon me by the customs of the service, and who received nearly half as much more than I did. I state all this detail to you as my reason for making an application upon the subject, which certainly I should wish to avoid, and should not make if there were any probability that General Harris would represent my case to Government before you leave Madras.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

ABSTRACT OF WHAT PASSED WITH THE PRINCES. [135.]

17th June, 1799.

Having made the necessary preparations for the departure of the four eldest sons of the late Tippoo Sultaun, as far as they could be made without disclosing their object, I waited upon Futteh Hyder on the 16th, for the purpose of delivering the letter addressed to him by the Governor-General, and of informing him of his Lordship's wishes that he should remove from hence into the Carnatic.

As the letter from Lord M. particularly referred Futteh Hyder to General Harris, I first told him that I had been ordered by the General to make known to him his wishes. I explained to him that, after a due consideration of the affairs of this country, the Governor-General had not thought it compatible with the interests of the British nation and of its Allies to place him or any of his family upon the musnud. However,

that his conduct in coming in, and since he had come in, had not passed unnoticed, and that the Governor-General had determined to give the family of the late Tippoo Sultaun an allowance which was not to exceed 7 lacs of rupees. I then observed that it must be unpleasant to his feelings to see the government of this country pass into the hands of others; and that for his own sake, as well as for the ease and convenience of the government to be established in Mysore, it was desirable that he should remove into another country. On this account, I told him that I had been ordered to request that he would prepare to remove immediately to Vellore in the Carnatic, and that the next day had been fixed for his departure.

He stated that he was much surprised at what I had said; that he had received a cowle, and had come in upon it; that it had been the custom of the British nation, when it had conquered kings and people in India, to restore to the former their governments, and he instanced the cases of Tanjore and Oude. He said, however, supposing that it was not thought proper that he should govern this country, there was no reason why he should be removed from it, and that he never should consent to move from the tomb of his father and grandfather, nor to leave his father's family, and asked emphatically what was to become of them if he should leave them. I told him that I did not conceive there was anything in the cowle which had been sent to him which either gave him grounds to hope that he should be permitted to govern this country, or that prevented the Governor-General from exercising the power that all Governments in India had of ordering their subjects to quit one place and to reside in another; that I acknowledged the generosity of the British nation in the instances to which he had alluded, but I observed that in these the exercise of its generosity was not incompatible with its interests and those of its Allies; that the families which, after having been conquered, had been restored to power, had not been intimately connected in politics with our irreconcilable enemies for the sole object of driving us out of India, and that therefore it had not been deemed incompatible with our interests that they should still govern their countries; that there was no intention of separating him from the families of his father and grandfather longer than was necessary to procure conveyance for the latter to the Carnatic, and that in the mean time they would be under my protection; that

he ought to recollect that he did not come in till twelve days after the assault, during which time his own as well as his father's family had been under my protection, and that they had not suffered, and that he had no reason to fear that they would suffer from his absence upon the present occasion. I then told him that what had been proposed was for his sake as well as for the ease of the Government of this country; that he must be aware that he would be an object of suspicion here at all times, and that he might expect that the smallest indiscretion on his part would occasion the detention of his person.

He still quoted the cowle, and, having expressed an anxiety to know what part of the allowance for the family he was to have, I told him 50,000 rupees annually. He then said that he should consult some of his friends upon the subject, and I told him that he was to consider what I told him as the General's order, which it was my duty to see obeyed, and that I should send Captain Marriott to him in an hour to take his directions respecting the carriage of his baggage and family. I then took my leave.

I repeated what I had said to Futteh Hyder to the other princes. Abdul Kaliz and Moiz u Deen expressed no anxiety excepting about the amount of their allowance; the other, Moien u Deen, said that he should consult his friends. I told him that I conveyed orders, and that whatever might be the result of the consultation they must be obeyed. He agreed that they should. Futteh Hyder and Moien u Deen called upon me in the evening, and expressed a desire to carry away half of the family of Hyder Ali and half of that of Tippoo. I told them that they might carry away as many as they pleased, but that the means of carriage at present were calculated and provided for the members of *their own* families, and that it had been thought most advisable to defer sending the families of their father and grandfather to a future opportunity. In the morning they called again, with a long list of doolies, camels, elephants, bandies, &c., which they wanted for the removal of the families of Hyder Ali and of Tippoo; but having informed them that we had means of carriage only for their own families, they expressed themselves satisfied, and prepared to depart.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[136.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 23rd June, 1799.

Henry has informed me that you wish that one of us should go to England, and that as it would be inconvenient to you that he should go, my going would be preferable. I am very willing to go if it is thought that I can be of any use. If I am made a Major-General (which I believe I am at this moment), and am not placed upon the Staff immediately, I must go to England, and therefore it will not be inconvenient to me; but if I am placed upon the Staff immediately, or if I am not made a Major-General, I relinquish confessedly the most respectable and the best situation for me that I could have in India. It will be particularly so if no General officer is sent into Mysore; and as they are generally so confoundedly inefficient, and as to send Baird here (considering what has passed) would be particularly unpleasant, I rather imagine that the General will not propose it. I mention this not as reasons against going, but as an inducement to you to consider well whether it will be necessary to send anybody, and whether your letters, &c., will not be fully sufficient to explain everything that has passed and your future plans. In my opinion Colonel Kirkpatrick would be of no use to you in London.

I recommend it to you to send Close to Poonah, the affairs of which court it is most necessary to settle immediately. He is the only man I have seen yet who manages the natives properly, and that merely from his perfect knowledge of their language. I will manage matters here in his absence, or you may appoint Macaulay to manage them. He will do it well; and he has already had a good deal of intercourse with Purneah.

I recommend it to you not to put the Company upon the Mahratta frontier. It is impossible to expect to alter the nature of the Mahrattas; they will plunder their neighbours, be they ever so powerful. The consequence of their plunder of the Company's territories will be perpetual representations at Poonah of grievances which it will not be in the power of Poonah to redress, and a bickering which will have no end. It will be better to put one of the powers in dependence upon the Company on the frontier, who, if plundered, are accustomed to it, know how to bear it and to retaliate, which we do not.

I have not had time yet to consider the other Mahratta questions.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [137.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 24th June, 1799.

The Princes will be at Vellore from the 12th to the 15th of next month. I am glad to find that the families of Hyder Ali and of Tippoo Sultaun can be accommodated in that fortress, as well as those of the Princes. They are anxious that all should be in the same place, which is desirable, both as it will save guards and there will be a greater tie upon the good behaviour and allegiance of the Princes. I recommend that they should not be allowed to perceive that they are guarded. We are not aware what a tie a Mussulman's family is upon him: as long as you keep their families the Princes will not attempt to escape. I think it would be advisable to have as much state as possible about them; to begin by not offering them to go out without having orderlies and guards to attend them to keep off the mob and to do them honour. This may be relaxed by degrees when the Mahratta business is settled, and they become accustomed to us.

The common garrison of Vellore will be fully sufficient.

I wrote to you yesterday about going to England. As far as my own views are concerned in the voyage, I think it will be better for me to remain in this country, particularly if no senior officer is left in Mysore. My situation will then be as respectable as it can be even after my return, and one in which I shall be able to render service to the public. However, I put that out of the question; and if you wish that I should go home, I'll go.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[138.] DRAFT REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON CAPT. NORRIS'S WORKS.*

Seringapatam, 25th June, 1799.

The Committee appointed to inspect and report upon the works directed to be performed by the engineer in Seringapatam met.

Present—

COLONEL WELLESLEY, *President.*
MAJOR SKELLY, } *Members.*
CAPTAIN BAILEY, }

Read an extract of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew to Colonel Wellesley, conveying the orders of the Commander-in-Chief for the Committee to assemble, likewise a letter of instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, by the order of the Commander-in-Chief, both dated Camp, 23rd June, 1799.

Colonel Wellesley communicated to the Committee memorandums of works proposed to be done in and about Seringapatam, which had received the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief, and the works had been ordered, and estimates of them had been ordered to be prepared.

The Committee proceeded to the Mysore Gateway.

The outside bridge upon two good stone piers is completed.

The inside bridge is not completed; a few beams are laid.

The Committee next proceeded to the Long Bridge, on the island.

The southern wall of the aqueduct is finished.

The northern wall about one-third finished.

The parapet wall of the bridge not begun, and there were no materials collected.

The Committee then proceeded to the Breach.

The principal breach in the main wall has been cleared. That in the fausse-braye wall has not been cleared, and there is much rubbish between the two.

Some few stones have been collected here, and some chunam.

Nothing more has been done to the principal breach, and the other parts of the wall which have been damaged have not been touched.

The Committee next proceeded to the Granaries, upon the roofs of which it appears that people have been at work.

* Report in the hand-writing of Colonel Wellesley.—ED.

The Committee next proceeded to the Arsenal Yard, where about one-eighth of the proposed gunshed is finished.

This work is well done.

Part of the Barracks of the Scotch Brigade have been covered in, and some window frames have been placed in windows broke out in the Barracks of the 33rd Regiment.

The Committee called for Captain Norris's book, by which it appears that he has generally had daily in employment,

1. The establishment allowed him by the Commander-in-Chief.
2. 170 pioneers.*
   3 tindals.
   56 Lascars; sometimes more.
3. About 30 European masons and bricklayers.
   5 European carpenters in the month of May.
4. Natives hired daily:
   20 bricklayers,
   1 carpenter,
   1 comattie maistry,
   70 coolies,
   83 women coolies,
   30 bandies.

It does not appear to the Committee that the work done is equal to what might have been performed by that number of persons.

The Committee are of opinion, 1. That all the works in Seringapatam ought to be done by estimate, in conformity to the regulations.

2. That the coolies allowed to the engineer's establishment ought to be discharged, as they belong to the place, and may be got upon daily hire.

3. That the carts ought to be discharged, as they can likewise be procured for daily hire.

4. That excepting
   1 draftsman,
   1 writer,
   1 conicopoly,
   2 peons,
   1 serjeant of stores,
   2 European overseers,

who ought to remain under the orders of the chief engineer,

* Pioneers were taken away on the 21st instant.

the remainder of the establishment allowed by the Commander-in-Chief ought to be placed under the orders of the commanding officer, viz.

1 conicopoly,
1 maistry bricklayer,
2 under maistries,
12 bricklayers,
2 carpenter maistries,
8 carpenters,
1 smith maistry,
6 smiths,
6 hammer men,
6 bellows boys,

of which descriptions it is apprehended a sufficient number of persons cannot be procured at present in Seringapatam.

5. That the engineer ought to have these upon his application, when he wants them, but that an account ought to be kept of their daily hire at the rate of the place for every day that he employs them.

6. That an account ought to be kept of the hire of the pioneers and Lascars, rating them as coolies for every day that they are employed under his orders.

7. That the amount of the hire of the establishment abovementioned, and of the pioneers and Lascars, ought to be set off against the amount of the estimates.

8. That the per centage upon the amount of the charge for the hire of the establishment, and of the pioneers and Lascars, ought to be deducted from the amount of the per centage upon the estimates.

[139.] *Draft of a Letter to the Military Board.*

7th July, 1799.

1. I should have addressed you before now, only that I have waited for an accurate plan of Seringapatam and for the proceedings of a Committee which has been appointed to survey the stores sent in by the army. For these I should still wait in order that in my first address I might give you the most full and satisfactory account of this place, only that, as you will perceive by the enclosed extract of a letter from the Commander-

in-Chief, I am under the necessity of applying to you immediately.

2. At the request of Captain M'Intire, the commissary of stores, I had applied to the Commander-in-Chief for leave to employ in the department an increased number of chuckledars,* which appeared necessary on account of the large number of arms which he received daily from the Committee appointed to survey and value the captured stores, and which he entered on his books.

3. The number of chuckledars on the establishment is fully sufficient to keep the arms in order; but as they are all at present in very bad order, it is necessary that he should employ as large a number as he can procure for the purpose of putting them first in a proper state.

4. Enclosed I have the honour to send you an abstract of the number of arms which Captain M'Intire has already received from the Committee, and has entered upon his books.

5. I request that you will recommend to Government that he may be allowed to employ in his department as many chuckledars as can be procured until the captured arms are put in a proper state, and I beg to have your orders respecting those which are reparable or unserviceable.

6. I hope in a few days to have it in my power to send you a full and satisfactory account of this place.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Captain M'Intire. [140.]

7th July, 1799.

1. I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief to the Committee of Prize.

2. I have likewise received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to desire that you will keep in separate books, the returns, receipts, and issues of all ordnance stores, &c., captured in Seringapatam, that they may be distinguished from the Company's stores in your charge should any future arrangements make such distinction necessary.

3. I have received the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to desire that you will immediately take charge of all the stores

* Men who polish arms, sharpen swords, and keep weapons generally in order.—ED.

described in the enclosed paper. You will not, however, enter them upon your books until they will have been surveyed and valued by the Committee, of which Lieutenant-Colonel [name illegible] is President.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[141.] *To William Hope Gordon, Esq.*

SIR, 7th July, 1799.

1. I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter written by the Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief to the Committee of Prize.

2. I have received the directions of the Commander-in-Chief to desire that you will immediately take charge of all the grain and other provisions in the public stores.

3. From the nature of the granaries, the quantities of grain they contain, and the badness and uncertainty of the weather, it is impossible at present to ascertain quantities exactly. You can, therefore, do no more than receive charge of the granaries, and I have to request that they may not be opened without the orders of the commanding officer of the garrison.

4. I shall immediately order a Committee to assemble to ascertain the quantities of the grain, and I have received the authority of the Commander-in-Chief to order such grain to be sold as may be found to be damaged, or likely soon to be so, from age or other causes.

5. I have received the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to desire that you will keep a separate book of the captured grain and provisions, and you will accordingly carry to the separate account of captured grain the proceeds of what may be sold as damaged, or likely soon to be so.

6. I request that you will be so kind as to have the granaries numbered immediately.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[142.] *To Lieut.-Colonel Scott, President of a [Grain] Committee.*

SIR, 7th July, 1799.

The Committee of which you are President is ordered to inspect the grain and provisions at present in the granaries.

"2. There is great reason to believe that from the length of time which has elapsed since a large part of it was put in store, it has become, or is likely shortly to become, damaged. You will be so kind as to report whether there is any in that state, and in which of the granaries it is placed.*

* Proceedings of a Committee held by order of the Hon. Colonel WELLESLEY, commanding the Garrison of Seringapatam, &c., 8th July, 1799; consisting of Lieut.-Colonel SCOTT, President; Captain BAILEY and Lieut. ALLAN, Members.

The Committee having met, agreeably to orders, proceeded to examine the grain and provisions in store, and continued to meet by adjournment till this day, when they find them in the state as follows:—

No. 1. Granary in good repair, containing paddy [rice in the husk] of three years old, in a good state.
2. Granary, containing new paddy, in a good state.
3. Granary, containing paddy of eleven years old, in good preservation.
4. Granary, do. do. do.
5. Granary, containing paddy eleven years old, and pepper of an excellent quality, and in high preservation.
6. Granary, containing paddy eleven years old, in a good state.
7. Granary, containing new paddy in good state, and raggy [a coarse grain] in tolerable condition.
8. Granary, containing paddy of three years old, in a good state.
9. Granary, containing ditto of four years old, in good condition.
10. Granary, containing paddy of eleven years old, in a good state; salt and pepper of the best quality, and in high preservation.
11. Granary, containing paddy of one year old, in a good state.
12. Granary, containing paddy, the half eleven years old, the other half one year old, all in a good state.
13. Granary, containing paddy of seven years old, in good condition.
14. Granary, containing ditto of eleven years old, do. do.
15. Granary, containing ditto of one year old, do. do.
16. Godowns, containing new paddy, in good condition.
17. Granary, containing paddy of six years old, in good condition.
18. Granary, containing do. do. do.
19. Granary, containing seven years old paddy, in a good state.
20. Granary, containing do. do. do.
21. Godowns, containing paddy of one year old, in a good state.
22. Granary, containing gram, apparently in good condition.
23. Godown, containing salt of an inferior quality.
24. Godown, containing ditto ditto.
25. Godown, containing fine salt.
26. Godown, full of pepper of the best quality, and in high preservation.
27. Godown, containing do. do. do.
A well containing some oil.

All the above granaries and godowns appear to be in good repair.

The Committee are of opinion there is no mode of ascertaining with any tolerable accuracy the quantities of the above articles in store, except by actual measurement.

(Signed) THOMAS SCOTT, Lieut.-Col., President.

Seringapatam, 10th July, 1799.

3. Upon this subject you will be so kind as to take the opinion of the merchants who are ordered to attend the Committee.

4. I shall be obliged to you if you will report to me whether it is practicable to ascertain the quantity of provisions in store.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[143.] LETTER TO THE COMMISSIONERS FOR THE AFFAIRS OF MYSORE.

GENTLEMEN, 9th July, 1799.

I have the honour to submit to you the following plan for the administration of justice in the Fort, and on the Island of Seringapatam.*

The inhabitants being Hindus and Mussulmans, there ought to be two courts for the administration of civil and criminal law. In the one, over which two pundits ought to preside, and in which the Hindu code ought to be the guide, cases in which Hindus are parties ought to be decided. In the other, over which a cazi and two assistants ought to preside, and in which the Mohammedan law ought to be the rule, cases in which Mussulmans are parties ought to be decided. Cases in which a Mussulman and a Hindu are parties ought to be decided in either the one or the other, according to the choice of the parties.

Cases in which an inhabitant and a soldier or sepoy are parties, ought to be decided as in other parts of the Company's territories, according to the military law.

In criminal cases the punishments cannot extend to life or limb; and I propose that in no case, whether civil or criminal,

* Reply from the Commissioners:

To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, commanding at Seringapatam.

SIR, Seringapatam, 9th July, 1799.

We have received your letter of this date, and shall, without delay, submit the plan which it contains, for the administration of justice within your jurisdiction, to the consideration of the Right Hon. the Governor-General.

Feeling the necessity of an immediate attention to this important object, and thinking that the arrangement suggested by you is well calculated to accomplish it, we beg leave to recommend to you to take the necessary measures for giving temporary effect to it until the orders of the Governor-General on the subject shall be received.

We have, &c.,

HENRY WELLESLEY.
WM. KIRKPATRICK.

the decision of these courts may be carried into execution excepting by the consent of the commanding officer of the garrison.

In order that the whole matter may come before him, as well as in order that Government may have at all times an opportunity of inspecting the proceedings of these courts, I propose that a person may be appointed to act as registrar to them.

The commanding officer might confirm the sentences of these courts through the registrar.

I should imagine that the total expense of these establishments would not exceed 3000 pagodas a year.

You will observe that I have confined the duties of the courts to the administration of civil and criminal law, and have kept police entirely distinct. That ought to remain as it is at present in Seringapatam and in all other garrisons, in the hands of the commanding officer, who conducts it through the means of the cutwal.

The plan which I have had the honour of laying before you appears to me to be best calculated for the inhabitants of Seringapatam: they consist of Hindus and Mussulmans; of both descriptions there are large numbers, and they have been accustomed to the modes of proceeding to be adopted under this arrangement.

They are separated from the other parts of the Company's territories; and the objections which have been urged against adopting similar modes of administering justice in other places, do not appear to apply to this.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

A REGULATION FOR THE DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE WITHIN THE FORT AND ISLAND OF SERINGAPATAM.

"Whereas it is expedient that such provision be made for the administration of civil and criminal justice within the Fort and Island of Seringapatam, and for affording to the inhabitants thereof such protection against acts of violence or oppression, as the present circumstances of the place will admit;—Be it therefore ordained:

2. That the care and management of the Police in the said

Fort and Island, and all the powers and authorities incident thereto, together with the superintendence of the administration of justice, be vested in the officer commanding the forces in Mysore, subject to such orders and directions as he may from time to time receive from the Governor in Council of Fort St. George.

3. That the said officer commanding the forces in Mysore shall from time to time make the necessary applications for authority to assemble General Courts Martial for the purpose of trying by martial law all such of the native inhabitants of the said Fort and Island as may be charged with offences tending to excite mutiny in the garrison, or to endanger the safety of the place, or who shall encourage desertion among the troops, or supply them with spirituous liquors, or who shall steal or embezzle, or be concerned in the stealing or embezzlement of any of the arms or accoutrements of the men, or of the ammunition or military stores of the garrison; provided that no sentence pronounced by such general court martial shall be carried into execution until the whole of the proceedings relative thereto be laid before the Commander-in-Chief, as required by the Mutiny Act, and his orders be for that purpose received.

4. That in all crimes and offences committed by British subjects which may not be cognizable by a General Court Martial, the said officer commanding the forces in Mysore, or, in his absence, the officer in the actual command of the said Fort and Island, shall transmit to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George all informations, depositions, and confessions relative thereto, and shall send the offender or offenders under a guard to Fort St. George, for the purpose of being there brought to trial; and shall moreover send all witnesses under an escort to Fort St. George, to the end that they may give evidence at the trial of such offender or offenders.

5. That for the trial of all offences other than those triable by martial law, and for the decision of all civil suits and actions, where the matter or thing sought to be recovered shall exceed in value the sum of eighty rupees, there shall be established at Seringapatam two courts of justice, namely, a court of Foujdarry for the trial of all criminal offences, and a court of Cutchery for the decision of civil suits and actions; which said courts shall be both held before one judge, who shall be a

British subject, and a servant of the Hon. East India Company, and who shall be from time to time nominated and appointed by, and shall hold his office during the pleasure of, the Governor in Council of Fort St. George; and the said judge, before he shall enter on his said office, or do any matter or thing in discharge of the duties thereof, shall take and subscribe the following oath, which shall be administered to him by the said officer commanding the forces in Mysore, in the presence of so many of the principal native inhabitants of Seringapatam as may be conveniently assembled: 'I, A. B., do solemnly swear, that I will, to the best of my skill and judgment, well and diligently discharge the duties of Judge of the Court of Foujdarry of Seringapatam, and of Judge of the Court of Cutchery of Seringapatam, and that I will administer justice in the same respectively, without fear, favour, or partiality, and in the mode prescribed, or which may be hereafter prescribed, by the regulations of the Governor in Council of Fort St. George; and that I will not directly or indirectly accept any present or reward from any of the parties who may be concerned in any prosecution, suit, or action which may come before me, or from any person or persons on their behalf, nor will I be concerned in any trade or traffic, sale or purchase, whereby I may become personally interested in any such prosecution, suit, or action; nor will I from regard, attention, or respect to any person or persons, delay, or deny, or alter the course of justice, but will in all things discharge the trust reposed in me faithfully, truly, firmly, and impartially, so help me God:' and the said oath when so taken and subscribed shall be forthwith transmitted by the said officer commanding the forces in Mysore to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, to be by him preserved among the records of Government.

6. That the said judge shall, in his Court of Foujdarry, have four assistants or assessors, namely, the cazi and mufti of the place, and two moulavies, who, having duly qualified themselves, according to the Moorish custom, for the exercise of their respective offices, shall sit with the said Judge to expound the Mohammedan law, and to determine how far those persons who may be charged with a breach of the said law may or may not be guilty; and the said assessors shall proceed in the trial of every prisoner brought before the court in the mode prescribed by the Mohammedan law; and after having fully

heard him in his defence, and examined according to the usages and customs of the country all necessary witnesses, as well on the part of the said prisoner as on the part of the prosecutors, and duly weighed and considered the evidence given by such witnesses, the said assessors shall declare and record their opinion as to his guilt or innocence, and if guilty shall pronounce on him such sentence as shall be agreeable to, and authorised by, the said law: provided nevertheless that the said cazi, mufti, and moulavies, and every of them, shall be subject to the control of the said Judge in all matters wherein he may deem it necessary to interpose his authority; and it shall be his duty to see that they conduct themselves with strict propriety, and that the trial be throughout fair and impartial; and in all cases which may affect the life or limb of a prisoner in the event of his being found guilty, or may expose a man or woman of high caste or family to a punishment which may subject them to the loss of caste, or may otherwise dishonour them, it shall be the duty of the said Judge to cause the whole of the proceedings to be taken down in writing, to the end that he may lay the same before the officer commanding the forces in Mysore, together with his own opinion as to the justice of the sentence, and the conduct of the assessors; and the said proceedings and opinion shall be forthwith transmitted by the said officer to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, with such observations thereon as he may think proper to make, and execution of the said sentence shall be stayed until the same shall be approved and confirmed by the Governor in Council of Fort St. George; and the said Governor in Council shall have full power and authority to remit the said sentence in the whole or in part, as to him in his discretion shall seem meet and proper.

7. That the said Judge, in his court of Cutchery, shall have two assistants, namely, the said cazi of the place to expound the Mohammedan law when thereunto required, and one pundit to expound when thereunto required the Hindu law; and he shall proceed in the decision of all civil suits and actions wherein the matter or thing sought to be recovered shall exceed in value the sum of eighty rupees in the manner hereinafter directed; and he shall have two seals for the purpose of authenticating therewith all proceedings of the said courts respectively; and on one of the said seals shall be engraved the arms of the

said Company, with the words 'Foujdarry of Seringapatam,' and on the other the same arms, with the words 'Cutchery of Seringapatam;' and during his continuance in office he shall safely keep the said seals in his own custody, and shall not intrust the same to the keeping of any other person; and on his resignation or removal from office shall deliver over the same to the officer commanding the forces in Mysore, or to such other person as the said Governor in Council shall think proper to direct; and he shall have one Daroga or officer to execute the sentences, judgments, or orders of the said courts respectively, together with such other officers, writers, peons, and servants, as to the said Governor in Council shall seem necessary.

8. That the seal of the Foujdarry shall not be affixed to any sentence or judgment of the said court extending to the loss of life or limb, or to the infliction of punishments on men or women of high caste or family which may expose them to the loss of caste or other dishonour, until such sentence or judgment shall be approved and confirmed by the Governor in Council as aforesaid; nor shall it be affixed to any sentence or judgment directing the infliction of any slighter punishment until an exact statement of the proceedings be laid before the officer commanding the forces in Mysore, and the said sentence or judgment be by him approved and confirmed; neither shall the seal of the Cutchery be affixed to any final order or decree of the Court of Cutchery until the whole of the proceedings upon which the same may be grounded shall be laid before the said officer commanding the forces in Mysore, and the said final order or decree be by him approved and confirmed, except only in such cases when the said final order or decree shall, upon appeal, as hereinafter provided, be approved and confirmed by the Governor in Council of Fort St. George.

9. That when any person shall apply to the said Court of Cutchery for redress of injuries, he shall make his complaint in writing, signed by himself or his vakeel duly authorised, and therein shall briefly declare the cause or reason of his complaint, with the time when, and the manner in which, the same arose; and at the time he shall prefer such complaint he shall offer two good securities to prosecute the same with effect, or, in case judgment shall go against him, to pay the defendant such costs, and to the Honourable Company such fine for exhibiting a false and groundless complaint, as the said Judge may direct; and

the amount for which security shall be offered as aforesaid shall be as follows, that is to say, on all sums of money or other things sued for not exceeding 300 star pagodas in value, 5 per cent.; on those above 300 and not exceeding 1500 star pagodas, 4 per cent.; on those above 1500 and not exceeding 3000 star pagodas, 3 per cent.; and on those above 3000 star pagodas, 2 per cent.

10. That when such complaint is filed, and security given as aforesaid, a summons shall be issued by the said Judge requiring the defendant to appear before him, on a day to be therein mentioned, to answer the said complaint; and in default of appearance by himself or his authorised vakeel, or on oath being made by the complainant, or some person on his behalf, that the defendant will, on hearing of such complaint against him, abscond and remove himself beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, the Judge shall issue a warrant under his hand and the seal of the said Court to the Daroga, directing him to arrest the person of the said defendant, and to bring him before the Court by a certain day to be in the said warrant mentioned, to answer the said complaint; and in case of the voluntary appearance of the said defendant, or of the arrest of his person by the Daroga, the Judge shall admit him to bail upon giving sufficient security to abide by and perform the final order or decree of the Court, or to surrender himself to the said Court to be charged in execution, until the same shall be satisfied; and in default of finding bail, the Judge shall order him to be detained in custody until he shall have found such bail, or until judgment may pass in his favour, unless he shall be willing to lodge the amount of the complainant's demand, together with a sum equal to the amount of the sum for which such complainant was obliged to give security to answer the costs of suit, and such fine as, in the event of judgment going in favour of the complainant, the Judge may think proper to impose upon him for unjustly withholding the right of another man; and in case he shall be so willing, the Court shall receive the same in money or goods, or in the Company's bonds, and shall forthwith order him to be discharged and set at liberty.

11. That after such bail shall have been given, or lodgment made by the defendant, or his body detained in custody for want of such bail or lodgment, the Judge shall appoint a day for the said defendant to put in his answer, which answer shall

be brief and direct, and shall contain either a denial of the charge or demand expressed in the complaint, or an acknowledgment thereof, or an acknowledgment with a set off against the same, of a debt due to the defendant of a similar nature, or finally, an acknowledgment and justification thereof. But if the defendant shall conceive that he ought not to answer, either for want of jurisdiction in the Court, or want of right in the complainant, he shall have liberty to plead to the jurisdiction, or in bar or in abatement, as he shall be advised, provided that if on such plea judgment shall go against him, the Judge shall impose such fine upon him as in his discretion he shall think reasonable.

12. That in order to prevent a tedious length of pleading, tending to obscure the matter in dispute, the Judge shall establish concise forms for complaints and answers, and other pleadings in all common cases, and shall fix the forms for other cases as they arise, and before any proceedings are had thereon; and no deviation shall be allowed from these fixed and established forms, which shall contain no more than is necessary to lay the matter in dispute clearly and distinctly before the Court.

13. That when the answer of the defendant shall be filed, and the matter in dispute is not a matter of succession or inheritance, the Judge shall recommend to the parties to choose some common friend for the adjustment thereof; and in case they cannot agree in the choice of such common friend, he shall recommend it to them to choose each party one friend, with power to the two friends so chosen to name an umpire for the adjustment of the matter so in dispute, in the event of their not making their award by a certain day; and if they agree so to do, the submission to the umpirage or award shall be made a rule of Court, and the parties shall be concluded thereby, unless it shall be proved by the testimony of two credible witnesses that the umpire, or the arbitrators, or one of the said arbitrators, was corrupted or otherwise unduly influenced, or unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said judge that the said award or umpirage did not embrace the whole of the matter in dispute, and that the same was in part only decided or adjusted.

14. That if the person or persons chosen by the parties for the adjustment of the matter in dispute shall refuse to accept the arbitration, or if the award shall not be brought in at the

time appointed by the Court, or, if brought in, it shall be set aside for undue influence or corruption, or for not embracing the whole of the said matter in dispute; or if both the parties shall not submit to arbitration, or the matter in dispute shall in any how relate to succession or inheritance, the Judge shall pass an order for the parties to proceed to the examination of witnesses, and, to compel the appearance of such witnesses, shall at the request of either party issue his summons to each of them respectively, commanding him to appear and depose upon oath, at a certain time therein to be mentioned, his or her knowledge respecting the suit depending between the parties, and intimating in such summons at whose instance the same shall have issued.

15. That upon the appearance of such witness he shall be paid by the party at whose instance he was summoned such reasonable sum of money for his expenses as the said Judge shall think fit; and in default thereof the said party shall not only lose the benefit of the testimony of the said witness, but shall be also committed to the custody of the Daroga until the same shall be paid.

16. That when it shall so happen that a witness by reason of age or sickness or the distance of his or her place of abode, or of the usage and custom of the country, cannot appear to give evidence before the Judge, such evidence shall be taken at his or her said place of abode, by virtue of a commission which the Judge shall grant for that purpose, directed to one person, male or female, as the case shall require, who shall be nominated by the complainant, and one other person of the same description nominated by the defendant; and the said commissioners shall thereupon examine the said witness, and report his or her knowledge of the matter in dispute by a certain day, to be in the said commission fixed and appointed; and such examination shall be taken on oath or declaration, according to the rank and sex of the witness, as hereinafter is directed.

17. That when a cause is ready for hearing, the Judge shall appoint a day for examining such witnesses as shall personally attend; and after the examination of such witnesses, or of so many of them as shall appear to be disinterested in the event of the suit, the depositions of such witnesses as shall have been taken before commissioners shall be read; and if the parties have anything further to offer, they shall be heard by themselves

or their authorised vakeels; but in such hearing the Judge shall strictly confine them to the subject immediately before him, and shall not suffer them to run into long or diffusive argument, or to introduce matter foreign or irrelevant to the matter in dispute.

18. That when a question of Mohammedan or Hindu law shall arise in a suit on which the said Judge shall be desirous to be assisted by the opinion of the Hindu or Mohammedan assessor, the question shall be put to such assessor in writing, with a clear statement of the case; and under such writing the assessor shall deliver his opinion, with the grounds and reasons thereof, and shall thereunto put his chop, and subscribe his name; and such opinion shall be publicly read in open Court, and shall be registered along with the other proceedings in the suit.

19. That when the Judge shall have duly considered the matter in dispute, with the evidence and arguments on the part of the complainants and defendants, together with the opinion of the assessor, if any there shall be, he shall pass judgment and award costs, as justice shall require; provided that, if both the parties to the suit shall be Mohammedans the judgment shall be according to the Mohammedan law, and if both be Hindus according to the Hindu law; and if one of the said parties be a Hindu and the other a Mohammedan, according to the law of the defendant; and as soon as may be after the said judgment shall be pronounced, the judge shall lay the whole of the proceedings before the officer commanding the forces in Mysore; and if the judgment given thereon shall be approved and confirmed by him, and the sum thereby ordered to be paid, or the thing delivered, shall not exceed in value the sum of 1000 star pagodas, the judge shall affix the seal of the Court to the said judgment, and cause the same to be duly executed: but if the judgment shall not be so approved and confirmed, execution shall be stayed until the case be stated to the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, and his orders thereupon be received.

20. That when the sum ordered to be paid, or thing to be delivered, by the said judgment shall exceed in value the said sum of 1000 star pagodas, and the party ordered to pay or deliver the same shall think himself thereby aggrieved, it shall be lawful for such party to appeal therefrom to the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, provided he shall within fourteen

days from the day of passing or pronouncing the said judgment pray leave by his humble petition for that purpose to the said officer commanding the forces in Mysore, and shall pay all fees of office for taking out of the said Court of Cutchery a fair transcript and fair translation into the English language of the proceedings, and give full and sufficient security to pay all such further costs as may be awarded against him by the said Governor in Council.

21. That when a woman shall happen to be defendant in a suit, and by reason of her high caste or family cannot without disgrace appear or be personally summoned to appear before a court of justice, she shall be summoned by the delivery of the summons to her dubash or any other of her servants; and every woman of whatever rank shall be allowed to give bail by her vakeel; and her vakeel shall in all respects be considered as a party himself in lieu and stead of his mistress; and in case judgment shall be given against her, he shall be liable to imprisonment until such judgment shall be satisfied, in the same manner as if he were actually a party to the suit: but if she shall refuse or neglect to appoint a vakeel, she shall, as to the suit then depending, forfeit her privilege, and be dealt with in like manner as other suitors.

22. That such persons of high caste or family, as by the usages and customs of the country are credited upon their declaration, shall not be compelled to take an oath; but when examined as witnesses in any suit shall, previous to his or her examination, repeat and subscribe the following declaration if he or she shall happen to be of the Hindu religion: 'I will faithfully answer such questions as shall be put to me in the cause between A. and B. according to the truth; I will declare nothing not warranted by the truth; if I declare anything not warranted by the truth, I shall be deserving of punishment from Almighty God, and if I break this declaration I acknowledge myself to be as guilty as if I had killed a Brahmin or slain a cow on the banks of the Ganges at Causee [Gangoutri ?]:' and if the witness shall happen to be of the Mohammedan religion, the declaration shall be, 'I do solemnly promise and declare in the presence of Almighty God, that I will faithfully and without partiality answer any question put to me respecting the cause between A. and B. according to the truth;' and every such witness shall, immediately after his or her examination, repeat and subscribe

a further declaration that he or she has answered according to the truth.

23. That every person who shall seek the aid of the Court, and shall make oath that he or she is not worth thirty pagodas in land, houses, goods, or money, over and above his or her just debts, shall be received as a poor person, and shall not be liable to any costs or charges, or be put to any expense whatsoever; neither shall he or she be obliged to give security to prosecute his or her suit with effect: but if he or she fail to establish his or her demand, and it shall appear to the Judge that the same was wholly frivolous or unjust, it shall be lawful to the said Judge to order such poor person to be whipped if he shall so think proper.

24. That when a defendant shall be committed to the custody of the Daroga for want of bail to abide by and perform the final order or decree of the Court, or shall be detained in such custody until he satisfy such judgment as may have passed against him, the complainant shall pay such batta for his subsistence in prison as the Judge shall think proper to direct, which batta shall be paid into the hands of the Daroga; and if the same shall, through the wilful default of the said complainant, be behind or unpaid for the space of seven days, the Daroga shall certify the same to the Judge, who shall thereupon order the defendant to be set at liberty.

25. That when a defendant shall not appear in obedience to the Judge's summons, and a warrant of arrest shall have thereupon issued, and on such warrant the Daroga shall have returned that the said defendant is not to be found, the Judge shall cause a notice to be posted up in the court-room, in the language of the said defendant, that if he do not surrender himself within one month the cause shall be heard on such evidence as may be produced by the complainant; and if within the said one month he shall not have surrendered himself, the said Judge shall proceed to examine the evidence on the part of the complainant, and in case the demand shall, on the examination of such evidence, appear to him to be just, he shall give judgment in favour of the complainant; and on such judgment being given, the complainant shall be called upon to show what goods and chattels there are within the jurisdiction of the Court belonging to the said defendant, to satisfy the said judgment; and having shown the same, the Daroga shall be directed to give

notice thereof to all the inhabitants dwelling near the place or places where the said goods and chattels shall happen to be, to the intent that all collusion between the plaintiff and defendant to the injury of a third person may as far as possible be defeated, and that all persons having a property in the said goods and chattels may come in and declare the same; and if no claim to the same shall be made within three months after the notice so given, the Judge shall notify the same to the officer commanding the forces in Mysore, and with his concurrence and assent affix the seal of his Court to a warrant directing the Daroga to sell the said goods and chattels, and from the produce thereof to satisfy the complainant's demand, first deducting such fees as the Daroga shall be allowed to take or receive, and to pay the remainder, if any there should be, to such person as may be authorised on the part of the said defendant to receive the same.

26. That the said Judge shall, in his Court of Cutchery, have power and authority to appoint guardians and keepers to the persons, estates, and effects of infants, idiots, and lunatics, and from time to time to call them to account upon oath, and to pass and enforce such order or orders as may be necessary for the due care and protection of the said infants, idiots, and lunatics, and to prevent all frauds and embezzlements of their said estates and effects; and in like manner the said Judge shall have authority and power, upon the petition of any single woman who shall not be under the protection of her father, or of any widow, to appoint stewards and bailiffs to the care of such of their estates and effects as in their said petition they shall pray to be taken into the protection of the Court, and from time to time to call such stewards and bailiffs to account upon oath, and to pass and enforce such order or orders as may be necessary to secure to the said single women and widows the regular payment of the interest or annual produce of their said estates and effects, and to prevent all frauds and embezzlements of the same; and he shall in like manner have power and authority to appoint administrators to the estates and effects of all natives dying intestate, and to the estates and effects of all testators who shall have died without appointing any person resident at Seringapatam to execute their wills, and shall from time to time call them to account upon oath, and pass and enforce such order or orders as may be necessary for the payment of debts or legacies, or for the division or distribution of the residue of such

estates and effects, or for the prevention of frauds and embezzlements, as he shall think requisite; and he shall have power and authority to allow to the said several guardians and keepers, stewards, bailiffs and administrators, a reasonable consideration or percentage for their trouble and responsibility, and, upon good grounds, to remove them from office, and to fine and imprison them for wilful neglect or misconduct, and to appoint others in their stead; and he shall likewise have authority and power to remove any executor who shall have been proved to have wilfully neglected or abused the trust reposed in him by his testator, and to appoint an administrator to execute the will of the said testator in the same manner as if no executor had been appointed, or, being appointed, had refused to act: provided that, if in the exercise of any of the powers or authorities vested in the said Judge by this article any person shall conceive him or herself to be injured or aggrieved, he or she may appeal to the said officer commanding the forces in Mysore; and if the order or orders passed by the said Judge, and complained of as grievous, shall not meet with his assent and concurrence, the case shall be reported to the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, and all further proceedings be stayed until his orders be received.

27. That the said Judge shall have power and authority to administer all necessary oaths; to adjourn his Courts of Foujdarry and Cutchery from day to day and from time to time as occasion may require; to imprison all natives guilty of contumacy or contempt of court, and to impose reasonable fines therefor; to suspend all officers and persons belonging thereto who shall misbehave or be negligent in the duties of their offices and places from the exercise and benefits thereof, and to do all other things necessary to the support and due execution of his authority, by making rules and orders of court for the better regulating and conducting the pleadings, process, and proceedings in the said courts respectively: provided that before such rules and orders of court shall be put in use or practice the same be laid before the said officer commanding the forces in Mysore, and be by him transmitted, with such observations as he may think proper to make thereon, to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, and be approved and confirmed by the Governor in Council.

28. That, for the speedy relief of the poorer inhabitants of

Seringapatam, the said Judge shall have power and authority to hear and determine in a summary way all such suits or actions as may be brought before him, wherein the debt or matter in dispute shall not exceed in value the sum of eighty rupees, and in such suits the order or decree of the said Judge shall be final and conclusive.

29. That no fee, gratuity, or reward be taken or received by any of the officers or servants of the said Courts respectively, save such as shall be allowed to be so taken and received by the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, and that a list of the fees so allowed shall be posted up in the court-room, in some conspicuous place, for general information."

Authorised by order of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council,

(Signed) JOHN HODGSON, Sec. to Government.

[144.] *To W. Hope Gordon, Esq.*

SIR, 13th July, 1799.

I have received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, the Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, in which he states, "that black pepper having been an article of trade with the late Tippoo Sultaun, is not to be considered as an article of military provision;" and I have to request that you will be so kind as to give over to the prize agents all the black pepper at present in the garrison stores.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[145.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 18th July, 1799.

Since the capture of this place, and I have been in command of it, I have had much reason to be displeased with the conduct of the Engineer employed here. I have made repeated complaints of him to the General, and having, by his orders, assembled a Committee to inspect his works, they made a report very much against him. The General, however, has taken no public notice of his conduct, and has not even adopted

the measures for checking his rascality proposed by the Committee. I have badgered and annoyed him so much that I understand he intends to resign his situation here, and as I know you to be anxious respecting this place, I wish that great care should be taken in the selection of the Engineer. The person that I should wish to have appointed Engineer of Seringapatam is Lieutenant Castles, with whom, however, I am not acquainted, but who bears an excellent character for honesty (which is an essential) as well as for ability. I cannot say so much for another gentleman, who, I understand, intends to apply for the situation.

I wait for a copy of a plan of Seringapatam, which was made by an officer of the 33rd, to write to the Military Board a full account of the place and of the improvements which I think ought to be made to it. In this letter I shall mention my opinion of ———, and I shall desire that it may be laid before Government.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Henry's leg is getting better, and he hopes to be able to leave this in three or four days. He unfortunately applied to it a wash which was intended to cure ringworms, which created an inflammation of which it was impossible to get the better for two or three days, and which made the sore much worse than it was on the day he met with the accident.

Draft of a Letter to Lieut.-Col. Doveton, Paymaster of Stipends. [146.]

Seringapatam, 18th July, 1799.

The bearer hereof is Gholam Ali, the Meer Suddoor, who, with his son Gholam Mohid u Deen, is going to reside at Vellore under your protection. The Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore have provided for them both by pensions.

Of all the servants of the late Sultaun, I believe, there was no one more attached to him than the Meer Suddoor; and there is no one who has rendered more effectual service to the Company and to the countries which have come under their government and protection than he has. After the fall of Seringapatam, and that the family of the Sultaun and the great Sirdars

had surrendered themselves, he had the good sense to see that the best thing that could happen for all parties was that the country should be settled as speedily as possible; and by exerting his influence over the killadars of the different forts, without making any private bargain for himself, he had the honesty to contribute, as much as lay in his power, towards a settlement which he conceived to be for the general good. I anxiously recommend him to you; and I am convinced the longer you know him, the better you will like him.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[147.] MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION WHICH PASSED THIS DAY BETWEEN CAPTAIN ——— AND ME.

19th July, 1799.

I had expressed my dissatisfaction at the manner in which the works were carrying on, that nothing had been done to the breach, &c. &c., and said that I certainly must represent these matters to Government through the Military Board. Captain ——— interrupted me, and said that he could not furnish me with the plan of the place for which I had asked; that when in Ceylon he had received orders respecting furnishing the commanding officer either of Trincomalee or Colombo (I am not certain which he said) with plans of the place: that all plans were to go to the chief engineer, and from him to the Military Board, and that he would not furnish me with one.

I then told him that I had served in other countries, and I had never heard that it was the rule to prevent the commanding officers of strong places from having plans of them, excepting in Holland, under the old Government. That in that country the Stadtholder, as captain-general, appointed the commanding officers of the strong places belonging to the States; but these, ever jealous of the authority of the Stadtholder, would not suffer the governors appointed by him to have plans of their places. However, that as he refused to give me a plan of the place, it was necessary that I should have that refusal in writing, and therefore that I should give him a letter, in which I should demand first a plan to be laid before the Military Board; secondly, one for my own use; and I desired to have his answer

in writing to that letter. I then wrote a letter in which I recited my former orders upon the subject and desired to have the plans immediately, which I gave into his hands.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain ———. [148.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 19th July, 1799.

I some time ago desired to have a copy of the plan of Seringapatam made by Lieutenant Warren, in order that I might transmit it to the Military Board. I beg to have it immediately. I likewise requested to have a plan of the place for my own use. I beg to have that immediately.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain ———. [149.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 20th July, 1799.

In consequence of the conversation which passed between you and me yesterday, in the course of which you told me that you would not furnish me with a plan of Seringapatam either for the Military Board or for my own use, I wrote you a letter, which I delivered into your hands, in which I desired to have both. I request to have an answer to that letter in writing immediately; and I inform you, that I shall consider your omission to answer that letter in two hours not only as a refusal to send me the plans which I have ordered you to furnish, but as a mark of disrespect to me as your commanding officer.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of the Military Board. [150.]

SIR, 21st July, 1799.

I have the honour to enclose, for the information of the Military Board, a copy of the proceedings of a committee which I appointed to survey the captured grain and provisions in the

public stores of Seringapatam. You will observe that the committee have reported their opinion that it is impossible to ascertain the quantity of these different articles by any method except by measurement; and as the quantity is very large, all the granaries being full, and as the weather is at present very uncertain, it does not appear practicable to adopt the only method pointed out by the committee. [*See page* 257.]

Some of the grain in store, although of a good quality and well preserved, is eleven years old: I recommend to the Board to give orders to dispose of part of that immediately. I ordered the garrison storekeeper to sell a small quantity which was on the top of one of the granaries, and was in some degree damaged, and it produced a rupee for fifty seers. I should recommend that all the grain above six years old should be sold, only that I fear that the crop of paddy in this country in the ensuing year will be small, on account of the unsettled state of the country for the last four or five months. In case of scarcity, it will be a great advantage, both to the army and the country, to have in the store of Seringapatam a large quantity of grain.

If the Board adopt what I have above recommended, and send orders to dispose of the grain in one or two of the granaries, it may be possible, but very expensive, to ascertain the remaining quantity accurately by measurement: it will then be proper to deliver it over regularly to the garrison storekeeper. At present he has charge of the granaries only; and as I have been unable to give him an account of the grain which he might enter regularly upon his books, I have given him directions never to open the granaries excepting by order of the commanding officer in a letter, of which I enclose you a copy.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[151.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, 22nd July, 1799.

I had the honour to receive your two letters of the 19th last night. I beg that you will do me the favour to inform the Commander-in-Chief, that the guns and stores ordered to Sera* have been ready for some days, and that as soon as the

* *Sera*, a town protected by a stone fort, stands on a tributary of the river

draught-bullocks arrive from Belloor,* the detachment shall march. I will inform you hereafter on what day they march.

The 2nd battalion 3rd Regiment shall leave this as strong as possible, and all the recovered men of the corps in camp, whether Europeans or Natives, shall go with the detachment. I expect that the guns and howitzers intended for Chinroypatam† will be across the river this evening, and the shot and other stores shall be sent across in the course of to-morrow. As soon as the draught-bullocks, which you state are to come from the neighbourhood of Sera, arrive, this equipment will be ready to move towards Chinroypatam. I will apprise Colonel Pater of the day when it will leave this.

I beg that you will inform the Commander-in-Chief that the carriages which will go with this equipment are not in what an Ordnance officer would call a serviceable state.

No means which this place can afford shall be spared to put them in the best state. Spare carriages shall be sent, and I have little doubt but that they will arrive at the place for which they are destined. It is, however, right that the Commander-in-Chief should have the opinion of the Ordnance officers here respecting them.

You have not mentioned intrenching tools for either of these equipments. It is probable that there are some with the army, but as there can be none with Colonel Pater's detachment, I will prepare some to be sent, in case the Commander-in-Chief wish it.

I shall send no rice with Colonel Shawe's detachment, unless the commissary bullocks should arrive from Bangalore before it marches. The salt for the Europeans, however, shall go with it.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 24th July, 1799.

I have read a paragraph in the Bombay newspaper stating that application had been made to me for leave to search the

Vedavati, 92 miles N. of Seringapatam, 2223 feet above the sea. Its possession was repeatedly contested by the Mahrattas with Hyder and Tippoo.—ED.

* *Belloor*, a town in Mysore, 38 miles N. of Seringapatam.—ED.

† *Chinroypatam*, a town and fort 38 miles N.W. of Seringapatam.—ED.

zenana in the palace for treasure, and that leave having been granted, the zenana had been searched. As I know that these newspapers go to England, and that people will believe that I allowed that search to be made, which, in my opinion and in the opinion of every well-thinking man, was a very improper one, I wish that some means could be devised of making those of whose good opinion one is most anxious, acquainted with the true state of the case. The truth is, that an order came to me from the Commander-in-Chief through the Adjutant-General, to allow the zenana to be searched by the prize agents. The application for it never went through me, as it ought according to the regular forms; and not only I never applied for it, but I postponed obeying it for several days, in hopes that I should either prevail upon the General to recal it, or that I might convince the prize agents that there was no treasure in the zenana. I should state all this in a public letter, with a request to you that it might be sent home, only that I fear that I should thereby offend the General. As I have not been publicly charged with having given the orders for the search to be made, a public justification of myself might be construed into a charge against the General, which I am by no means inclined to make. I wish, therefore, that if you write to Mr. Dundas, and take any notice of the search of the zenana for treasure, you will tell him at the same time that I had nothing to do with it excepting that I obeyed the General's order, and that I took every precaution to render the search as decent and as little injurious to the feelings of the ladies as possible.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[153.] *To W. H. Gordon, Esq.*

SIR, 24th July, 1799.

There is a large quantity of grain belonging to the grain department at present under the Caryghaut Hill, in charge of a conicopoly and a guard. Some of it is in gunny bags, some in bulk. I beg that you will, as soon as possible, take charge of the whole from that conicopoly; and it is to be disposed of as follows:

The remaining bullocks, which arrived here some days ago

from Tanjore and the Ramnad country, are to carry that which is in the gunny bags. You will take the gunnies brought here by the bullocks which arrived yesterday from Bangalore, and you will put in them the grain which is in bulk. These are to be carried by the bullocks which brought the gunny bags.

This grain is intended to be sent to the army with the detachment under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe. As soon as it is ready to move I request you will let me know it, that I may order a party to escort it to join that detachment on its march to Sera.

You will be so kind as to inform the commissary of grain with the army, of your having sent this grain by my order.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Corner. [154.]

DEAR SIR, 27th July, 1799.

A detachment under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe marched from hence on the day before yesterday, and I have sent with it, in charge of a conicopoly belonging to your department, what follows, for the use of the Europeans composing that detachment:

	Garce.	Mercal.	Measures.
Salt	—	76	7
Rice	1	207	3

17 casks of arrack, containing 883 gallons.

The conicopoly has besides received from Purneah's Naib 520 sheep, for which you are to pay at the rate of †

This provision is calculated for fifteen days for Colonel Shawe's detachment; but as a longer time may elapse before he reaches the army, and as he will not find arrack upon the road, I have spared him a sufficiency to last him for twenty-eight days, at full allowance. Besides this, I have sent in charge of the same conicopoly † garce of salt for the use, for sixty days, of the Europeans in camp, the number of whom, including

* *Naib* is a Hindustani word derived from an Arabic root. It generally means deputy; but according to the *Glossary* of Professor Wilson, it also signifies a representative, a viceroy, a lieutenant, and a sub-collector.—ED.

† Blank in manuscript.—ED.

the 12th, I have calculated at 2500. I hope it will arrive safely. Mr. Cochrane has sent no conicopoly here, so that I have been acting in that capacity since the beginning of this month.

I have written to him, and he has not even answered my letter; so that I don't know what to pay him for the arrack, for which I signed a receipt. I think the best method of settling the account would be for me to pay you for the casks which I received, deducting the price of 883 gallons which I have returned: that will make the settlement of the account very easy.

I hope, in the course of a day or two, to send after Colonel Shawe's detachment all the rice belonging to you which was left under the Caryghaut Hill. About that which is in the bags there is no doubt; and if all my plans succeed, there is none respecting that which is in bulk. I have made the following arrangement respecting the sheep:

Purneah's Naib, Bajee Rao, has already delivered to the conicopoly 500, for which I will either pay him and receive the money from you, or I will give him an order upon you for the amount.

Bajee Rao has, besides, sent orders to the aumildars on the road towards Sera and Chittledroog to furnish him with any more that he may want, for which Colonel Shawe will either pay or pass his receipt. If he pay for them, you and he can settle the account; if he pass his receipt for them, I will pay for them or give drafts upon you for the amount to Bajee Rao.

The quantity I received was 3344 gallons.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[155.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, 27th July, 1799.

I have the honour to inform you that the detachment, consisting of H. M. 12th Regiment, the 2nd of the 3rd, some Artillery, fifty pioneers and gun Lascars, marched from hence under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe on the 25th instant.

I enclose returns of the ordnance and stores Colonel Shawe took with him, together with a statement of the draught and carriage cattle employed in transporting them; the camp-

equipage and stores belonging to the corps; fifteen days' provision, twenty-eight days' arrack for the Europeans of Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe's detachment; sixty days' salt for 2500 Europeans; a tumbril, containing a lac of star pagodas,* in Sultany pagodas; and another, containing the prize-money of the 10th Bengal Regiment. The field pieces and their tumbrils are drawn by bullocks which came here with them.

Besides what is above mentioned, Colonel Shawe has got with him the colours taken by the army during the war, which I have ordered him to deliver to the commanding officer at Sera; and all the recovered men, Europeans and Natives, belonging to the corps in camp. I should likewise have sent with this detachment the prize-money for the 2nd of the 2nd, and 1st of the 11th, only that the prize agent would not give it up.

By the 29th I hope to send away all the grain belonging to the grain department at present under the Caryghaut Hill. It will overtake Colonel Shawe upon the road.

I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to request the Commander-in-Chief to order back Mr. Ellis and the store-Lascars.

A surgeon, Mr. Ewart, is gone with this detachment.

Eight thousand bullocks have arrived from Bangalore, and I will send off the equipment for Colonel Pater's detachment as soon as the draught cattle, which you mention in your letter of the 19th instant, arrive.

I expect the Commander-in-Chief's orders respecting the disposal of the remainder of the draught and carriage bullocks after Colonel Pater's equipment will have been despatched. The bullock maistries with Colonel Shawe's detachment, as well as those lately arrived from Bangalore, complain sadly of want of pay. The former have produced a paper from Mr. Burlton, in which he says that he paid them one month's pay on the 14th of June; but we are ignorant, and so are the bullock maistries, whether it was for May, June, or July: the others can produce nothing. I have declined to authorize the issue of any money to any of them; but, as they may really feel the distress of which they complain, I recommend that Colonel Shawe may be authorized to make such advances as the Commander-in-Chief may think proper to those he has with him, and that I may

* The Star pagodas, coined at Madras (each 8 shillings in value), formed the money of account; the Sultany pagodas were those struck by Tippoo.—ED.

receive orders to authorize an advance to those who are here at present.

It is impossible to describe the inconvenience which is felt daily on account of the non-observance of the regulations, which require that detachments, &c. should carry with them certificates, stating the day to which they have been paid.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[156.] *To Captain ———.*

SIR, 27th July, 1799.

You will probably think it necessary to submit an estimate to the Military Board before you begin the repairs of the granaries, as you have my orders not to employ the establishment upon them. With regard to the materials, I beg to inform you that I gave no orders to have them carried away; but I think it of little consequence whether they are carried away or not, or what becomes of them, provided they are not used in any public building, as they are rotten.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[157.] *To the Secretary of the Military Board.*

SIR, 27th July, 1799.

I have the honour to enclose two estimates which have been given to me by Captain ——— to be laid before the Military Board.

To neither of them do I think it proper to subscribe my name.

I do not think it proper to subscribe my name to that for the aqueduct over the bridge, a work which was ordered to be completed by the Commander-in-Chief on the day after the place was taken, because I conceive the charges to be enormous, and because I do not conceive that credit has been given to the full amount for the work done by the pioneers and the establishment placed under the orders of Captain ———.

I do not subscribe my name to the other estimate, 1st,

because I do not approve of placing the bridge (which, however, is very necessary in some place) in the spot proposed by Captain ———; 2ndly, because the charge for it is enormous.

After having repeatedly warned Captain ———, both in conversation and by letter, of the necessity of forwarding the comparatively trifling, although necessary works which he had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to perform, I thought it my duty at last to make known to the Commander-in-Chief, in a private letter, the state in which they were. The consequence was, that he ordered me to assemble a committee to inspect them, a copy of whose Report * I have the honour to transmit to you. The Commander-in-Chief then referred me to the Military Board for a decision respecting all matters relating to this garrison; and I should before now have troubled the Board upon this subject, and at large respecting the garrison, only that I told them that I was waiting for a plan, which would have enabled the Board to form an opinion respecting my ideas.

The papers No.† will make known to them the reason why I refer this subject to them at present; and I request that Captain ——— may have an order to give me a plan forthwith, in order that I may lay before the Board the fullest information respecting this place as soon as possible. It is with regret that I state circumstances unfavourable to any officer, and an opinion founded upon them. The Board will scarcely believe that nothing has yet been done to the breach; that the aqueduct, by means of which the fort is supplied with water, and of which an estimate is now sent, remains unfinished; that not one third of the proposed gunshed is finished; although all these most necessary works were ordered and undertaken in the first week after the storm. Upon the state of these works, and upon the enclosed estimates, I found the opinion, which I beg may be made known to Government, that Captain ——— is not a fit person to be employed as the engineer at Seringapatam.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* See Draft Report, 25th June, 1799, No. 138.—ED.

† Blank in draft. Probably copies of letters of 19th and 20th July, Nos. 147, 148.—ED.

[158.] *Draft of a Letter to the Adjutant-General.*

30th July, 1799.

I have the honour to inform you that 1500 bullocks, loaded with the grain which had been for some time under the Caryghaut Hill, went from hence yesterday morning, escorted by an European officer and 20 men, to join the detachment under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe. The escort is to return as soon as the grain will have been delivered over to Colonel Shawe. I have received your letter of the 26th instant.

From your letter of the 19th instant, from Sera, I had reason to expect that draught bullocks for the heavy ordnance going to Chinroypatam would be sent from that neighbourhood, and accordingly I made no arrangements for providing any. The number remaining, after sending off the equipment to Sera, is 131, as you will perceive by a reference to a copy of a paper from Mr. Gordon, enclosed in mine of the 27th instant.

In addition to these, Mr. Gordon has in readiness at present 100, and I hope to be able to procure 170 besides, which will be wanting to send off the equipment. This is all ready on the other side of the river. I have sent Mr. Ellis and 24 store-Lascars with the equipment for Sera, and shall send Mr. Franks and Mr. Alston with that for Chinroypatam. I hear that Colonel Shawe has passed Nagmunglum.*

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[159.] *To the Governor-General.*

MY LORD, Seringapatam, 31st July, 1799.

I have the honour to enclose lists of the pensioners, made out according to their different classes, and the places at which they have chosen in future to receive the amount of their pensions. I take the liberty of recommending that copies of these lists may be sent to the commanding officer of each station at which any pensioner may have chosen to reside, with orders to the paymaster at each station to provide for the payment of the pensions therein stated by the usual means.

I have likewise the honour to enclose a list of persons who appear to have claims to be considered, and who are not in-

* *Nagmunglum*, or *Nagamangulum*, a large square mud fort, 26 miles N.E. of Seringapatam.—ED.

cluded among those provided for by the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore. I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will send your orders respecting these persons.

By a reference to "the statement of pensions and gratuities granted to different persons, &c. &c.," your Lordship will perceive that 1200 Canterai pagodas annually is the sum allotted for the mosques in the Fort. The expenses attending those mosques appear to be 2294 pag. 5 fans. annually, by a paper marked No. 10. I have not yet given orders that any sum should be issued to them, and I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will send me your orders upon this subject.

In consequence of the powers I received from the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, I have granted pensions, as contained in the paper marked No. 11, to the families of Meer Sadook, Reza Saheb, Booreham u Deen,* and the Savanore Nabob, and have divided them as therein stated. They are included in the list of pensions payable at Seringapatam, and I hope to receive your Lordship's approbation of them. I have likewise divided the pension granted by the Commissioners to the family of Seyd Saheb, as stated in the same paper.

The paper marked No. 12 contains a statement of the payments from the sum allotted for the families of the late Tippoo Sultaun and Hyder Ali. The additions which I should propose to make to them are stated at the bottom of that paper, for which I request authority from your Lordship. The expense of the tombs for the months of May and June has been only 306 rupees; hereafter it will be as stated in the enclosed paper No. 12.

I enclose a letter from Captain Macleod relating to some persons who had been omitted in the list of nanperverish which he had given to the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore. Their names are at the bottom of the list of nanperverish, and I hope your Lordship will approve of my having extended to them the bounty of Government till I could receive your orders upon the subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* Budder u Zeman?—ED.

[160.] *To the Resident at Hyderabad.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 31st July, 1799.

I have the honour to enclose you a list of the names of pensioners formerly in the service of the late Tippoo Sultaun, to whom pensions have been granted by the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, by order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, and who, having chosen to receive their pensions at Hyderabad, have received from me certificates accordingly.

I take the liberty of recommending them to your protection, and of requesting you will take the necessary measures for providing for the regular payment of their pensions.

List of Pensions granted on Hyderabad.

Names of the Pensioners.	Annual pensions for life, in star pagodas.
Noor ul Apsar Khan	700
Meer Hussein	140
Seyd Ashant Ali Khan	83⅓

The pensions are to be paid quarterly: the pensioners have received one quarter each, or to the 31st July.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[161.] *To the Governor-General.*

MY LORD, 1st August, 1799.

I enclose a list of persons on whom the bounty of Government has been conferred, standing in the third class in the statement of gratuities, &c. transmitted to your Lordship by the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore. I have reason to believe that many of the remainder of the persons whose names stand in the same class have left Seringapatam; and the others still in Seringapatam will not come for their gratuities. I submit it to your Lordship whether the period is not now arrived at which it will be proper to withhold the bounty of Government?

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. [162.]

MY DEAR HENRY, Seringapatam, 2nd August, 1799.

"I received your letter from Bangalore, and I am very sorry that the bearers were so bad. You had, however, the only sets that could be procured here.

I enclose you a letter which I received from M'Kenzie immediately after his departure from hence, and I shall be obliged to you if you will show it to Mornington. I refer you to Webbe for all the particulars relating to his claim to be appointed Surveyor-General. It appears to me very necessary that there should be such an officer upon the local establishment. Hitherto, whatever may have been the merits of the Surveyors employed, or the excellence of their works, the Government have derived no benefit from them for want of the office of the Surveyor-General, where they might be examined and arranged; and the fact is, that excepting of the jaghire and the survey lately made by Mr. Mather of the Barahmahal, the Company have no survey of any part of the coast, notwithstanding that officers have been employed and paid at different times to survey every part of the Carnatic and of the Circars. I shall say nothing of M'Kenzie's merits as a surveyor; his works are a strong proof of them. He was under my command during the campaign, and I never saw a more zealous, a more diligent, or a more useful officer. During the siege he conducted the operations on the north side of the Cauvery; and although the effect of the batteries he constructed has been acknowledged and a subject of praise in the General's orders, and notwithstanding that by his exertions during the siege he has entirely lost his health, his name has never been mentioned.

It is reported here that General Bridges and General Baird are about to quit the army, and that General Popham is very ill. I have written to the General to say that I am ready to take the field at a moment's warning, if he wants me; and as I know that he wishes to go to the Carnatic, I think it probable that he will call for me and leave me in the command of the army. In that case I have a fair chance of being left in the command in the Mysore country, and, having gone the first into the field, of coming last out of it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[163.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, 6th August, 1799.

I received your letter of the 30th July on the 2nd; and on the next morning I sent off 20 bullocks loaded with musket ammunition, and 6 loaded with carbine ammunition, to Chinroypatam; and I, at the same time, wrote to the officer commanding at that post, to desire he would forward it to Hooley Honore* or to Colonel Stevenson, wherever he might be. Colonel Pater arrived here this morning, and has informed me that Colonel Stevenson has withdrawn the post from Chinroypatam: this may occasion the miscarriage of the musket and carbine ammunition, as, according to the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, I gave orders that it might be given over to the commanding officer at that post. However, I have sent a messenger to order it on to Hooley Honore; and I have likewise written to Mr. Franks to desire that he will look out for it, and send it on with all expedition. I have likewise apprised Mr. Franks of the probability that the post at Chinroypatam is withdrawn; and I have ordered him to proceed to Hooley Honore, unless he should receive orders to act otherwise from head-quarters, or from Colonel Stevenson.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you a statement of what Mr. Franks has got with him, and of the number of bullocks employed in transporting it. In obedience to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief I have sent with him an European serjeant and fifty pioneers.

The arrack for camp did not come here; I heard of it at Nagmunglum on the 26th ultimo, and I sent orders immediately to the Native officer in charge of it to proceed to camp at Chittledroog as soon as possible. I apprised Colonel Shawe of its being on the road, and I desired him to look out for it, and to take it on with him if he should fall in with it. I have heard from him twice since he passed Belloor; he does not mention the arrack, and I therefore imagine that it must have been in advance of his detachment.

By the enclosed statement you will observe that I have been obliged to use, as draught cattle, the Honourable Company's

* *Hooley Honore*, or *Onore*, a town and large stone fort situated on the right bank of the river Budra, a few miles above its junction with the Tunga, the union of the streams forming the Tunga-budra or Toombuddra. The fort is 127 miles N.W. of Seringapatam.—Ed.

carriage bullocks, and some of the bullocks which were grazing at Caunabaddy, and some of the carriage bullocks lately arrived from Bangalore. As some of them are weakly, I have desired Mr. Gordon to send with them some chini,* of which they are to have an allowance of two seers each per day; and I have likewise sent some bullocks supernumerary to the regular establishment, lest they should fail on the road.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Earl of Mornington. [164.]

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 17th August, 1799.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Cummer u Deen. It is an answer to one which I wrote to him, in which, having recited the bounty of Government towards him, I desired that he would let me know at what place he intended to receive his pension. I think the answer so improper, and shows so little gratitude for the favour shown to him, that if it depended upon me, he should have no pension from the Company. I have informed him that I should send the letter to you, and that you would act as you might think proper both with regard to himself and to the Punganoor Polygar. I am going to the army on the 19th, and I shall leave orders here that as soon as a good opportunity offers, some boxes, containing Tippoo's musical tiger,† some curious arms, a beautiful war turban and dress which he wore in the Adoni campaign, and other curiosities, &c. &c., shall be sent to you. Sydenham has got the seals. I enclose a letter for Henry, which contains the bills from the prize agents for these things; and if he should be gone, I shall be obliged to you if you will give it to the person who manages your affairs. I likewise enclose a public letter about Shuckur Oolla's mother-in-law.

18th August.

I go to the army this day, and Sydenham sets out for Madras to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* *Chini*, a kind of coarse sugar.—ED.

† Now at the Museum of the East India Company in London.—ED.

[165.] *To the Earl of Mornington.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON, Seringapatam, 19th August, 1799.

I wrote you a letter this morning, but there is one circumstance I forgot to mention to you. The prize agents have got a large quantity of clothes belonging to, and worn by, the late Sultaun, which, unless prevented, they will sell at public auction, and which will be bought up as relics by the discontented Moormen of this place. This will not only be disgraceful, but may be very unpleasant; and I therefore recommend that the whole may be bought by the Government, and either given to the Princes, or anything done with them that you may think fit.

You may conceive what sharks they are. This day I have been obliged to send an order to prevent them from selling the doors in the palace.

Believe me, &c.;

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Let me know what shall be done with the clothes. I have stopped the sale of them for the present.

[166.] *To Lieutenant-General Harris.*

DEAR SIR, 26th Aug., 1799.

I have received Colonel Agnew's private and public letters, and I am much obliged to you for the additional mark of your favour and confidence in allowing me to appoint my own staff. Colonel Agnew will communicate to you what I have written to him upon this subject.*

* *To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, 24th Aug., 1799.

It is now late at night, and I despair of your arrival before we start. I have, therefore, just finished the official letter you will with this receive from the General, containing general instructions.

I hope you will not long be detained in the field. Dhoondiah's force is scattered; the slaughter of his people, and execution of his killadars, have had a fine effect, and I do not think he will find it easy to collect volunteers for his future expeditions.

The day after to-morrow I hope Bednore will be garrisoned, and Cowley-droog. Gooty,* you know, is taken; and I trust Hartley, when he does get under

* *Gooty* is situated in a hilly country within 12 miles of the place where the Pennar river bends eastward towards the sea. The Droog rises abruptly from

Before I left Seringapatam, Colonel Scott desired me to request your permission for him to go to England, in a letter which I wrote to you. I have this day informed him that you

way in Canara,[a] will be as sure as he is slow. I hope he will hang, as he is ordered to do, the killadars of Jemalabad, &c. Bowser has pardoned the scoundrel at Gooty, and says the Nizamites admire his clemency. If he had hanged him, I should have admired his judgment; but he is no longer under the orders of our Government.

The General leaves the detail of cavalry, his guard, at your disposal. If you detain them, order one of your staff to sign their abstracts and feed them by a monthly bill (as heretofore) on the Paymaster.

I have all my preparations for the journey still to make, and it is near midnight, so I will only add my best wishes, and beg, if I can be in any way useful to you at Madras, that you will let me know how.

I have, &c.,

P. A. Agnew.

Lieut.-Colonel Agnew, Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

My dear Colonel, Camp, Hurryhur,[b] 19th August, 1799.

The General has this day received provisional orders which allow of his returning to the Carnatic when the public service in Mysore will allow his

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its base to a height superior to all the eminences around. The upper sides are nearly perpendicular to the crest, which is enclosed by walls all round its edge. The Droog is so well scarped by nature as to preclude the possibility of an open escalade or surprise. The height of the flagstaff cavalier on the pinnacle of Gooty is 700 yards, and the higher walls are 600 yards above the level of the plain on the south. The road, which forms the eastern and only ascent to the Droog, seems to have been partly worked out, and partly built up against the rock, beginning at the bottom in a ramp paved and faced with large stones, and carried up in a zigzag direction till it enters the inferior projecting table rock and fort of Margooty, when it runs up in a still closer adherence to the overhanging precipice of the Droog, traversing from one work or battery to another till it lands at the upper gateway. In this progress it is covered and strengthened by walls with parapets, batteries, and traverses of masonry, which render it a grand and useful work by which loaded cattle may pass up from the bottom to the summit: the width is from 24 to 30 feet, paved throughout, and but in a few instances interrupted by steps. (Abstracted from 'Remarks on the Forts on the Northern Frontier of Mysore in 1800-1,' by Colin Mackenzie, Captain of Engineers. Wellington MSS., Book I. of 1803.)—Ed.

[a] *Canara*, a province on the western coast of India, extends between 12° 11' and 15° 30' N. lat.; area, 7720 square miles. Its name was not given by the natives, but is supposed to be a corruption of *Carnata* (the country above the Ghauts), an ancient kingdom, of which the present British province was a dependency.—Ed.

[b] *Hurryhur*, distant 127 miles N.W. ¼ W. from Bangalore, 45 miles W.N.W. from Chittledroog, and 94 miles N.W. ¼ W. from Hullihall, is situated close to the E. bank of the Toombuddra river, about 700 yards below its junction with the small river Hurdravattee, and on the great commercial and military thoroughfare between the central towns of Mysore and Poonah. The

have left the army, and I have given him leave to go to Madras. I have also desired him to make his application to you in the regular form through Captain Young.

I wish you joy of the successful termination of every thing here.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[167.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew.*

SIR, 27th Aug., 1799.

I beg that you will inform the Commander-in-Chief that Purneah having represented that Kistnapah Naig, the Polygar of

absence, and informing him that he is to leave you in command of the troops in Mysore, for which purpose the Generals are to return to the Carnatic.

Circumstances are not yet ripe for General Harris's quitting this country, at least unless you are here to take command. Ten or twelve days may make much difference in the state of affairs; and I am directed by the General to tell you that by to-morrow's post you may expect orders to join the army near Hooley Honore, and that the sooner you send off your baggage and other indispensables by the route the guns for Stevenson marched, the better. We shall anxiously look for your arrival.

As the General Staff will accompany the Commander-in-Chief to the Carnatic, Lord Mornington authorises his naming staff for you. The General wishes to have your sentiments on the person to be named.

Perhaps Grant, your town-major, is the best qualified man for the chief staff situation above the Ghauts; but at present, at all events, it will be necessary you leave him at Seringapatam to assist the officer you leave in command there, who will be, I imagine, Colonel Sherbrooke.

We move the day after to-morrow southward, and shall proceed slowly to Hooley Honore, which appears a good situation for the body of the army, while the detachments are advancing to Nuggur.

Believe me, &c.,

P. A. AGNEW.

To Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding at Seringapatam.

SIR, Camp at Hurryhur, 12th Aug., 1799.

The Commander-in-Chief has directed me to signify to you his orders that you proceed without delay to join the army near Hooley Honore, leaving the

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fort has an esplanade of 80 yards open to the pettah, and forms an irregular square, three sides of 200 yards, and one of 120, with angles on the W. and E. faces that afford a small flanking defence on their sides. There are about 13 turrets or small high narrow bastions disposed along a lofty and narrow wall. The pettah forms an irregular square figure, 750 by 600 yards in extent, enclosed by a mud wall and sufficiently wide but dry ditch, which defences have failed to protect the place from the depredations to which the inhabitants are exposed from contending parties on the frontiers. (Mackenzie's 'Remarks;' Wellington MSS., Book I., 1803.)—ED.

Bullum,* had assembled a force in the districts about Oostara, had taken possession of Munserabad,† and had wounded and imprisoned the Rajah's aumildar, I have ordered the 1st battalion of Bengal Volunteers, under Captain Malcolm, to march to-morrow morning towards Oostara, in order to re-establish the Rajah's authority in that country.

Purneah has sent in advance about 250 horse and 500 foot, who are to prepare boats for the passage of the river Hyatanee for Captain Malcolm's corps.

I have sent orders to the commanding officer at Chittledroog to send to camp the 3rd battalion of Bengal Volunteers as soon as the 2nd battalion 3rd Regiment arrives there.

As I apprehend that Kistnapah Naig may take refuge in the territories of the Rajah of Koorg, I have written to Mr. Mahony to request that he will represent to his Excellency that the Honourable Company being bound by treaty to protect and defend the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, it is not proper that the disturbers of and rebels against the government of this Rajah should find an asylum with one so closely allied with the British Government as is the Rajah of Koorg, and that in case the Polygar should enter his country, he ought to adopt all means in his power to seize and deliver him up.

I am, Sir, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew. [168.]

27th Aug., 1799.

A vakeel from Goklah‡ arrived last night on the opposite side of the river, and visited me this morning. He brought with him

command of Seringapatam to the officer next in seniority to you, under such instructions as you may think proper for his guidance.

The Commander-in-Chief recommends your proceeding to the army by the route of Chinroypatam, and following the marches of Colonel Stevenson's detachment to Hooley Honore.

I have, &c.,

BARRY CLOSE,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

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* *Bullum*, a mountainous tract above the Western Ghauts, in about 13° N. lat. Hamilton says in his Gazetteer, page 294, that Bullum, "although nominally under subjection to the former sovereigns of Mysore, never was effectually conquered until military roads were made through it by the Duke of Wellington in 1801-2."—ED.

† *Munserabad*, a village in Bullum, 70 miles N.W. of Seringapatam.—ED.

‡ A well known Mahratta leader in the service of the Peshwah.—ED.

a khelaut and a letter for the Commander-in-Chief, which I received, and which Major Macaulay will send to Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

He said that Goklah had got possession of Dhoondiah's family; that Dhoondiah had fled towards the country of the Nabob of Savanore, pursued by a party of Mahratta horse; and that several elephants, camels, and horses had been taken from him by the Mahrattas. I told the vakeel that I should send the Commander-in-Chief's answer to Goklah as soon as it should arrive from Madras.

The vakeel will return to his employer this evening with a letter which I have written to Goklah.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[169.] *To Major-General Hartley.*

Camp near Devarhonelly, on the banks of the Toombuddra,*
SIR, 27th Aug., 1799.

Having been appointed to command the army above the Ghauts, and Lieutenant-General Harris, on going to the Presidency, having given me orders to communicate to you the state of affairs in this part of the country, I now proceed to obey them.†

* Formed by the junction of the Tunga and Bhudra at a height of 952 feet above the sea, in lat. 14°, long. 75° 43', from whence it has a course of 325 miles to its fall into the Kistna river. In the dry season the rocky bed of the Toombuddra contains little water, but during the rains its stream is broad, deep, rapid, and muddy.—ED.

† *To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.*

SIR, Camp, Devarhonelly, 24th Aug., 1799.

As there appears to be little hope of your arrival in camp before the departure of the Commander-in-Chief, who leaves this for the Presidency early to-morrow morning, I am directed by him to convey to you the following information and instructions.

The orders issued this day will inform you that the whole of the troops serving above the Ghauts are placed under your orders, and that a temporary staff has been fixed to enable you to conduct the details of the force placed under your command. So soon as you have selected the officers you wish to appoint to these situations respectively, the Commander-in-Chief authorises you to publish their appointment to the army serving in Mysore, and you will report to him when you have done so.

Captain Pierce, who remains for the present in charge of the Adjutant-General's department in camp, will lay before you a statement of the departments of the army, and a return of the troops and their distribution. The 25th

The forces of the rebel Dhoondiah having been dispersed by the detachments under Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Dalrymple, excepting about 300 with which he was driven into the

Dragoons, 2nd battalion of Artillery, and His Majesty's 12th Regiment, are ordered to the Carnatic.

On inspection of the returns of the bullock department, you will find that nearly the whole of the hired draught bullocks and a great proportion of the carriage may soon be discharged. The uncertainty of the movements which it might eventually be necessary to make has hitherto induced the Commander-in-Chief to keep this establishment on a more extensive scale than will now be required.

The heavy guns destined some time since for Gooty are ordered to Chittledroog, to be lodged there with the stores attached. Those intended for the Bednore detachment may, it is imagined, also be ordered to the same place, as they will not be required in the Bednore country, and Chittledroog is the best depôt for military stores, &c., on the frontier of Mysore.

The recent success of Colonel Stevenson's detachment in the pursuit of Dhoondiah's banditti leaves but little doubt of the immediate restoration of order in the Bednore province: that freebooter has been driven to take refuge in the Mahratta districts, and his followers are dispersed. The pointed injunctions of the Right Honourable the Governor-General to avoid hostility with the Mahrattas, even should they have garrisoned parts of Mysore, prevented Colonel Stevenson from entirely destroying Dhoondiah's remaining force. It was, however, dispersed, and he has since been plundered by Goklah, a Mahratta chief on the borders of the Bednore country. Considering all serious opposition to our government in that district at an end, the Commander-in-Chief is desirous that so soon as garrisons have been placed agreeably to the orders Colonel Stevenson has received (copy of which you will obtain from Captain Pierce) in Bednore and the most important of its dependent forts, the detachment of Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple may be ordered to the territories of the Nizam: this he trusts may be done, without risk, in fifteen days more; but to guard against accidents, and insure your possessing the means of acting with effect if necessary, Major-General Hartley has been directed to aid your force in Bednore with two Native battalions from Canara, should you apply for such assistance from him: he is also desired to communicate to you his plan of operations below the Ghauts, as you will inform him of the state of affairs above; so as to cooperate, if necessary for the public service, within the limits of your respective commands.

Major Macaulay, acting, in the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Close, as Resident in Mysore, will be the medium of communication between you and Purneah, the Rajah's dewan; to whom you will no doubt afford every support and assistance in the settlement of the country.

In all cases of resistance or rebellion against the established government, the Commander-in-Chief has caused the most severe examples to be made of those who were found in arms. The effect has been what was expected; and he recommends, should any such case hereafter occur, that you adopt a similar line of conduct.

To prevent the ill consequences which sometimes arise from the question of property in cases of capture being ill defined or misconceived, I addressed to Colonel Stevenson, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, a letter of which a copy is enclosed for your information and guidance in any case of reference on this subject.

A quantity of camp equipage remains at Chittledroog, lately arrived from

Mahratta country, he was plundered by Goklah a Mahratta chief, on the frontier. His family was secured, and he fled towards the territories of the Nabob of Savanore, pursued by a detachment of Mahratta horse. All the forts in the Bednore country have been either seized by one or other of these detachments, or have been evacuated by the enemy. Bednore and some others are garrisoned by part of the detachment under the orders of Colonel Stevenson; Cowleydroog by the Bombay troops.

Colonel Stevenson is at Anantpoor * with three regiments of Native cavalry; Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple's detachment, consisting of four battalions of infantry, is to be collected at Shikarpoor as soon as possible; and when the country becomes settled in some degree, and the Rajah's troops have taken possession of the posts which it is intended they should occupy, I shall order him to cross the Toombuddra and march towards the Nizam's frontier, in pursuance of the instructions I have received from the Commander-in-Chief.

Colonel Stevenson will remain in the province of Bednore with the cavalry and two battalions of infantry in the different garrisons, and such part of the Bombay troops as you will allow to remain there.

I have detached one battalion of infantry to Oostara in order to cooperate with the Rajah's troops in settling the Bul country and the districts about Oostara, which have been disturbed by the polygar of Bullum, who is in arms with a banditti which he has collected. I shall remain on the Toombuddra with the remainder of the army, two regiments of European cavalry, two of European infantry, and two battalions of sepoys, till everything

Madras. Some of the corps in camp are at present ill-covered; but if it appears probable that they may shortly be placed in garrison or cantonments, it is very desirable that the stock of tents now advanced to Chittledroog should be carefully preserved in the stores of that frontier station. The field pieces attached to infantry corps ordered to the Carnatic from this quarter of Mysore should also be deposited there.

Major Macaulay is intimately acquainted with every thing that has lately passed in this country, which renders it unnecessary for the Commander-in-Chief to enter into farther details.

I have, &c.,

P. A. AGNEW,

Mil. Sec. to the Commander-in-Chief.

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* *Anantpoor*, or *Anautpoor*, a town in Bednore, 150 miles N.W. of Seringapatam.—ED.

is settled in the Bednore country, and I will apprise you of any change of my position.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAPTAIN MALCOLM, PROCEEDING TO OOSTARA. [170.]

Camp, 27th Aug., 1799.

You will march to-morrow morning with your battalion, and the field pieces attached to it, towards Oostara by a route which will be shown to you by some hircarrahs whom Purneah will send with you. 500 of the Rajah's infantry, and 250 of his cavalry, are gone before you, and you will be accompanied by an aumildar of Purneah's.

You will get possession of the fort of Munserabad on the other side of the Hemavutty, and give it over to the Rajah's people.

There are other places in the district of Oostara and Bul country, at present in the possession of the polygar of Bullum, which you will likewise deliver over to the Rajah's people, and you will do every thing in your power to establish his authority in those districts. Wherever you find arms or military stores, you will destroy them.

Purneah's people will have provided boats for the passage of the river Hemavutty by the time you reach it. You will take particular care to prevent your men from plundering, and you will pay attention to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, contained in a letter to Colonel Stevenson, a copy of which is enclosed.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* ADDITIONAL, FOR CAPTAIN CAMPBELL, 74TH REGIMENT.

There is a place called Ey Goor, at the distance of about four or five coss from Munserabad, which is the residence of the Rajah. You will be pleased to destroy it, and hang all persons either in it or Munserabad that you may find in arms.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[171.] *To Captain Orr, Deputy Adjutant-General.*

DEAR SIR, 28th Aug., 1799.

I am quite at a loss for some knowledge of the principal posts and roads in this and the Bednore country. I understand that, although your official duty is in another line, you still pay attention to the surveys of the countries through which the detachment marches, and I shall be obliged to you for any communication you can make to me respecting them.

As I think it probable that you will very naturally wish to have all the credit of your own labours, I promise you that I will not communicate them to any person who will make any other use of them than that to which I intend to put them; I mean to forward the public service. Pray remember me most kindly to Colonel Dalrymple and the staff and other officers of the detachment. I sincerely rejoice in their success.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[172.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, 28th Aug., 1799.

Upon examining and considering the state of the bullock department, I find that nearly all the hired bullocks in the service of the Company may be discharged as soon as the heavy stores now on their march from Sera and Simoga arrive at Chittledroog.

My instructions, however, in my opinion, do not authorize me to discharge any from the service, and I shall accordingly wait for further orders from head quarters. Even if I have mistaken their meaning, the public service will suffer no inconvenience from the delay, as almost all the maistries are in debt. It might suffer very great inconvenience from my hurrying this measure.

I enclose some letters arrived from Colonels Stevenson and Haliburton. I have instructed Haliburton to order the polygar of Bilghy * to go to Munro's Cutchery.

Everything remains quiet in these parts.

Yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* The *Passes of Bilghy* are still known as a difficult part of the route from

To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew. [173.]

SIR, 29th Aug., 1799.

I have the honour to inform you that, after providing a supply of arrack sufficient for the detachments under Colonel Shawe and Colonel Carlisle, proceeding to the Carnatic, there will remain above the Ghauts for the use of the Europeans in the field fifty-two days' arrack at two drams per day. Of this quantity twelve casks are at Bangalore, and I have given orders to the commissary of provisions to send from camp to Bangalore twelve arrack carts, which will be ready to move from thence to whatever point may be necessary.

I have likewise given him orders to send to Kistnagherry from Chittledroog sixteen platform carts belonging to his department, in order to bring up any further quantity of arrack which the Commander-in-Chief may think necessary upon a consideration of the length of time which it may be desirable to keep the troops in the field. I have done this as I have learnt from Major Corner that there has been great difficulty in providing carts at Kistnagherry.

I beg leave to inform you that, if it be intended that the Europeans at present in the field should be in garrison above the Ghauts, it will be necessary that arrack should be sent from the coast for their use. Those in Seringapatam are supplied by a person who makes it there; but he does not make more than sufficient for their consumption, and it does not appear to be of a quality to bear transporting for any great distance.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*To Colonel Sherbrooke.** [174.]

SIR, 29th Aug., 1799.

I have received the report of the Committee of which Lieutenant-Colonel Scott was President.

I request that you will be so kind as to order a garrison Native

Canara to Mysore; the surrounding country being a rugged, mountainous plateau formed by an expansion of the Ghauts. Distance from Bangalore N.W. 210, from Mangalore N. 105 miles.—ED.

* Lieutenant-Colonel of Her Majesty's 33rd Regiment, left in command at Seringapatam during the absence of Colonel Wellesley.—ED.

court martial to try the persons concerned in the robbery of the stores, and that you will give orders that the punishment which will be sentenced may be inflicted on them. You will be so kind as to levy a fine upon the two brass men amounting to the sum which Colonel Saxon and Captain M'Intire will inform you the brass guns and cohorns which are still missing are worth. Of this they may recover what they can from the thieves. The whole will be paid to Captain M'Intire, and carried by him to the separate account of captured stores.

You will be so kind as to desire the cutwal to inform the brass men that persons receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be such, are punished as principals in all civilized countries, and that they may look upon the fine levied upon them by my orders as a mark of lenity, and by no means what they deserve.

I beg that you will be so kind as to give notice to the officers commanding the regiments composing the garrison of Seringapatam, that it is my intention to look at them in the field when I return to Seringapatam. I enclose a paper stating the movements to which I beg their attention.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE IN PRECEDING LETTER.]

MOVEMENTS TO BE PRACTISED PARTICULARLY.

1. Marching in open column, quick and slow time, officers keeping their distance and being perfectly covered in the alignement.

2. Forming and deploying the close column.

3. Forming line from open column upon a front, centre, or rear division by the échelon march of divisions.

4. The filing of the rear divisions of an open column into an alignement on which its head may have entered.

5. Forming line to the reverse flank of a column by the wheel of each division of the battalion in succession.

6. Gaining ground to a flank by the échelon march of divisions and subdivisions.

7. Marching in line.

N.B. All formations must be made on fixed and determined objects, but camp colours ought to be disused as much as pos-

sible, and the points of formation ought to be either such as the country may afford or the mounted officers of the corps.

Draft of a Letter to Major-General Hartley. [175.]

29th Aug., 1799.

In my letter of the 27th instant I informed you that Cowley-droog was occupied by a detachment of the Bombay troops, which statement I find, from information I have since received, was erroneous. It has been occupied by a part of the detachment under Colonel Stevenson. He informs me that Colonel Boyce had occupied Hyderghur; but by a letter received from him by Colonel Stevenson on the 24th, it appears that he is desirous of withdrawing the troops which he had sent to take possession of Hyderghur, and it also appears that Colonel Stevenson was about to send a detachment to relieve them.

The Commander-in-Chief has informed me that he had requested you to send into the province of Bednore two battalions of sepoys, if I should find it necessary to apply to you for such assistance. I do not conceive that such a number will be necessary; but considering that the Nizam's subsidiary force must be sent into his Highness's territories forthwith, that many posts must be occupied in the Bednore country, and that it is probable I shall be under the necessity of sending a detachment against the Bilghy polygar to reduce him to the Company's subjection, I shall be obliged to you if you can send with convenience into Bednore one battalion of sepoys.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [176.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, 30th Aug., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 27th, which is very satisfactory. I hope that by this time you will have been able to take some steps towards collecting the contingent, which it is intended should be sent to the Nizam's territories as soon as it can be spared.

I shall be glad to know what posts you think it necessary to

occupy in the Bednore country, and whether the two battalions you have with you will be sufficient for everything for the present.

Having only one battalion in camp, I can send you no more; but I have written to General Hartley to desire that he will send one of the Bombay battalions to you.

I think that we shall have occasion to send a detachment against the Bilghy man, who has been trifling, as I understand, for some time. Five companies of sepoys and two troops, or three if they are weak, with two guns, will annihilate him. Let me know whether you can spare the five companies from your garrisons; if you cannot, I must endeavour to send some Bengal sepoys to relieve some of your posts. I expect another battalion of them in camp on the 5th of next month.

For the sake of forage, I intend to move on the day after to-morrow towards Hooley Honore, at which place I shall remain for some days.

I enclose a letter which Mr. Stevenson sent to me to forward to you. I forwarded two from him yesterday.

We hear that Dhoondiah is in the Savanore country, surrounded by Goklah's Mahrattas; that he has offered to enter into Goklah's service, but that Goklah refuses to admit him into it unless he gives himself up.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[177.] *To Colonel Stevenson.*

SIR, 31st Aug., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 28th instant, and I approve much of the distribution which you have made of the troops under your command.

It appears that you have fourteen companies of Native infantry at Nuggur. I wish that you would be so kind as to detach five of them, with three troops of cavalry and two guns, to Bilghy, with instructions to take possession of that post and reduce the neighbouring country to the Company's authority.

You will be so kind as to communicate as soon as possible with Captain Munro, the collector of Canara, by means of the post at Hyderghur. Inform him of the steps taken to reduce the polygar of Bilghy, who must be sent to his Cutchery.

As soon as the detachment will have got possession of Bilghy, and the neighbouring country will have been subjected to the Company's authority, it will return to join you at Nuggur, leaving at Bilghy two companies. These are to remain there until relieved by a party of Bombay sepoys.

I have sent orders to the postmaster at Seringapatam to run a tappall from thence to Nuggur, by Benkypoor and Simoga. It would be very desirable to have one established from Nuggur to Bangalore, or any other part of Canara that may be thought most proper by the collector and you. I wish that you would communicate with him upon this subject, and take such measures as you may think necessary to establish it as soon as possible.

I intend to move to-morrow towards Hooley Honore for the sake of forage.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew. [178.]

SIR, 31st Aug., 1799.

I have received a letter from Colonel Stevenson, in which he informs me that he has distributed his force as follows:

The 1st of the 1st and the 1st of the 8th at Nuggur, from whence he has detached five companies; two with an European officer to Cowleydroog, two with an European officer to Chandergooty, and one under a subahdar to Hyderghur, to relieve a company of Bombay sepoys.

The 4th Regiment of Cavalry is at Anantpoor; the 1st and 2nd at Ondagunny. Orders have been given for the Nizam's subsidiary force to be collected at Shikarpoor preparatory to its marching to his Highness's territories.

I have sent orders to Colonel Stevenson to detach five companies of sepoys and three troops of cavalry, with two guns, to Bilghy, to take possession of that post and to extend the Company's authority over the neighbouring country. The polygar, who has been in arms, is to be sent to Captain Munro, with whom I have desired Colonel Stevenson to communicate upon this subject.

Two companies out of the five are to be left at Bilghy until relieved by a detachment of the Bombay army; the others and the cavalry are to return to Nuggur. I have written to Captain Munro to request that he will apply to General Hartley for a detachment for this purpose.

As it appears very desirable that there should be a communication by tappall between the Presidency and Canara, and as the route by which the army tappall comes is not the shortest to that province, I have written to the postmaster at Seringapatam to desire that he will run a tappall from Seringapatam to Nuggur by Benkypoor and Simoga, and to Colonel Stevenson to desire that he will run one from Nuggur by such route and to such place in the Canara country as may appear, upon a communication with the collector, to be most advisable.

I intend to move to-morrow towards Hooley Honore for the sake of forage.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[179.] *To Major Cuppage.*

SIR, 1st Sept., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 29th and its enclosures.

I approve much of Captain Greenhill's caution in avoiding to commit the Honourable Company's troops with those of his Highness the Nizam, or of Cummer u Deen. I have written to head quarters upon the subject, and the matter will be settled by Government.

I am concerned to find that the Aurnial polygar has again disturbed the peace of the country. I trust that the celerity with which you moved the force under Captain Aiskell will have the desired effect, and that you will get possession of the polygar's person.

The repetition of the crime of rebellion of which he has been guilty, renders it necessary that the most rigorous measures should be adopted against him and his adherents; I therefore request that he and all those taken in arms with him may be punished with death. Lenity towards them would have the most cruel effects, by encouraging others to take arms and again to plunder and ravage the country, and murder its inhabitants.

You will be so kind as to give orders to the officers commanding detachments sent out by you to destroy all arms and military stores of all kinds that they may find.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [180.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp near Hooley Honore, 2nd Sept., 1799.

I had intelligence some days ago respecting the polygar of Bullum, who is the same man, under another name, as the one mentioned to you by Lieutenant Mackay.

I sent off immediately a detachment under Captain Malcolm, which I trust will shortly settle his matters.

In your letter of the 31st, in which you recite the distribution of your troops, you state that you had ordered Colonel Haliburton to cross the Werdah * with such part of his battalion as he might think necessary to reduce any aumildars and polygars in the Soonda † country that had not already submitted to the Mysore Government. I conclude that you have desired him not to act against any post in the possession of the Mahrattas, or against any person belonging to them, in conformity to the instructions from the Commander-in-Chief.

I am yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [181.]

SIR, 4th Sept., 1799.

From your letter of the 1st instant, received last night, I am apprehensive that you may have misunderstood the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief which I understand were sent to you.

In his letter to me of the 24th of August, Colonel Agnew says, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, "The pointed injunctions of the Right Honourable the Governor-General to avoid hostility with the Mahrattas, even should they have gar-

* *Werdah* or *Wurda*, a river 250 miles in length; its course is generally from N.W. to S.E.; it formed the boundary between the territories of the Rajah of Berar (Nagpoor) and those of the Nizam.—ED.

† The territory of the Rajah of *Soonda* or *Sudha* comprised a rough and mountainous tract, situated to the eastward of the culminating ridge of the Ghauts. It became the prey of Hyder Ali in 1763. On the downfal of Tippoo the district was incorporated with the British dominions. *Soonda* town is built on a small stream of the same name, tributary to the Baidli Nullah. Distance from Bangalore N.W. 220 miles, from Mangalore N. 130. —ED.

risoned parts of Mysore, prevented Colonel Stevenson from entirely destroying Dhoondiah's remaining force."

I beg that you will, as soon as possible, send orders to Colonel Haliburton not to attack any posts occupied by the Mahrattas, nor to interfere with any arrangements they may have made for the settlement of the Soonda or any other country, in conformity with the spirit as well as the letter of the instructions from the Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief, with which, as it appears by the above-mentioned paragraph from Colonel Agnew, you have heretofore been made acquainted.

If Colonel Haliburton should have got hold of any persons, civil or military, belonging to Goklah, or placed by him in the Soonda country, you will be so kind as to give him orders to dismiss them, with everything belonging to them, as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[182.]

To Colonel Stevenson.

MY DEAR COLONEL, 5th Sept., 1799.

I have received your letters of the 3rd instant.

There is a hill fort in the Bednore country, called Gurdandroog,* the killadar of which still holds out, as I am informed, and plunders the neighbouring country for his subsistence and

* *Gurdangherry* or *Droog*, 85 miles N.N.W. of Seringapatam, and 5 miles to the left of the great road leading from thence to Hurryhur, forms the summit of a conical-shaped and barren rock, itself part of a chain of hills which run transversely to the direction of the road from Baagoor to Banaveram. It is enclosed by a wall or parapet overlooking the precipitous side, having one gateway connected with a room or choultry for the use of the guards. The centre of the place is filled up by high masses of naked rock, on the highest pinnacle of which is a small pagoda or religious building. Two other lines of walls run irregularly round the lower parts of the hill. The fortress has six cisterns of water, two of which are deep, and well secured in hollows of the rock; a large granary contains supplies of food. The pettah or native town is overhung by the impending naked rock. The lower fort attached to the foot of the hill covers a square of about 300 yards. Gurdangherry was formerly a frontier post of great importance to the Rajahs of Mysore, by whom it was fortified in the middle of the 17th century, as a protection against the neighbouring polygars. It was kept up and strengthened by Hyder and Tippoo. (Abstracted from 'Remarks on the Forts on the Northern Frontier of Mysore,' by Captain Mackenzie. Wellington MSS., Book I., 1803.)—ED.

that of his garrison. It is imagined that a company of our sepoys, with a party of the Rajah's infantry, would induce him to give up the fort upon the terms which Purneah intends to offer him.

As you seem to be of opinion that the post of infantry at Simoga is not necessary, I have written to the officer commanding the company there to desire that he will hold himself in readiness to march at a short notice upon an expedition, for which he will hereafter have a guide and instructions from me. He is to send the musket ammunition, &c., in his charge over to my camp.

As soon as he will have performed the service upon which he will be ordered, he shall join you with his company at Nuggur.

I understand that you have got some prisoners at Nuggur, persons who were most active in forcing the killadar to give up the fort to Dhoondiah. It is not our custom to inflict corporal punishment, and it is too late to hang them. It is not safe to send them about their business until we have got possession of Gurdandroog: I, therefore, think that the best method of punishing them is to make them do any work you may have in hand upon the fortifications of the place.

I have this instant received two more letters from you of the 3rd instant, one public, the other private.

I have already written to General Floyd to inform him that it is impossible for you to leave Bednore at present. In the present state of affairs I cannot permit you to come away, and I think that for your own sake, as well as for the public interests, you are in the right to desire to stay. I shall write this day to General Harris upon the subject.

I have not been able to leave camp yet, but I hope to be able to go over to Bednore in a day or two.

I am afraid that there is some mistake respecting the detachment to Bilghy. I have not received Colonel Haliburton's letter, in which, as you say in yours of the 3rd instant, there appears a probability that the polygar will be subjected. Bilghy is a part of Canara belonging to the Company, and lies about four coss distant from Chandergooty. Colonel Haliburton, as I understand, is gone into the Soonda country; but my letter of yesterday will have induced you to recall him from thence.

It is, however, necessary that Colonel Haliburton's battalion,

as it belongs to the Nizam's detachment, should be collected and brought to Shikarpoor as soon as possible, and therefore it is desirable that the five companies ordered in my letter of the 31st August to march to Bilghy should move from Nuggur as soon as possible.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[183.] *To Colonel Agnew.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, 5th Sept., 1799.

By some unaccountable misapprehension of the instructions which the Commander-in-Chief sent him, it appears by Colonel Stevenson's last letters to me and to Macaulay, that he has sent Haliburton into the Soonda country to dispossess the Mahrattas of the posts in their possession, and to punish the aumildars placed there by Goklah. Upon the first intelligence I had of the mistake, I sent him orders by express to withdraw Haliburton without delay, and to restore to the Mahrattas any persons belonging to them who may have fallen into his hands, with all their property. As by Haliburton's letter of the 28th August, from Ondagunny, it appeared probable that he would be four or five days crossing the Werdah, and as he then was to take possession of Chandergooty, I hope that my orders sent yesterday will arrive in time to prevent the intended mischief.

The hopes that this will be the case, and the disinclination which I have to bring into a scrape an officer whom I know very well, have induced me to withhold any official intimation upon the subject, and I shall still remain silent until I hear the event.

All is quiet in the Bednore country. The killadar of Gurdangherry still keeps his fort, I believe only because nobody has been to ask for it. I send a detachment there immediately.

The heavy guns are across the river and in my camp at this place. As I understand, however, that matters are not quite settled with the Mahrattas, I keep them here for a few days. We are in a fine place for forage, and the delay will do our bullocks no harm, unless by depriving them of the habits of starving.

I have written to Seringapatam to desire that they will prepare

for a large indent for musket ammunition which I intend to send there. This is to be sent to Chittledroog upon some of our bullocks, which are doing nothing at Seringapatam, and I trust it will not be useless if we have des affaires à débrouiller with the Mahrattas.

For our numbers we are complete in camp in everything else. Grant wishes to be barrackmaster, if the General has no objection. Macaulay informs me that I ought to correspond with Government, and send the Adjutant-General copies of my letters. It is more respectful to the General, and equally so to Government, to send all information through him. I rely upon you to let me know which is proper.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OFFICER COMMANDING A COMPANY AT SIMOGA, GOING ON AN EXPEDITION TO GURDANGHERRY. [184.]

Immediately on the receipt of these instructions, you will march from Simoga to Anantpoor, where you will deliver the enclosed sealed letter to Appoo Rao, the aumildar of Anantpoor and Eckery.

He will supply you with whatever you may want there, with bazaar articles for your march to Gurdangherry, and with guides to show you the road.

You will likewise desire him to supply you with two or three scaling ladders, and persons to carry them. As soon as you will have been supplied with everything you want at Anantpoor, you will march with the guides which will be furnished by the aumildar to Gurdangherry.

You will immediately on your arrival communicate with the killadar and send him the enclosed open letter from Purneah, and desire him to give you possession of the fort. If he give you possession, you will hand it over to Purneah's aumildar, and will proceed to join Colonel Stevenson at Nuggur.

If he refuse to give you possession, you must attack the fort and take it by escalade, if you should deem it practicable to get at it; and having got into it, hang the killadar and all persons whom you may find there in arms.

If you should not deem it practicable to get at the fort, you

will report to me as soon as possible its situation and everything relating to it, and if you find that you can subsist in the position which you will have taken, you will remain there until you hear from me.

I enclose the extract of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew to Colonel Stevenson, to which you will pay attention.

You will as much as possible prevent your people from plundering the country.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[185.] *To Colonel Sherbrooke.*

SIR, Camp near Hooley Honore, 5th Sept., 1799.

I have the honour to enclose an indent on the stores at Seringapatam for 1,000,000 rounds of musket ammunition, which, as soon as it is completed, I request you will send upon bullocks, with which Mr. Gordon will furnish you, to Chittledroog.

You will send with it a small guard and a careful person belonging to the store department.

I wish that part of this indent, viz. 300,000, should be sent to Chittledroog as soon as possible. You will, therefore, be so kind as to send it off as soon as it is ready; the remainder may follow at a future period.

As several of the carriage-bullocks at present at Seringapatam are furnished with gunnies, you will desire Mr. Gordon to supply for this service those which are so furnished. These gunnies are to be used for the carriage of the ammunition.

As it is probable that there will be some difficulty in getting the bullock people to march if they do not receive their pay for the month of August, you will desire Mr. Gordon to give those sent to Chittledroog upon this service their pay for August, making the necessary stoppage from such of them as are in debt to Government, whether for money advanced or for rice or other articles intrusted to their charge and lost. Mr. Gordon will send to Captain Mackay an account of what he pays them, and will give them the usual and necessary certificate.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [186.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp near Hooley Honore, 6th Sept., 1799.

A letter from Colonel Dalrymple to Major Macaulay informed me last night that you had permitted him to cross the Toombuddra. I am glad to find that he is prepared to cross it, but I don't conceive the general situation of affairs to be such as to allow him to leave us yet, and I have this day written to him by express to desire that he will remain where he is for a few days longer.

I preferred to send my letter direct to him, instead of through you, as I am nearer to him than you are, and it is probable that it may reach him before he marches. It could not do so if it went by Nuggur.

I am not sorry that Colonel Haliburton was still at Chandergooty on the 2nd instant, as appears by your public letter of the 4th instant which I have just received. I have great hopes that mine of the 4th will have reached you in time to enable you to prevent his entering the Soonda country, or interfering in any shape with Goklah's people.

Upon inquiry I find that Purneah has given orders to his managers in the Bednore country to levy no duties whatever, and he has done this to induce the people of the country to return and settle in it.

Any expenses that you may have incurred on account of crossing rivers, hircarrahs, &c. &c., ought to be charged in a bill, which must be made out in the usual form. I think that you will do well to delay to make it out till the service is over, and then send it to me for my signature.

I refer you to Colonel Agnew's letter to you of the 21st August for a rule for your conduct in regard to the proceeds of the camels and tattoos you mention.

Your endeavours to restore tranquillity to the country have had the wished-for success, and I don't conceive that Purneah has an opinion of them different from what they deserve.

I recommend it to you to have no more communication than is necessary with the Pundit and the [word illegible in MS.]

I have this day sent instructions to the officer commanding the company at Simoga to march to Gurdangherry and to get possession of it.

I sent your letter yesterday to Mrs. Stevenson, and I will send off that which I have just received this day.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[187.] *To Colonel Sherbrooke.*

DEAR SHERBROOKE, Camp near Hooley Honore, 7th Sept., 1799.

I have received your letters of the 3rd and 4th.

All I wanted in the rupee was that it should contain the name of Shah Allum * instead of that of Lord Mornington, which they proposed to mark on it.

It seems now, however, that they have omitted that of the Rajah, which is irregular. That is their own affair, and as they have marked the name of the King upon the rupee, I am satisfied.

I am concerned for Tew's disappointment, which, however, I thought probable. I will write to Cliffe this day to stop the succession, and I will inform him that I have desired you to recommend young Irwin for another ensigncy, with desire that it may be dated on the day that my recommendation of him was sent.

Gaff or Quin knows for what ensigncy he ought to be recommended. Deverell received the money for an ensigncy which did not belong to him, purchased by Mr. Briscoe. It will be proper that Mr. Irwin should be recommended for the ensigncy belonging to Deverell, and my memory does not enable me to say which that is.

Tell the killadar of Chittledroog that I know that he is to have a pension, but I have not the amount of it; it will most probably be paid at whatever place he chooses. The reason why I can give no further information about it is, that it was a matter settled by the General, about which I have no document whatever. I have written to the General upon the subject, and you may give the killadar the most positive assurances that he will have his pension. In the mean time, if he is in want of money, desire my moonshee to give him some, and I will repay it when I return.

I think it very proper that General Floyd should have the

* Name of the Great Mogul.—ED.

guns for Lord Clive; but I don't think it safe to allow them to leave the fort without the regular order from the Military Board, which it will be very easy for Lord Clive to send down.

The fact is, that I have received some very unpleasant letters (couched, in my opinion, in very improper terms) from the Military Board; and, when it can be avoided without injuring the public service, I don't intend to make myself liable to such again. If you will read this part of my letter to General Floyd, I dare say that he will see the propriety of my conduct. The clerks in office at Madras, not being aware, I presume, of the value of character, write public letters which become public records, whereby, with a stroke of their pen, they deprive an officer of that valuable gem. It is very easy to misrepresent the best intentions, and when they are misrepresented I don't see any remedy excepting a public appeal and trial, which are worse than submitting to the misrepresentations.

I am glad to find that the fire did no mischief.

Yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. [188.]

DEAR GORDON, Camp near Hooley Honore, 7th Sept., 1799.

You must do as the Military Board have ordered you, not sell any grain that is not likely to be damaged by the weather. The price, high or low, ought to have no effect on your sales, as the grain is not sold to bring in money, but because it is likely to be spoiled if it be kept: the question is, whether it is better to take a small price for it than that it should be spoiled. I think it better to take a small price for it; but if it is not likely to be spoiled, it must not be sold at all.

Let me know exactly how much money you have got, and give me a general notion of the probable demands upon you between this and the end of October.

If there be any necessity for it, I'll see if I can't beat Ben Roebuck, Esq., out of the sixty days. Cherry draws upon him at thirty.

I think it will not be advisable to move the grain into another granary, because it will cost money, for which you must have the authority of the powers *below;* besides, if the price of grain

falls, the paddy will not be worth the expense of moving it. The pioneers must not be employed upon this work.

I have written to Sherbrooke this day, but you may show him this part of my letter.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[189.] *To Colonel Sherbrooke.*

DEAR SHERBROOKE, Camp near Hooley Honore, 8th Sept., 1799.

I beg that you will inform Shuckur Oollah that I have procured the pension which he asked for his mother-in-law, and that as soon as I return to Seringapatam I will make arrangements for the payment of it.

Desire my moonshee to inform Gholam Ali Vakeel that I have received authority to grant pensions to Meer Khadir Ali and to certain other persons, a list of whose names I have not by me at present, and that as soon as I return I shall make the necessary arrangements on their account.

Ibrahim Saheb and Ameen Saheb are to have the pensions which I proposed to grant to them; but for the same reason, the want of the necessary documents and memorandums, I must defer to make any arrangement on their account until I return to Seringapatam.

The mosques in the fort are to have the allowances which I proposed for them. These different people will trouble you to know the amount of their respective pensions. I can state nothing about them till I return to Seringapatam.

I wrote a letter to Gordon yesterday, which I desired him to show to you. I have this day written to give him leave of absence on certain conditions.

Yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[190.] *To Colonel Sherbrooke.*

DEAR SHERBROOKE, 9th Sept., 1799.

In my letters of the 7th I stated my sentiments in regard to the killadar of Chittledroog, and on the same day I wrote to

Gordon respecting the grain a letter which I desired him to show to you.

I recommend that Captain Norris and his people may not be employed at the Toste Khanah, if it takes them away from other work which they have been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to perform. If, as he says, the carpenters have no work, they may make the window-frames, and you may indent upon M'Intire for timber.

By the bye, the Scotch brigade have some carpenters and masons, who ought to be made to assist in fitting up their own barracks. The 33rd Regiment completed theirs with very little or no assistance at all, and if the Scotch brigade do not give their assistance, they must expect that a great length of time will elapse before they will inhabit the Toste Khanah. If any expense is to be incurred, the work must be delayed till all the forms of application can be gone through and answers can come from the Presidency. I will not subject either myself or you to receive such letters from the Military Board as I have received lately.

I wish that immediately upon the receipt of this letter you would order a company of sepoys from the garrison, commanded by an European officer, to march to Ooscotta, on the Hemavutty, there to endeavour to communicate with Captain Malcolm of the 1st Bengal Volunteers. He is gone across that river to attack Munserabad, and the intention in posting this officer at Ooscotta is to keep up his communication with the army and Seringapatam. If the Native corps have no officer, you must send an officer belonging to the King's regiments with this detachment.

He must move by forced marches to Ooscotta, and Bajee Rao must furnish him with two or three good hircarrahs, who will show him the road and will carry his letters to Captain Malcolm. This officer must let me know when he arrives at his station. Let him take with him sixty rounds of ammunition for each man.

The object of Captain Malcolm's expedition is to subdue the polygar of Bullum, Kistnapah Naig, who has got possession of Munserabad and is plundering all that country. Malcolm writes me word that he apprehends that he will suffer from a want of grain. I wish that you would adopt one or both of the methods I am now going to point out to send some grain to Ooscotta after the detachment as soon as possible.

Either let Bajee Rao send it by means of the brinjarries or country grain merchants. If Bajee Rao cannot, let the cutwal send it by means of those who supply the island and fort.

As Malcolm complains of a scarcity, the market at Ooscotta and in the Bul country will probably be better than that which they have either in Seringapatam or the neighbourhood.

Yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[191.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple.*

SIR, 10th Sept., 1799.

I beg that, as soon as convenient after the receipt of this letter, you will march with your detachment from Shikarpoor by Ondagunny towards Chandergooty. You will cross the Werdah at the place where it was crossed by Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton, and remain encamped on the side of it until you receive further orders from me. I recommend it to you to recall Captain Blair and his department from Hoonelly,* and to send them forward to the Werdah to prepare boats for you on that river.

Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton, with his corps, will receive orders to join you, as will the 1st and 4th Regiments of Cavalry.

You will take the 2nd Regiment with you.

I shall send a copy of this letter to Colonel Stevenson.

I intend to cross the Toombuddra with the army to-morrow, and I shall proceed to Shikarpoor.

* The Fort of *Hoonelly*, or *Hoonhully*, 144 miles N.N.W. of Seringapatam, is built close to the west bank of the Toombuddra river, which is here about 550 yards wide. One mile and a quarter farther up is a ferry; the width is 750 yards. The river is fordable in the dry season, but during the rains its stream rises suddenly to a height of 20 feet and upwards, and flows with considerable rapidity. Nevertheless passengers and goods are passed over in round basket boats. The fort is irregular in shape, the longest side 290, the shortest 230 yards. The walls are of mud, faced below with stone, surmounted by little bastions, or rather narrow turrets; the parapet remarkably high, with loopholes; the ditch deep and dry, with a high glacis (like many places on the Mysore frontier); a high covert way, and small circular works on its angles; and in place of a banquette a small raised terrace placed behind the covert way. In the centre of the fort is a conical, solid cavalier, commanding all around it, and containing magazine for stores, &c. (Abstract from Captain Colin Mackenzie's Remarks, &c. Wellington MSS., Book I. for 1803.)—ED.

Although, from the information I have received, I have reason to expect that the Werdah will be fordable by the time that you will reach it, yet as it may continue full longer than we expect, and as I may hereafter be obliged to cross it with the army, I shall be obliged to you if you will prepare boats for us.

I have derived much assistance from the sketch of the marches of your detachment in the Bednore country, sent to me by Captain Orr. I beg that you will convey to him my thanks, and request that he will give me any further information of the country which he may obtain on your proposed march to the Werdah and on the other side of it.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Malcolm. [192.]

SIR, 10th Sept., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 8th instant, and Colonel Harness and Captain Barclay have communicated to me those which you wrote to them on the 7th.

In consequence of what you have stated in all of them, I have been induced to detach the light infantry of the 73rd and 74th Regiments from camp to assist in your expedition, as from your statement of the nature of the country, as well as from the information I have been able to obtain of it here, it does not appear to be well suited for the operations of cavalry.

I am sorry that you will not have the assistance of the Koorg Rajah or of the Bombay army, or of the troops from Simoga, as you propose; but I trust that the reinforcement now sent will accomplish all the objects of the expedition. These are to get possession of Munserabad, and not to hurt the Polygar, as you seem to imagine.

You will halt in your present position until the reinforcement above mentioned reaches you. In the mean time I beg that you will see that boats are prepared for the passage of the river, that scaling-ladders are made, and long bamboo forks (two for each ladder) to place them up against the walls.

You will, of course, obtain all the information you can of the nature and strength of Munserabad; of the ditch, whether wet or dry; of the means by which the place is watered; of the road

from Munserabad to a place called Ey Goor, the residence of the Polygar; on which side of Munserabad it is; of the road leading to Munserabad from the river, &c. &c.

You will be so kind as to send a person to Sacrapatam,* who will conduct Captain Campbell, of the 74th, to the spot where you are encamped.

As I imagine that Captain Campbell is senior to you, he will take the command of the detachment, and you will hand over to him the instructions which I have given to you and all my letters. I have no doubt but that you will give him every information and assistance in your power.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[193.] *To Colonel Stevenson.*

SIR, Camp near Hooley Honore, 10th Sept., 1799.

Orders which I have this day received from the Presidency, of which I am about to give you the outline, have induced me to alter the system according to which I have been acting since the Commander-in-Chief quitted the army.

It appears that Government now intend to take possession of the Soonda country for the Rajah of Mysore, and I have accordingly received directions to desire that Goklah and the Mahrattas will retire from it. Should they refuse to give me possession of it, I have received instructions to act as I may think best to obtain it.

I enclose you a letter which I have this day written to Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple. I beg that you will order Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton to join him on the Werdah. I have sent orders to Major Sentleger, at Simoga, to march to Anantpoor and thence to Ondagunny. You will be so kind as to order him with the 4th Regiment, and Major Watson with the 1st, to place themselves under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple, and to cross the Werdah with him. The 2nd Regiment of cavalry is, I understand, at Shikarpoor with Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple; if it should not be so, that also must join him.

* *Sacrapatam*, a town 88 miles N.W. of Seringapatam.—ED.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple will remain on the Werdah till I receive Goklah's answer.

In the mean time I shall cross the Toombuddra with the army, and shall take a position at Shikarpoor (I think), from whence I can act as circumstances may point out.

This distribution of the force is not to alter the destination of the five companies ordered to Bilghy. According to my former orders, when they will have got possession of that place, two companies will be left in it. The others will return; and when a detachment of the Bombay army will have relieved those two companies ordered to be left at Bilghy, they likewise will return.

You will be the best judge whether it will be necessary to have garrisons at Shikarpoor and Anantpoor. If it should be so, three companies can form those garrisons; if it should not, they may join Colonel Dalrymple's detachment.

The troops at present in garrison at Nuggur, Cowleydroog, Ondagunny, and Chandergooty, will remain where they are.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary to Government. [194.]

SIR, 10th Sept., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 5th by express.

I have in consequence thereof written to Doonda Punt Goklah a friendly letter to desire that he will evacuate Soonda and the territories belonging to the late Tippoo Sultaun, of which he has taken possession. In case he should maintain his position, I will move against him, as directed by the Governor-General in Council, giving him a reasonable time to retire. In the mean time I have taken the following preparatory measures:

I have ordered Colonel Dalrymple to march from Shikarpoor and to cross the Werdah with three battalions of sepoys and the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Regiments of cavalry. The 2nd battalion 7th Regiment, being already on the other side of the Werdah, will join Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple when he will have crossed that river. Two battalions will remain as garrisons for Nuggur, Cowleydroog, Ondagunny, and Chandergooty, detaching five companies to subdue the polygar of Bilghy.

I shall to-morrow cross the Toombuddra with the army, and shall proceed to Shikarpoor as a position from whence I can act as circumstances may point out.

These forward movements will convince Doonda Punt Goklah that we are prepared and are determined to have possession of the territories for which I have asked; and this conviction, and the example he has recently had before him, will probably induce him to evacuate them without giving us the trouble of driving him from them.

At the same time, from the advanced stage of the season, I have no reason to apprehend any inconvenience from having the army on the other side of the Toombuddra, or Colonel Dalrymple on the other side of the Werdah. I have every reason to believe that in a few days both rivers will be fordable.

In expectation that I should receive orders to get possession of Soonda, and in order to be prepared for all the consequences of them, I have within these few days ordered from Seringapatam to Chittledroog ten sacks of musket ammunition, three of which were to be sent there immediately.

There are bullocks at Seringapatam which are doing nothing, and can carry this forward.

The army and detachments at Chittledroog are well provided with every other article of equipment.

With the same view I have kept the heavy guns with the army which had crossed the Toombuddra to Simoga, and have since recrossed it; and I can without inconvenience take them on with me.

There are others complete with ammunition in Chittledroog, and we have bullocks prepared to take them wherever it may be necessary.

As I have received letters from Captain Malcolm, of the 1st Bengal, stating his wish to be reinforced by some Europeans for the attack of Munserabad, I have this day detached Captain Campbell with the light infantry of the 73rd and 74th Regiments to his assistance, and with them I hope that matters will very shortly be settled in those parts.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple. [195.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, 11th Sept., 1799.

Many complaints have been made by Purneah that the people of the country are pressed by the officers of the army to act as coolies, then are driven by the sepoys, and are afterwards dismissed unpaid.

I have purposely omitted to require either names or descriptions, and I shall be glad if you will do the same.

As you command a detachment which is not in general idle, I shall be obliged to you if you will give some general warning against this practice, which, if continued, will be made known to Government and will occasion its severest censures.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [196.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp near Hooley Honore, 11th Sept., 1799.

I have received information upon a subject to which I request you to attend.

The officer in command at Anantpoor has for some time been in the habit of desiring the aumildar to send him people whom he has employed at work, and has paid. Within these few days he has desired the aumildar to furnish him with coolies for the purpose of sending them for some baggage at Bangalore, and the aumildar having stated that there are but few or no coolies in the country, he has desired him to press the bazaar people to be employed as such. The irregularity of this proceeding is glaring, and I shall be obliged to you if you will interfere to prevent a repetition of it.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Sherbrooke. [197.]

DEAR SHERBROOKE, Camp near Hooley Honore, 11th Sept., 1799.

I had so much to do yesterday that I was obliged to defer to this day to answer your letter of the 7th.

I beg that you will desire my moonshee to write a letter to the ladies in the mahal,* and state how much concerned I am that all my endeavours to render their situation comfortable to themselves and respectable in the world should have failed from their dissensions; that I intreat that they will live together as friends till I return to Seringapatam, when any grievance or inconvenience that they may feel will be removed.

The truth is, that some of them are rich in jewels, &c. &c., and belong to the families of Moormen, who, being desirous of obtaining their property, have endeavoured to get them out of the mahal. Finding that I have refused to suffer them to depart, they have found means to sow dissensions among them, and to make them discontented with their situation. This I have found upon inquiry to be the case. Recommend union and patience to them.

Finding that Captain Malcolm of the Bengal Volunteers did not get on with the Polygar of Bullum as we ought upon all occasions, I have at his own request sent the light infantry of the 73rd and 74th to his assistance. Campbell will command the whole detachment, and write to him anything you have to say to them.

I don't believe that the order for the batta will apply to or will be issued in this Presidency, and I am told that it does not apply to officers having the rank of Colonel. I will let you know all that I hear about it, as well as any answer that I may have to the letter which I wrote about you.

Information which I have received and orders which have come from Madras induce me to cross the Toombuddra with the army; but this will not prevent my return to Seringapatam before the end of the month. I am going to *induce* the Mahrattas to give up the province of Soonda, which they have seized.

I return the plan of the palace, with marks in pencil, showing what improvements I wish should be made. My intention is to enclose the Scotch brigade in that yard with the mud wall, marked D. Let their front gate be large and handsome.

Grant has a plan for necessaries for them: if it accord with the enclosed, let it be put in execution; if not, desire him to let me know (marked on the enclosed) where he wishes to have them.

* The Zenana, or women's apartments.—ED.

I wish that you would let Bajee Rao have any of the coining utensils which there may be in the old mint, now used as a barrack by the Meuron Regiment. I understand that the prize-agents have some of them. The sircar will pay for any that they may have.

I observe that the plan of the palace has been drawn by Captain ———. I cannot but be well pleased that he should give his assistance unasked in a public work of this nature, but I wish that he would perform that which has been ordered.

I have just received your letter of the 8th, and approve of your arrangements for the covering of the troops. Take care that the Scotch brigade make their windows regularly.

Yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Campbell, 74th Regiment. [198.]

DEAR CAMPBELL, 14th Sept., 1799.

The last accounts from Captain Malcolm are more favourable than those which we had formerly received, and he now seems to be of opinion that his own battalion will be fully sufficient for the proposed operations against Munserabad. If he be now right in his conjectures, your success is certain. I wish, however, that if you think the sepoys can do the business alone, you will employ them upon the assault: of this you will be the best judge on the spot.

I am informed that the road between the river and Munserabad is jungly, as is that between Munserabad and Ey Goor. The people in that part of the country have had an awkward example of success against our troops in a jungly country in the Cotiote war; and as the Polygar is a clever fellow, I should not be surprised to hear that he operates upon the same principle against you. I put you upon your guard in case my information respecting the nature of the country be well founded, and I recommend it to you to have out strong flanking parties in the jungle to keep all clear for the main body.

We want the greatest part of Purneah's cavalry that is with Malcolm's detachment. Keep with you what his people will call 150 or 200, and send back the remainder.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[199.] *Draft of a Letter to Josiah Webbe, Esq.*

16th Sept., 1799.

I have been kept here till now by the difficulties in getting the brinjarries over the river. I hope, however, to be able to get a sufficient number of them over to-morrow to enable me to move forward.

I wish that you would turn your thoughts to our money matters. We have money enough with the army to pay the troops for August (which they are now receiving) and for September, which they will receive at about this time in the next month. At Seringapatam there is money enough to pay the troops dependent upon that garrison for September. I cannot say what Major Innes has in his hands, as I have not heard from him lately.

I understand from Macaulay that there is no chance for some time of getting anything from the Rajah, and I don't believe that much may be expected for bills at sixty days, which the Paymasters are authorized to draw upon the Paymaster-General. As the Coromandel monsoon may be expected in a month, which will render the conveyance of money still more difficult than it is at present, I think that it would be proper to make provision immediately for sending a large sum forward; and it would, perhaps, be advisable that the Paymaster-General should authorize the Paymasters in this country to draw upon him at shorter dates. They would have a better chance of getting money than they have at present.

I have not yet heard of Dalrymple's being across the Werdah, nor any certain accounts of Goklah's motions or of his force.

As soon as Dalrymple gets across, he is to take possession first of Budnaghur and then of Mundragoor, which are the only two posts of consequence in Soonda. He will then take up a position between them, and, by means of his detachment and the Rajah's peons, put Purneah's aumildars in activity.

I think that I shall cross the Werdah, as if all remain quiet on the Mahratta frontier, it will be necessary to send Dalrymple's detachment back to the Nizam's country, and the army must take his place.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [200.]

SIR, 17th Sept., 1799.

As soon after you will receive this as convenient you will advance from your present position on the Werdah into the Soonda country. You will first get possession of Budnaghur, which I understand to be four coss distant from the Werdah; then of Mundragoor, which is nine distant from Budnaghur.

I do not understand that there are any other posts of consequence in the Soonda country. As, however, the information which you will obtain on the spot will be more accurate than that which I have got, if there should be any other posts you will act accordingly.

Although the Soonda country must be got from the Mahrattas, and though, if they do not evacuate it, they must be driven from it, it is very desirable to avoid hostilities with their forces under Goklah, or under any other chief. You will, therefore, avoid him if possible; and I request that all persons in either of the above-mentioned forts, or in any other of which you may be obliged to get possession by force, may be spared and sent to Goklah.

The person whom Purneah has appointed aumildar of Soonda, by name Poupagah, will wait upon you and will point out to you the borders of the Soonda district and of the Mahratta territory. You will be so kind as to be very careful not to enter the latter. If there should be any district respecting which there is a doubt or a difference of opinion whether it belongs to the Mahrattas, or is part of the territory of the late Sultaun, you will not enter it; but let me know all the circumstances respecting it.

After you will have got possession of Budnaghur and Mundragoor, in case there should be no other post of consequence in the Soonda country, it will be advisable that you should take up a position between them, and that you should get possession of the inferior posts, either by means of the Rajah's troops or by small detachments of those of the Company. This, however, depends upon the position and strength of Goklah's force. If you find that he is in strength and does not retire, you will, of course, run no risk by detaching any part of your forces. There

is a post in Soonda called Soopah,* which lies towards Goa: as it is much out of the way, it is desirable that it should not be attacked till I cross the Werdah.

You will be so kind as to leave the persons on the Werdah, who, I understand from Colonel Dalrymple, have made a bridge of boats over which he has passed. This they must keep in repair till the army comes up.

I shall march from hence to-morrow, and shall reach the Werdah I hope by the 23rd or 24th. I shall proceed by Shikarpoor. Let me know the name of the place where Colonel Dalrymple crossed the river.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[201.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew.*

SIR, 18th Sept., 1799.

The copy of my letter to the Secretary of Government, of the 10th instant, will have made you acquainted with everything that passed up to that day.

I have since been employed in crossing the Toombuddra; and having got everything across yesterday, I made a march this morning towards the Werdah. Colonel Dalrymple, with the Nizam's detachment and two regiments of cavalry (the 4th Regiment is following him), crossed that river on the 16th. Colonel Stevenson has joined him and has taken the command of the troops. The Polygar of Bilghy has surrendered his place to a detachment of the Bombay army.

I have instructed Colonel Stevenson to get possession of Budnaghur, which is four coss distant from the Werdah, and of Mundragoor, about nine distant from Budnaghur. These I understand to be the only posts of consequence in the Soonda country. After Colonel Stevenson will have got these, he is to take a position between them and wait till I join him.

I have this instant received the letter from the Secretary of Government, in which he informs me that Colonel Dalrymple will receive orders to march immediately for Hyderabad. As I

* *Soopah*, a town situated in an elevated, rocky tract of country, with luxuriant, well-watered valleys, is distant from Mangalore N. 170, and from Bombay S.E. 280 miles.—ED.

hope to be across the Werdah by the 23rd or 24th, Colonel Dalrymple will be able to commence his march at that time.

I have received no certain intelligence of Goklah's strength. Colonel Haliburton, who has been near him, informs me that he has 3000 horse, 6000 foot, and seven guns; but if he should be inclined to make any resistance, the army, even after Colonel Dalrymple's departure, will be more than a match for him. General Hartley has promised to send a corps to Nuggur, the arrival of which will enable me to move Captain M'Farlane and the troops from thence, together with five companies of Coast sepoys which were intended for Bilghy, into Soonda. These may be wanted there as garrisons.

The state of affairs to the north-westward has induced me to refrain from discharging the bullocks, although authorized by the Commander-in-Chief to do so; I have, however, arranged them in such a manner as that they may be discharged whenever Government may think proper.

All the draught-cattle are gone to Chittledroog with the carriage-cattle, carrying stores belonging to the heavy ordnance, or for which there was not employment with the army. There is a large number of carriage-cattle at Seringapatam, and some on the road between Seringapatam and Chittledroog, carrying musket ammunition.

All these can be discharged at a moment's notice, and it will by no means affect the movements of the light army.

153 of the country carts in the department of the Commissary of Provisions are to be discharged on the 1st of next month; 37 remain, and as they become empty they will be discharged and sent to the Carnatic.

We have at present with the army about forty days' arrack for the Europeans, at half allowance. After the Europeans under Colonel Carlisle and the 12th Regiment will have taken from Bangalore a sufficient supply, there will remain twelve casks of arrack, for which I have sent. I have besides sent sixteen carts, drawn by the Honourable Company's bullocks, to Kistnagherry, for as many casks of arrack. Exclusive of these last, and not providing for the 12th Regiment, you will observe that there is in Mysore arrack for only fifty-two days at half allowance; and as the Coromandel monsoon may be expected in about a month, I take the liberty of suggesting the propriety of sending a supply to Bangalore as soon as possible. This ought to be done

whether it may be necessary to keep the Europeans in the field or not.

The country carts, which I have above mentioned will be discharged, are unfit for service; but if other carriage cannot be procured, it will be better to have them stopped at Kistnagherry and to make use of them, than that the troops should be without arrack.

It will likewise be necessary to send up some treasure previous to the setting in of the monsoon.

The paymasters in camp and Seringapatam have about as much as will pay the troops in arrear for September. I don't imagine that they have any prospect of getting more money for bills on the Presidency, or in any other manner.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[202.] INSTRUCTIONS TO CAPTAIN DAVIS OF THE PIONEERS.

20th Sept., 1799.

You will proceed with 100 pioneers to-morrow in front of the army as far as you can with convenience towards the river Werdah, which you will reach near Anawooty.* Your march will be to Ondagunny nine miles, Togarsee nine miles, Anawooty twelve miles, to the river two miles.

The object in sending you forward is to construct a passage across the river between Anawooty and Jerrah, by which the guns and stores, &c., &c., can pass with ease.

For this purpose tent bamboos and rope, and artificers, will be furnished you, as you will see by the General Orders of this day.

You will purchase in the bazaars in camp, or wherever they can be got, chatties and small rope, which you will use in constructing the bridge.

What follows appears to me to be the best method of making this bridge. Pass two strong ropes across the river at the distance of about six feet from each other. Let them lie upon the surface of the water, and be staked to the bottom at

* *Anawooty*, or *Annawutty*, a town 180 miles N.W. of Seringapatam.—ED.

equal intervals. Tie with small rope the tent bamboos upon these strong ropes at the distance of four or six inches between each bamboo, and where the river is deep tie chatties to the tent bamboos. Cover the bamboos either with smaller bamboos, if they can be got, or with bushes and earth, so that the cattle, &c., may pass over.

My wish is to cross the river, and to encamp at Jerrah on the 23rd.

A company of sepoys will accompany you.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*To J. Uhthoff, Esq.** [203.]

SIR, Camp four miles north of Ondagunny, 21st Sept., 1799.

I arrived here this morning with the army on my way to get possession of the Soonda country, and I expect to be able to cross the Werdah, near Anawooty, on the 23rd or 24th. It it reported that the Mahrattas have withdrawn their troops from the greatest part of Soonda, having, as usual, previously plundered it of cattle, &c. &c.

The distance at which the army is likely to be from its source of supply, particularly of those articles of which our officers and European soldiers have most need, induces me to look towards Goa for some of them, and to trouble you upon this subject.

What we shall principally want is Batavia or Colombo arrack for the soldiers, and wine for the officers. You will much oblige me if you will take measures at Goa to have a large supply of each sent to us, and the merchants and others who may bring them may depend upon the most liberal treatment, or, in short, any for which you may agree with them.

In the course of my operations in Soonda, I intend to take possession of a place called Soopah, which is only thirty miles from Goa. I shall be obliged to you if, as soon as you hear that I have got a post there, you will send to it whatever of the above-mentioned articles you may have been able to get for the army.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* British envoy at Goa, a Portuguese settlement on the Malabar coast, temporarily occupied by the troops of the East India Company.—ED.

[204.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, 21st Sept., 1799.

I received and issued to the army on the 18th instant the orders of Government of the 4th, by which certain heads of departments mentioned therein are dismissed from their offices, and their establishments are discharged on the 30th instant.

As it appears to me essentially necessary not only to the army, but to the public, that these departments should exist as long as the troops remain in the field, a necessity to which Government and the Commander-in-Chief could not have adverted at the time of issuing that order, I shall endeavour to prevail upon the Paymaster, the Commissary of provisions, who likewise has charge of the grain department, the Deputy-Commissary of stores, and Deputy-Agent for draught and carriage cattle, to remain with the army at least till I receive further orders.

These gentlemen have expressed some anxiety respecting their establishments, all of which have served the public well, as the Commander-in-Chief and you know, and who will suffer great distress if they are to be discharged at the distance of 400 or 500 miles from the Presidency. Doubtless Government will not be unmindful of their services, and will extend to them its accustomed liberality.

I am informed that the Mahrattas have withdrawn their troops from the Soonda country, but have driven off cattle, &c. &c.

Colonel Stevenson advanced from Chandergooty on the 19th, and I hope to cross the Werdah, near Anawooty, on the 23rd.

Captain Malcolm writes that the Polygar of Bullum has sent to him the persons who murdered the aumildar at Oostara, and I expect to hear that he or Captain Campbell will have put the Rajah's troops and aumildar in possession of Munserabad. Everything there seems settled.

I acquainted you in a former letter that I had sent a detachment against Gurdangherry. I have just heard from Lieutenant Lindsay, who commanded it, that the killadar had given up to him the fort, and that the people of the country were returning to their habitations.

If it be the wish of Government that the 12th should remain in the Mysore country till after the Carnatic monsoon, it will be expedient to remove them from Bangalore; as at the present moment it will be very inconvenient to take out of Major Cup-

page's hands the command which he has held with such advantage to the public, at the same time that it will not be proper to keep it from Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, if he should remain long at Bangalore.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Sherbrooke. [205.]

Camp four miles north of Ondagunny,
21st Sept., 1799.

DEAR SHERBROOKE,

I have received your letter of the 16th. The only objection I have to giving the Scotch brigade so much of the yard is, that we shall have to lodge so many people in the palace that I am afraid we shall not find yards for them all equally spacious. However, I am by no means wedded to my own opinion: if the building of the wall can be delayed till I return, let it be so; if it cannot be delayed without inconvenience, let it be built where you propose.

My reason for having one entrance to the barracks was, that Scott proposed that it should be so constructed. If two are wished, let them have two. If they have the large yard proposed, the door K must be opened for the scavengers.

My operations on this side will, I am afraid, keep me away from Seringapatam till towards the middle of October; however, as I hear the Mahrattas have retired, I hope to get there at that time certainly.

Tell Skelley that I would give him leave, only that the truth is I have not the power which I have assumed of giving leave to officers to quit my district. I will send his application to the Commander-in-Chief, who alone can give him the leave he requires.

I promised Major Shee some time ago that Irwin should go to the light infantry. He, however, is not a lieutenant. I'll try what can be done for* when I return.

I desired Gordon to show you the letter I wrote to him about his leave. If he has quitted the garrison without your consent, he has behaved most improperly, and so I shall inform him. He has the leave of Government.

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

I have desired Quin to pay everybody as usual, and I have sent him orders for money for that purpose.

Shawe has not got the command of Bangalore. He is only halted there till I see whether I want him.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[206.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, 22nd Sept., 1799.

I have the honour to enclose two letters which I have received from Doonda Punt Goklah. Colonel Stevenson writes me word that the Mahratta troops have been withdrawn from all the posts in Soonda; that he has occupied some of them, and has given orders that possession may be taken of others. A person calling himself the Rajah of Soonda had put peons in some of the forts as soon as the Mahrattas were withdrawn. I have ordered Colonel Stevenson to turn them out, to take from them, and destroy, their arms, and to desire the Rajah of Soonda to come to my camp to state his claims to Purneah. This he had before been desired to do by Captain Munro, and had received a cowle from Purneah.

Purneah's aumildars have entered Soonda, and have commenced their settlement of the country.

Thus it appears that all the objects which I had in view in the design which I had formed of crossing the Werdah have been accomplished. Therefore, although I have constructed a bridge over it for foot passengers and bullocks, the difficulties of dragging over my wheel-carriages, the inconvenience of the length of communication with the countries on the other side of the Toombuddra, from whence the supplies for the European troops must come, that of bringing them through the close and jungly Bednore country, and the difficulty in crossing them over two rivers not fordable, have induced me to determine to remain with the army on this side of the Werdah, at least till I see some necessity for passing it.

Colonel Dalrymple will, I hope, cross it near Anawooty on the 24th on his way towards Hyderabad. I shall send a battalion of Bengal sepoys to Colonel Stevenson to-morrow.

I have ordered Captain M'Farlane with the troops now at

Nuggur to move forward as soon as a battalion of Bombay sepoys which General Hartley has promised to send will arrive there. Captain M'Farlane's battalion, and the five companies of the 1st of the 1st now in Soonda, will be sufficient to garrison all the posts in that province, and I shall then draw in the 2nd Bengal Volunteers.

I hear from Captain Campbell of the 74th that, although the Polygar of Bullum had given up to Captain Malcolm of the Bengal Volunteers the murderers of the aumildar at Oostara, he had not admitted the troops into Munserabad. Captain Campbell had therefore determined to cross the Hemavutty on the 19th instant, and to attack him in his place.

I enclose a third letter received this day from Doonda Punt Goklah, with the vakeels from the late Tippoo Sultaun to the Peshwah, who had been detained and plundered by the Mahrattas on the frontier.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [207.]

SIR, Camp five miles north of Togarsee, 22nd Sept., 1799.

I have received your letters of the 20th and 21st.

The province of Soonda and those possessions of the late Tippoo Sultaun held hitherto by Goklah and the Mahrattas are to be given over to Purneah's aumildars, and the strong places are to be garrisoned by the Honourable Company's troops and those of the Rajah of Mysore.

I know nothing about the Soonda Rajah excepting that there is a person calling himself so, who was desired to come to head quarters, and who received a cowle from Purneah for that purpose. I beg that you will be so kind as to order his peons to be disarmed and to be turned out of the forts, and their arms to be destroyed.

Inform the Soonda Rajah that if he have any claims, he must come to Purneah to state them.

I have just received a civil letter from Goklah, in which he says that he has withdrawn his troops from Soonda, in order that it may be occupied by those of the Honourable Company.

I am happy to hear that you have found that he has done so. This circumstance, and a consideration of the distance from which the supplies for the European troops must come, and of the difficulties attending the passage of two rivers not fordable, have induced me to determine to keep the main body of the army on this side of the Werdah, at least for some time. I shall, however, send across the Werdah the 3rd battalion of Bengal Volunteers with its guns, in order to enable you to effect those objects which I am about to state to you.

The letter from Government to Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple, of the 12th instant, will have shown the necessity that his detachment should be withdrawn from Soonda. As soon as convenient after you will have received this letter, you will give orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple to begin his march. I have written him a letter respecting the route which he will be obliged to take.

Captain Tetley, of the Bengal Volunteers, will receive orders to relieve the company of Native Infantry belonging to Colonel Dalrymple's detachment at Budnaghur, and afterwards to join you between that place and Mundragoor.

As soon as Captain Tetley will have joined you, I request that you will relieve the detachment of Coast sepoys at Mundragoor with a similar number of his battalion, and that you will send forward the five companies of Coast sepoys, the two troops and two guns, to get possession of Soopah. There they are to remain; the two troops to return to join you.

I imagine that the road by which these five companies will march is by Soonda and Hullihall.* They will take possession of these places and give them over to the aumildar.

The cavalry and any part of Captain Tetley's battalion that may not be detached may remain at some convenient situation between Mundragoor and Budnaghur. I hope that it will be across the river to-morrow.

I have written to Mr. Uhthoff at Goa, to request that he will endeavour to prevail upon the traders there to bring supplies for the European officers and soldiers from thence to the army by Soopah. I beg that you will desire the officer proceeding there to communicate with Mr. Uhthoff as soon as possible after he

* *Hullihall*, a town and fort in N. Canara, 19 miles W.S.W. of Darwar. —ED.

will arrive there, and to assist with small guards any traders that may wish to come to the army. Soopah is about thirty miles from Goa.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [208.]

SIR, 24th Sept., 1799.

I have received yours of the 22nd.

I yesterday gave orders that 200 brinjarries should be sent from hence to your camp. They are gone across the river this morning, and will, I trust, give you a timely supply. I have also spoken to Purneah respecting the necessity of collecting supplies for your detachment, and he has promised that you shall want nothing which the country can afford as soon as the Rajah of Soonda's peons will suffer his aumildars to settle it. I cannot promise you gram, as there is none in this country, and it is inconvenient to bring it from the right bank of the Toombuddra. It has occurred to me that these countries are not fit for cavalry. It does not appear possible for them to act with effect at all times, and it is difficult to procure supplies for the horses. Therefore, as soon as the aumildar has taken possession of the country, I intend to draw in the cavalry.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Draft of a Letter to Colonel Close.** [209.]

Anawooty, 24th Sept., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 17th, and I am happy to find that we have a prospect of seeing you soon.

I have written to Seringapatam to desire that your baggage may be put into my house and taken care of. The sick and wounded are still in the Laal Baug, and their cook-boys and followers of all descriptions have made sad havoc in the garden. That will, however, undoubtedly be the best place for you, and I have written to desire that the soldiers may be removed from

* Appointed Political Resident in Mysore.—ED.

it if possible. In the mean time you will do well to take up your abode with me.

The Mahrattas have withdrawn from Soonda. I have, therefore, determined to remain on this side of the Werdah with the main body of the army till the country is settled, although I have made a good bridge over that river. To this I have been induced by considerations of convenience for supplies for the Europeans, as well as by a desire to do no more injury to the country than is necessary.

Stevenson is encamped about twenty miles from hence at Pollah, about three miles from the Mahratta post at Haungul, with three regiments of cavalry and one battalion of Bengal sepoys which I sent to him. It is so difficult to procure gram for the cavalry, that I intend to draw them in as soon as the aumildars will have got good hold of the country, and I think that, for the present, I'll put the Native cavalry at Shikarpoor. This country, in general, is not fit for them. There is much paddy ground and jungle. The roads are confined, the villages surrounded by jungle, and it is difficult to find a hard and dry spot anywhere sufficiently large for a camp. There is no gram in it. If we are to have cavalry in Mysore, it ought to be on the right bank of the Toombuddra, near Hooley Honore.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[210.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver.*

SIR, Chittledroog, 24th Sept., 1799.

I beg that you will instruct Mr. Franks as follows:

All the draught and carriage bullocks in the hire of the Honourable Company at Chittledroog are to be mustered by him as soon as possible after the receipt of this letter. They are to be discharged from the Company's service on the 1st of October. According to the muster which Mr. Franks will take of them, the owners are to be paid by him one pagoda for each draught or carriage bullock. They are then to proceed to Kistnagherry, where they will be met by Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas, or his principal servant, who will settle accounts with them. Mr. Franks will give them the regular certificate of the muster taken; likewise, one of the money paid to them. He will inform the maistries that they will be allowed pay for their cattle to carry

them to the place where they were hired, reckoning their march at fifteen miles each day.

The bullocks of Captain Robertson's corps having been hired by Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Franks has nothing to do with them. They are to remain with that corps till further orders.

Money will leave camp to-morrow morning to enable Mr. Franks to pay the sums above mentioned to the bullock maistries, and it is hoped that it will arrive at Chittledroog in time.

In case the bullocks employed in carrying musket and carbine ammunition from Seringapatam should not arrive at Chittledroog before the 1st, they are to be mustered and discharged as soon afterwards as possible. Their maistries are to receive a pagoda for each, and are to carry the certificates as ordered for the others, together with another certificate stating the day on which they were discharged from the service.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Sherbrooke. [211.]

24th Sept., 1799.

Immediately upon the receipt of this letter, I request that you will order Captain Ogg to muster all the bullocks in the hire of the Honourable Company now at Seringapatam. They are all to be discharged from the Honourable Company's service on the 1st of October. The paymaster at Seringapatam is to pay the maistries one pagoda on account for each bullock which will be produced at the muster, and they are then to be sent off to Kistnagherry, where they will be met by Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas, or his principal servant, who will settle all accounts with them. The regular certificate of the muster taken, and of the money paid to them, must be given to the maistries, and the paymaster will inform them that they will be allowed pay for their bullocks until they can arrive at the place where they were hired, reckoning their march thither at the rate of fifteen miles per day.

Orders are sent to Chittledroog to give the advance, and discharge the bullocks sent there with musket and carbine ammunition.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[212.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, 24th Sept., 1799.

As all matters remain quiet on the northern frontier, I have determined to discharge all the hired bullocks in the service of the Honourable Company on the 1st of October, excepting such as are actually employed with corps and departments in camp or with corps at present in garrison, but which, from the situation of the country, may be called into the field. I shall hereafter send you an account of the numbers which will remain in the service after the 1st of October.

I had collected at Chittledroog all the hired draught cattle and carriage cattle which had been employed in the carriage of stores to the northward and to Simoga. These I had given in charge to Mr. Deputy Commissary Franks. There remained at Seringapatam about 4000. Some of the maistries, particularly those who brought bullocks from the southward, are in debt to Government. Nearly all the others have been paid for August, and some of them are in debt for rice lost, &c., &c.

I have ordered Mr. Franks to muster all the bullocks at Chittledroog, and Captain Ogg those at Seringapatam. Money has been sent from camp to enable Mr. Franks to pay the maistries one pagoda on account for each bullock mustered at Chittledroog, and the paymaster has been ordered to pay those mustered at Seringapatam the same sum. The bullocks are then to be discharged on the 1st of October, and sent to Kistnagherry, where Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas will meet the maistries and settle all their accounts. I have desired Mr. Franks and the paymaster at Seringapatam to inform the maistries that they will receive pay for their bullocks to carry them to the place where they were hired, reckoning their march thither at the rate of fifteen miles each day from the 1st of October.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[213.] INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAPTAIN BLAIR, OF THE ENGINEERS.

You will be so kind as to examine and report upon the forts of Budnaghur, Mundragoor, Hullihall, Soopah, Sercey, and Soonda, all in the province of Soonda, on the Mahratta frontier.

You will state particularly their relative situation, with and distances from each other, and, as nearly as you can find out, from the Mahratta frontier.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Captain Macaulay. [214.]

Mundragoor [Mudnagoor], 28th Sept., 1799.

The road between Budnaghur and this place is nearly a perpetual jungle; where there is no jungle there is but little cultivation. The fields appear to have been cultivated formerly, but now there appears nothing but wild paddy and strong grass. The soil is finer even than that in the Bednore country, and we have had more rain than we had there. Mundragoor is a fort of the same kind with all those which we have seen in this country, only rather larger and better built. The roof over the wall is in excellent order. Goklah attacked the fort after the fall of Seringapatam, and made a breach in the upper part of the wall near the gateway, and burnt the gate. If it should be thought advisable to have a post of ours in this country, this appears to me the best place for it. The fort can easily be cleaned out and cleared of all the trees and wild grass growing in it, and then it is possible that it may not be unwholesome. Near the fort the country is more open than in other parts. Goklah has carried off from hence, and indeed from the whole province, the majority of the people, all the ploughs and all the property. There are two large pettahs near this fort, in which he has left scarcely anything.

I think that it would be proper to write Goklah a letter to tell him that he must have driven off the people because the Soonda Rajah, an usurper, was about to take possession of the province, but that as it now belongs to us, he ought to suffer them all to return to their villages. He, it is said, is gone to some place at a considerable distance, but that our Soonda people are at present detained in the jaghire of Ball Kishen, the relation of Pursheram Bhow. If you think letters to them would have a good effect, or rather would not have a bad one, have them written in my name and sent. The Soonda Rajah is at Soonda, and, as well as the *Jungle Nabob*, will be sent to camp.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[215.] *Draft of a Letter to Captain Macaulay.*

29th Sept., 1799.

I have just received a letter from Colonel Sentleger, by which it appears that he has met with some opposition at a village called Samaranee, about two coss on this side of Hullihall; but he does not state whether from Mahrattas or the peons of the Soonda Rajah. I rather believe from the former. He is himself slightly wounded, has lost 3 sepoys killed and 18 wounded. He says that, for his future operations, he will want rice, and musket and 6-pounder ammunition. With regard to the former, I have written to Stevenson's camp to desire that the brinjarries which I had sent there before I left the army may be forwarded immediately. I know that they had not been emptied, and were not likely to be called upon when I was in that camp. Tetley's battalion, with forty rounds per man and two tumbrils full of 6-pounder ammunition, will be at Samaranee either to-morrow or next day; but I shall be glad to have some musket ammunition forwarded with some rice to Stevenson's camp as soon as possible. If a steady European belonging to the store department could be sent with a tumbril of 6-pounder ammunition likewise, it would be a great object; but it must not be sent excepting in charge of a European, as no native has perseverance to bring a wheel-carriage through these bad roads, jungles, swamps, &c., &c. Communicate this letter to Colonel Harness, and tell him that I shall be obliged to him if he will give orders for what I have above mentioned. It appears by Colonel Sentleger's letter that the post at Samaranee is not surrounded by a wall, but by a thick hedge and barricade; that the houses in the village were filled with people who fired through loop-holes in their walls; that the action with them lasted about two hours, when the post was carried, and almost everybody who had been in it was put to death.

Colonel Sentleger did not (as it appears) intend to advance upon Hullihall till joined by Captain Tetley's battalion, and I shall be with them by that time myself.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General. [216.]

SIR, 30th Sept., 1799.

The copy of my letter to the Secretary of Government, of the 22nd, which I sent to you, will have informed you that I had received intelligence that the Mahrattas had been withdrawn from the province of Soonda.

I ordered Colonel Stevenson to send to the northward a detachment, consisting of six companies of the 1st of the 1st and two field-pieces, and the 4th Regiment of cavalry, to take possession of all the posts in Soonda as far as Soopah. At the same time I sent across the Werdah the 2nd battalion Bengal Volunteers, which was to get possession of the fort at Soonda, and then to join Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger at Hullihall, and proceed under his command to Soopah.

The killadar of Darwar,* Bappojee Scindia, had put a garrison into Hullihall consisting of 500 infantry and 100 horse, and about 300 men into a village called Samaranee, about two coss on this side of it.

Colonel Sentleger, upon coming to his ground yesterday at Samaranee, sent forward a troop under Lieutenant Mason to give cowle to the village. This troop was fired upon, and Lieutenant Mason's horse killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger then moved forward with a company, which was in advance with him, and a three-pounder, and was obliged to retire from the stockade in front of the village with some loss. The remainder of the infantry and cavalry then came up, and Colonel Sentleger, although wounded, repeated his attack, which he states lasted above two hours, when he carried the village, and a large number of the persons who had defended it were killed. I enclose a list of the killed and wounded of the Honourable Company's troops. Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger is wounded, but slightly.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger speaks highly of the conduct of the troops, and particularly mentions Lieutenant Macally, of the 1st of the 1st, and Lieutenant Mason, whom I had sent to do duty with the 4th Regiment of cavalry.

Last night some of the wounded men found their way to Hullihall, and this morning it was evacuated and taken possession of by Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger.

* *Darwar* or *Dharwar*, a strong mud fortress in a plain; 235 miles N.W. of Seringapatam, and 223 miles from Poonah.—ED.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger has much merit in having brought forward, with incredible expedition, his troops and guns through jungles, over swamps, by the worst roads that I have seen in India.

I left camp on the 26th instant, with an intention of looking at the posts in this province on the Mahratta frontier, of which I shall hereafter send you an account. The country is a continued jungle from the Werdah, with scarcely an inhabitant in the few villages which are seen.

The Mahrattas, but particularly Bappojee Scindia the killadar of Darwar, have driven off inhabitants and cattle, and have plundered the country of everything.

The army is encamped at Anawooty, on the other side of the Werdah, where I shall keep it until matters are completely settled in this province. The 1st and 2nd Regiments of cavalry are at Pallisem, between Budnaghur and Mundragoor.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[217.] *To Captain Campbell, 74th Regiment.*

SIR, 1st Oct., 1799.

I have received great satisfaction from the reports you have sent of your proceedings in the command with which I intrusted you, and I am convinced that had it been necessary to use force to get possession of the fort against which you were sent, its strength would not have kept your troops out of it. I beg that you will inform Captain Malcolm that I was happy to find that the preparations for passing the river, for escalading the fort, and for bursting the gates were in such forwardness when you joined him; and that I cannot but applaud his having called for assistance when he thought it necessary to carry the object intrusted to him, even although his share of the credit to be gained might thereby be diminished.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to the Secretary of Government. [218.]

Hullihall, 1st Oct., 1799.

I have received accounts from Captain Campbell, stating that he had crossed the Hemavutty on the 20th of September; that the Polygar made several attempts to induce him to delay his attack upon Munserabad, but that he marched to the fort on the 21st, found it abandoned by the Polygar and his troops, and that he took possession of it immediately. He describes it as a strong, well-built fort, in which he found several guns, ten of which, on excellent carriages, were on the works. On the 24th Captain Campbell marched to Ey Goor, the residence of the Polygar, about seven miles from Munserabad. This place he found likewise abandoned and in flames. Captain Campbell was employed in putting some grain and ammunition into Munserabad, where he intended to leave a small garrison and to return with his detachment to join the army.

I imagine that the Polygar has fled to the Koorg country, where he was accustomed to take refuge formerly when he was pressed by the troops of the late Sultaun. I wrote to Mr. Mahony some time ago to state the probability that he would take this step, and to request that, if he did so, he would urge the Rajah to give him up as a disturber of the Government of one of the allies of the Company. This he promised to do, and I hope to hear that the Polygar is arrested.

I arrived here this morning. I quitted the army on the 26th of September, in order to visit the posts in this province on the Mahratta frontier, of which I shall hereafter send an account to Government. The Mahrattas have entirely left the country. Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger, with the 4th Regiment of cavalry, a detachment of the 1st of the 1st, and two 6 and two 3-pounders, attacked a force belonging to the garrison of Darwar, posted in the village of Samaranee (who fired upon his advanced guard, which was about to give cowle), and killed and wounded a large number of them, among the former of whom was their chief, with some loss on his side. The consequence was that Hullihall was evacuated immediately, and the Kittoor * Polygar withdrew some people whom he had posted

* *Kittoor*, a fortified town 19 miles W.N.W. of Darwar, and 26 miles S.E. of Belgaum, was formerly a place of considerable extent and splendour. —ED.

in the Honourable Company's territories. I conclude that the Commander-in-Chief will lay before Government the details of this affair, which I have transmitted to him. I have sent in to the killadar of Darwar four prisoners, who were taken upon this occasion, with a letter stating that the obstinacy of his people, and their disobedience to the orders which they must have received from Sree Munt, had obliged Colonel Sentleger to attack them, in order to get possession of the territory which belonged to us; that I trusted that his sense of the friendship which subsisted between the Honourable Company and the Mahratta state would induce him to take measures which would preclude the necessity of hostility in future, and that he would order to be released the ryots and others belonging to this province, who I understood were in confinement in the Mahratta country.

From the river Werdah to this place (eighty miles) the country is a continued jungle. The Mahrattas have driven off the inhabitants who were in the few villages that are seen. On the day after to-morrow I hope to be in possession of Soopah, the only post not held by us. It is garrisoned by the peons of the Soonda Rajah.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[219.] *To Major Macaulay.*

DEAR MACAULAY, Hullihall, 1st Oct., 1799.

I received your letter of the 28th last night, and I am very much obliged to you for the news. I think it probable that the French may have sent a fleet to India; but it does not appear that Manesty has any intelligence that they have done so, and therefore it is to be supposed that the report originates in the brain of some Bombay politician.

I have sent orders respecting tents for Close. I don't know what to do for carriage for them, as all our bullocks are to be discharged this day. I have desired Barclay to try whether he can't get a sufficiency from the grain department to enable him to send Close some camels or elephants.

I saw the village of Samaranee this morning; it is large and well stockaded. This is but a bad fort, with a large and a fine pettah, and we should have made ourselves masters of both with

the greatest ease. The country from Turrikerra to this place is more open, and, particularly from Samaranee, is more cultivated, than any that I have seen in this province. Darwar is about seven coss from hence, nearly east. It appears that the affair at Samaranee made much impression: as soon as the wounded people came in, the infantry went off, and the cavalry followed in the morning. The fort has all the appearance of a place from whence a flight had been made; rice, salt, chatties, clothes, arms, sticks, &c. &c., are lying scattered about the choultries, guard-houses, and habitations of the sepoys, and they had not time to plunder the pettah, although they had driven away many of the inhabitants. This country proves what a curse to human nature the Mahratta government and neighbourhood is.

Colonel Sentleger moves towards Soopah to-morrow. Tetley is not yet come up, nor have I heard of him since he informed me that he had prepared his scaling ladders to take the dismantled fort of Soonda. I heard a gun this morning, which was probably his signal of distress in the jungle.

I shall go on to Soopah to-morrow, and shall order Tetley to remain here. This place, Mundragoor, and Soopah must be occupied by our troops if we intend to make anything of the province of Soonda.

Sentleger has got four prisoners, whom I am going to send into Darwar with a letter to the killadar, in which I shall inform him that the obstinacy of his people and their disobedience of the orders of Sree Munt obliged our people to attack them at Samaranee in order to obtain possession of the country which belongs to us; that I send back some of them, and that I am sorry to inform him that many others have been killed in the action. I shall at the same time give him a hint about suffering the ryots, &c., to return to their habitations.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Major Macaulay. [220.]

Half way to Soopah, 2nd Oct., 1799.

I understand from Purneah that Kistnapah Naig is gone with 2000 men into the Koorg country, and that the Koorg Rajah has

it in his power to catch him if he pleases. I wish that you would write him a letter upon the subject. I intend to return to Seringapatam through the Bul country, and if I find that we get Soopah without difficulty to-morrow, I shall send orders for the army to march to Shikarpoor, and there remain for a day or two till I can come near them. I shall return from Soopah by Soonda, and from thence to Chandergooty. Hereafter I will give you the details of my march.

No news from Tetley. Our march this day was nearly west. The country near Hullihall open, cultivated, and beautiful; afterwards the road came through the thickest jungle that I have seen yet. I am now upon the river which runs by Soopah.

In my opinion this country ought to be under the commanding officer below the Ghauts if we are to have troops in it. The road from the province of Bednore to Hullihall, which is our most northern post, and where we ought to have a garrison, is necessarily along the Mahratta frontier, and I believe in one place crosses the Mahratta territory. I passed within twenty yards of a Mahratta village, guarded by their peons. It will be impossible to send money, stores, &c., to our people in this part of the province unless with strong escorts, which we can't well afford. If there is a communication with Soopah from the lower country, it would be much better that the commanding officer of the new cantonment at Goa should have these swamps and jungles under him, as well as those below. Darwar is, I believe, north-east from Hullihall, instead of east, as I told you yesterday.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[221.] *Draft of a Letter to the Secretary of Government.*

4th Oct., 1799.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I took possession of the fort at Soopah yesterday without opposition. The peons of the Soonda Rajah, of which there had been many in the fort, quitted it on the day before, when they heard of the action with the Mahrattas at Samaranee. The people complain that they have been plundered, but the Soonda Rajah had not driven off the inhabitants, as he and the Mahrattas have in other parts of the province.

If I find it possible to collect a sufficiency of grain to secure

the subsistence of the troops, I shall leave here two companies of the 1st of the 1st, as this is a post of some consequence, upon which many villages depend, and which is distant only about twelve coss from the territories and seat of government of the Rajah of Kolapoor,* who is a plunderer of the first order. He has lately taken Dhoondiah into his service, and, I am informed, has killed Pursheram Bhow in an action which he has had with him.

I have ordered the 4th Regiment of cavalry to return to Hullihall, which is about thirty miles from hence, having found the road so bad that it was scarcely practicable for cavalry; and it appeared so difficult to bring forward the field-pieces of the 1st of the 1st, that when I found that my escort was received into the fort I ordered them to be taken to Hullihall with the 4th Regiment of cavalry. For the present, I intend that Budnaghur, Mundragoor, Hullihall, and Soopah shall be occupied by the 1st of the 1st and 1st of the 8th. The officers and the troops in general must remain under canvas, as there is no cover for them. As the country has been already plundered by the Mahrattas and the Rajah of Soonda, and as soon as the army is withdrawn they may again commence their depredations, and thereby render the subsistence of the troops extremely precarious, I have resolved to secure it by sending into the province of Soonda, and distributing to the different posts, a large proportion of the grain at present in charge of the grain department of the army. I have accordingly sent orders to have 600 loads of it passed over the Werdah, and sent forwards to Mundragoor, from whence it will be distributed.

It will be necessary for Government to come to some determination respecting this province. It is not in my power to give any account of its value, but it does not appear possible that it can for a length of time recover what it has suffered from the Mahrattas, &c., or that, even if it were in the state of cultivation in which it was formerly, it can pay the expense of the troops which must be employed to protect it. I am informed that it is a most unwholesome country to those who are not accustomed to it. But there are other circumstances relating

* *Kolapoor*, a Raj or State within the limits of the region popularly termed the Deccan, comprising an area of 3445 square miles, sloping from the Western Ghauts towards the level of Belgaum. Kolapoor, the chief town, is 130 miles S. from Poonah.—Ed.

to it, which it is particularly my duty to represent to Government. These are the length, the difficulty and precarious nature of the communication with the nearest post of consequence which I shall have in the Mysore country. That I shall suppose to be Bednore. From hence to Bednore is 230 miles at least, through jungles, over swamps, and by the worst roads that I have seen in India; 120 miles of this road are necessarily along the Mahratta frontier, which is distant from it about one coss; in one place the road goes about twenty yards from a Mahratta village, where their peons are stationed; and in all parts it is in the power of any plunderer of that nation to intercept our communication. If Government should be determined to keep this province, and to guard and defend it by means of the Company's troops (and I don't see in what other manner it can be kept), it would be much better to place it under the orders of the commanding officer in Canara, whose communication with it is shorter, less difficult, and perfectly secure. I find, upon inquiry, that there is a road from hence to Seedasheeghur* practicable at all seasons for cattle, and the distance between the two places only sixty miles. The detachment of General Matthews' army which took this place in the war of '80, advanced by this road. I doubt not that I shall find, upon inquiry at Soonda, that there is a road from thence to the lower country. If it be so, by means of Soonda and Soopah, it will be in the power of the commanding officer in Canara to communicate with the three posts upon the frontier, Budnaghur, Mundragoor, and Hullihall, without danger of interruption.

I enclose a sketch of the road from hence to the Werdah, which will elucidate what I have above mentioned. That from thence to Hullihall is through a very difficult country.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. I have sent orders for the army to fall back to Shikarpoor.

[222.] *To Joseph Uhthoff, Esq.*

SIR, Soopah, 4th Oct., 1799.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I took possession of this place yesterday, the peons of the Rajah of Soonda having

* *Seedasheeghur*, or *Seedashevaghur*, in N. Canara, 145 m. N.W. of Mangalore. —ED.

quitted it the day before. I attribute their having done so (without being forced) to an action which a detachment of our troops had with a part of the Mahratta garrison of Darwar, posted at a barricaded village called Samaranee, in which a large number of the latter were killed.

I shall leave here two companies of Native infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Marriott. I shall be obliged to you if you will endeavour to prevail upon the merchants at Goa to send him supplies of wine, &c., as at this distance from Madras he has but little chance of getting any from thence.

The army is 150 miles from hence, and it appears that Goa is 60. It is vain to hope to get any material supply from Goa, as well on account of the distance as of the badness and difficulty of the roads through the province of Soonda; I, therefore, shall trouble you only for the gentleman posted here.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIEUTENANT MARRIOTT, COMMANDING TWO COMPANIES OF INFANTRY IN THE FORT AT SOOPAH. [223.]

The aumildar has received orders to furnish you immediately with a sufficiency either of rice or paddy to supply your troops until I can send you a good supply from Hullihall. With what will come I will send you a letter stating what you are to pay for it.

It will be advisable that you should keep in the fort, if possible, at least forty days' grain. I beg that you will endeavour to ascertain the distance from Soopah to the nearest post of the Bombay army in the province of Canara, and that you will keep up a communication with the officer commanding it, as well as with the officer commanding at Hullihall. It is very desirable to know the distance from Soopah to Seedasheeghur, and whether the road is practicable for wheel carriages or for carriage cattle. You will let me know when you will have ascertained these points, and I will send you orders for the establishment of a tappall to them.

The Mahratta who is nearest to your post is the Rajah of Kolapoor. You will endeavour to ascertain the distance of his

nearest post, and of the seat of his government, from Soopah, what kind of road leads from one to the other, whether there are any obstacles upon it for the march of wheel carriages, or whether it is a road only for foot passengers or for cattle.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[224.] *To Major Macaulay.*

MY DEAR MACAULAY, Camp, 5th Oct., 1799.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Bappojee Scindia, which ought to be sent to Government. It is in answer to mine from Hullihall.

If I meet with the Soonda Rajah, I will do as you propose.

My letter to Government of yesterday will have shown you that it is very immaterial what is done with the country, provided it is not to be kept by the Madras army.

I have not been inattentive to the probable want of arrack; but I am glad to find by the return sent by Barclay that we have enough for fifty days with the army.

I have put two companies under Lieutenant Marriott into Soopah. It is a place like all the others, only upon an eminence, with two dry ditches. It is about 100 yards from one of the rivers, and about 20, at one point, from the other; the only difficulty that we should find in taking it would be getting over the river to it. It would be possible to bring guns of any size, but none without great labour.

I have instructed Marriott to make himself master of the direction of all the roads, &c., &c.; and I have desired Purneah to order the village-people to make a good road through the jungle from Hullihall to Soopah. We ought to have a road from Soopah to the sea.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[225.] *To Josiah Webbe, Esq.*

MY DEAR WEBBE, 7th Oct., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 25th September, and I shall certainly do everything in my power to avoid calling upon the

Presidency for money. I have already ordered bullocks to Seringapatam, and tumbrils to be prepared there to transport the Soolacky rupees and gold mohurs to the army, if necessary. I shall be obliged to you if you will send me an official order to issue them at a discount.

I have lately had hopes that we shall soon receive something from Purneah. A quantity of rain has fallen, and he has told me within these few days that the crop in Mysore will be plentiful. These supplies, and what we may expect for bills upon the Presidency at the shorter dates, will, I think, enable us to go on for some time without calling upon the Presidency.

I have nothing to add to my public letters respecting this country. In no one point of view is it deserving the attention of the Company; but if it be kept, it must be by the Bombay troops. To us it is no frontier, not even for Canara; it is difficult to communicate with it; it would be impossible to move a body of troops through it to attack the Mahrattas; it exposes us to perpetual warfare with freebooters; and it will not give a sufficiency of revenue to pay the expense of keeping it.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAPTAIN TETLEY. [226.]

Samaranee, 7th Oct., 1799.

You will remain with the battalion under your command, and that part of the 1st of the 1st which will arrive this day, at Hullihall, while you are relieved by Captain M'Farlane's battalion; you will then hand over to him the command and these instructions, and proceed to join the army with your own battalion and its field-pieces, near Shikarpoor, by a route which Captain Colebrooke will give you: you will take with you the detachments of your regiments which you will find at Mundragoor and Budnaghur. That at present at Soonda will join you.

Hullihall is about twenty miles from Darwar, where there is a Mahratta garrison under the command of Bappojee Scindia. There is besides a Mahratta army in motion on the frontiers, under the command of, and belonging to, the Kolapoor Rajah and the plunderer Dhoondiah; and another under the orders of

Doonda Punt Goklah. There are others of inferior note belonging to the Polygar of Kittoor, &c., &c. The object of all these is to plunder the country, but there is no reason to believe that they have designs of hostility against the Company. You will, however, watch their motions; and although you will cautiously avoid to enter the Mahratta territory, you will instantly attack in such force as will insure you success whatever body of Mahrattas or other troops may presume to enter, or to appear in arms in the Company's territory, and you will destroy as many of them as you can.

Orders will be given to the aumildar to throw a supply of grain into Hullihall, Mundragoor, and Soopah. You will be so kind as to report to me the progress which he makes in doing so. A large number of brinjarries, loaded with grain of different kinds, have been ordered from the camp at Pollum to Mundragoor, where they will wait your orders. There is also a supply of musket and 6-pounder ammunition at the same place. A supply of rice is wanted immediately at Soopah, which you will take care to send off as soon as possible. The officer in command there will communicate to you his wants of musket ammunition, &c.; of musket ammunition he has at present 1500 rounds, besides what the men have in their pouches.

Instructions will be sent to Captain M'Farlane respecting some rice belonging to the grain department, which he will bring with him.

Arthur Wellesley.

[227.] *To Captain M'Farlane.*

Sir, Samaranee, 7th Oct., 1799.

Captain Barclay will have communicated to you my wish that you should proceed to Mundragoor, and I now request that you will move on to Hullihall, where, as you will perceive by the enclosed copy of my instructions to Captain Tetley, you are to relieve him.

It is my intention that you should command in the Soonda country, and you will be so kind as to consider those instructions, and what is contained in this letter, as your guide.

I think that it will be advisable to keep in Budnaghur a small detachment of the Company's troops, as well to give con-

fidence to the people of the country, as to insure the communication with the province of Bednore: you will therefore relieve the Jemadar's party of the Bengal volunteers with a similar party of your battalion.

There are a company of sepoys in Mundragoor under Lieutenant Kelly, a detachment with Lieutenant Lindsay, and two detachments of Bengal sepoys; the latter are to join the army with their battalion, and you will judge whether it will be necessary that the whole of the former should be stationed at Mundragoor. This post you will find very important as a point of communication; as, in fact, the road from the province of Bednore goes along the Mahratta frontier, which is never distant from it more than three miles.

At Hullihall I recommend it to you to keep collected everything which is not employed in the posts above-mentioned and in Soopah. You will perceive how Hullihall is situated with respect to the Mahratta frontier. The country has been plundered and depopulated by the Mahrattas, and by every freebooter in this part of India who could prevail upon people to follow his fortunes. The consequence is, that but little is to be found in it. The first effect of any serious hostility on the part of the Mahrattas, or of the irruption of any freebooter, would be, that you would be straitened in your supplies, and that, in all probability, you would get nothing from the country. In order to avoid this evil, I have ordered into the province a large number of brinjarries, and 300 loads of rice from the grain department; you will use the former as you may think proper, but I strongly recommend that the latter may be placed (in such proportions as you may think fit) in Mundragoor, Hullihall and Soopah. The aumildar has received orders to supply those places with grain, but we all know that no great dependence in these objects is to be placed on the natives; and even supposing that you could rely upon him, the crop now on the ground must be reaped before he can supply a grain. You must, therefore, depend upon the bazaars for your daily and usual supply, and upon what you will bring with you for the time when you will be hard pressed.

I am at present on my way to Soonda, from whence I will let you know whether it is necessary that a company of Bengal sepoys now there should be relieved. I rather believe that there is no necessity to have any of our troops there. Some of

the Rajah's peons are there, as well as in other places, and I think that you will find them of use. You will find no cover for your troops at Hullihall, and I shall therefore immediately take measures for sending to your battalion and to the 1st of the 1st some camp equipage, for which I beg that you will send the indents on the stores at Chittledroog. You will have fine weather for the next six months, and before the rains set in, Government, in all probability, will have determined what is to be done with the troops stationed in this country.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[228.] *To Major Macaulay.*

MY DEAR MACAULAY, Samaranee, 7th Oct., 1799.

I am afraid you will have been disappointed in my account of Soopah, but not more than I was when I saw it. I am, however, glad that I have been there. I have settled with Purneah to make a good road from thence to the Canara country towards Seedasheeghur, and I will communicate with Munro upon the subject, in order that we may have one from the sea to meet it. I have written to Major Browne to desire that he will arrest the minister, and keep him till he receives instructions respecting him from Captain Munro.

They all act *without master's knowledge* in the Mahratta country; you will have seen that Bappojee Scindia has done so as well as Goklah.

Purneah says that the death of Pursheram Bhow, and the probability that the Kolapoor Rajah will attack him next, will induce Goklah to court us for some time. It appears that we shall have a quiet time of it on this frontier.

I intend to leave the largest part of a regiment at Hullihall, as being the best place for subsistence, the nearest to Darwar, and the best situated upon the whole for watching the plunderers on the frontier. Mundragoor is rather too far from the northern part of it, being three long marches from Hullihall.

A vakeel from the Kittoor Polygar has come in with some story about a village, a jaghire, five hundred horse, and four hundred foot. I have told him that he is a subject of the

Peshwah's, that I will have nothing to do with him, and that he must apply to the head of his own government if he has anything to say to ours.

From a letter from Government I judge it to be the intention to dispose of the 12th in the Carnatic; but if they remain in Mysore, we must find a place for them. I have received a growl and a list of grievances from Shawe.

I have given instructions to Tetley, which are to be handed to M'Farlane, to attack any body of troops that may be assembled in the province of Soonda, and to destroy as many of them as he can. As I understand that the Nizam's people are plundering on the borders near Sera, I think that it would be advisable to tell them the history of the Mahratta detachment at Samaranee, and leave it to them to apply it.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Hartley. [229.]

SIR, Camp in the province of Soonda, 8th Oct., 1799.

After I had written to you on the 24th of September, I came into the province of Soonda, with an intention of seeing the posts which the troops were to occupy on the Mahratta frontier, of which I have since made the tour.

It appears that Bappojee Scindia, the killadar of Darwar, had ordered some troops, which he had placed in Samaranee and Hullihall in order to plunder the country, to maintain their posts against the British troops. Colonel Sentleger, with the 4th Regiment of cavalry and a detachment of the 1st of the 1st, attacked, on the 29th September, the village of Samaranee, which the Mahrattas had barricaded strongly, and carried it with some loss on our side. A number of the Mahrattas were killed, as well in the defence of the barricade as in their retreat from it when they were charged and cut to pieces by two troops of the 4th Regiment under Lieutenant Mason. Hullihall was evacuated that night, and our detachments have since met with no opposition either from the Mahrattas or the Rajah of Soonda. I have reason to believe that the action at Samaranee will have the best effects on the frontier with the numerous

contending banditti who are our neighbours. Each of them had been concerned in plundering and driving off the inhabitants from this country, but within these few days they have offered to send them back.

I have found the communication between my nearest post in Bednore and this country so difficult, and, as it is necessarily along the Mahratta frontier, so precarious, that it would be very desirable if the troops in this province were under the orders of the commanding officer in Canara, and depended upon the depôts below the Ghauts for their supplies of all kinds. As matters are situated at present, it is in the power of any plunderer on the Mahratta frontier to intercept our communications, and it may be depended upon that, on some day or other, there will be no want of inclination to do so.

At all events, I have desired the aumildars of the province to make a good road from Soopah (our most western post) to the borders of Canara, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Captain Munro to meet them. I understand that Soopah is not more than sixty miles from Seedasheeghur. It might be very convenient to the troops in this province to have a good road to the sea coast.

I am now on my return to join the army, which I have ordered to Shikarpoor, in the province of Bednore; and, as everything is now settled above the Ghauts, I shall order it into cantonments almost immediately.

As I understand that the three Bengal volunteer battalions are to remain some time in Mysore, I shall not want the battalion of Bombay sepoys which you were so kind as to send to Nuggur upon my requisition. As soon as I can relieve them I will send them down the Ghauts.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[230.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.*

Camp in the province of Soonda,
8th Oct., 1799.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

I conclude that Macaulay has made you acquainted with everything which has been passing in this country since I left the army on the 26th of last month: if he have not, I will send

you copies of my letters to Government, which will best explain everything. Sentleger's action at Samaranee has had the best effects. The killadar of Darwar has offered to send in the persons whom he had carried off from our country, and everything is as quiet as you could wish. For the present, I intend to leave here those parts of the 1st of the 1st and 1st of the 8th not employed in Bednore, amounting to about 1500 men. These will be fully sufficient; and the troops will be so uncomfortable, and the climate is reported to be so unwholesome, that I believe we must eventually withdraw them, and keep the country by means of the country peons.

We will talk over these matters when we meet, which, I hope, will be soon. I shall be at Soonda on the 10th, Chandergooty on the 12th, from whence I shall either join the army, or go to Nuggur, as Purneah may wish.

I propose to return to Seringapatam through the Bul country, with some of the troops which must go into garrison. Purneah wishes much to disarm the inhabitants there (in the Bul country), a measure which I conceive will tend much to preserve the peace.

I shall write nothing to Government respecting the future station of the troops till I see you, and I wish that you would turn over the subject in your mind. We must be strong on this side, and yet there is no place for our troops.

I believe I shall be able to get the sick out of the Laal Baug, and a trifling expense, which I shall order to be incurred, will clear it and render it habitable.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To P. Cherry, Esq., and duplicate to W. H. Gordon, Esq. [231.]

SIR, Camp, 9th Oct., 1799.

I have received a letter from the Secretary of Government, in which he conveys the orders of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council that I should urge you to transmit to the Military Paymaster-General your accounts as speedily as possible.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General, as well as the Governor [of Madras] in Council, have expressed the most anxious wishes, and have given to the Auditor-General the strongest

injunctions, to close all the accounts of the late war. This, as well as a sense of your duty, and of the advantages which you will derive from a speedy settlement of your accounts, will doubtless induce you to exert yourself to send them to the Paymaster-General at an early period.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[232.] *To J. Uhthoff, Esq.*

DEAR SIR, Sercey, 12th Oct., 1799.

I have just received your letter of the 28th September, which ought to have reached me many days ago. If it had, however, I don't think that I could have acted otherwise than I have acted in regard to the Rajah of Soonda. The friendship which I heard the Rajah of Koorg had for him, and the interest which it appeared that you had taken in his behalf, induced me to refrain from treating him as an enemy; on the contrary, I invited him to my camp (where, I believe, he now is) as a friend. He deserved to be treated as the worst of enemies: he and his people have plundered and destroyed wherever they have been, and I have to attribute to him principally the most disastrous and the most numerous scenes of human misery that I have ever had the misfortune to witness. I have been induced to order that his peons might be disarmed, as the only effectual means of preventing them from plundering the country; and I shall persist in the plan of suffering no persons in arms to appear in it who are not in the employment of the established Government, as the only method of preserving order, and of inducing the few persons who have habitations remaining to return to them. It is a matter of indifference in whose hands the government is placed, as it is almost literally true that, owing to the conduct of the Rajah of Soonda, and of different Mahratta chiefs who have made this country the scene of their predatory operations (but principally to that of the former), there is little in it to govern besides trees and wild beasts.

I am concerned to be obliged to make such a representation of a person in whose favour you have interested yourself; but truth obliges me to do it. Indeed, as you observe, his conduct in taking arms at all does not appear unexceptionable.

I am obliged to you for your letters, with which I hope you will favour me occasionally. I have little to communicate from this quarter. Since I have taken possession of the province of Soonda, and have found from the conduct of the neighbouring Mahratta chiefs that they have no intention of disturbing us (which they manifest by sending back the inhabitants whom they had driven away, and the property which they had carried off), I have ordered the army to fall back upon Shikarpoor; and I shall shortly place the greatest part of it in cantonments on the other side of the Toombuddra. I have been the more induced to take this step, because I learn that the loss sustained by the Mahrattas in the action at Samaranee was very considerable, and that it has made a great impression on all their chiefs.

I write to Sir William Clarke by this occasion.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*To Sir William Clarke.** [233.]

DEAR SIR, 12th Oct., 1799.

I have received, and am much obliged to you for, your letters of the 27th of September and 3rd of October, and am concerned that I could not go to Goa from Soopah. Mr. Uhthoff will acquaint you with my reasons. I have been lately making a tour of my posts upon the Mahratta frontier, with which it appears to me that the communication is very difficult and precarious. I am informed that there is a road from Goa to Soopah, which, as far as it lies in the territories subject to that settlement, is good and practicable for troops at all seasons; and I have given directions that that in the province of Soonda, which is a continuation of it, should be made equally good. There is another road from Seedasheeghur to Soopah, which, I am informed, is more easy than that from Goa, as the Ghauts are not so high in that part. I shall be obliged to you if you will endeavour to ascertain the nature of the road from Goa towards Soopah, as I think that it may be desirable hereafter to place the posts in that country under the commanding officer in the Canara country. I have already directed Lieutenant Marriott

* In command of a body of British troops stationed at Goa.—ED.

to make inquiries upon these subjects, and I will now desire him to communicate with you respecting them, and to give you the earliest intelligence of anything that may come to his knowledge.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[234.] *To Colonel Sherbrooke.*

MY DEAR SHERBROOKE, Camp at Shikarpoor, 17th Oct., 1799.

In one of your letters to me you talk of doolies for the regiment de Meuron and for the Scotch brigade; but I am afraid that you will find it impossible to procure bearers for them. For the latter the doolies and bearers of the 12th will answer; for the former you will do well to hire carts if they are to be got (which I believe they are not), and to fix doolies upon the carts. M'Intire may probably be able to contrive something with the old platform carts and doolies, for which you will indent for bullocks.

As soon as the 12th Regiment arrive, all their hired draught and carriage bullocks are to be mustered. They are then to be discharged according to the orders which I heretofore sent respecting discharging bullocks, excepting such as may be wanted to carry or draw provisions, tents, &c. &c., for either of the other regiments. These are to be sent with them, and when they arrive in the Carnatic orders will be given for discharging them.

Don't suffer the draught bullocks which I have ordered from the army for treasure to be applied to any other purpose on any account.

I wish that you would order the general hospital out of the Laal Baug palace, and let the sick go into the choultries near Hyder's tomb. Let the Laal Baug palace be cleared as you propose.

The army will cross the Toombuddra in a few days, and I am now fairly on my return to you.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[235.] *To the Secretary of the Military Board.*

SIR, 17th Oct., 1799.

I have to apologise to the Military Board for having so long omitted to send an answer to your letter of the 21st August,

which I thought unnecessary till I received your letter of the 4th instant, as I had been informed that the Board had passed the estimates respecting which I had given an opinion, of which they desired to know the grounds.

I am called upon to "state the particular reasons under which I conceived certain estimates to be erroneous," and "the grounds upon which I differ in opinion with the engineer in respect to the situation for the bridge across the ditch on the outside of the fort."

As I have not a plan of the place, nor with me at the present moment my memorandums respecting this proposed bridge, I must entreat the Board to excuse my deferring to send them my opinion upon it until I return to Seringapatam. I will not fail then to take the earliest opportunity of sending it.

I knew that Captain ——— got for nothing the materials for many of the works, that they were brought to the spot where they were used by the pioneers, &c., &c. I compared the amount of his estimates with the expense of similar works to individuals in some instances, and with similar works in other parts of India in others, considering and comparing the price of workmen and materials at Seringapatam with that at other places Upon the whole, I was induced to come to a conclusion that the amount of the estimates was too large, and I considered it my duty to communicate my opinion to the Military Board. Those, however, whose duty it is to pass a judgment upon these subjects have delivered a different opinion by passing the estimates, and I conclude that mine was erroneous. I erred in supposing that it was necessary that I should sign my name to the estimates; and, from a perusal of the regulations respecting public works, I am induced to believe that I have erred in imagining that a commanding officer of a strong place has anything to do with its fortifications, excepting when a new work is to be built to state its necessity. It appears that Government have intended that they should be solely under the direction of the engineer. If I have erred, however, I must beg to observe that it has been in consequence of my desire to render a service to the public, that I made known to the Military Board what appeared to me to be improper, because I could find no other remedy for it, and by no means because I had a wish to injure an officer for whom, as an individual I have great respect.

In regard to the copy of the proceedings of the Committee of Survey which I transmitted to you, I beg to observe that I sent it, not as an original paper, but as a collateral proof of Captain ———'s neglect. This neglect is sufficiently proved by the one fact, that the breach at Seringapatam is open at this day. The present chief engineer built up the breaches at Bangalore in five weeks. I am sorry that the Committee was not composed of the persons ordered by the regulations to sit on it; but I must inform you that I was particularly ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to assemble the members who composed it, and that the mode of proceeding adopted was particularly pointed out by him in a letter from his secretary, the present Adjutant-General. It is difficult, if not impossible, at this distance from Seringapatam, and after so many months have elapsed, to prove that every work which was examined was precisely in the state in which it was reported. The respectability of the members who sat upon the Committee with me can be the only answer to Captain ———'s letter. I believe them to be as incapable, as I know myself to be, of reporting to the Commander-in-Chief anything that was not as they represented it.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

Seringapatam, 19th Oct., 1799.*

[236.] REPORT OF WHAT IS NECESSARY TO BE DONE IN THE PRESENT STATE OF THE UNFINISHED WORKS IN SERINGAPATAM, AND WHAT APPEARS TO BE REQUISITE FOR PUTTING THE FORT INTO A RESPECTABLE STATE OF DEFENCE.

The improvements required to the unfinished parts of the fortifications are as follows:

1st. To make communications across the inner ditch to the rampart and upon the works, for the convenience of the artillery and the troops, which will require to have raised the lower part

* This Report, which is taken from one of the draft letter books of 1799, commences in the handwriting of a clerk, and is continued and concluded in that of Colonel Wellesley, who did not return to Seringapatam until November. The Report is therefore evidently misdated, as Colonel Wellesley was at Shikarpoor on the 19th October. See letter of that date.—Ed.

of the rampart, to carry the sewers into the outer ditch, and to have strong barrier-gates at the communications across the inner ditch.

2nd. The unfinished interior works on the sides next the river, where there are several heaps of earth, and several deep places dug for foundations, require to have the stones that are laid for a new wall taken up again and appropriated to other purposes, the deep places to be filled up with earth, and to form the ground into a rampart, such as the earth near will admit of, with a parapet having a small berme * outward, and the slopes sufficient to prevent the mud falling into the ditch, and to have a wide communication round the interior of the fort; the work finished nearly after the manner of those that were destroyed at Pondicherry; and in case there is a deficiency of earth for making a wide rampart, which is recommended, the work can be so low as not to be seen from without, and there will be a very complete parapet and trench with water in it, to enable the troops to repulse an assault made on the sides next the river. Where the interior works are built up with masonry, very little more than a parapet appears necessary, except in places where the rampart is not formed. I cannot recommend the filling up the inner ditch, as there is no want of space within the works; and the ditch being dug very deep, in order to be supplied from the river, and in places, more than ten feet out of rock, it will cost much to fill it up. It is in itself a good defence, particularly as water can easily be thrown into it from the aqueduct upon the bridge, which is twenty feet above the bed of the river: it requires, therefore, some consideration before it should be filled up.

3rd. The stone glacis and covered ways that have been begun on the sides next the river require to be finished, and are necessary to be done, as they may assist to preserve the works, and prevent the lower part of the wall from being discovered from without. The covered way and glacis require to be completed in several other parts round the fort. The work within the covered way at the south-east angle of the fort, which is continued to the Bangalore gateway on the east face, and to the Mysore gateway on the south, consists of a deep ditch and parapet:

* Narrow path or covered way.—Ed.

I recommend a removal of the parapet and filling up the deep part, so as to prevent any cover by means of the ditch, and that it may be commanded from the works; and to have palisades planted in the two covered ways.

4th. On the sluices: those that have been made at the north-west angle to let water into the ditches, must be filled up again entirely, and no communication with the river but by the sluice at the north-east angle, which is required to be so constructed as to keep the water in the ditches at any height; a sluice is required from the watercourse leading from the aqueduct on the bridge, to the ditch in front of the lines that extend from the great bridge to Dowlut Baug; and, as that ditch or trench is very irregular and not near finished, there should be a communication, though ever so narrow, made to the deep parts of it, that the water may be thrown into it, and a flood-gate or sluice at the lower end to keep the water in it: by this means the defects in the trench may be hid, and it would appear more respectable than it really is.

5th. The sewers in the fort to be put in repair as soon as possible.

6th. The water for supplying the garrison is conveyed by means of an artificial stone channel to a great part of the fort, and it is necessary to keep the channel in good repair. It has been completed by the late Sultaun to a great extent (as is shown in the plan by a strong dotted black line) from the great bridge into the fort, and continued round the fort as far as the great mosque. This channel is the only good water in the fort; there are several wells, but they have different degrees of salt-water, which, I understand, is not made use of to drink.

7th. On the lines without the fort, I do not recommend any expense to be incurred, either in the preservation or destruction of them; the only precaution necessary is to prevent any part of the mud falling into the ditch, as it may be not only considered a defence, but the water being conveyed over a considerable tract of ground affords supply to the gardens, &c. There is a very deep trench begun from the ditch of the fort at the south-west angle, and cut almost as far as the aqueduct on the bridge; this trench or ditch, and the reservoirs it leads into, I have lately discovered to be of no use, and may be filled up, as the water can be supplied much more easily by making an opening in the

walls near the ditches, which can be stopped at discretion, and as the place where the water is let out again is at the north-east angle of the fort.

On the public buildings:

The public buildings are, in their present state, for the most part very indifferent; many of them require new roofs and supporters, and some are so old as to be dangerous to live in; the buildings within the boundary of the Sultaun's palace are in better repair than any of the others.

The new works recommended are:

To enlarge the cavaliers on the high part of the fort, which I have surrounded by a line of works enclosing the south-east angle of the fort; the cavalier at the north-west angle to be enlarged so as to take in the magazine, and enclosed by a thin wall in the rear, so as to be able to make a good defence against musketry; at the north-east angle of the fort to have a large square work to act as a flank to the work that is detached on a spot of ground surrounded with a deep ditch, which spot of ground I also recommend to be occupied, as it is necessary to have a very strong post at the north-east angle of the works, as well for the protection of the sluices that communicate the ditches with the river, as for the security of the supply of water for the garrison, independently of the water channel made by the late Sultaun. A drawbridge is proposed, as described in the plan, to join it with the new fortifications. The other parts of the old works I recommend to be kept in repair, to be commanded, as much as possible, by the new works, and to be considered as a protection to the inhabitants, after the manner of the fortifications round the black town of Madras. On the east face, the new plan is to remove the inner rampart, as it is very narrow and in a state of ruin in places; the second or outer wall is in a better condition, and can have a broad rampart by raising the inner part of it. To supply water to the new works independently of the present mode, which is subject to be cut off, I propose sinking shafts or wells in the dry ditch near the river at the north-east angle, and to have more wells dug in the ditch towards the high ground where the water is found to be good for use. The redoubt on the glacis at the south-east angle to be enlarged inside.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[237.] *To Captain Tetley.*

SIR, Camp near Shikarpoor, 19th Oct., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 12th, with its enclosures.

I beg that you will write to Bappojee Scindia, and inform him that, on the day after the action at Samaranee, I sent to him all the persons who had fallen into our hands; that in one of his letters he informed me that he had received the orders of Srce Munt (the Peshwah) to send back all the persons and property that had been carried off from Soonda by his troops; that I have been in expectation that he would obey those orders, and that I am surprised to find that he now refuses to obey them, upon a plea which, if it existed at all, was in full force at the time when he promised to send back the people; that his letter has been sent to Government, whose orders will be received upon the subject. If any of the persons who have deserted should be retaken, I beg that you will keep them in confinement, and report them to me.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[238.] *To Captain Munro.*

SIR, Camp at Shikarpoor, 20th Oct., 1799.

Having been informed by the resident in Mysore that the province of Soonda is to be placed under your management, it is proper that I should apprise you of the strength and position of the military force stationed in it.

There are in Soonda at present fifteen companies of the 1st of the 1st and one of the 8th, with four 6-pounders with their usual complement of artillery, under the orders of Captain M'Farlane. The 3rd Bengal Volunteers is likewise at present in Soonda; but as I have ordered it to join the army, I shall detail only the positions of the other two battalions.

There is a Jemadar's party in a small fort, called Budnaghur; a company, under Lieutenant Kelly, in Mundragoor; two companies, under Lieutenant Marriott, in Soopah; and the remainder, with the four guns, under Captain M'Farlane, at Hullihall. This last is farther to the northward than the others, nearer to Darwar, and better situated for a post to watch the motions of the different bodies of Mahratta troops on the frontier. In all the places above mentioned, as well as in Soonda, Sercey,

Bonawassi, Jerrah, and Nundycotta, peons have been placed by Purneah, the dewan of the Rajah of Mysore. I have desired him to suffer them all to remain in the country until you determine whether you will want their services.

As the country has been plundered by different bodies of Mahrattas and by a person calling himself the Rajah of Soonda, and as the irruption of any freebooter on the frontier might intercept the communication between the posts, and for a time put the troops to some inconvenience for subsistence, I have determined to guard against the effects of what has happened, as well as of what may happen, and have sent into the province 300 loads of Company's grain, which I have desired Captain M'Farlane to throw into the different forts in such proportions as he may think most advisable. Besides this a number of brinjarries have been sent in, and I am informed that the bazaars are well supplied by dealers from the Mahratta country.

I enclose you a sketch of the country, which you may find of use, and which will show the relative situation of the posts occupied by the troops with each other. I have already explained to Government the nature of the communication between Soonda and Bednore, and have recommended that the troops in the former should be placed under the orders of the commanding officer in Canara, whose communication with them would be the more safe.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [239.]

SIR, 20th Oct., 1799.

As it will probably be the wish of Government to put the army into cantonments and garrisons as soon as possible, I take the liberty of submitting the following arrangement as what appears to be most convenient.

I take it for granted that it is intended to leave in Mysore (at least for the present) all the troops that are above the Ghauts, excepting, probably, the 19th Light Dragoons and one of the European regiments of infantry.

These consist of the 19th Dragoons and three regiments of Native cavalry, the head-quarters and part of the 1st battalion of artillery, two companies of Bengal artillery, four regiments

of European infantry, supposing the regiment de Meuron and Scotch brigade to be gone, twelve battalions of sepoys (including three of Bengal volunteers), and one battalion of Bombay sepoys at Nuggur, which I shall notice hereafter.

I should propose that the three regiments of Native cavalry should be placed at Hooley Honore, which is a convenient station for forage, and not very distant from the gram countries. They will be well forward towards the Mahratta frontier. The expense which has been incurred at different times in building cantonments which have afterwards, for various reasons, been found inconvenient, and the consideration that, in this country, it is unnecessary to put horses under cover, and that the sepoys can hut themselves as they do elsewhere, induce me to refrain from proposing that any fixed cantonment should be built. It will be necessary, however, that the officers should be put upon tent allowance, and probably Government will think it proper that an annual or monthly allowance should be made to the commanding officer for a building for their arms, accoutrements and saddles. The Commander-in-Chief has already instructed me to send into Chittledroog all the field-pieces and ordnance with the army, and I should propose to place there the companies of Bengal artillery at present in the field.

I propose that there should remain in Seringapatam the 1st battalion of artillery, and two regiments of Europeans, where they will have good cover.

Either Chittledroog, Sera, or Bangalore would be a good station for another regiment of Europeans. In the first and the last there is cover for them; but there are doubts respecting the climate of the first, and there are reasons which probably would make it inconvenient to send a regiment of Europeans to Bangalore at present. Sera is a healthy place, where it would not be difficult to procure provisions, but there is no cover for the men. They must, therefore, remain there in tents, until the climate at Chittledroog is better known, or until to place them in Bangalore would not be attended with inconvenience. I propose that there should be 4 battalions of sepoys at Seringapatam, from whence will be detached garrisons to Mysore, Munserabad, and to Chinroypatam.

2 battalions of sepoys in Chittledroog.

1 battalion of sepoys in Sera, detaching garrisons to Paughur, Mergesie, and Mudgherry.

1 battalion of sepoys in Bangalore, detaching to Ooscotta* and Colar.

1 battalion of sepoys at Nundydroog,† making the detachments to the northward found necessary by Captain Irton.

The corps of pioneers at Seringapatam, from whence detachments might be made to any place where their services might be necessary.

2 battalions of sepoys at Nuggur, detaching garrisons to Chandergooty, and Anantpoor, and Cowleydroog.

1 battalion of sepoys at Hurryhur.

Thus then there will be:

3 regiments of cavalry at Hooley Honore.

1 battalion of artillery, 2 regiments of Europeans, 4 battalions of sepoys in Seringapatam.

The corps of pioneers, detaching to wherever they may be necessary.

2 companies of Bengal artillery, 2 battalions of sepoys in Chittledroog.

1 regiment of Europeans, 1 battalion of sepoys at Sera.

1 battalion of sepoys, Bangalore.

1 battalion of sepoys, Nundydroog.

2 battalions of sepoys, Nuggur.

1 battalion of sepoys, Hurryhur.

As I have been informed by the resident in Mysore that the Soonda country is to be placed under the management of the collector in Canara, I propose to move into that province the battalion of Bombay sepoys at present at Nuggur; and if the commanding officer below the Ghauts should not find it convenient to send another battalion into Soonda, I propose to leave there part of the battalion which I have proposed to post at Hurryhur.

There is a large number of elephants and camels with the army, and of draught and carriage bullocks, all of them the property of the Honourable Company, to which, without doubt, the Commander-in-Chief has already drawn the attention of Government. The best situation for the bullocks is along the eastern bank of the Toombuddra, between Hooley Honore and Turrikerra. It is a fine grass country, and there is a sufficiency of jungle in it to give them cover.

* *Ooscotta*, a small town and hill fort, 16 miles N.E. of Bangalore.—Ed.

† *Nundydroog*, a hill fortress, 1500 feet above the Mysore plateau, 94 miles N.E. of Seringapatam.—Ed.

The late Sultaun kept his elephants and camels at Narsingpoor, a large village upon the Cauvery, near its junction with the Cassani. As it is a rice country, and there is jungle in the neighbourhood, it would probably be the most convenient situation for those of the Honourable Company at the present moment. A small number might be kept near Sera, for the use of the European regiment.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[240.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Nuggur, 23rd Oct., 1799.

I have the honour to transmit a letter and some enclosures, which I have received from Major Cuppage.

I have in consequence desired him to reinforce a detachment, which he has out under the command of Captain Munro, with two guns from Bangalore, and a number of men to make it 400 rank and file from such of the posts in his district as can best spare them; and I have requested him to instruct Captain Munro as follows: He is to place himself on the borders of Punganoor, to take the earliest opportunity of communicating with Captain Graham, and to comply with such requisitions as he may receive from him, in order to enable him to put in execution the orders that he may receive from Government.

As Cummer u Deen is the vassal of the Nizam the ally of the Honourable Company, and as I understand that his right to the districts which he has seized is at present under discussion, I have not thought it proper to order Captain Munro to drive his people from Chedem and Condoor, but I have requested that he may be instructed to act in regard to them as he may be required by Captain Graham.

It is not, however, improbable that Cummer u Deen may have entered some other part of Punganoor to which he has never laid claim, or that he may hereafter plunder the remainder of that talook, or some other part of the territories of the Honourable Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore; in any of these cases I have requested that Captain Munro may be instructed to attack his troops without delay, and to treat them as their conduct deserves.

I have requested Major Cuppage to instruct Captain Munro to act in regard to the troops of the Polygar of Punganoor as he may be required by Captain Graham.

As it is very desirable that Government should have the earliest intelligence of Cummer u Deen's conduct on the frontier, I have desired Major Cuppage to report to you whatever may come to his knowledge relating to it, and to make me acquainted with the order which he may receive from Government. I have likewise desired him to communicate upon the same subject with Captain Graham.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [241.]

SIR, Nuggur, 24th Oct., 1799.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Bappojee Scindia, the killadar of Darwar, has sent to the commanding officer at Hullihall the persons who had been carried away from the province of Soonda by his troops. All remains quiet upon the frontier.

It would be very desirable if the officer in command in Soonda had the means of procuring intelligence of the designs and movements of the different bodies of Mahratta troops on the frontier; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay before the Right Honourable the Governor in Council my request that he will grant an allowance to the officer in command in Soonda to enable him to employ persons to give him intelligence of what passes on the Mahratta frontier.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Josiah Webbe, Esq. [242.]

Nuggur, 25th Oct., 1799.

Colonel Close has communicated to me a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, dated the 17th instant. I think it proper to observe upon the proposed exchange of Soonda for territory on the borders of the Barahmahal,

that as the former will, in that case, belong to the Rajah of Mysore, and as it will be equally necessary to protect it by means of the troops of the Honourable Company, nothing will be gained by the measure in a military point of view. It will not even be so convenient a military arrangement as for the Company to keep it, to manage it by means of the collector of Canara, and to protect it by troops under the orders of the commanding officer in that province. He will have a short and easy method of communicating with them; they will have their supplies and everything they can want near them and in their rear.

Colonel Close will have the honour of stating to Government various political considerations upon this question.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[243.] *To Colonel Sartorius.*

SIR, Nuggur, 25th Oct., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 20th instant, and I beg leave to congratulate you upon the capture of Jemalabad, and upon the prospect which you have of tranquillity in that part of the Honourable Company's territory which is under your command.

My letters to the late Major-General Hartley will have made you acquainted with the state of affairs above the Ghauts. Everything remains quiet; the army has crossed the Toombuddra, and I have reason to expect orders from Government to put the troops in garrison and cantonments.

I some time ago recommended to Government that the troops in Soonda should be put under the orders of the commanding officer in Canara, as a military arrangement likely to be very convenient; and as orders have been sent to the collector in Canara to undertake the civil administration of Soonda, I imagine that Government will adopt what I have recommended. You will in that case probably find it convenient to relieve the troops in Soonda by others belonging to the Bombay establishment, at present in the northern part of Canara, and to send back the Madras troops to Bednore. This will enable me to relieve, and send down the Ghauts, Major Disney and his battalion. I will give you the earliest intelligence of any determination upon this subject, and will at the same time communi-

cate to you all the information which I have respecting the posts in Soonda, and on the Mahratta frontier.

In the mean time it is necessary that Major Disney's battalion should remain here for the present, if you can spare it; and as it may be obliged to perform a march of some length and difficulty when it leaves this, it will be proper that it should retain its field establishments for a short time. I have apprised Major Disney of my opinion upon this subject, and have requested him to keep his dooly-bearers, notwithstanding the orders which he had received from the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army to discharge them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny. [244.]

SIR, [Undated in letter-book.]

I have received your letter of the * instant, in which you have informed me that you have put Lieutenant Ritso in arrest, and have enclosed copies of certain papers which you had received from him, upon which you ground two charges against him.

It appears that Lieutenant Ritso was so anxious to absent himself from his regiment, that he forgot the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, the established rules of the British service, and the respect due to you as his commanding officer; and that he claims leave of absence as a right, not as a favour which he is to receive in consequence of your application for it.

There are two ways by which an officer obtains leave to absent himself from his corps. When an officer is sick and unable to do his duty, and the head surgeon certifies that a change of climate is absolutely necessary for his recovery, the Commander-in-Chief has been pleased to permit him to absent himself from his regiment. When an officer has business or any reason which induces him to wish to be absent from his corps, he requests his commanding officer to apply to the Commander-in-Chief to give him permission to absent himself. If the commanding officer sees no objection, he makes the application. A different mode

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

would tend to the subversion of the discipline of the army; but in no case that I know of till now has that which I have above stated been departed from. To neither of these modes of proceeding has Lieutenant Ritso adhered; but because the head surgeon of the army could not sign his sick certificate, he makes an insinuation against him as unjust, and the application which he grounds upon it for a particular committee of surgeons to assemble and consider his case, is improper. He then passes over all forms of application, and claims a right to be absent from his corps because I gave leave to another officer at your request. If I agreed in the justice of this claim, if I did not mark such conduct with my most decided disapprobation, I should be unworthy of the command which has been intrusted to me.

I should certainly order a court-martial to assemble immediately for the trial of Lieutenant Ritso upon the charge which you have given against him, only that I am in hopes that he will become sensible of his error, and that he will make a proper apology to you, as his commanding officer, for his disrespectful behaviour to you, and to the head surgeon of the army for the insinuation conveyed against him in the papers which you have sent me. I beg that you will communicate this letter to him; and when I hear from you that he has made apologies such as I have above described, I shall request of you to release him from his arrest.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[·245.] *To Colonel Dalrymple.*

Camp at Benkypoor [Bancipoor],
31st Oct., 1799.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

When I was in the province of Bednore, Colonel Close sent me a complaint against a party of the 10th Regiment, who were in a district in charge of some brinjarries belonging to your detachment, and who not only insisted upon passing without paying the duties upon pepper, of which they had fifty loads, but they were plundering the country, and forcing from the villagers subsistence, &c., &c.

Enclosed I send you a paper which I have received from Colonel Close upon the subject, and I anxiously recommend it to you to make the sepoys pay for what they took from these

villagers, and to send the amount to Colonel Close. With regard to the duties upon the pepper, I have made inquiries upon the subject, and what follows is the result:

General Harris made an arrangement with Purneah, when the Government was delivered over to him, that all articles of *provision* going to the army, or to any of its detachments, should pass through the country duty free. It does not appear, however, that pepper was ever considered an article of provision, either in the army, by the traders, or by the collectors of the duties; as it has always paid them without difficulty or objection on the part of those who were carrying it. I have, therefore, desired your brinjarries to pay the duties as they go through the country.

I hear that you have got on very well, and with great expedition. I have been all over Soonda and Bednore since I saw you.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [246.]

SIR, Camp at Benkypoor, 31st Oct., 1799.

Purneah has informed me of his intention to disarm the people in the Bul country; and as a body of troops will be necessary to enable him to put his intention in execution, I shall move the army towards it to-morrow. It will be convenient that the troops and departments should be assembled in one place at the time when I shall receive the orders of Government to distribute the former in garrisons and cantonments, and to discharge the latter; and they will not be more distant from their proposed situations in the Bul country than they are at this place. This is my reason for proceeding there with the whole army instead of sending a detachment. The Native cavalry, with the exception of one regiment, which I take with the army, will remain at Hooley Honore.

I have appointed Captain Barclay to be Deputy Adjutant-General, Captain Cunningham to be Deputy Quartermaster-General, and Captain West to be my Aide-de-Camp, from the 26th of August, in the orders of which I enclose you a copy for the confirmation of Government. These gentlemen have been

acting in their several situations since the Commander-in-Chief appointed me to command the troops in Mysore, although I have omitted to put them in orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[247.] G. O. Camp at Benkypoor, 31st Oct., 1799.

The officers commanding at Mundragoor, Soopah, or any other post in the province of Soonda, will send their reports to the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, through Captain M'Farlane, and will obey such orders as they may receive from him; those commanding at Chandergooty, Anantpoor, Cowleydroog, or any post in Bednore west of the Toombuddra, will send their reports through Major Disney, of the Bombay establishment, and will obey such orders as they may receive from him.

When any officer in either province has any thing to communicate which he thinks it essential should be known quickly, he will communicate it to Colonel Wellesley directly, as well as to Captain M'Farlane, or Major Disney, respectively. Those two officers will communicate with each other, and will lose no time in transmitting to Colonel Wellesley the reports which they may receive from the posts under their orders.

Colonel Stevenson will take the command of the cavalry encamped at Hooley Honore.

Captain Barclay is appointed Deputy Adjutant-General, Captain Cunningham Deputy Quartermaster-General to the troops in Mysore, and Captain West Aide-de-camp to Colonel Wellesley, from the 26th August.

Colonel Wellesley has been informed that when the sepoys are sent out on safeguards, they force the inhabitants of the villages to give them provisions of different kinds, and money; and that, abusing the trust which is reposed in them, they suffer certain persons to carry away from the villages what they please without paying for it. Thus it appears that a safeguard, instead of being a benefit, is distressing to the village into which it is sent; and that the sepoys are forgetful of the first principle of a soldier, which is fidelity to the trust reposed in him.

It is essentially necessary that the practices complained of,

and above noticed, should be put a stop to forthwith; and Colonel Wellesley gives notice that, whenever the inhabitants of any village complain that the safeguard requires provisions of any kind, or money, the whole guard will be punished; and the excuse that either the provisions or the money had been offered will not be allowed, as to take either is positively forbid.

In order to prevent safeguards from suffering some individuals to plunder the villages, although they may strictly guard them against others, notice is given, that if any village is plundered when a safeguard is in it, and it does not appear in the clearest manner that it was not in the power of the safeguard to prevent it, the whole of the guard will be punished for a neglect of their duty.

Colonel Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will have this order translated, and read to their men at four different parades; and that, whenever safeguards are sent out from their corps, they will order their adjutants particularly to recal it to the recollection of the sepoys.

It is likewise necessary that the adjutants should take down the names of the villages to which safeguards are sent, and of the sepoys sent to each, in order that when a complaint is made it may be easy to know what persons were guards in the villages.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. A. O. 31st Oct., 1799. [248.]

The army to march to-morrow morning, by the right; the *general* to beat at five, and the assembly at six o'clock. H. M. 19th Dragoons to form the advance. The details coming on the duty of the advanced piquets; those on that duty and the pioneers to move as usual.

The baggage must follow the line, and keep on the road; and Colonel Wellesley begs that the commanding officers of corps will give particular orders to their followers not to go upon the cultivation. The baggage-master must keep them off it. Quartermasters, &c., to meet Captain Cunningham on the right of the line, a little before assembly beating.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[249.] *Draft of a Letter to Colonel Sherbrooke.*

Camp, 1st Nov., 1799.

Purneah has just been with me, and mentions that the cutwal has seized some money in the hands of a man of the name of Puttah, for a debt due by him to a soucar, by name of Rugobah. This Puttah is an officer of the Rajah's mint (a gold refiner), and the money seized belonged to another man named Nurgechitty.

This money must be returned to Puttah, who must be answerable for his debt in some other manner, as the money in the mint must not be seized. I believe it amounts to about 1500 pagodas.

I send a public letter about the road by which the money is to come to us.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[250.] *To Major Disney.*

SIR, Camp at Belloor, 9th Nov., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 4th instant, and the orders issued by Colonel Sartorius which you enclosed.

As it is not certain whether you will not be obliged to march, I think you will do well to retain the field establishment belonging to your corps.

I have written to Colonel Sartorius upon this subject, and have communicated to him my opinion and the grounds of it, and I have no doubt but that he will agree that your field establishment ought to be kept for the present. But the reason which induces me to recommend that you may keep it (viz. that you may be ready to move, if necessary), is a sufficient one for not employing any of the persons belonging to it at a distance from your corps; and I therefore recommend that the persons only who will be furnished by Ram Rao may be employed at Anantpoor and Cowleydroog.

I am concerned to find that you should imagine that any of the ordnance or stores have been made away with. I wish that, as soon as possible, you would ascertain what quantity of ordnance and military stores there are in Nuggur, and on the outworks, lines, &c., &c., and that you would make out a return of them. Of these you will take charge for the present; but, as your garrison is not sufficiently large to enable you to put the

necessary guards wherever there is ordnance or stores, I recommend that you should remove into the fort whatever of either is valuable, and at present on the outworks or in the lines. Ram Rao will receive orders to assist you with some of his sebundies, to enable you to place guards in such parts of the lines as you may think necessary; but as these sebundies are raised to enable him to collect the revenue, and to keep the country quiet, it is very desirable that you should not call upon him for the assistance of any of them, excepting you find it absolutely requisite.

It is intended that the servants of the Honourable Company should take charge of all grain, and provisions, and garrison-stores, that may be in the garrisons occupied by their troops, as soon as the paymaster (who, on the Madras establishment, is likewise garrison-storekeeper) can make the necessary arrangements for receiving them. You will inform Ram Rao of this, and give him directions not to suffer any of either to be taken out of the stores until Mr. Gordon's people can take charge. To give the commanding officers of garrisons charge of the garrison stores immediately, although it would probably be the best means of securing them, would throw great responsibility on those officers, and would give them unnecessary trouble.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq. [251.]

SIR, Camp at Belloor, 9th Nov., 1799.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Gordon, in answer to a reference he made to me respecting taking charge of the garrison stores belonging to the Rajah of Mysore in forts garrisoned by the troops of the Honourable Company.

It appears that Government have not determined whether these stores are to belong to the Honourable Company or to the Rajah; but whatever may be determined upon this subject, it appears desirable that wherever the Honourable Company's troops are posted, there should be the certainty of supply, as well as the check afforded by means of the agency of the Honourable Company's servants, and the regulations of this

Government. If it should be determined that the garrison stores are to belong to the Rajah, there will be no difficulty in giving him credit for the amount which will appear to have been received by the paymaster acting as garrison store-keeper.

I have given directions to the officer commanding at Nuggur to take charge of the military stores there. Hereafter, when Government will have decided upon the stations of the troops, it will be proper to make arrangements for the care of the military stores, as well in the smaller forts as in those in which Government may think fit to make larger depôts.

From conversations with Purneah, it appears that he is well disposed to give up any claim that the Rajah might be supposed to have to the garrison and military stores in the different places in his territories, if it shall appear to Government that it is desirable that he should do so, in order that they may be properly arranged and taken care of. In the mean time he has given orders to his aumildars to give over to Mr. Gordon's servants the garrison-stores, wherever they may be prepared to receive them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[252.] INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAPTAIN BURRELL, 3RD BENGAL VOLUNTEERS.

Camp at Belloor, 12th Nov., 1799.

You are to march in the morning to Munserabad by the short route, leaving your guns in the Park. You will encamp at Munserabad to-morrow.

The rebel Kistnapah Naig the Polygar of Bullum is, as I am informed, concealed in a village called Oorbeggy, at about three coss from Munserabad; and his son and part of his family are concealed in another village called Coordegall, which is two coss from the same place.

The army will march to-morrow to Ooscotta, and I intend to-morrow night to push forward two parties from thence to these two villages; and I request that you will likewise push two parties, one upon Oorbeggy, the other upon Coordegall, in the night, so that they may arrive at their destination as day

breaks in the morning, in order to co-operate with the parties which will be sent from the army.

At Oorbeggy there is but a small body with Kistnapah Naig; but there are 400 peons, as I am informed, with his son at Coordegall. You will, therefore, take care that the detachment going to Coordegall is sufficiently strong to insure success against the above-mentioned peons. In case the rebels should have gone from the villages above mentioned, and either of the parties should receive intelligence which would incline them to believe that they would find them in any other place, they are to follow them; otherwise the parties of your battalion are to return to Munserabad.

Your baggage and your men's knapsacks are to be left at Munserabad, and the troops will take on these expeditions only a sufficiency to cover them in, and rice, &c., for two days, which they must carry in case they should be kept out on the pursuit.

As these are rebels who have done, and may do, much injury to the country and the inhabitants, you will put to death all those whom you may find in arms, but spare the old men, women, and children, and others who do not bear arms. There is property along with Kistnapah Naig or his son, which I beg you will take care to secure.

Captain M'Pherson will accompany you to Munserabad, and I beg that you will employ him with one of your detachments.

As the country through which you will advance is jungly, each party must have a strong advance guard, and, particularly when they approach the villages which are to be attacked, strong flanking parties.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P.S. Besides the parties above mentioned from the army with which you are to co-operate, another will be sent to a village called Gourdabangerry, to which it is imagined Kistnapah Naig may fly.

To Colonel Sherbrooke. [253.]

SIR, Camp at Ooscotta, 14th Nov., 1799.

I beg that immediately upon receipt of this letter you will order the 12th Regiment to march from Seringapatam by Ban-

galore and the Pednaigdurgum Pass to Vellore in the Carnatic. They are to be supplied with tents from the stores at Seringapatam, and with carriage for them by indent upon the paymaster, to whom I beg that you will signify my wish that no time may be lost in procuring it.

The 12th are to take with them their field-pieces and tumbrils, and the artillery attached which they brought with them to the garrison. Indents must be made upon the paymaster for draught bullocks for this ordnance. You will, of course, supply the 12th Regiment with doolies in the best manner that you can.

You will desire the officer commanding the 12th Regiment to lose no time on his march, and to write to me and to the head-quarters of the army occasionally to communicate his progress. One serjeant and fifty pioneers are to accompany the 12th Regiment to the Carnatic.

I beg that you will be so kind as to intimate to the officer commanding the 2nd battalion 12th Regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 9th Regiment, that I have received the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to send their corps to the Carnatic as soon as they can be relieved in Seringapatam. They are, therefore, to be prepared to march by the time that the army reaches that neighbourhood. They will receive tents by indent upon the stores at Seringapatam. For these carriage will be furnished by the departments of the army.

It is the wish of the Commander-in-Chief that all the corps going from this country to the Carnatic should take with them their field-pieces; you will, therefore, order the Commissary of Stores at Seringapatam to prepare the usual complement to proceed to the Carnatic with the corps above mentioned, and draught bullocks will be furnished for them by the departments of the army. The detachments from the 2nd of the 9th and 2nd of the 12th must be warned to be in readiness to march with their corps when they will be relieved.

The army will commence its march towards Seringapatam by Chinroypatam the day after to-morrow.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the treasure is arrived.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain M'Farlane. [254.

SIR, Camp at Ooscotta, 15th Nov., 1799.

I have received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to desire that the 1st battalion of the 1st Regiment may be sent to the Carnatic without delay; you will, therefore, make the following arrangement for relieving the posts occupied by detachments from that corps, and send it by the route of Mundragoor, Budnaghur, Jerrah, Anawooty, Shikarpoor, Hoonelly, Chittledroog, Sera, Bangalore, Pednaigdurgum Pass, to Vellore in the Carnatic.

You will relieve the two companies of the 1st of the 1st, now in Soopah, with one of the battalion under your command. The detachment of the 1st of the 1st, in Mundragoor, must be withdrawn; but as it is of more consequence, in my opinion, that you should have a body of troops collected at Hullihall, which you can move to any place where they may be wanted, than that there should be a garrison in Mundragoor, you need not send any of your corps to relieve the company which will be removed from thence. It is necessary, however, that Lieutenant Kelly should give up the grain which he received to Captain Munro's aumildar, and that he should send you his receipt for it. Captain Munro's peons will remain in charge of Mundragoor, of which I beg you will inform him.

You will inform the commanding officer of the 1st of the 1st that I have sent orders to have all the detachments from his corps now in the province of Bednore sent to Chittledroog, where he will meet them. He will be so kind as to send me indents upon the stores at Chittledroog for fresh camp equipage, which I will countersign; and I will send orders to Chittledroog to have it ready for him by the time he arrives there. I will order Major Disney to relieve the detachment of the 1st of the 8th, now in Chandergooty, and to order it to march to Hullihall to join you.

The 1st of the 1st must bring with it its field-pieces and artillery.

I have received your letter of the 26th October; the artillerymen and Lascars are arrived in my camp, and are at present in the provost's guard. I am concerned that you should not have punished them upon the spot. The crimes of which they have been guilty are to be attributed in a great measure

to want of discipline, and to a lawless spirit, which will always find its way among soldiers when they feel that they can transgress without the certainty of punishment. I can only most anxiously recommend it to you to keep a strict hand over them, and never to pass over the slightest fault.

I have received great pleasure from observing the attention which Lieutenant Marriott has paid to the instructions which I gave him. You will desire him to hand them over to the officer who will succeed him. In case the Soonda Rajah's peons should appear again in any part of that district, or in any other in Soonda, they are to be attacked according to the spirit of my instructions to you and Captain Tetley.

I have the honour to be, &c.;

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[255.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, Camp at Ooscotta, 15th Nov., 1799.

I received your letter of the 9th instant yesterday evening. The 19th Dragoons marched from camp this morning for Bangalore by Chinroypatam and Nagmunglum. They will arrive at Bangalore on the 25th or 26th of this month, and at Vellore by the 7th or 8th of the next, if not detained by the severity of the weather.

The Scotch brigade marched from Seringapatam on the 25th of last month, and ought to be now very forward towards the Carnatic. I have this day written to the commanding officer of that corps to desire that he will lose no time on his march. I have sent orders to Seringapatam for the 12th to march immediately towards the Carnatic. I have desired the commanding officer to indent upon the paymaster for carriage for their tents, and draught cattle for their guns, in hopes that they will be got before the carriage and draught cattle which I sent this morning from the army can possibly arrive there. However, if it should not be possible to procure a sufficiency of cattle, the supply which I have sent from camp will reach Seringapatam in six or seven days. This corps may, therefore, be expected at Bangalore by the 30th of this month, and at Vellore by the 15th of the next. The 74th Regiment will arrive at Bangalore by the end of this month. I have ordered Major Cuppage to

begin his march as soon as either that corps or the 4th Regiment of cavalry will arrive. The Major has draught and carriage cattle, and I have given directions to the officer commanding the 19th Dragoons to leave at Bangalore all the empty bullocks belonging to the provision department which he will have when he will arrive there. These will answer for any deficiencies which may occur in any of the corps on their march to the Carnatic.

The 3rd Bengal Volunteers will begin their march to Chittledroog to-morrow. They will arrive there on the 25th, and are to take with them spare draught and carriage for the 1st of the 2nd. This corps may be expected at Vellore about the 20th of next month.

The 1st and 2nd Bengal Volunteers will begin their march to Seringapatam to-morrow; they will arrive there on the 22nd or 23rd. They will take with them draught and carriage cattle for the 2nd of the 9th and 2nd of the 12th, and these corps may be expected at Vellore by the 15th of next month.

As the 1st of the 1st is still in Soonda, I am afraid that it will not arrive at Vellore till the latter end of December. I have, however, lost no time in sending orders for its march, and, in the mean time, I have ordered all its detachments in the Bednore country to be collected and marched to Chittledroog. I shall likewise send fresh carriage and draught cattle for this corps to Chittledroog, in order that it may not be delayed. The other corps above the Ghauts will march to the places pointed out for them in your letter of the 9th instant.

As the cavalry is to be at Bangalore, Sera, and Chittledroog, or Hooley Honore, I have requested Colonel Stevenson to remain at Sera as the most centrical situation, till I could receive the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

In order to be able to put in execution the orders of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, with a view to the plan stated in Mr. Secretary Webbe's letter of the 9th instant, I have directed the commanding officers of corps to keep with them their field establishments for the present, and have intimated to them that it is not impossible but that they may again be moved.

I shall be glad to receive orders respecting the public departments of the army, which I will detain at Seringapatam.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[256.] *Draft of a Letter to Major Disney.*

Camp at Ooscotta, 15th Nov., 1799.

I have received the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to send the 1st battalion 1st (Madras) Regiment to the Carnatic; and as it will be necessary that its detachments should accompany it, I have to request that you will make the following arrangement for their relief.

You will be so kind as to order a company of the battalion under your command to Cowleydroog to relieve two companies of the 1st, stationed there. These two companies, the detachment which has been withdrawn from Hyderghur, and is at present, as I imagine, at Nuggur, and the detachment at Anantpoor, must march under the command of Lieutenant Mackay to Chittledroog, where they are to remain till joined by the main body of the battalion which is coming from Soonda. Anantpoor must, for the present, be kept by some of Ram Rao's peons.

As Captain M'Farlane will now be left with only one battalion in the province of Soonda, it is very desirable that it should be as complete as possible. I therefore beg that you will send one company of your battalion to Chandergooty to relieve the detachment of the 1st of the 8th (Madras) Regiment which is there. You will order Lieutenant Lucas to proceed with his detachment by Bonawassi, Jerrah, Budnaghur, Mundragoor, Turrikerra, to Hullihall, where he will join his corps.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[257.] G. O. Camp at Ooscotta, Saturday, 16th Nov., 1799.

The army to march to-morrow morning by the left: baggage to follow the line. The *general* to beat at five o'clock, and the assembly at six.

The details coming on the duty of the advanced piquets to move in advance. The Native details on that duty to form the rear guard. Thirty pioneers to move in advance with the piquets; a non-commissioned officer and twelve with the park, and the remainder at the head of the line.

Quartermasters, &c., to meet the Deputy Quartermaster-General on the left of the line, a little before assembly beating.

The 1st Regiment of Native Cavalry, Captain Balfour's com-

pany of artillery (with the exception of a detail which he will furnish to the guns of the 74th Regiment and to the 3rd Bengal Volunteers), will proceed according to instructions which will be given to the commanding officers of those corps.

When elephants or camels are detached with any corps or individuals, the officer in charge of them is to give to the commanding officer of the corps, or the person with whom they are detached, a return, stating the number and names of the elephants, the number of camels, the daily allowance of grain and other articles to each, the number and names of the servants attached to each, and their monthly pay.

The elephants and camels are to be under the charge of the officer commanding the corps with which, or the individual with whom, they are detached, who will be so kind as to take care that they receive the daily allowance appointed for them, and will pay the servants their monthly wages. On the 1st of every month he will transmit to the officer appointed to take charge of the Honourable Company's elephants and camels a return of the numbers of each, and of the names of the elephants, of the numbers of servants attached to them, and an account of disbursements for grain and other articles and servants' wages for the preceding month.

The subordinate agent for the carriage of camp equipage in charge of the elephants and camels having been authorised to give them, besides their daily allowance, such other articles as in his judgment may be absolutely necessary, the officers commanding corps, and individuals with whom elephants or camels may be detached, will give them whatever they think necessary for their preservation, and will send an account of what they shall have given on the 1st of every month, along with the account of disbursements for their usual and regular allowance.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to Josiah Webbe, Esq. [258.]

Camp at Ooscotta, 16th Nov., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and have lost no time in making the arrangements for the march of the troops to the Carnatic. Some of them are gone, as you will perceive by my letter to Colonel Agnew, and the whole will be in motion to-morrow. I have been obliged to halt this day for the Bengal

sepoys, who have been out for these last two nights hunting Kistnapah Naig, and are not yet come in.

I intend to keep the departments at Seringapatam till I hear from you, and I will prepare there the necessary equipments for a light field train. I will also send to the regiments of cavalry at Sera and Bangalore all that they want to render their light artillery efficient. I have already ordered the commanding officer at Chittledroog to do the same for the 1st Regiment, which is going there.

I am afraid that the troops in Malabar and Canara have discharged their field establishments, and if that is the case, some time will elapse before they can be prepared to take the field.

I conclude, however, that you have apprised the commanding officer there of the supposed danger, and that he will take measures immediately for supplying his deficiencies. I will assist them as far as I can. You will be glad to hear that we have money enough to pay the troops this month and the next. The bills at fifteen days' sight produce much, and the Rajah has paid two kists, and there is money at Seringapatam sufficient to pay a third.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[259.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner.*

SIR, Camp at Pollum, 17th Nov., 1799.

As Lieutenant Ford with his party has joined the army, I think it proper to communicate to you the satisfaction I have derived from observing the zeal and alacrity with which the commanding and other officers of the three battalions of Bengal sepoys under your command undertook the fatiguing and unpleasant duty of seeking for and pursuing Kistnapah Naig: of this I request that you will inform them.

At the same time it is necessary that I should animadvert upon the conduct of Lieutenant Campbell. His separation from his party might have been occasioned by the darkness of the night, but it was his duty to report what had happened as soon as he arrived in camp. I learnt it by accident from the hircarrah who had accompanied him, nearly two hours before I heard from Lieutenant Campbell, and it is probable that they had been in camp an hour before the hircarrah came to me.

The consequence of his neglect might have been serious, and I beg that you will warn him on no account ever to omit to

make his report as soon as possible after he will have returned from a service on which he may be employed.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Draft of a Letter to the Secretary of Government. [260.]

Camp near Hassen, 18th Nov., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 6th instant, in which you inform me that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council desires that I will dispose of the Honourable Company's elephants, camels, and bullocks in such manner as I may judge most convenient for their accommodation.

Adverting to the proposed plan stated in your letter of the 9th instant, supposing certain intelligence received to be well founded, and the design of the enemy to be an attack upon the British possessions in India, I have thought it best for the present that each corps should have with it means of moving in case there should be a necessity to call for its services. As therefore it has become necessary to detach from under the inspection of the officers who have charge of them, some of the Honourable Company's elephants, camels, and draught-bullocks, I have given out orders, of which the enclosed is a copy, in order, if possible, to have them taken care of and fed.

As the corps which are going into the Carnatic will be no longer under my command, and will have with them the Honourable Company's cattle, it will be necessary that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council should confirm these orders if he should approve of them.

I have made arrangements for placing the elephants, camels, and bullocks which will not be attached to corps in such situations as that I shall be able at a short notice to send to either coast such a supply as the Right Honourable the Governor in Council may order.

I feel myself much obliged to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council for having left me in the command at Seringapatam, and of the troops in Mysore; but I hope that in case the enemy should appear on either coast, his Lordship will employ me with the troops destined to oppose them.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[261.] *To Captain M'Farlane.*

SIR, Camp at Hassen, 18th Nov., 1799.

I have received information that certain plunderers from the Mahratta country have been lately in the habit of making incursions into the Honourable Company's territory in Soonda, in order to rob certain merchants who have come thither for the purposes of trade. They watch them during the day, and having found out where they intend to halt for the night, they rush upon and rob them. Of this practice several merchants have complained.

It is very desirable that means should be adopted immediately to check this practice. To write to any of the Mahratta chiefs on the borders upon the subject would be useless, and I therefore recommend that you should endeavour to obtain information respecting one of these gangs; that you should watch their motions, and having ascertained any of their plans, concert measures with Captain Munro's aumildars for the co-operation of the sebundy peons with a party of the Honourable Company's troops to catch them. If any of them are caught, they are to be hanged. An example or two will induce them to prefer any country to the Company's as the scene of their future operations.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[262.] *To J. Uhthoff, Esq.*

DEAR SIR, Camp at Gram, 19th Nov., 1799.

I have received your letters of the 24th October and of the 3rd instant, and am much obliged to you for the intelligence which they contain. Several of the Mahratta chieftains on the borders have attempted to negotiate with me or with the resident in Mysore; among others I believe that Pursheram Bhow's son sent a vakeel to my camp during my absence in Soonda, and Major Macaulay had a conversation with him. The object of all these attempts was to obtain the assistance of the Honourable Company's troops, for which it was proposed to give a subsidy; but as all these chiefs (as we understand them at least) are subjects of the Peshwah, I have not thought it proper to encourage any negotiation with them: on the contrary, I have uniformly referred them to their own Government at Poonah. At the same time I have endeavoured to keep up a friendly

intercourse with them; and the question whether assistance is to be given to all or any of them remains in such a state, that it is in the power of Government to take it up, to negotiate, and come to a conclusion upon it with any of them that it may be found convenient to protect.

The Government of Fort St. George have approved of this method of proceeding with them, and they have instructed Colonel Close and me to act upon this principle in case any of the Mahratta chieftains should renew their proposals to receive from the Company a force and to pay a subsidy.

All that we can wish from the Mahrattas is that they should remain quiet on our frontier, and that they should not harbour our enemies. By what I can learn of the Peshwah's Government, it has not strength to insure the first, nor is it likely to have it until what was held out to them in the late negotiation is accepted. I doubt whether we should be able entirely to prevent them from harbouring our enemies even if we had a subsidiary force at Poonah; but I am certain that to send one to any of the chiefs subject to Poonah, not only would not have the effect about which we must be most anxious, in assisting the Mahrattas at all, but very probably would induce them to seek the assistance of our enemies in order to balance our power in their state.

Matters cannot last long as they are at Poonah: the Peshwah's Government must either fall to pieces or he must accept our support. If he should still be obstinate, out of his ruins some power may be formed whose authority it may not be difficult for us to secure, and afterwards to enlarge to such a degree as we may think proper; but until time and the common course of events bring about his ruin, I don't conceive that it is either consistent with the British character in India, or safe, to give assistance to any inferior member of the Mahratta empire.

There may be some who imagine that the best thing that could happen to us would be to see the Mahratta government crumble to pieces, and upon its ruins the establishment of a number of petty states. With those who think thus I differ entirely. Not only we should not be able to insure the tranquillity of our own frontiers, and could not expect to keep out our enemy, but we should weaken the only balance remaining against the power of the Nizam. This, it is true, is contemptible at present, but in the hands of able men might be turned to our disadvantage; and as I conceive that we ought never again to

be involved in a country war, we ought to have such a balance as would always keep the Nizam's state in order. With this view the Mahratta power, as it stood prior to Lord Cornwallis's war, ought to be preserved if possible, and we ought with equal care to avoid its entire destruction and the junction in one body of all the members of the Mahratta empire.

I have written more upon this subject than I originally intended; but what I have said will show you that I have not been inattentive to it, and will prove that the best method of treating these offers from the Mahratta chiefs is not to negotiate, but to refer all to Poonah, and at the same time to maintain an intercourse upon which a treaty may be grounded, whenever circumstances may induce Government to think that it would be consistent with the British interests.

Sir William Clarke will communicate to you my letter of the 15th; I have no other news. I expect to be at Seringapatam with the army in a day or two.

I am yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[263.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 21st Nov., 1799.

I arrived here this morning, and I find that after mending and patching all the old unserviceable camp equipage in the stores there will not be a sufficiency to supply tents for the two Native corps which are to march; but when the 73rd arrive I shall take from them a few tents which they received shortly after I joined the army, which are still serviceable, and which will about complete the two Native corps. We shall then have no tents whatever in store, and upon this subject I shall be obliged to you if you will give a hint to the Military Board.

I send to the Secretary of the Military Board by this day's post the proceedings of a committee upon the arms and accoutrements of the 2nd and 4th Regiments of Cavalry, and certain returns of their wants. I take this opportunity of mentioning to the Board our total want of tents.

You can have no conception how much this place is improved.

The Toste Khanah is made into one of the best barracks for a complete regiment of Europeans that I have seen in India, and it has not cost the Company one shilling.

The arsenal is in good order, and we shall have shortly a very fine parade.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To J. Uhthoff, Esq. [264.]

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 24th Nov., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 6th instant. Hitherto the communication between Soopah and this part of the country has been very irregular, which is to be attributed to the former disturbances in the Soonda country. The people having then quitted it, and having but very lately returned, it has been impossible to procure a sufficient number of runners for the tappalls. You will therefore do well to continue to send your letters by the usual route.

I shall be glad to hear from you whether you think it would be possible to run a tappall from Goa to Bombay or to Poonah direct. We have lately proposed to Government two roads by which we have been informed that it is possible to run tappalls through the Mahratta country to Poonah: one which will go from Chittledroog by Badamy, the other which will go from Hullihall in Soonda by Darwar to Poonah. We prefer the former, as it will not run through the disturbed districts of the Mahratta country, although it will not run for so great a length of road through our own territories as that by Hullihall and Darwar.

When either of these tappalls is established, I will apprise you of it: if Government fix upon the Badamy route, you will have to send your letters by Soopah to Chittledroog. If the Darwar route is fixed upon, you will have to send them by Soopah to Hullihall.

I have already desired Mr. Cochrane, the postmaster in the Mysore country, to run a tappall from Hullihall by Soopah to Goa; and as he will probably find it necessary to trouble you upon this subject, I shall be obliged to you if you will give him whatever assistance may be in your power.

I have no news for you.

I am yours, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[265.] G. O. Camp at Seringapatam, Monday, 25th Nov., 1799.

The 2nd battalion 12th Regiment to march out of garrison to-morrow morning, and to encamp near the 2nd of the 9th.

The detachment of artillery, with the guns attached to those battalions, and the recovered Europeans and Natives going to the Carnatic under the orders of Major Munro, are likewise to cross the river to-morrow and to be ready to march off on the next day.

One battalion of Bengal volunteers will go into garrison to-morrow, the other on the next day.

The Town Major of Seringapatam will send a detail for the guards to Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner, and the battalion going into garrison to-morrow will furnish them.

Colonel Wellesley has great pleasure in making known to the army the satisfaction which he has derived in observing the discipline and good order of the 2nd battalion of the 9th, and the 2nd battalion of the 12th, at the review of those corps yesterday and this morning. Although the shortness of the time which the commanding officers of those corps have had leisure to attend to their discipline, and the duties upon which they have been employed, might have been a reason why they should not be in the best order, the attention which has been paid to them has prevented the necessity of using it. Colonel Wellesley will undoubtedly report to the Commander-in-Chief the state in which he has found these corps.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[266.] *To the Secretary of the Military Board.*

SIR, 25th Nov., 1799.

The Military Board, by your letter of the 21st August, having desired me to transmit to them a plan of Seringapatam, which I should receive from Captain ———, "with such alterations and improvements as he should deem necessary," and that I should offer "any observations or remarks that I may have thereon," in obedience to their commands I now transmit some papers received from Captain ———, and trouble you upon the subject.

From its situation Seringapatam is naturally a strong place: what it wants principally is the means of giving a flanking fire; and that it is not in our power to give it. We must therefore be satisfied with such improvements as the nature of the place

will allow, and probably the Board will consider it necessary to begin by some of its most glaring imperfections.

Of these the principal one is the difficulty of communication between the main body of the place and the outer rampart. If the plan upon which the Sultaun appears to have acted is to be proceeded upon, and the Board should decide that there shall be two ramparts and ditches on the north and south-west faces, it is absolutely necessary that (many) communications should be made, as recommended by Captain ——— in the first paragraph of his report.

I conceive, however, that on the faces above mentioned, it will be better to destroy the inner wall or rampart, which is in no part finished, and to fill up the inner ditch.

This will remedy one of the imperfections above noticed, for which Captain ——— provides by making communications across the inner ditch.

But there is another glaring imperfection in Seringapatam, for which no remedy is provided. This is the narrowness of the outer rampart on these faces. By a reference to the sections (which I conclude are correct) the Board will perceive that neither the ramparts nor the defences are of the requisite thickness; and it will be allowed that in works to which it is found impossible to add the means of giving a flanking fire, it is desirable that in all parts they should have the means of giving a direct fire. But in Seringapatam the outer rampart is in no part so broad as that a gun can be fired upon it, and the Board will perceive that it is impossible to give to it and the defences the requisite thickness, and a slope to the rampart, unless the inner ditch is filled.

Now as no benefit is proposed to be derived from the inner rampart and ditch, excepting after the first or outer rampart is breached, I take the liberty of suggesting that it would be proper, first, to consider of the means of rendering that as strong and complete as possible, and that the second rampart and ditch, which can be only a secondary consideration, should be sacrificed to that object, should it be necessary.

I should propose then that the second rampart should be thrown into its ditch in order to make room for widening the outer rampart and for giving it the proper slope.

There will be this additional advantage in destroying it, that the place will be kept clean, and there will be a fine space

between the houses and its works on the two faces above mentioned.

If the Board should determine to preserve the second rampart and ditch, it will be necessary to build a strong retaining wall to the outer rampart, the foundation of which must be laid in the ditch in many places, otherwise the rampart will fall into the ditch.

It is very desirable that the covert way and stone glacis should be completed on the faces above noticed.

I agree with Captain ——— in thinking that the parapet in front of the eastern and southern faces of the fort ought to be destroyed and thrown into the ditch, that a palisade should be fixed in the covert way which it is proposed to make, instead of that ditch, and that the whole should form an outer covert way and glacis in front of the inner.

It would be better, however, if that ditch were filled entirely, and the glacis and esplanade were completed.

It would then be proper to join with the main ditch of the place, the ditch of the redoubt at the south-east angle, and the ditches of the out-works covering the Bangalore and Mysore gates, and of the inferior out-works.

There are channels, as I understand at present, at each side of the western angle of the fort in order to let water into the ditch.

This having been taken off from the river is of the same level with its bed, and therefore by means of the sluices at the north-east and south-west angles the ditch has water in it in proportion to the fall of the river.

That on the northern side in proportion to the fall of the northern branch from west to east.

That on the south-western side in proportion to the fall from west to south-east.

If either of the channels at the west angle be closed, the supply of water of course will be diminished; and as there may be a convenience in being able to dry the ditch for the purposes of repairs, &c. by means of the sluices at the north-east and south-west angles (the former of which I must observe is admirably constructed, and if the stone glacis is finished, is well defended), I do not recommend that any of these channels or sluices should be destroyed.

The fall of the river, as it affects the ditches, is a subject

worthy of the consideration of the Board. It appears to be about 5 feet on the northern face between the west and north-east angles. It is therefore clear that a sluice which will contain 5 feet water at that angle will give a ditch of 5 feet deep, provided that it is excavated from the west angle to the east as much as is necessary to give it that depth. But as the Cauvery during the monsoon rises considerably, a sluice which would contain 2 feet more than the natural level of the river would give a ditch of 7 feet during the whole year upon an excavation of 5 feet. The expense, however, of deepening the ditches is to be considered, although it might improve the plan, and will probably prevent the Board from adopting that plan.

In order that the Board may be enabled to judge whether it is better to preserve the channels and sluices as they are at present, and to excavate the ditches, or whether it is better to adopt the plan proposed by Captain ———, viz. to close the channel on the north-west side, and to open a passage for the water into the ditch from the aqueduct on the Mysore bridge, it will be necessary to explain the grounds upon which each plan stands.

It would be best to have both methods of supplying water, but, from what I shall state hereafter, the Board will probably be of opinion that that would be impossible, and that if Captain ———'s plan is adopted, not only the channel at the north side of the west angle ought to be closed, but that that at the south side ought to be closed likewise.

The water in the aqueduct on the Mysore bridge is dammed off from the river at about a mile above the fort; the height of the bridge is about 20 feet: therefore from that aqueduct there would be a fall into the ditch at the south-west angle of the fort of 20 feet; that would give at the western angle a depth of 15 feet. But as the aqueduct is 15 feet higher than the bed of the river at that angle, either the channels for letting in the water at present must be closed, or the water coming from the aqueduct will run out. The benefit then resulting from this plan is to put water into the ditch to the amount of 15 feet in any part if necessary, without deepening it, and at a small expense.

It is necessary, however, that the Board should be informed, 1st, That the water coming to the fort by the aqueduct is liable to be cut off, and that it was cut off during the last siege.

2ndly, That by applying that water in this manner it is diverted from the supply of the fort and island. It is besides to be observed that there must be great strength in the works at the western angle of the fort which are to contain water to the amount of even 7 feet above the level of the river.

If the stone glacis were to give way, or the water were to filter through in any considerable degree, the ditches would be dry, or only of the same depth as the bed of the river. On the other hand, the decay of the aqueduct or of the nullah by which it comes would be equally fatal.

It may therefore be thought a dangerous experiment to close the present supplies of water and to open new; and the other plan, viz. to deepen the ditch from the eastern angle, may probably be deemed the best.

It is to be observed of this that nothing can derange it excepting an alteration in the course of the river. As long as that lasts as it is, the ditch must have water in it.

It is impossible for any place to be better supplied with water than Seringapatam is, and I am therefore anxious that although the sewers and channels may be repaired, nothing may be done to alter their course.

There is scarcely a large house unprovided with a good well in which there is water from the river; there are many in the streets and public buildings, and I must observe that we cannot improve them. I agree with Captain ——— in thinking that it would be very desirable to enlarge the cavaliers (particularly that at the western angle, which ought to be faced with brick), as they are now so small that it is scarcely possible to fire a gun upon them; but I differ with him in opinion upon his project of the new works surrounding the cavaliers and enclosing the south-east angle: 1st, because they are not necessary for the defence of the place; 2ndly, because I conceive the great strength of Seringapatam to consist in its situation upon the Cauvery; and by Captain ———'s plan it appears to be intended to remove the line of defence from that river, in case it should be attacked from thence, to the heights on the south-east side of the fort. I am afraid the position will not be so good for the defenders as it is at present, although the line will be shorter.

As the eastern and southern faces of the fort are the weakest from the want of the Cauvery, I should not propose to destroy

the inner rampart there, or to fill the inner ditch, particularly as they are finished, although they may want some repairs, and as it will be possible to thicken the outer rampart and its defences without requiring the space occupied by the inner ditch.

If this inner rampart be allowed to stand, it will be necessary to have a strong work on each flank of it, at the north-east and south-west angles of the fort, to command the outer rampart on the north and south-west faces.

To conclude then, I recommend that the inside rampart may be thrown into the inside ditch on the north and south-west faces. That the outside rampart on all faces, and its defences, may be made of the proper thickness, with the usual slope. That the stone glacis on the north and south-west faces should be completed, and that a work of the nature of a redoubt should be constructed at each flank of the inner rampart, which I propose should remain on the south and east faces.

That the ditch in front of the south and east faces should be formed into a covert way and palisaded, and that a second glacis should be formed on those faces.

In this I have considered the subject only as the Military Board are desirous that it should be considered.

But if every thing is to be done to the place which, in my opinion, would render it complete, I should recommend that the ditch on the northern and south-west faces may be deepened, so as that it may in all parts contain the quantity and depth of water which there will be at the sluices at the north-east and south-west angles; that the ditch on the esplanade in front of the east and south faces may be filled, the glacis and esplanade completed, and the ditches of the outworks at the east angle, in front of the Bangalore and Mysore gateways, and others, should be joined to the main ditch of the place.

I am fully aware of the disadvantage under which I labour in delivering an opinion upon this subject when I differ in some points with the engineer; but I have obeyed the orders of the Military Board, and I hope that the opinion which I have delivered will at least prove to them that I have given some attention to the subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[267.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 26th Nov., 1799.

I have received intelligence that a gang of robbers who have been plundering and murdering people in the Mysore country reside at Chargull under the protection of the Polygar, who is even said to share the spoil with the gang, and to be at its head; and as I believe that it is the intention of Captain Graham the collector to attack them in their retreat at Chargull, and to endeavour to root them out, I have desired Major Cuppage to assist him, if he find that he can do so without being materially delayed upon his march. Major Cuppage has already been very active in tracing and unearthing some of this gang.

I apprise you of this circumstance in case you should find it necessary to hasten the march of Major Cuppage's battalion.

I have reviewed the 2nd battalion of the 9th Regiment and 2nd battalion of the 12th Regiment, previous to their departure from Seringapatam; and I have the pleasure to inform you that although the commanding officers have had but few opportunities of attending to their discipline, from the corps having been much on duty, and employed on working parties, as well as from the badness of the weather, I found them in the best order.

I have just received a letter from Colonel Hart, in which he says that he can send neither a regiment of Europeans nor a battalion of sepoys to the Mysore country, and he has called upon me for the battalion of Bombay sepoys now at Nuggur.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[268.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 27th Nov., 1799.

I have the honour to enclose extracts of orders which I have given out, and which require the confirmation of Government.

As Mr. Todd is the surgeon of the 2nd of the 9th, I have appointed him to take charge of the detachment of artillery going to the Carnatic with that corps and the 2nd of the 12th.

The different corps which have gone to the Carnatic from Seringapatam having taken with them a large proportion of the Lascars, I have thought it best to strike off the strength of the

garrison those which have been detached, and to add to it those who have come to Seringapatam with the army. In case there should be any necessity to put the troops in the field again, it will be easy to form the departments of the Commissary of stores and Quartermaster-General from the garrison; and the Lascars thus put under the Commissary of Seringapatam will render some service during the time that they remain there.

I have struck off the brigade staff and all other extraordinary staff and establishments, from the 30th instant. The provision which I have made for the inhabitants of the Carnatic is fully sufficient, and will, I hope, meet with the approbation of Government.

I have thought it proper to retain the staff and establishments excepted from the orders of this day, until more light is thrown upon the intelligence transmitted by the Governor-General, and till I receive the directions of Government.

I wish to draw the attention of Government to the situation of the Native sick and wounded ordered into the General Hospital. The Commander-in-Chief gave orders that they should be attended by Mr. Inglis, and that they should receive each 3 quarters of a seer of rice and * pice per day. They have been well attended and taken care of since the capture of Seringapatam, but at a considerable expense to Government. As their numbers are now much diminished, as there will be no inconvenience in taking them into the Native General Hospital, and as it is an object that they should be removed from the mosque in the fort, for which the Honourable Company incurs a large expense, I have ordered that Dr. Anderson may take charge of them instead of Mr. Inglis, who has desired leave to go to the Carnatic, and that they may be moved to the Native General Hospital.

There are several of them who have lost limbs, and are otherwise disabled in such a manner as to render it impossible that they should ever gain a livelihood by their own labour or exertions. It would be cheaper for Government to allow to those who are in such a state a small pension.

By degrees the hospital expenses attending these Native sick would diminish, and would at last entirely cease.

I have the honour to enclose an application from Lieutenant-

* Blank in manuscript.—Ed.

Colonel Gardiner for leave to go to Bengal. I shall be very much obliged to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council if he will appoint Serjeant Turton Regimental Serjeant of Seringapatam.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[269.] *To Josiah Webbe, Esq.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 29th Nov., 1799.

Since my return to this place I have received frequent applications from the ladies of the Mahal of the late Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun for a supply of clothes. I have in consequence made inquiries upon the subject, and have had statements before me of what would be necessary for them for one year, and the expense.

This amounts to a sum exceeding 29,000 rupees, and is about equal to the estimated amount for this article which was laid before the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore. Notwithstanding this, and that I am authorized to incur any necessary expense of this kind for the family of the Sultaun, I don't wish to incur so large an expense as this is at one time without apprising the Right Honourable the Governor in Council thereof, and knowing his sentiments respecting it.

I have the honour to enclose you a statement of the fund provided by treaty for the family of Tippoo Sultaun: you will perceive that although the provision made for every person connected with the family is handsome, there is a large balance in favour of the Company; and that Government will be enabled to provide equally handsomely for the younger branches of the family as they advance in years.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[270.] *To W. H. Gordon, Esq.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 1st Dec., 1799.

I have the honour to inform you that the Honourable Company's troops will occupy the garrisons as stated in the enclosed paper. As soon as you can make the necessary arrangements,

you will send your servants to each of them, who will receive from the aumildars of his Highness the Rajah the garrison-stores and provisions which they may contain, for which they will give their receipts. Of these garrison stores and provisions you are to take charge, and all the regulations which are applicable to such articles in the territories of the Honourable Company and of the Nabob are equally so in this country. You will, however, keep a separate account of what you will at present receive.

List of Garrisons which will be occupied by the Honourable Company's Troops in the Territories of the Rajah of Mysore.

Nuggur, Cowleydroog, Anantpoor, Chandergooty, } Dependent upon Nuggur.
Chittledroog.
Sera.
Paughur, Mudgherry, and Mergasy.
Nundydroog.
Bangalore.
Severndroog.
Goorybunddroog [? Gurdangherry Droog].

In the Province of Soonda belonging to the Company.

Mundragoor.
Hullihall.
Soopah.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq. [271.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 2nd Dec., 1799.

I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to lay my request before the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, that he will appoint a chaplain to this garrison. There are a large body of European troops here, many officers, the resident and gentlemen of his family, and it appears very desirable that they should have the advantage of regular divine service, and other duties which a clergyman would perform.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[272.] *To the Secretary of the Military Board.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 2nd Dec., 1799.

I have the honour to enclose you a return of the gun carriages, &c., &c., which have been found in Seringapatam and have been examined by the Committee of Survey, and a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Saxon respecting them. I entirely concur with him, and recommend that I may be allowed to order that the carriages which are in the worst state may be destroyed; the woodwork to be laid up as firewood, and the ironwork carried to account.

Upon a former occasion I transmitted to the Military Board a return of the arms captured in Seringapatam. There are in the stores at present about 13,000 stand of English arms, which some repairs would render serviceable and fit for the Company's use. It is very desirable that the Board should come to a decision respecting them, and that I should receive orders to destroy those which the Committee have reported to be unserviceable. The ironwork and materials of these might be carried to account.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[273.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Close, Resident at Mysore.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 2nd Dec., 1799.

I enclose you sunnuds for pensions for the killadar of Chittledroog, the family of Hussein Ali Khan, Abdul Mahomed, the brother of Abdul Kuddoos, about whom there are orders in the letter from Colonel Kirkpatrick, which I showed you; and the nanperverish about which I spoke to you. Insert the names of the places at which the pensions of the killadars are to be paid.

I have besides made out sunnuds, and have given orders, for the payment of the following pensions up to the 30th November. They stand upon the "Family Fund."

Ibrahim Saheb's family	3600 rupees	annually.
Ameen Saheb's family	600 star pags.	,,
Zemul ab Deen Taker's widow	200 star pags.	,,
Meer Khadir Ali	400 star pags.	,,
Turbent Ali Khan's family	400 star pags.	,,

For all these, orders have been received from the Governor-General.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-General Harris. [274.]

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 4th Dec., 1799.

My public communications with the Adjutant-General and the Government have made you acquainted with the manner in which I have been going on here. You left me but little to do, and we are now quiet and prosperous every where.

I hear that you sail shortly for England with Mrs. Harris and your family. I beg that you will do me the favour to present my best respects to her. I shall never forget the many marks of favour and kindness I have received from you, for which I again return my thanks. Wherever you go I shall always be glad to hear of your happiness; of your success there is no doubt.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [275.]

SIR, 4th Dec., 1799.

I enclose you the draft of a plan according to which I propose to carry into execution the proposition for establishing a Judicature in Seringapatam, which was approved by the Right Honourable the Governor-General and the Commissioners in Mysore.*

It is unnecessary that I should make any remarks upon it excepting what appear in the notes in the margin.

In case the Right Honourable the Governor in Council should approve of this plan, it will be necessary that he should empower me to administer the oaths of office to the registrar and to the Native judges, and then to administer the usual oaths to the evidences at the trials. It will be also proper to establish salaries for the registrar and the Native judges. If his Lordship have no objection, I should propose Captain Symons for the

* See page 259 for Plan.—ED.

office of registrar; I have not the pleasure of being acquainted with him, but I have heard much of his talents and qualifications for that office. I propose to appoint Hubeeb Oollul the Cazi. His Lordship's notice will doubtless have been drawn to Hubeeb Oollul by his services during the time that the Commission was assembled at Seringapatam.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[276.] *To the Deputy Adjutant-General.*

SIR, 4th Dec., 1799.

I enclose some letters which have passed between Dr. Ewart, the Inspector-General of Hospitals in Ceylon, and the surgeons of the King's regiments upon this establishment, which render it necessary that I should trouble you with a few lines.

In the letter marked No. 1, Dr. Ewart desires that the surgeons will keep a journal in a particular form, a copy of which they are to send him at the end of every month. This journal appeared likely to be so voluminous, and it was probable that so much of the valuable time of the surgeons would be spent in making it up in a manner fit for his inspection, that they requested that he would excuse them from sending it. This has drawn on them his displeasure: he has threatened to bring them to a court martial, which is the principal cause of my troubling you, as I cannot stand by and see a deserving man who has served under my orders during six years of war, and always to my satisfaction, exposed to the risk which naturally attends all trials of that kind.

By the order of the Commander-in-Chief in India, a copy of which I enclose, you will perceive that the surgeons of his Majesty's regiments are ordered to send a report of their sick monthly, according to "the accompanying form." I do not quote the remainder of the order, as I have it not before me; but it does not contain one word about a journal, nor of sending that or any other report to him, excepting that of which a form is sent.

Excepting by that order, I know of no authority in this country by which Dr. Ewart has a right to call upon the regimental surgeons for any report or return. I have always

considered the Medical Boards at the different Presidencies as the head of their respective medical establishments, and to their orders I have always taken care that due obedience should be paid. These Boards have been formed by order of the different Governments, of which the Commanders-in-Chief are a part, and these orders must have been sanctioned by his Majesty's ministers at home. This I conceive to be the highest authority.

Neither do the regulations for improving the situation of the regimental surgeons (if they applied exclusively to this country, which I deny) order that the journal should be sent which Dr. Ewart has required. The Doctor, in his letter to Dr. Brown, has misquoted the order: he has left out these words, "a report to be made by the 20th of every month to the Army Medical Board." It is a copy of that report which is to be sent to the inspector, and not of the journal which the Doctor would lead us to suppose, as you will perceive upon a reference to the regulations for improving the situation of regimental surgeons. That report is sent at present, by orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India.

Being then of opinion that Dr. Ewart has no right to call for this journal, I must request to have the Commander-in-Chief's orders upon the subject: and I beg to know whether in all cases the surgeon of the 33rd is to obey Dr. Ewart, their own head surgeon who visits the regimental hospital generally twice a week, or the Medical Board, or if he is to obey all; in case of a difference in their orders, to which of them he is to give the preference.

With regard to the journal itself, if the time of the regimental surgeons allowed them to keep it and to attend to their other duties, I should think nothing more desirable; but I have been a witness to the occupations of my surgeon, and can speak with certainty of the fact. He goes into his hospital every morning at 7, and does not quit till 11; he returns to it again at 3, and does not quit till half-past 5. Therefore during the day he has four hours not employed in the hospital.

But Dr. Ewart is mistaken if he supposes that the surgeon of the 33rd has not at all times kept a journal: he has not kept one certainly in all the accuracy of form prescribed in the order, but such a one as has enabled him to make out very sufficient reports of the cases under his charge.

In the Doctor's letter it appears that he thinks the purvey-

ance ought to be taken out of the hands of the surgeons, and that too much of their time is taken up by that branch of their occupation. I cannot say whether that business can be done with greater economy or advantage to the public and to the sick; but this I can say, I have seen hospitals in different parts of the world, and since I have been in the army I have not seen any in such good order, or where the sick are taken such good care of, as upon the Coast.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[277.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Hart.*

Sir, Seringapatam, 8th Dec., 1799.

You will doubtless have received either from the Governor-General, from General Stewart, or from Mr. Uhthoff, the intelligence to which I alluded in a former letter, of a fleet seen to the westward of the Cape near the Line by the captain of an American ship on the 7th of July. Intelligence which has since arrived, stating the probability that the British fleet, under Lord Keith, had engaged the combined fleets of France and Spain in the Mediterranean on the 8th of July, although not confirmed by official authority, appears at least to have proved that those fleets were in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar on that day. There is therefore reason to believe that the fleet seen by the American captain did not belong to the enemy. There is, however, further reason to believe that it was a Portuguese fleet. When Mr. Uhthoff communicated the intelligence above mentioned, which he had received from the Governor-General, to the Governor of Goa, he said that he had received intimation that a fleet corresponding in numbers nearly with that seen, was to sail from Lisbon for the Brazils, the East Indies, &c., towards the latter end of May or beginning of June, and that it was probable that it would be on the 7th of July in the place where the captain of the American had reported that he had seen one. I therefore think that we have strong grounds to hope that the tranquillity of the Honourable Company's possessions on the sea-coast will remain undisturbed.

I have this day received a private letter from the Adjutant-General, in which he states that orders have arrived from

Bengal to send back thither all the troops belonging to that establishment which have been serving hitherto under the Government of Fort St. George at Hyderabad and elsewhere. This deprives me of three battalions of Native infantry, and further deprives the Government of Fort St. George by the obligation which is imposed upon it of sending two battalions immediately to Hyderabad. The Adjutant-General has therefore requested me again to urge you to send a battalion of Bombay Sepoys into Soonda, in order to relieve the 1st battalion 8th (Madras) Regiment which is there, and which I have received directions to prepare to send away immediately. He has likewise desired me to inform you that it is impossible to allow Major Disney's battalion to leave Nuggur. As by the statement which I have above detailed it is probable that you will be undisturbed for some time, you might find it possible to detach a corps into Soonda, and thus enable us to send away the Bengal troops without inconvenience or risk.

I shall be glad if, in making your arrangements, you can leave Major Disney in command of the corps which must remain at Nuggur, as I have every reason to be pleased with his conduct since he has been there.

P.S. In case you should be able to detach a corps into Soonda, and that it should come from the northern part of Canara, it would be very convenient, and would accelerate the march of the 1st of the 8th, if the post at Soopah of one company were relieved on the march. Captain M'Farlane's headquarters are at Hullihall, on the Mahratta frontier, about 30 miles from Soopah.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew. [278.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 8th Dec., 1799.

The orders to the Bengal troops to prepare to go to Hindustan have made them as happy as the prospect which they give ours of an increase of establishment has made us.

I have written to Hart to desire to have another Bombay battalion for Soonda, and I have stated to him the probability from the tenor of our last accounts from Europe, first that the

French and Spanish fleets were in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar on the 8th of July, and next from accounts which doubtless you will have received from Uhthoff, that the fleet seen by the captain of the American was Portuguese. Whether that will send the battalion or not I cannot tell, but in the mean time I have ordered M'Farlane to prepare to march.

You have said nothing about the Bengal Artillery, which, however, I have ordered to be in readiness to move. I have likewise sent orders to have the 1st of the 1st halted at Chittledroog. I think that we ought now to dismiss the departments, and have peace without the expense of war. I am ready whenever I receive orders.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[279.] *To the Secretary of the Military Board.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 8th Dec., 1799.

I have received the directions of Government to state to the Military Board my sentiments "respecting the repairs or buildings which may be necessary for the immediate accommodation of the troops in cantonments."

As I have not yet had an opportunity of visiting all the posts in Mysore, and have not received the reports of the committees which I had ordered to survey the buildings for troops which they contain, I cannot write with certainty or precision: I shall therefore confine myself to what appears most necessary at the present moment.

In Soonda, where a corps of Sepoys is posted at Hullihall, I think it is absolutely necessary to make barracks for the Sepoys and houses for the officers. The Malabar monsoon is so severe in that country, that the most distressing consequences are to be apprehended if some steps are not taken immediately for that object. But as it will be impossible between this time and the next monsoon to make such buildings as will be permanent, or as the Honourable Company's troops are accustomed to, I should propose to the Board to order the officer who is in command in that country to make such temporary buildings as he thinks will cover in and protect the troops during the monsoon. The same rule may be followed for a temporary accommodation

for the officers. These cannot be very expensive, as the timber which will be necessary is plentiful. Hereafter when the Military Board will have had time to send an engineer into that country, a plan may be devised for making permanent accommodations for the troops. As when I was in Bednore I received complaints from Captain M'Farlane, stating the sufferings of his Sepoys from want of cover when they were sick, I ordered him to construct a temporary building for an hospital, of which I hope the Board will approve. Hereafter I will send the Board information regarding the other posts.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Harness. [280.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 10th Dec., 1799.

The subject which you have referred to me in your letter of the 8th instant is one of great difficulty and extent, and it does not appear that you have considered it in any point of view excepting as it affects the convenience of the regiment. It appears to be agreed that it does not affect their interests, and therefore it is difficult for me to give any decision upon it on public grounds. I have accordingly determined to refer Captain Campbell's letter to you to Mr. Gordon, and to desire him to give an answer to it; and I shall send both, with such observations upon them as may occur, to Government. In the mean time, as I am anxious that the 74th Regiment should suffer as little inconvenience as possible, I have desired Mr. Gordon to send orders to his servants to pay Captain Campbell in rupees, which he says he has, or in other coins the currency of the Carnatic at the Company's exchange, and thus the matter must rest till Government send further orders upon the subject.

The fact is, that in this question both parties are in some degree in the right, though both differing widely. A small quantity of good temper and moderation accommodates these matters without reference to authority, which always requires time to decide; and thus the inconvenience is severely felt before any step can be taken to remove it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[281.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, 15th Dec., 1799.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the orders which I have given for the discharge of the public departments of the army and of the bullocks which have remained in the service. Since the 31st of May, when the large bullock establishment was discharged, the bullock maistries and owners have received only one pagoda per month for each bullock in the service. The reason of this is, as I am informed, that the head maistries and owners represented to the Commander-in-Chief, through the principal agent Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas, that they were obliged to go to the Carnatic to settle their accounts, that the persons left in this country in charge of the bullocks were only their servants, and they therefore requested that these might receive only one pagoda for each bullock, and that a settlement for the remainder of the line might be made with them thereafter. The Commander-in-Chief gave orders accordingly, and matters have so continued since his departure. Some of the bullocks in the employment of the army at present were hired originally by the principal agent, Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas, and of these there are regular registers and accounts, but their maistries and owners are generally in the Carnatic. Others came from the southern countries and the Barahmahal, and of these no registers or regular accounts have been received from the persons who hired them. For these reasons, and because I am not apprised of the principle upon which Government have determined finally to arrange all the bullock accounts, I have thought it best to do no more at present than get rid of the expense by discharging the bullocks from the service, and to delay to make any arrangement for the settlement of the accounts until I can receive the orders of Government. That which appears to me to be the best method of settling the accounts, is to order the principal owners and maistries to meet the principal agent at a particular place in this country on a particular day, after which no claims on account of bullock hire ought to be received. I mention in this country because it will be inconvenient to allow the principal agent to go so far as Conjeveram from the Honourable Company's draught cattle.

If the gentlemen to the southward, or in the Barahmahal, cannot transmit the requisite registers and accounts to enable

the principal agent to settle for the bullocks which they hired and sent to the army, it will perhaps be deemed proper to order the principal agent to give these gentlemen an account of all sums which have been paid on account of the bullocks hired by them since they arrived at the army, and to order them to settle the accounts with the bullock owners and maistries. Immediately after the capture of Seringapatam, when the army began to move, its means of carriage were so scanty, that it was impossible to allot it off exclusively to particular departments. Afterwards when supplies of bullocks arrived from the Barahmahal and the southern countries, as they brought no registers or accounts, it was equally impossible for the principal agent to make over to the subordinate agents in each department the bullocks for its carriage, with all their registers and accounts settled up to the day on which they were made over according to the regulations of Government.

Accordingly since the 31st of May the subordinate agents have had nothing to do with the payment or management of the bullocks employed in the carriage of the departments of which they had charge. Everything has been paid and settled by the principal agent, and for this reason it is that I propose that he should meet the maistries and owners and come to a final settlement with those whose papers will allow of it. The bullocks still remaining in the service will be settled with upon the same principle when the corps go into cantonments and garrisons.

After the 31st of December there will remain still in office the principal agent for draught and carriage cattle who is in charge of that fine establishment of draught cattle belonging to the Honourable Company, and the deputy agent for the carriage of camp equipage in charge of the Honourable Company's elephants and camels. I have lately ordered the principal agent to complete the karkhanas of draught bullocks, by drafts from the carriage bullocks and calves, many of both of which are fit for it, and when he will have done so I will have the honour of laying before Government a state of the whole establishment.

I recommend that the camels may be disposed of; they are not fit for public carriage, as they require much care and are not hardy.* of them have died since they have been in the possession of the Honourable Company.

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

The Deputy Adjutant-General, Deputy Quartermaster-General, and my aide-de-camp are still in office, and I shall be glad to receive the orders of Government respecting them.

I shall order the doolies which still remain here to be employed in removing the sick and wounded from Chittledroog, Sera, and Seringapatam to their corps on both coasts, and then to be discharged.

I have allowed Mr. Gordon the conicopolies mentioned in the order, as Mr. Cochrane's people have not yet arrived to supply these sick Europeans with arrack. I have ordered Mr. Grant into Soonda to take charge of the 1st of the 8th, which corps is very unhealthy, and the surgeon is dead. As the troops are still receiving field allowances, I have not authorized Captain Grant to deliver barrack articles, excepting to the troops in Seringapatam, such as are stated in the enclosed paper, the issue of which was authorized by the Commander-in-Chief. I enclose a letter which I have received from Captain Grant upon the subject, and I take the liberty of recommending that he may be allowed to charge the expense of the lamps which he has provided for Seringapatam, and that he may be ordered to provide with the same the other garrisons which it is intended to occupy, of which I have given him a list.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[282.] *To Captain M'Farlane.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 15th Dec., 1799.

Captain West * wrote to you yesterday to inform you that a battalion of Bombay Sepoys had been ordered from the province of Canara to relieve your corps in Soonda, and to desire that as soon as relieved you would begin your march towards Chittledroog. Intelligence received this day from Lieutenant-Colonel Close, which is enclosed, induces me to desire that you will halt at Hullihall till further orders, notwithstanding the arrival of Bombay Sepoys at Hullihall. As you have people employed to give you intelligence of what is passing on the Mahratta frontier, it is extraordinary that you should not have heard of this force belonging to the Kolapoor Rajah, to whose motions,

* Aide-de-camp to Colonel Wellesley.—ED.

the attention of the commanding officer in Soonda is particularly drawn in my instructions to Captain Tetley. I beg that you will without delay endeavour to find out the truth of this intelligence, and direct your inquiries to these points: Whether the Kolapoor Rajah has in reality an army in the field? What is its strength? Where is it posted? At what distance from our frontier? What is the design of the Kolapoor Rajah? What force has Doonda Punt Goklah to oppose to him? What part will Bappojee Scindia take in the contest if there should be one? What force can he bring into the field?

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government, Fort St. George. [283.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 16th Dec., 1799.

I have the honour to enclose you an account of certain sums which have been drawn for, and expended by me, in consequence of orders from the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore.

These expenses fall upon the fund provided by treaty for the support of the family of Tippoo Sultaun, and are rather below the estimate given in to the Commissioners: those for the "Ratib"* particularly have fallen considerably, and will fall still lower: those for the tombs have increased nearly to the amount of the estimate; they were low at first, because the people who belonged to the tombs had fled, and those only who were present were paid; and latterly they have been higher, as the whole of the establishment have been present. The increase of thirty-eight rupees per month for Jamm u Deen and Surur u Deen will, I hope, be allowed.

It will be necessary that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council should decide upon the manner of settling the accounts of this "Family fund" in future. There can be no doubt but that they ought to go through the hands of one person, otherwise the state of the fund, from which there are so many small drains, can never be ascertained. And as the disbursements fall neither upon the civil nor military fund, that one person ought to send his accounts to Government, under the

* *Ratib* is a Hindustani word, signifying a daily allowance of food.—ED.

head of "Accounts of the Fund provided by Treaty for the family of the late Tippoo Sultaun." The person who naturally ought to be at the head of the fund, who ought to draw for what may be wanted from the Treasury, to make all payments from it, and to account for the whole of it, is Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton. As long as any part of the family remains at Seringapatam I can settle with him the accounts of disbursements which I may make, and receive the money from Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton, or from the paymaster, for bills which Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton might be enabled to draw upon the Treasury. In the same manner he ought to pay the amount of all the pensions from the fund. He might either send bills or remit money to Hyderabad and to Seringapatam, which, with Vellore, are the places at which the pensioners have chosen to receive the amount of their pensions. If the Right Honourable the Governor in Council should approve of this plan, and will give the necessary orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton, I will make arrangements for the settlement of all the accounts of the pensioners and others without loss of time. The manner in which I propose to do it is as follows: I propose to obtain from Mr. Gordon an account of all sums which he has paid on account of the "Family fund," whether to pensioners or in consequence of orders from the Commissioners in Mysore, or from me; to have the amount debited upon his books to Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton, who will pay Mr. Gordon by an order on the Treasury. He will likewise pay the resident at Hyderabad the amount disbursed by him.

Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton will then send up the accounts under the different heads of "Pensions at Seringapatam;" "at Vellore;" "at Hyderabad;" "Payments on account of the Mahals and younger Princes," and "Tombs," and extraordinary payments made in consequence of the orders of the Commissioners. The vouchers for the expenses up to the end of this year must be the bills of those who paid, and the receipts of those who received the money, and the whole will answer the debit at the Treasury against Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton.

As it appeared to Lieutenant-Colonel Close and to me that Shah Abbas, who is married to Tippoo's daughter, and who is pensioned in consequence thereof, ought to be upon the "Family fund" instead of upon the Rajah, we have removed him to the former. His pension is 291⅔ star pagodas *per annum*. I have

likewise granted pensions upon the fund since I sent you the list, in consequence of former orders, dated 24th August, from the Governor-General, as follows:

Turbent Ali Khan's family	..	1400 rupees *per annum.*
Meer Khadir Ali		1400 ,,

Upon examining a letter from Captain Malcolm to Ibrahim Saheb, Tippoo's brother, I find that the pension, promised to him by order of the Commissioners, is 3400 star pagodas, instead of 3500 Canterai. I therefore propose to increase his pension 1750 rupees. The whole will make 5570 rupees more than appeared in the statement which I sent to you on the 29th of November.

No provision has yet been made for the payment of the expenses attending the mosques in the Fort, amounting, according to the estimate, to 2293 Canterai pagodas *per annum.*

It does not appear that this expense falls properly upon the Rajah, or upon the fund provided for the family, and I shall, therefore, be glad to receive the orders of Government respecting it.

I have, &c,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq. [284.]

DEAR WEBBE, Seringapatam, 17th Dec., 1799.

I this morning received the letter from the Sub-Secretary of Government, of the 10th instant, with its enclosure. I wish that I had received it before I sent you mine of yesterday's date, as it renders that unnecessary. I shall, therefore, be obliged to you if you will return it to me with the account enclosed, which I will send to Doveton, after I shall have taken from it the amount of the expenses of the tombs. It appears that they are to be paid by the Company.

I enclose you the copy of a letter from Colonel Kirkpatrick, which, you will perceive, gives authority for granting the pensions proposed in my letters to the Governor-General of the 30th July and 19th August, and of which I concluded that you were apprised, or I should not have granted the pensions in consequence of it. I have, however, acted in communication with Close.

Close will have made you acquainted with the reports which have reached us, that the Kolapoor Rajah has an army in the field of about 5000 horse and 5000 infantry, in which Dhoondiah Waugh has a command. Until we can ascertain the foundation of this report, I have thought it best to desire that the 1st of the 8th may not leave Soonda till further orders, although it may be relieved by a Bombay battalion from Canara. I have desired M'Farlane to make particular inquiries regarding this army, and I will let you know the result.

We are much in want of a bridge here over the northern branch of the Cauvery, and having lately had some conversation with Close and Purneah upon the subject, it seems to have been agreed that the Rajah should pay half the expense (which is fair enough, as he will benefit by it as much as we shall), and Purneah proposes to build a bridge for the sum stated in the enclosed estimate. This, however, will be a common country bridge, and will not be in the most convenient situation, or in that which would be most capable of defence. We are obliged to place it where the bed of the river is most rocky, in order to be able to fix the stone uprights in the rocks, and therefore cannot choose the situation which would be most convenient in other respects.

I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether Government will be inclined to build a bridge here. If they should be so, it cannot be done at a cheaper rate than at that proposed by Purneah. But if Government should be disposed to make a handsome bridge here, and (as Dr. Anderson says) leave one memorial of our having been in this country, there is a convenient place for it, where Tippoo had intended to build one, and had already commenced it. This, however, will be an expensive work.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[285.] *To Colonel Sherbrooke.*

MY DEAR SHERBROOKE, Seringapatam, 18th Dec., 1799.

As I know you are aware of the inconveniences which the regiment has suffered from Colonel Cornwallis's neglect in not sending after us his accounts for years 94 and 95, I have less

reluctance in troubling you upon that subject. I know that when I quitted Poole, in March 96, when the regiment was about to embark for India, Colonel Cornwallis had materials in his possession, and such progress was made in bringing the accounts to a close, that it would have been in the power of any man to settle for every shilling before the regiment sailed. However, he not only allowed the ships to sail without settling his accounts, but afterwards, when I went away in June, they were still unsettled: notwithstanding, he gave in his resignation, and sold his commission. As from his former dilatoriness I had reason to apprehend that he would still delay the settlement, and that, being out of the service, the accounts might never be settled, I desired Messrs. Meyricks to detain in their possession the purchase-money of his commission as a security to us all for the arrangement of our accounts.

It has lately been reported that he has sent out to India his accounts; but they have never been received, and I apprehend they never were sent. I beg that when you arrive in England you will procure a copy of what it is alleged has been sent, and transmit it, keeping another copy in case the first should fail. If Colonel Cornwallis should not have settled his accounts, I beg that you will be so kind as to desire Messrs. Meyricks to detain not only the principal but the interest of the purchase-money of his commission which I ordered them to keep in their hands. At all events the principal must not be given up till the accounts arrive at the regiment, nor, if he has transmitted the accounts at all, must the interest till he settles and sends them out.

I acknowledge these measures to be harsh, and I am sorry to trouble you with them; but it cannot be helped.

If when you arrive in England you should find any other measures necessary, such as legal proceedings, &c. &c., I beg that you will take them, in order that we may get our accounts.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton. [286]

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 24th Dec., 1799.

Within these few days I have received an application from a very respectable man (Père Dubois) to have returned to their

husbands the wives of about 200 Christians, and other unmarried Christian women, whom Tippoo had carried off from their husbands and friends upon different occasions when he visited the Malabar coast and Canara, and who were placed, and are now supposed to be, in his Zenana. I have refused to comply with this request, although the refusal is unjust, because, the Company having taken this family under its protection, it is not proper that anything should be done which can disgrace it in the eyes of the Indian world, or which can in the most remote degree cast a shade upon the dead, or violate the feelings of those who are alive. Le Père Dubois has made another request upon this subject which can do neither, and he places it upon such strong grounds that it does not appear to me to be possible to refuse compliance.

He says that the husbands of these women, who were taken from them in the most indecent and tyrannical manner accompanied by acts of cruelty which it is unnecessary here to detail, are desirous of marrying again; and he says that he cannot perform the marriage ceremony unless he ascertains whether their former wives are really dead. The means of ascertaining this fact are possible, and, therefore, until they are resorted to, he will not perform the ceremony. This appears to me so reasonable that I have not thought it proper to refuse compliance; and I have accordingly desired to have a list of the names of the Christian women still alive in the Mahal. Some difficulty has been made in giving it, and I have not received it yet, but I hope to get it in a day or two.

I understand that many of these women went to Vellore with the Princes, and I shall be obliged to you if you will endeavour to procure a list of the names of those who are still alive. I make no doubt but that, upon representing the cause of the request, and upon giving an assurance that it is not intended to ask for a single woman, the good sense of the young men will induce them to grant what we are obliged to ask. I must observe that, although I have given this assurance here, and press you to give it at Vellore, I am by no means certain that if the matter came before Government they would not be obliged to give up every woman of them. Justice and all our prejudices and passions are on the side of the Christians, and there is nothing which can induce the Government to refrain from doing what is just excepting the consideration which I have

above mentioned has weight with me, which after all is only one of policy, and that not of a very urgent nature. If the Princes and the family here carry *their* prejudices so far as to refuse compliance with the reasonable request of Père Dubois, the granting of which will enable him to remove much of the inconvenience and grievance suffered in consequence of Tippoo's tyranny and injustice in this instance, I shall be under the necessity of forwarding to Government the whole that has passed upon this subject, and the result will then be most probably, that Government will give orders not only that every Christian woman, but every woman detained in the Zenana against her consent, may be allowed to depart. I don't wish to hint this idea, much less to hold it out as a threat; but I mention it to you, as I know your wishes for the ease, honour, and satisfaction of this family, as an inducement to you to urge them most seriously to give the information required, and to allow no vain prejudices to affect their conduct upon an occasion so interesting to a large number of people.

I enclose you a letter which I have received from Père Dubois. You perceive that he asks information only about a few; but he has repeatedly told me that the husbands of others are coming from the coast upon the same errand, and I have therefore determined at once to procure a list of all those still alive.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major Disney. [287.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 24th Dec., 1799.

I have received your letter of the 20th instant. Mine of the 17th instant will have acquainted you that I intend that you should remain at Nuggur with the 1st battalion 5th Regiment, to which corps I understand from Colonel Hart you are appointed, and that the 1st battalion 4th Regiment should march into Soonda. It will be necessary, therefore, that this last corps should be complete in camp equipage and in the means of carrying it, and you will supply whatever deficiencies there may be of either from the 1st of the 5th. In case it should be convenient to you to detain at Nuggur the followers of the 1st of the 4th, and the commanding officer of that corps has no

objection, I have none, to your sending with the 1st of the 4th the followers of the 1st of the 5th, provided there is no public inconvenience in changing them from one corps to the other.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[288.] G. O. Camp at Seringapatam, 25th Dec., 1799.

Colonel Gardiner, with the troops under his command, will march to-morrow morning according to instructions which he will receive.

It is essentially necessary that on the march through the Mysore country the greatest attention should be paid to the preservation of the property of the inhabitants; that for this purpose safeguards should be sent to the villages, and such other measures should be adopted as in Colonel Gardiner's opinion will tend to this desirable end. The order published on the 31st October last must be read to the Bengal sepoys at three different parades; and when safeguards are sent out, the rules laid down therein must be observed.

In case the assistance of the country is at any time wanted for the conveyance either of public or private baggage, it must be required from the aumildars in moderation, must be paid for regularly, and the assistance received must not be carried further than is absolutely necessary.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[289.] *To the Secretary of the Military Board.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 25th Dec., 1799.

I have received the orders of Government to communicate my sentiments to the Military Board respecting the repairs and buildings which may be necessary for the immediate accommodation of the troops. I have the honour to enclose the proceedings of committees, which have been held by my order at each station in the Mysore country, to survey and "report upon the nature and state of the buildings occupied by the officers and troops." The reports from some of the stations have not yet been received; but I have preferred to send those which have arrived to detaining from the Board for any greater length

of time the information which they contain. Hereafter, as the others come in, I will transmit them to you. Excepting at Bednore and at Bangalore, there are no quarters for officers in any part of the country; the houses which they inhabit in general are old and out of repair. If the Government should determine to keep them as quarters, it will be necessary to give them a thorough repair, which will not render them fit for the purpose for which they are at present used; at the same time that it will in the end be more expensive than to build proper quarters.

The state in which are the buildings for the accommodation of officers, the immense expense which must attend the construction of new quarters in all parts of this country, the length of time which must elapse before these are built, should Government decide upon the measure, during which the officers will suffer great inconvenience and probably incur a large expense, induce me to propose that the officers of corps in the Mysore country should be put upon tent-allowance.

I am aware that this question has been frequently canvassed, and that little new reasoning can be added in support of the measure; but it may be urged that the troops were never in such a situation for want of quarters as at the present moment in this country; that at all former periods when the subject has been considered, the expense which the Honourable Company had already incurred on account of officers' quarters, the accommodation for officers which, in consequence of that expense, there was in all parts of the country which it was necessary for the troops to occupy, had considerable weight in the decision which was made. The total want of camp-equipage may, besides, be brought as an inducement to put the officers upon tent-allowance.

It may doubtless be urged that, if quarters cannot be given to the officers, they will have lodging-money.

Upon this I observe that, as the officers will be obliged generally to build their houses, and as the expense of building in this country is immoderate, the lodging-money will be no compensation for it. If with that is considered the general expense of living in this country, occasioned by the great distance of the stations of the troops from the Presidency, from whence all articles of supply will come, Government will pro-

bably be of opinion that it will be proper to order the tent-allowance.

Even the quarters of the officers at Bangalore and Bednore require some repairs; and the nature of the building at the former, and the climate at the latter place, will probably render repairs more frequent than the Board will expect.

The Board will have great pleasure in observing that at all the stations, excepting at Nundydroog, the soldiers and sepoys are well accommodated. As the Malabar monsoon will set in in a few months, I recommend it to the Board to order the repairs to be made which are reported to be necessary. Excepting at Seringapatam, there are no engineers in the Mysore country; and the commanding officers of corps might be ordered to put in repair and render habitable the buildings occupied by their corps, for which they might send the estimates, and the expense might be checked in the same manner as when buildings are executed by an officer of the corps of engineers.

At all events, whether this plan or any other is adopted, it is very desirable that the repairs should be begun without delay.

A regiment of European infantry has been ordered to Chittledroog, but I beg to draw the attention of the Board to the Report from thence, by which they will perceive that there is no accommodation for it.

It does not appear that there are stables or other buildings required by the cavalry in any part of the country. It is supposed that the horses will not want stables, and we understand that the Sultaun never built any for his cavalry. Certain buildings, however, are wanting for the arms, accoutrements, and saddles of the cavalry, and for quarters for the officers. If the Government should order the tent-allowance, it will apply to them as well as to those of the infantry, and nothing will remain to be provided excepting buildings for the arms and for the gram.

I, some time ago, submitted to Government the outline of a plan for providing these buildings, supposing the whole of the cavalry would have been in one cantonment, which will answer equally well although they are separated. My idea was, that an allowance should be given to the commanding officers of regiments to provide the buildings, which, I must observe, it is particularly their interest should be of the best kind.

The inconveniences which have been felt from having fixed

cantonments for the cavalry, and the expense which always must attend the construction of extensive buildings for troops, which afterwards, for divers reasons, may be found inconvenient, are strong inducements for adopting a plan for procuring the buildings that are necessary, which will admit of a change in the position of the troops, and will not create a heavy, although a permanent, expense.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*To Colonel M'Kenzie.** [290]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 29th Dec., 1799.

I have for some time omitted to answer your last letter, although I have done what you desired. I have made many inquiries respecting the manner of assisting to forward the views of your relation, and have made application that he should be appointed to the situation which he is particularly desirous to obtain. I found, in the first place, that that situation was not vacant, and was not likely to become so; in the next place, that, if it were vacant, it was one to which the first men in the medical profession in this country were looking, among others, I believe, the head surgeon of the army, under whose directions Mr. M'Kenzie has served lately. Under these circumstances there has been no ground to hope that Mr. M'Kenzie would be appointed to it; but I hope that he will get some situation which will be agreeable to him. I shall be obliged to you if you will desire him to let me know when anything becomes vacant which he may wish to obtain.

I hope that you will not go home, but that you will wait here to serve upon the staff. Although you are my senior, I have no objection to serving in the same army with you. There are now two vacancies upon the staff in this country which would just suit us, and, as the climate of the Carnatic would probably agree with you, I should wish to see you here. I know that that idle fellow Munro wants to get you back to the Highlands of Scotland, but you must not mind what he says, and must remain in India till the conclusion of the war. As I believe that you are as rich as you wish to be, I would advise you to go

* The late General M'Kenzie Fraser.

home, if I thought it probable that you would be employed upon the staff on the service which, we have every reason to believe, is going on in Holland; but that will be over before you can arrive in England; it is therefore better that you should remain here.

You will have heard of Sherbrooke's departure for Europe: he has never had a day's health in India, and he therefore does right to go home. Your friend Monypenny is here, and well. Remember me to all in the 78th.

Yours sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[291.] *To Lieut.-Colonel Cliffe.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 1st Jan., 1800.

I enclose you the copy of an order which we have received in the 33rd Regiment, but which has not yet been issued by you, although it appears to have been dated above three years ago. I am rather anxious about it, because it affects an officer in the 33rd Regiment. There was a short-pay company in the 33rd for above a year after the date of that order. If that have effect, the disadvantage falls upon Captain Keating, the youngest by purchase during that period. If it have not effect, it falls upon Captain Anderson, to whom was given the last company vacant without purchase, and who, according to the former rules of the service, is entitled only to the short-pay, as long as the gentleman lived who had had permission to retire upon his pay, or until another company should become vacant, and should be disposed of without purchase.

I should wish to know your sentiments upon this subject before I make any regular application. Although it appears clear that, at some time or other, the disadvantage will fall upon Captain Keating, he refuses to submit to it, alleging, as his reason, that it is impossible that it can be intended that the order should have a retrospect, and should deprive him of money which he had received and spent. You will easily believe that, if this order had come to the regiment through you, the only regular channel of communication, I should not have hesitated to desire that it might be carried into execution by the paymaster, as it respected Captain Anderson and

Captain Keating; but now, however just it appears that the latter should bear the burden, I have no means of enforcing it I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether an official application upon this subject will be attended to.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [292.]

SIR, 8th Jan., 1800.

I have, by this day's tappall, transmitted to the Military Board lists of the stores surveyed by committees ordered by me in Paughur, Mudgherry, Mergasy, in Nundydroog, in Nuggur, Chandergooty, Anantpoor, Cowleydroog.

For the care of these, it will be necessary that persons should be appointed to assist the commanding officers of the stations at Paughur, at Nundydroog, and at Nuggur. Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey, in a letter of which I enclose an extract, has recommended Serjeant Leonard of the 2nd battalion 12th Regiment, to be appointed store-serjeant at Paughur; and Major Cuppage has recommended Serjeant King to be appointed store-serjeant at Nundydroog. As Major Disney who at present commands at Nuggur, belongs to the Bombay establishment, and can have but little knowledge of the forms and manner of making up returns required by this Government, and as there are large quantities of stores at Nuggur, and in the other posts in the province of Bednore, I recommend that a deputy-commissary or a conductor may be sent there. I have drawn the attention of the Military Board to the diligence of Major Disney in surveying the stores in the province of Bednore.

The troops being still on field-allowances, and having their lascars attached to them, who have done the duty of the lascars in the forts which they have occupied, it has not been necessary to fix any establishment of them for these forts. The enclosed extract of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey will explain the want of them, and the various uses to which they will be put. I recommend, therefore, that an establishment of artificers and store-lascars may be given to the forts of Paughur, Nundydroog, and Nuggur. This last, on account of its size and the

quantities of stores which it contains, will require a larger proportion than the two former.

I imagine that the Commander-in-Chief fixed the proportion of lascars for Chittledroog; but of this post I will write more fully when I shall have received returns from it.

I recommend that at Seringapatam, Chittledroog, Nundydroog, Paughur, Nuggur, and Hullihall in Soonda, permission may be given to fire a morning and evening gun.

The distance which the posts in this country are from the Presidency, from whence must be drawn at present all articles of supply, induces me to propose that a laboratory may be established at Seringapatam.

I have transmitted to the Military Board an indent for the articles which will be required for the laboratory, should Government allow one; and the Military Board will probably be ordered to fix an establishment for it.

The establishment of artificers and lascars at Seringapatam is already very large; but I must observe that the business of the store-department is immense, occasioned by the arrangement of the captured stores and ordnance, of those belonging to the army, and by the repairs and additions to the arsenals and store-rooms.

It will not, therefore, be very convenient to spare from the present establishment of the store department any very large number of persons for the laboratory. I have the honour to enclose a letter from Colonel Saxon on the subject of a laboratory.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[293.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton.*

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 10th Jan., 1800.

By letters received from Government, I learn that it is intended that you should pay the pensions of the family of the late Tippoo Sultaun and Hyder Ali, and other charges falling upon what is called "The Fund provided by Treaty for the Families of Tippoo," &c., &c. Of some of these charges payment has hitherto gone through my hands, and I conceive that the best method of arranging the business would be as follows.

All the payments have been made hitherto by Mr. Gordon, in consequence of orders from the Commander-in-Chief, from the Commissioners of Mysore, or from myself. They have consisted of payments to pensioners on the fund, and to the Princes when here, and for the Mahals since their departure. I should propose that Mr. Gordon should charge your account with all that he has paid from the fund since the fall of the place; that he should make over to you the vouchers and receipts of those to whom he has paid the different sums, in order to enable you to make out and settle your accounts with the Accountant-General. These, with my accounts of the sums which have passed through my hands, will enable you to settle the whole business, and to give Government a clear view of the charges upon the fund, and of the means which remain for a liberal provision for the younger branches of the family.

If you approve of this method of proceeding, let me know it, and I will transmit to you all the papers and documents which will enable you to settle the business. If you should not approve of it, I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know how you propose to settle these accounts, and to whom you wish that I should transmit the accounts of the money which has passed through my hands. It will also be necessary that you should make arrangements for the future charges upon the Family Fund which are incurred at Seringapatam. I will still receive the money which is necessary from Mr. Gordon, and hereafter will adopt such other method of providing as you will point out.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. [294.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 10th Jan., 1800.

I have received the directions of Government to desire that, until provision can be made for certain wounded inhabitants of Seringapatam and sepoys in the service of the late Sultaun, by the Dewan of the Rajah of Mysore, they may be pensioned at the expense of the Honourable Company and paid by you.

They have hitherto received an allowance amounting to three-quarters of a seer of rice and three pice per day each;

but as it appears that they will be better able to subsist by commuting the whole into money, I think it proper to desire that they may receive each one Carnatic Milee [or Meilie] fanam per day, to be paid daily.

I enclose a list of the names of those who are to receive this allowance, and you will be so kind as to begin to pay it on the 15th instant, from which day the allowance which they have hitherto received through the hands of Captain Grant will be stopped.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[295.] MEMORANDUM ON PRIZE-MONEY.

Seringapatam, 11th Jan., 1800.

The Order from the Government of Fort St. George, which contains the substance of a letter from the Governor-General upon the subject of a production from the Prize-Committee, reached me this day.

As the greatest part of the army was under my command at the time when this publication was circulated, and as I know that the officers of many of the corps did consider and determine upon the questions proposed by the Committee, I think it but justice to myself to explain the manner in which that happened.

The Order, with great propriety, in my opinion, considers such deliberations and decisions as highly improper and detrimental to the discipline and subordination of the army; but, from the circumstances which I am about to mention to you, I could not consider them so at the time when the publication was received and they were held.

The publications were received by the officers commanding corps (not by me) when I was absent from the army and in the province of Soonda. The covers in which they were enclosed were signed by the Adjutant-General, and the officers to whom they were directed were requested to communicate the determination of their corps through his office: thus, when I returned to the army, I had every reason to believe that that publication had come from the same authority which had before communicated to us everything relating to prize-money and to

the Prize-Committee, and the deliberations then proposed appeared as proper as those which were held in the army at the time the Prize-Committee was appointed.

But I acknowledge that I had still my doubts of the propriety of any deliberation whatever upon this subject, and accordingly, two days after my return from Soonda, I wrote to the Adjutant-General a private letter, in which I acquainted him of my opinion, and asked him what the General wished the corps to do. After some time had elapsed, and most of the corps (particularly those in garrison and at a distance from me) had considered and determined upon the questions referred to them, I received a private letter in answer, in which the Adjutant-General said that the publication in question was to be withdrawn, and that the General would not point out any mode of proceeding upon the subject. In the mean time the majority, if not most, of the corps had deliberated and had given their opinions.

The situation of an officer in command in this country, upon an occasion like that of which I have been writing, is very unpleasant. He has doubts in his mind of the propriety of a proceeding for which there is the sanction of authority put in his hands to stop it, because he has always reason to suspect that in contests of that kind he will not be supported by Government. This was my case; and I declare to you most solemnly, that if I had imagined that I should have been supported by the Government, I should have exerted all my authority to prevent that which it appears is now deemed a breach of discipline and subordination, and which I thought was such when it was going on, although from the manner in which the publications were sent to the corps, and that in which their answers were required, there was reason to believe it was otherwise.

As a further proof of my sentiments upon this subject at that time, I mention that I received papers from almost all the different sets of claimants for prize-money, which they desired me to circulate among the troops under my command. I returned these to the persons who had sent them, and informed them that I could not communicate to the army under my command anything which was foreign from the service on which they were employed, or which did not come to me from the highest authority.

I have thought it necessary to write thus much in justification of myself, and I should certainly do it through the public channels, only that I don't wish to be the accuser of my superiors, or to bring forward again a public discussion of a subject upon which enough has been said already.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[296.] *To Major-General Sydenham.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 16th Jan., 1800.

I omitted to inform you that I had spoken to Captain Cunningham respecting the seals,* about which you wrote to me, and that he says that he will give them to Lord Mornington. He is naturally anxious to have the merit of presenting them himself.

I have written both to Government and to the Military Board respecting the establishment of a laboratory at Seringapatam, and I hope that the idea will be adopted. Upon looking over your establishment at Madras, I see that you have only a serjeant at the head of it, and I therefore concluded that at first we should have only a serjeant, who, for his good conduct and attention, might hereafter be made a conductor. This appears to meet your idea, as stated in your letter of the 11th, which I have just received.

I have received a letter from Government, in which I am desired to give my opinion respecting the Sircar bullocks. I have lately ordered Captain Mackay to draft from the carriage-bullocks and calves such cattle as might be fit for the draught, and equal in size and strength to those already in that branch. He returned yesterday from this service, and has nearly completed the numbers of all the karkhanas. He is now occupied in making out statements and returns of the whole establishment, and, as soon as I receive those from him, I will send them to Government, with my opinion upon the whole subject.

I have already had some conversation with Close respecting the manner of taking care of the cows, and of procuring from them a regular supply of the same breed of cattle for the service. It appeared to us both to be best to leave in the hands

* Signets used by the late Tippoo Sultaun, which the Governor-General desired to send to England.—ED.

of the Rajah's dewan all the cows. There are already some calves, but not fit for work; and, of course, when we come to examine more minutely into the subject, there will be means of knowing exactly the number of cows, where they are, and the quantity of cattle which may be expected from them every year. There is a disadvantage in giving over to a black Government any part of this establishment, which, however, may be checked, in a great degree, by the vigilance and control of the resident. This, together with the advantages which attend that measure, such as their being kept without expense or additional establishments, counterbalances, in my opinion, the inconveniences and losses to be apprehended from the corruption, the knavery, and robbery in all native Governments. The establishment is now nearly complete; the cattle are healthy, and, in general, young, so that there is no reason to expect any very great deficiency in their numbers for some years. If it were otherwise, I might be induced to recommend that an expense might be incurred for the cows, and for the preservation of the calves which are to keep it up hereafter.

The great inconvenience which we felt in the bullock establishment of the last war (and which, I believe, has been felt in every war) was the want of drivers; and, indeed, I may say that the wages of those that belong to the present establishment of bullocks constitute nearly the whole expense.

In the wars which we may expect in India in future, we must look to light and quick movements; and we ought always to be in that state to be able to strike a blow as soon as a war might become evidently necessary. There would be no difficulty in hiring bullocks (and even good ones) to draw our guns, in the same manner as was done in the commencement of last war, during the time that the other preparations might be making; but for these, as heretofore, there would be no drivers; and by the time that the army would be collected and prepared to move, the bullocks, as usual, would be either dead or unfit for service. Therefore, I insist upon it that, whether the bullocks are kept or not, the corps of bullock-drivers ought to be retained in the service in the present situation of affairs, even if to pay the expense it should be necessary to send away a regiment of Europeans or to disband one of sepoys. But the bullock-drivers make nearly the whole expense of the establishment, and, therefore, considering the small expense attending, and the great

advantage of having 3500 trained cattle in good order when the army is to take the field, I would not recommend that their numbers should be at all diminished.

This number will give a sufficiency for a field-train of 50 pieces of cannon, with all their stores, and will leave a large number for your provision department. It would be useless and ridiculous to think of providing for a heavy train, and it would be improper, in my opinion, to apply those bullocks to the draught of it, should one be ever necessary.

It is first to be recollected that a road must be made wherever a heavy gun goes, and that, when that is done, the number of bullocks allowed by the Company's regulations, be they ever so bad, are fully equal to drawing it as fast as it ought to go. Of this I have only to refer to the experience of the last war. It was certainly impossible to find worse bullocks than the army had, and yet there was no difficulty in getting on the guns, excepting where the road was bad. In these situations, the best bullocks, even those we have now, would not have enabled us to make longer marches, or to move more quickly. Good and strong bullocks are essentially necessary to field-pieces, because these are always liable to be moved across the country where there is no road, and because, in fact, they can be of no use to the troops excepting they can be so moved. Therefore it is that I would have this establishment kept and applied solely to the drawing of a field-train and its stores, and of a provision department, and, perhaps, of treasure.

I agree with you that there is no man more fit than Mackay for the care of this establishment. His attention ought certainly to be drawn to the objects which you mention, and I will take an opportunity of mentioning them to him.

I have desired the troops to indent for bullocks upon Mr. Gordon: first, because I wished to put in activity all his departments; next, because at the time when I gave those orders it was desirable to have the draught-bullocks collected and ready to be applied, as their service might be required, on either coast. But, in my opinion, there will be no inconvenience in employing these bullocks on the ordinary peace duties in this country, and, in that case, indents for *draught cattle* must be made upon the principal agent. But it must be recollected that, if they are so employed, it will be necessary to use the Company's carts and carriages upon all occasions; and I doubt

whether, upon the whole, it will not be better and less expensive to use those and the cattle belonging to the country. It will, however, be in the power of Government, and might be left in that of the commanding-officer in this country, to order that indents for draught cattle might be made upon the principal agent, when it does not appear that there will be any inconvenience in so doing.

I have written you more than I intended about these bullocks, which, I assure you, are great favourites of mine.

I have received the directions of Government to make arrangements for the payment of the Bombay troops serving in this country. I have settled this matter as follows, and I shall be glad if you will let me know whether the system will answer: I have taken the 77th Regiment on the establishment of Fort St. George, and have thus rendered their business as simple as that of any other European corps in this country. The payments to them on account of this Presidency will commence in March in arrear for February, and I have delayed them till that period in order that the commanding-officer may have an opportunity of making himself acquainted with our establishments, our forms of abstracts, returns, and allowances. The Bombay Native troops, having certain establishments and followers with which we are unacquainted, to which our regulations don't attach, and of which it might be inconvenient to deprive them, I have thought it better to leave the settlement of their accounts and the check in the hands of the Bombay paymaster in Canara. I have accordingly arranged that they are to send their abstracts to him, and a copy of them to Mr. Gordon. He will pay the amount as an "advance on account," and will charge what he pays in his accounts of disbursements as such, for which the abstracts and receipts of the commanding-officers will be his vouchers. Whenever he will pay a sum of money on account of these abstracts, he will inform the Bombay paymaster thereof; and if he should pay any charge not allowed by the Bombay regulations, the Bombay paymaster will inform him of it, and he will subtract the amount from the next abstract.

The 77th will be paid on this principle in February the arrears of January.

There will be certain expenses attending the Native corps occasioned merely by their serving in this country. These are the full batta to the officers commanding at Hullihall and at

Bednore, &c., &c. I have desired that these may be charged by Mr. Gordon and vouched in the usual manner, and I have directed him to transmit to the commanding-officers forms for this purpose.

I intend to send to Government, either this day or to-morrow, a copy of my letter to Mr. Gordon upon this subject, and this will doubtless be submitted to you. What I have above mentioned, however, is the outline of the plan.

Will it not be necessary that the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India should be given for the removal of the 77th from one establishment to the other? Mention this to Mr. Webbe. There will be ample time for obtaining them if they should be necessary.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[297.] *To W. H. Gordon, Esq.*

SIR, 16th Jan., 1800.

I have received the directions of Government to make arrangements for the payment of the troops belonging to the Bombay establishment now serving in this country. These are the 77th Regiment at Chittledroog, the 1st battalion 4th Regiment in Soonda, and the 1st battalion 5th Regiment in Nuggur.

It appears, on every account, desirable that the 77th Regiment should be removed to the establishment of Fort St. George, and I shall give orders to that corps accordingly. I request that you will be so kind as to send to the commanding-officer a statement of the allowances to this corps under the existing regulations, and copies of the forms according to which he is to make out his abstracts. I will give directions to Captain Quin to make to him communications of a similar nature upon the subject of the King's subsistence. You will begin to pay him in March the arrears of February.

The Native Bombay troops have establishments attached to them with which the Coast [Madras] troops are unacquainted, in the same manner as these have certain establishments peculiar to themselves.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to deprive these two Bombay corps of their establishments in order to assimilate

them to those serving under the Government of Fort St. George, and it will be equally so for you to pay and check the expenses of these corps, if they have attached to them the establishments which have been found necessary to the Bombay Native troops, instead of those to which the regulations of the Government of Fort St. George attach. I am therefore of opinion that the best arrangement which can be adopted will be that you should pay them, "as an advance on account," the amount of each month's abstract; that they should send you a copy of their abstracts, which are to be transmitted to the Bombay paymaster in Canara, with whom their accounts are to be settled. It will be necessary that when you pay any sum to either of these corps you should acquaint the Bombay paymaster thereof, and on account of the abstract of what month. He will, of course, inform you whether you have paid too much; and whatever you will have overpaid in one month, you will have to subtract from the amount of the abstract of the next.

There are some expenses which will arise in consequence of these corps serving in this country which it will be in your power to check, and which, therefore, ought to appear in your accounts. These are, the difference of batta to the officers commanding them, should the Right Honourable the Governor in Council think proper to appoint them to command the stations at Nuggur and Hullihall, and other extra expenses.

In your accounts-disbursements you will charge what you will pay under the first head as "an advance to * battalion * (Bombay regiment)," for which the abstracts and receipts of the commanding officers will be your vouchers. The charges for the expenses occasioned by those corps serving in this country will be vouched in the manner required by the regulations, and I request that you will be so kind as to furnish with the forms of abstracts, bills, &c., &c., the commanding officers of the two corps.

I request also that you will communicate to them the arrangement made for paying their corps.

I have above informed you that the 77th Regiment will be removed to the establishment of Fort St. George, and have requested you to pay them in March their arrears for February. I have delayed to that time the period at which you are to commence paying them on account of the Government of Fort

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

St. George, in order that the commanding-officer may know what establishments are allowed him, may have time to discharge those not allowed, to make himself master of the forms of abstracts, amount and nature of allowances, &c., &c. It will be necessary, however, that this corps should be paid by you for December and January, and you will be so kind as to pay them as "an advance on account" in the same manner and upon the same principles as above pointed out for the payment of the 1st battalion 4th Regiment and 1st battalion 5th Regiment.

You will observe that the copies of abstracts which it is above directed that the Bombay battalions should send you, must be those of each company's and individual's abstract, and that the receipts to be produced by you must be those of the individuals who signed the abstracts.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[298.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, 17th Jan., 1800.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain Mackay, the principal agent for draught and carriage bullocks, with copies of returns of the Honourable Company's bullocks, and estimates of the expense of 100 bullocks, and of the saving upon it which can be made.

I recommend that the alteration in the establishment, and the other arrangements proposed by Captain Mackay, should be adopted.

It is necessary that I should draw your attention to the estimate of the expenses of this establishment. By this it will appear that nearly the whole of them are occasioned by the wages to the bullock-drivers. These are a most useful body of men, the want of whose services has been felt in every war, particularly in the last. If Government should be determined not to keep up the establishment, there is reason to apprehend that the drivers will apply themselves to some other occupation, and it will be impossible to find them again or to replace them when the army may be called into the field. It is unnecessary that I should point out the inconveniences to be apprehended in

such an event; but they would be more sensibly felt in the species of warfare which may be looked for in future, than in any other of which we have hitherto had the experience.

If it should be determined to keep up the establishment upon its present footing, with the alterations proposed by Captain Mackay, it will be possible, without inconvenience, to increase the karkhanas to the amount of 50 bullocks each, without materially increasing the expense; and thus there will be an establishment of draught cattle ready at all times, equal to almost any service upon which the army may be called.

It may be observed that much of the expense of the bullocks might be balanced by that which they will save by the performance of the work for which cattle are hired in time of peace. But it must be recollected that, in that case, the Company's carts and carriages must be used, and the constant expense of their repair would be greater than that of the hire of the country bullocks and carts. I therefore do not reckon upon any saving of the ordinary expense of hire for cattle, although there may be occasions when it will be proper to employ the Sircar bullocks.

As far as I have had an opportunity of observing this establishment, it appears well regulated, and that Captain Mackay has paid the greatest attention to it. It might, however, be proper to throw in upon it some of the regulations of Government for musters of all the people attached, the abstracts and vouchers for their pay, and the other checks to which the establishments under this Government are accustomed.

In Captain Mackay's letter allusion is made to some cows and calves still in the country and belonging to this establishment. I rather believe that of the former there are about 4000, but Lieutenant-Colonel Close has not yet obtained from the dewan a regular account of the numbers of either. From the different communications which I have had with him upon this subject, it appears that he is of opinion that it will be most proper to leave the cows and calves in the hands of the Rajah's Government. They are kept without expense; and hereafter, when Lieutenant-Colonel Close will have had an opportunity of examining this subject, and will have known the exact number of the cows and the places in which they are kept, there will be means of ascertaining the supply of calves which may be expected for the establishment. If this supply should be certain,

it is better that the cows should be left in the hands of the Government of the country than that the establishment for the bullocks should be loaded with the care of them, or that the Government should be obliged to incur any additional expense on their account.

The bullocks are now grazing, some in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, some between Sera and Bangalore, and some on the banks of the Toombuddra, between Turrikerra and Hooley Honore, in the stations which I fixed for them, with a view of providing a supply for either coast or for the troops in this country. There will be neither inconvenience nor difficulty in finding for them in different parts of this country, a sufficiency of grass for the whole year.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[299.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 19th Jan., 1800.

I have received your letters of the 13th, 14th, and 15th, and I am much obliged to you for the lists contained in the first.

My opinion about the lists is that it is very immaterial whether they are correct or otherwise, which opinion, however, ought not to be known to those from whom we required them. All that we wanted was a statement from the best authority which could be deemed authentic, in order to quiet the scruples of the Christian priest, and thereby procure the second marriage of the aggrieved persons, provided it did not appear by that list that their wives were still alive.

If the name of any woman still alive should have been omitted, and her husband should be married again, the breach of the law will not be very criminal either in the priest who marries them or the man who is married; and as it is not intended that these women should ever quit the Zenana, it will never be known whether the lists are correct or otherwise. Upon this principle it is, that although I have received information that the list which I procured from the Mahal here was by no means correct, I have not thought it proper to take any notice of the information, or to desire to have another.

I enclose some letters for the Princes; one of them is from myself to Futteh Hyder.

I am glad that you approve of the method of settling the accounts of the Family Fund which I have proposed. I shall be prepared to put it in execution as soon as you will have communicated to me the sentiments of Mr. Woolf.

There is a mistake in the sunnud of Mahomed Gyas. His pension is 200 Canterai, or 166⅔ star pagodas. In my return I put him down paid to the 31st of July, conceiving that it would be more convenient to make that day the end of the first quarter or three months; but the paymaster, more accurate in business, thinks that a pension which commences from the 4th of May ought to be paid for three months on the 4th of August. The difference is very trifling, and may be settled in any manner you please.

With regard to the difference between the amount granted by sunnud and that in the statement received by you from Government and from me, you will do well to inform Mahomed Gyas that I made a mistake, and that it will be necessary not only that he should not receive in future more than what is stated in the lists, but that the overplus paid to him in the first quarter should be refunded. If, however, there is any difficulty upon this last part of the subject, I will pay the difference for the quarter received as a compensation for my error.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of the Military Board. [300.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 23rd Jan., 1800.

I enclose a letter, and a paper enclosed therein, which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Saxon.

By a reference to the plan of Seringapatam, the Board will perceive that it contains many magazines, all of which are surrounded by houses, and none of which, from their construction, are entirely secure. To keep powder which is not proof, and is therefore unserviceable, will be useless and attended with risk, and considerable expense in the repairs of the magazines and the provision of barrels or boxes to hold it. I therefore recommend that this powder which Colonel Saxon has tried and has reported unserviceable may be destroyed, and that

permission may be given to destroy such of the remainder of it as may be found in a similar state, excepting probably about two hundred barrels, which may be used for the morning and evening guns and for salutes. I have reason to believe that there will still remain a large quantity of powder fit for the Company's service.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[301.] *To Major Shee.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 23rd Jan., 1800.

A report has reached my ears, of which I think it necessary to apprise you, and to request that you will make inquiries upon the subject. I have been informed that Mr. ————, of the 33rd Regiment, having learnt that an order had been given by the Governor-General that the detachments of the army under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne and Lieutenant-Colonel Read should share in the Seringapatam prize-money, had bought from Lieutenant Lister his right to a share in the prize for 450 pagodas. I have been informed likewise that Lieutenant Lister was not aware of the orders which had been given in favour of the detachment to which he belonged, of which, however, Mr. ———— gave him no intelligence; that Lieutenant Lister, having subsequently learnt that such orders had been given, had desired to return his money to Mr. ————, which has been refused.

I am fully aware that it is not uncommon for officers to dispose of their chance of prize-money, and for others to purchase it, and that if either the receipt of it is very uncertain, or the time at which it will be received very remote, the purchase-money is not usually equal to the prize-money expected. But in this case it appears, as I am informed, not only that it is certain that Mr. Lister will receive prize-money, and at no very distant period, but that Mr. ———— knew that this was the case, and that he concealed his knowledge from Lieutenant Lister, who was in a state of uncertainty. Therefore this transaction is by no means similar to other purchases of prize-money which have been at different times in different armies, and has the appearance of an usurious transaction, of which no gentleman ought to be guilty. I beg that you will do me the favour to inquire into these circumstances, and let me know whether they

are as I have stated them. If they should be so, my anxiety for the credit of the army under my command, above all, for that of the 33rd Regiment, will induce me to bring forward to a public discussion the conduct of Mr. ———— upon this occasion; unless I hear from you that he is sensible of the impropriety of his conduct, and that he has received from Mr. Lister the money which he gave him, and has restored to him his right to receive his prize-money.

It may happen, however, that I have been misinformed as to the facts upon which I have grounded the intention which I have above communicated to you, and I shall be glad to hear that it is so, and the real state of the case.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant Marriott. [302.]

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 2nd Feb., 1800.

I have received your letter of the 29th January, in which you desire that I will write to Mr. Webbe, or to you if I should think that you can be of any use in assisting me in the charge of the family of the late Sultaun, which still remains at Seringapatam.

I have long been desirous that some person should be appointed to take charge of them, but have been prevented from making known to Government my wishes upon this subject by two considerations. I was much flattered by the confidence reposed in me with regard to this family immediately after the fall of the place, for which the only return I can make is to pay the greatest attention to them as long as they remain here. It would appear that I was not sensible of the confidence of Government if I were to desire to get rid of the charge, to which nothing but trouble is attached, which is one reason for refraining from desiring it; and another is, that I am very unwilling to make any formal proposal to increase the staff of this place, which I am sensible is already very large. I must therefore decline to write to Mr. Webbe upon the subject. However, if you can prevail upon Government to appoint you to take charge of them, I shall be very happy; and I think that the appointment will be a proper one. If you should pass this way, or

should come to reside at Seringapatam, I hope you will make my house your home.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[303.] *To Colonel Stevenson.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 3rd Feb., 1800.

I have received your letter of the 30th of January, and I am much obliged to you for the intelligence which it contains; which, however, differs much from other intelligence from the same quarter. By all accounts, however, it is clear that there are large bodies of Mahratta troops on foot, of which it is very desirable that we should have every intelligence. It appears by accounts which I have received that Scindiah's troops, or as they are called, the troops from Poonah, have joined Appah Saheb. I have heard this morning that the two bodies joined have had an action with the Kolapoor Rajah's army, in which the latter was defeated, but with no great loss. It does not appear that Dhoondiah was in the defeated army; on the contrary I believe him to be somewhere between Savanore * and the Kistna.

Goklah is still at Savanore making preparations, and he will join the Bhow's son, Appah Saheb; but the Killadar of Darwar, Bappojee Scindia, remains neuter.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[304.] *To Captain Stewart.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 4th Feb., 1800.

I have received intelligence of a very vague nature, I believe, but which I think it proper to communicate to you for your information. It has been stated to me that there are in this country a number of vagabond horsemen with evil intentions of different kinds. Among other places upon which I am informed that they have designs is Mysore, where they might undoubtedly annoy the Rajah and his family considerably. I conclude that

* *Savanore*, or *Shahnoor*, an ancient town, 39 miles S.E. of Darwar.—ED.

you have a guard at the new fort, which, whatever it may be, it will not be necessary to increase; but I beg that you will yourself visit it frequently, take care that sentries are placed at the unfinished and accessible part of the fort during the night, and that they are alert on duty. It is likewise desirable that a part of your detachment should remain in the barracks at all times prepared to turn out.

These measures of precaution you will take quietly, without giving room for alarm to the family (for which, in truth, there may be no grounds), or giving reason to believe to those whose designs are thus guarded against (should there be any such) that you suspect them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. [305.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 9th Feb., 1800.

I have to inform you that I have received directions to put into the field a detachment which will consist of about 300 Europeans and 2500 Natives. For these it will be necessary that you should make provision as follows:—For the Europeans there must be arrack and provisions during the whole time that they will be out, of which a large proportion must be prepared to leave Seringapatam with the troops in the first week in March. I reckon that the detachment will be in the field for three months. There must be one month's grain at half-allowance for the Native troops, and about 25,000 pagodas in cash for the payment of the troops for the month of March. Besides bullocks for the carriage of the grain and provisions for the troops, about 350 will be required for the carriage of stores, which you will have to supply on indent from Captain M'Intire. There will be no occasion for draught bullocks, or for carriage for the tents (excepting bamboo coolies) as the departments will supply them.

Dooly-bearers to carry about 30 doolies for the Europeans will be required.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[306.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 9th Feb., 1800.

I have received your letter of the 5th instant, and I beg leave to observe that you have omitted to enclose the copy of a letter from Mr. Woolf which you state to have put up in the same cover with your own letter.

I some days ago sent you some letters from the Savanore Nabob to the mothers of the three Princes. The wife of this Nabob, Tippoo's sister, sent to inform me that she had letters from her husband for the Princes, and some days after she had given me this information she sent the three letters which I enclosed, and which I have reason to believe were not the letters which came from the Savanore Nabob. These, I imagine, have been sent to the Princes by a private hand.

I mention this at present because a report has come to my ears of an extraordinary nature—that an attempt was to be made by a thieving banditti, employed by Dhoondiah, to carry off the young Princes who are here, at the time when they should be hunting with me. These Savanore letters come from the quarter in which Dhoondiah is, and if there should be any truth in the report, they may have a reference to the plan. I am now examining into the truth of it, and I shall be able to give you more information in a day or two; in the mean time it is desirable that it should not be talked of.

It is not improbable that Dhoondiah may want one of these Princes in order to put him at the head of the Mussulman party, but I should doubt the truth of this report.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[307.] *To the Officer Commanding in the Province of Malabar.*

SIR, 9th Feb., 1800.

The Resident in Mysore will have made you acquainted with the wishes of the Right Hon. the Governor-General that detachments should be formed in the Mysore country and in Malabar for the purpose of awing or compelling the Pyche Rajah to submit to the authority of the Honourable Company in Wynaad. In compliance with these wishes I have this day

taken measures to collect at Seringapatam a force consisting of 5 troops of Native cavalry, 2 battalions of Sepoys, 4 flank companies of Europeans, 4 of Natives, 500 Native pioneers, and a detachment of artillery and ordnance proportionate to that force. I trust that this detachment will be collected and ready to move from Seringapatam in the beginning of the second week in March, and I shall proceed myself in command of it.

When I shall have obtained more accurate information than I possess at present of the nature of the Wynaad country, the position and strength of the Pyche Rajah and his resources, I shall inform you of the plan which I intend to pursue and the road which I shall follow.

From the experience which the officers of the Bombay establishment have of the species of warfare of this man, and of the Nairs in general, you will doubtless be of opinion that as large a detachment should be formed in Malabar as can be spared from the ordinary duties of its garrisons. The nature of the country renders it desirable that the detachment should be accompanied by a body of pioneers, and the local information and experience of Captain Moncrieff of the corps of Pioneers render it an object that he should be with them.

I shall be glad to hear from you when you expect that your detachment will be prepared to move; likewise its strength, &c. &c.; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make me acquainted with the line by which you propose to enter the Wynaad country, the place at which you would think it most proper that the two detachments should join, and any other information which it may be in your power to give me.

I shall be obliged to Captain Moncrieff if he will send me a copy of his map of the countries below the Ghauts.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [308.]

SIR, 10th Feb., 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain Tomkyns. I understand that the European troops on the Bengal establishment when in garrisons in the provinces of Bengal or Bahar receive their pay, which for the artillery

amounts to the sum stated by Captain Tomkyns, and half batta. This is about equivalent to the pay received by the European troops in garrison on this establishment. When out of those provinces, or in the field, they receive their pay and full batta.

There is a contractor in Bengal who furnishes the troops with their provisions, and who receives for every man on half batta five Sonaut rupees, and for every man on full batta ten Sonaut rupees. When the troops receive what is called dry batta the money is paid to them by the contractor, who gives them the amount of his contract, viz., five rupees per month for every man on half batta, and ten rupees for every man on full. The Bengal artillerymen have hitherto received their provisions from the Commissary of Provisions of the Army, and since his department has been discontinued, they, as well as the other troops, have received money in lieu of provisions from the paymaster. When this payment will be discontinued at the end of this month they will receive less than the other troops. As these artillerymen have left their families in Bengal with family certificates, which it will be difficult to discontinue, and as the time of service of a large proportion of them has expired, the Right Hon. the Governor in Council will probably deem it expedient that the payment, which they have hitherto received since they have been in garrison in the Mysore country, may still be made to them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[309.] *To Captain Colebrooke.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 11th Feb., 1800.

I have received orders to put a detachment into the field, and I have reason to believe that it will be prepared to march from Seringapatam by the 7th or 8th of March. I have always found that your Native guides are by far the most intelligent people of that kind that are in the country, particularly for our troops, as they know to a nicety whether a road which they have explored will suit us, of which all others that I have seen are ignorant. I shall therefore be much obliged if, without delay, you will send me here a few of the most intelligent that you have got. If you have nothing better to do, perhaps upon

application you might be allowed to join me yourself, and if you do I shall be glad to have you. If you come to me, you have no time to lose.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [310.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 11th Feb., 1800.

I have received your letters of the 6th and 7th. I have already written to Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor regarding the public cattle belonging to the Bombay Government employed with his corps, and as to his establishments Mr. Gordon and he will settle that matter.

You and Colonel Montresor must be the best judges of the propriety of the officers of the 77th living in the town when the men are encamped outside of it; upon that subject I can say nothing. I strongly recommend that the 77th should be kept in tents rather than be put in any place of the unwholesomeness of which there is the smallest doubt. Troops can be kept healthy in camp by cleanliness, shifting the ground occasionally, &c. &c., but nothing can keep them so if their barracks are unwholesome. I have had a woeful experience of the truth of this remark in my own regiment.

All your reports and letters upon the subject of barracks and quarters at Chittledroog have gone to Government, and I have repeatedly pressed for a decision relating not only to the quarters at Chittledroog, but to those in all parts of the Mysore country.

Present my best compliments and congratulations to Mrs. Stevenson (I hope by this time), Mrs. Walker and Captain Walker.

I have just heard that twenty casks of arrack left Bangalore for your garrison on the 9th instant.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[311.] G. O. Camp at Seringapatam, 13th Feb., 1800.

Colonel Wellesley had great pleasure in observing at the review of the 1st battalion 2nd Regiment this morning, that great pains had been taken, and much attention paid to them, and that the corps is in high order. The system of discipline which it has practised is not that which is generally in use at the present day, although it appears that it is that ordered by authority for the troops serving under the Presidency of Fort St. George.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[312.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 14th Feb., 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain M'Farlane. I imagine that you must have given Harponelly to the Nizam; and I conclude that Dhoondiah will have no scruple about attacking it.

The aumildar of Nunjuncode [? Nunjengoor] was here yesterday with one of his muttaseddees, and they proved clearly, in my opinion, that all the principal people accused and arrested had been at Nunjuncode constantly for the last six or seven months. It may be true that some of the inferior people had been in Dhoondiah's army, and it may also be true that a plan, such as that of which the informer has spoken, was talked of in his camp; but I doubt whether any of them came here with an intention of putting it in execution.

The old killadar of Seringapatam, Seyd Mahomed, came here last night, and told me that he had information that there was a man in the village in which he lived who was raising men for Dhoondiah, and he produced a man who had given it to him. The person raising the men is the sirdar who was confined by Purneah in the fort of Anawootty when the army was there. I have handed the informer and his information over to Bajee Rao, and have desired him to report it to Purneah, and to make such inquiries as he might think necessary to ascertain the truth. Coupled with the intelligence from Captain M'Farlane, I think all these rumours of men being raised in the country, &c. &c., are very extraordinary, and that

they deserve the attention of this Government. This story about Dhoondiah has come down now through three different channels, and they appear to be distinct from each other.

I am, however, convinced there is no truth in the information I first received; although, as I above said, some of the persons accused may have been followers of Dhoondiah, and may probably at this moment have some connection with him.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [313.]

SIR, 14th Feb., 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain M'Farlane. Intelligence has been given to me from different quarters of Dhoondiah's plots and designs upon this country, and his agents and emissaries have been pointed out; but having made inquiries into the truth of the reports which have been made to me, and which are in general circulation, I cannot find that there is any foundation for them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General. [314.]

SIR, 18th Feb., 1800.

I enclose letters and other papers which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny and Major Shee, who are in command of the 73rd and 33rd Regiments in the garrison of Seringapatam, and I shall be obliged to you if you will lay them before Major-General Brathwaite.*

From the facts stated it will appear that it is impossible for an Ensign to live upon his pay, and that a Lieutenant can barely subsist upon it, in this country.† This arises from the expense of

* Major-General Brathwaite had succeeded Lieut.-General Harris as Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army.—ED.

† The following documents show the items of expenditure.—ED.

Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, commanding at Seringapatam.

SIR, Seringapatam, 15th Feb., 1800.

I have the honour to send you the annexed letter from Lieutenant Gordon, in the name of the subalterns present with the 73rd Regiment; also a statement

the European articles which officers must consume, as those which the country produces, firewood excepted, are as cheap here as in other parts of India, and are likely every day to

of the monthly expenses of officers at Seringapatam, which I feel myself at liberty to forward, from a perfect conviction of the statement being extremely moderate. I am sorry to say, from recent losses, that the transport of articles from Madras is attended with a very considerable risk.

Permit me to observe that, having been on two Committees of Survey which examined the different public buildings in Seringapatam fit for the accommodation of officers and soldiers, and having upon these occasions had an opportunity of acquiring some insight into the business, I have no hesitation in saying that an allowance of five pagodas per month is totally inadequate to furnish quarters for an officer at this station. I need hardly attempt to point out to you that, from the difficulty of procuring workmen of all descriptions and materials at Seringapatam, it is almost impossible for officers to build accommodations for themselves, as has been done in the Carnatic, had they even ready money sufficient for the undertaking, which I may safely say is far from being the case with the 73rd; and it is to me equally obvious that, if they actually had the means, such a measure to officers liable not only to be ordered from the station, but from the country at the shortest notice, would be imprudent in the extreme. I am, therefore, hopeful that, should what I have said appear to you in the same point of view, you may be induced to represent the case of the officers of the 73rd Regiment to Government, on whose liberality I have the most perfect reliance. It may be necessary to mention that there are no captains present with the regiment, but I am in daily expectation of the arrival of some officers of that rank.

I have, &c.,

M. MONYPENNY, Lieut.-Col. 73rd Regt.

A Monthly Statement of Expenses incurred by Officers at Seringapatam on the most moderate calculation.

	Star Pagodas.
Messing per month	9
One pint of wine per day, at 7 pagodas per dozen	8¾
Breakfast, paying for tea 3½ pagodas a caddy, and 15 pagodas for a tub of sugar	7
Two servants, one at 3 pagodas and one at 2 pagodas	5
Washerman, barber, and totyman	3
Tailor, upon an average, as he is usually employed per month (at 4 pagodas)	1¼
Occasionally for coolies when on guard, &c.	1
Hair powder, pomatum, blackball, soap, &c.	4
Incidental expenses, such as postage, stationery, candles, &c.	3
Star pagodas	42

Charges by Merchants for European and other Articles furnished by them.

	Star Pagodas.
Scarlet cloth, per yard	8
Epaulets, per pair	18
Hats, each	6
Feathers, each	2½

Long

become more so. But the dearness of the necessary European articles is, I am afraid, irremediable.

The custom which the officers of the European corps have of living together in a mess, and the advantage which they derive from procuring the European articles for their consumption immediately from their agents at Madras instead of from the dealers in Seringapatam, are what will enable them (Ensigns excepted) to subsist at all. But the officers of the Native corps who live separately, and who are obliged to take what they want from the dealers in the country, would, if there were any of the rank of Ensign, suffer the greatest distress. At all events all subalterns will be more severely pressed than they are accustomed to be in any part of India. Besides the dearness of the necessary European articles, it is proper that I should men-

	Star Pagodas.
Long cloth, &c., the same as in the Carnatic.	
Nankeen, per corge	21
Boots, per pair	10
Powder, per dozen	6
Pomatum, per dozen	8
Blacking, per ball	0½
Candles, per maund	12

N.B. Bandy hire from Madras at 13 each, and a cooly 2½ pagodas, who carries 1½ dozen wine or a tub of sugar, &c.

Major Shee, commanding 33rd Regiment, to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.

SIR, Seringapatam, 15th Feb., 1800.

I beg leave to lay before you a statement of the difference in price in various articles at Seringapatam and Fort St. George, and also a calculation of the unavoidable expense of living at this place. The statement and calculation were made by the officers of the 33rd, and by them I have been requested to transmit them to you. I can with certainty say that they are in general correct, and that the only difference I have found between them and the result of my own inquiries is that the estimate of expenses is in a few instances rather too low.

By these it will appear to you I am persuaded that it is absolutely impossible for a subaltern officer on half batta to exist in Seringapatam, at least to afford himself the bare necessaries of life, without incurring a certain monthly debt, the accumulation of which must finally prove ruinous. If by a representation of the facts which they have stated, submitted by you to the Government, you conceive that some allowance above half batta and house rent (which are adequate to their expenses) might possibly be obtained for the officers serving in Seringapatam, you would thereby render them a most essential benefit, and confer the highest obligation.

I have, &c.,

JOHN SHEE.

Calculation

tion another circumstance which diminishes the means and adds to the distress of the subaltern officers in Seringapatam. The houses, the property of the Company, which they occupy are so bad, and so much out of repair, that in order to keep themselves covered from the weather they are obliged to incur a monthly expense. It may be said that that is their own affair, and that they have no business to incur an expense for the repair of a public building; but when the forms which must be gone through, and the delays which take place before any repair of a building can be made, are considered, and that the question is, whether an officer is to be protected from the weather or not? there is no doubt but that he will incur an expense for that object. I don't urge the propriety of it, but I mention it to show the whole difference in the situation of officers in Seringapatam and in other places. Those who are not accommodated with houses belonging to the Company must hire them, and they certainly cannot procure anything for the lodging-money which is proposed to be allowed.

Calculation of what an Ensign on Half Batta in Seringapatam can afford to expend in a Month of 30 days.

	14th Feb., 1800. Star Pagodas.		
Madeira for a month of 30 days, 15 bottles, at 6 pagodas per dozen	7	21	0
Messing for ditto, including servant's wages at the mess	9	0	0
Breakfast for ditto ditto	7	11	0
Servant's wages, per month	5	0	0
Washerman and barber	3	0	0
Candle and oil, per month	1	0	0
Keeping himself in jackets, one epaulet, pantaloons, waistcoats, shirts, boots, socks, hats, feathers, pocket handkerchiefs, towels, and soap for one month	10	0	0
Total expenditure of an Ensign in Seringapatam for one month of 30 days	42	32	0
Total allowance to an Ensign on half batta in Seringapatam for 30 days	31	7	49
Total expended above the Ensign's pay and allowance for a month of 30 days	11	24	31

N.B. In the above adjustment of an Ensign's expense for a month, he is allowed only what he can barely exist on: he can neither have a friend to dine with him, nor can he afford himself a glass of beer, spirits and water, nor any thing exclusive of his pint of Madeira at dinner, and every thing has been calculated for him on the most moderate and reasonable terms. In his clothing he is allowed but one epaulet and two pair of boots in the year.

The officers of the corps, however, in Seringapatam are not the only sufferers; the greater distance of Chittledroog from the Presidency must increase the expense of all European articles there, and I judge from the reports that the buildings occupied as quarters are not in better repair.

I shall be obliged to you if you will lay my request before Major-General Brathwaite, that he will take this subject into consideration, and recommend to Government such remedy as he may think proper.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Captain M'Farlane, and of one which I have written to the Secretary of Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Surgeon Trevor, 33rd Regiment. [315.]

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 20th Feb., 1800.

I have received your note and the extract of a letter from Mr. Ewart which you enclosed. I don't recollect that the form of the returns or monthly report which you are required to send to Mr. Ewart, which was received from the Adjutant-General's office, contained any place for the name of the commanding officer of the regiment; and I know that there was no order to the commanding officers of regiments to sign and transmit reports to Mr. Ewart.

As, however, it appears that the want of my signature to your report has drawn from Mr. Ewart an insinuation that I am not satisfied with your general conduct, I think it but justice to you to state, that you have now been under my command for seven years, that during that time the regiment has been employed in different parts of the world and various climates, and that upon all occasions your attention to your duty, your humanity, and your skill, have claimed and received my fullest approbation. I have also the pleasure to inform you, that having, at different times, had occasion to converse with the medical gentlemen on the staff of the armies in which we have been employed, they have uniformly given testimony to your good conduct; particularly that gentleman has who is at present at the head of the medical department of the army in the Mysore country.

You have my permission to communicate this letter to Mr. Ewart, or to whom else you please.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[316.] *To the Secretary of the Military Board.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 22nd Feb., 1800.

I enclose papers as follows to be laid before the Military Board:—

Indents on the Commissary of supplies for articles wanted on emergencies.

Indents from Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey for certain articles for his corps ordered on detachment. I have given directions that these may be prepared, but I must inform you that the arms are captured property, there being no other in store.

I have received your letter of the 16th instant, and upon a reference to mine of the 4th instant I find that I had not mistaken the idea of the Board in the arrangement proposed for the settlement of the bullock-accounts.

Registers and regular accounts have been received only of those bullocks hired by Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas, and a few hired by Mr. Gordon; no registers or regular accounts have been received of those hired by the gentlemen in the Barahmahal and in the southern countries.

As a bullock-owner or a maistry is not perfectly acquainted with all the regulations of the Government, and cannot be aware whether the papers of which he may be possessed are exactly according to form, or contain such information as might enable the principal agent to settle his accounts, I thought it better that the advertisement which I requested the Board should order to be published should point out clearly, and in the manner which they would understand, what owners of maistries were to go to Bangalore to settle their accounts, and what owners, &c., to the gentlemen who hired their bullocks.

I was the more induced to propose that this should be the case because all the bullocks hired in the Barahmahal and in the southern countries wanted registers, and therefore the advertisement in this form would not only be better understood

by the bullock-owners or maistries, but would equally correspond with the intentions of the Board.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Brathwaite. [317.]

DEAR SIR, 25th Feb., 1800.

I have received your letter of the 20th instant,* and I am infinitely sensible of the confidence you have placed in me in requiring my opinion on a plan which you have formed for the

* *Major-General Brathwaite to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.*

DEAR SIR, 20th Feb., 1800.

The Military Board have determined to recommend the putting the cavalry corps under your command on tent-allowance, and the granting house rent, such as may be deemed adequate to the end proposed, to the infantry officers, &c. Being myself an enemy to hasty parsimonious measures, which often ultimately turn out the most expensive, I am very desirous of availing myself of my present situation to recommend it to Government to go a little farther. It has always been my wish to have at all times, even in the Carnatic, a collected, moveable, and moving force. Nothing can so much conduce to the health of the troops, and to check the hopes of adventurers and depredators, as the having a smart force always ready to punish them; and perhaps I might have little trouble in convincing Government that such a force is essentially necessary in Mysore, and that whatever the expense may be, that it is money laid out to advantage, and in all probability a necessary, real economy; but to bring my opinions before Government with effect, I should be better informed than I am, and be able to tell them how it is to be done; that is, what corps, from those actually now in the conquered countries, can be collected, and kept constantly in an efficient state. By having camp equipage and a field train, the officers being upon tent allowance, the cattle we have and intend to keep up in that country will render the pressure comparatively light. I own to you that I wish to see all the cavalry, one European regiment at least, and six battalions of Natives with a suitable field train so collected, and with brinjarries and a bazaar always with them, so that they could move at the shortest notice with 30 or 40 days' provisions: these would, I think, give such effectual protection to the country as would greatly encourage the inhabitants to industry; they would be ready for any immediate service, and when that did not occur, might be stationary for any length of time where you thought their presence was requisite, or as the easy acquisition of forage or the temperament of the climate might indicate. Perhaps nothing can be done until the Wynaad business is over, but that very business points out the utility of my proposal, and may perhaps be the basis on which it may be established in future. I shall thank you for as early a communication of your sentiments as your business will permit.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

JOHN BRATHWAITE.

public service. I had before heard that you had such a plan in contemplation, and had turned it over in my mind, and I can, therefore, without delay, communicate to you my sentiments respecting it.

Considering the dispersed state of our garrisons, their weakness, the Powers which are our neighbours, the nature of their Governments, and of that of this country, I am clearly of opinion with you that not only the people of the country will not imagine themselves to be secure, but that, in fact, they will not be so, unless a force such as you describe is stationed in it.

We have the example of Bengal to recommend it. The inhabitants and the borderers of Oude are a most turbulent and unsettled race; yet the field-detachments in that country have always kept them quiet. They were not formed upon such good principles as that which you propose will be, or they have degenerated, as they have loaded themselves with two cantonments; and, besides, they have not the advantage which your detachment will have of garrisons and forts at all points from whence stores, &c., may be received.

The question upon which you have particularly desired my sentiments is the number of corps of those allotted for Mysore it would be possible to put in the field. I will state what I think will be necessary for our garrisons supposing the detachment which you propose should be formed. I don't think that Seringapatam can, or ought to be, weakened, at least for the present. There is a large arsenal here, and numerous idle fellows, all of whom have been sepoys, and would desire nothing better than to do mischief. We have four reliefs now for our guards, and when the Wynaad detachment will be gone there will remain about three, so that you will perceive that we have not more men here than we ought to have. There must be a corps in Soonda, because it would be difficult to move through that country a detachment of any size; and one in Bednore, because that is a rich place not very distant from the Mahratta frontier, which in the absence of the proposed field-detachment would certainly be plundered if the corps were withdrawn. There ought, likewise, to be one corps at least in Chittledroog, and a detachment in Nundydroog, and another in Paughur; probably two companies in each. There will then remain for the field-detachment of the troops allotted for this country three regiments of cavalry, one of European infantry,

two battalions and six companies of Natives. I have reduced the garrisons as low as they can be made, and have provided only for their common duties, as the field-detachment will be considered the strength of the country, and what will connect them with one another.

I shall now consider our means of carrying your plan into execution, and communicate to you my notion of the articles which will occasion the expense to be incurred.

We have bullocks for our guns, provision and store departments, which it appears are to be kept up at all events. We have elephants and camels, the former of which will probably be kept; both will carry * private tents.

The officers, I suppose, will be upon tent-allowance. The expense to Government then will be:—1st. The wear and tear of tents for the soldiers and sepoys, against which may be set off barracks which must [otherwise] be erected for them in different parts of the country. 2ndly. The Lascar establishment and bamboo-coolies, which must be kept up for these tents, and for the store department of the detachment. 3rdly. The additional allowance to be made to the officers of the detachment. Upon this subject I refer you to my letter to the Adjutant-General of the 18th instant. If the detachment is at all times to be in readiness to move, it will be necessary that the officers should at all times retain in their service the people and cattle requisite to move their baggage. For this purpose it would probably be proper to give them batta; but if that is given to the officers, it must likewise be given to the soldiers and sepoys, which, excepting when they are actually moving, is not necessary. From the calculations which I transmitted to the Adjutant-General you will perceive that an officer cannot well subsist on half-batta; and tent-allowance will not be much more than will find his tent and carriage for it. Something ought, therefore, to be given to him to keep up his field-establishments, and you will be the best judge whether it ought to be in the nature of batta, or additional tent-allowance, or under what name it can be given. 4thly. The wear and tear of carriages for the provision-department. 5thly. Bullocks for the carriage of stores. 6thly. Bullocks to carry fifteen days' gram for the cavalry. 7thly. Doolies.

It will be necessary to have always with the detachment about forty days' arrack, for which I have already provided

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

carriage; but from the notion which I have formed from experience of the ready resources of this country, and from the certainty which I have of procuring a large and an excellent bazaar, I should not deem it necessary to provide for either meat, rice, or salt for the Europeans, or grain for the Natives. I know that in case any of them are wanted for an extraordinary occasion in any part of this country, they, and bullocks to carry them, can be procured at a short notice. The bazaar-men would naturally have bullocks, which would fully supply the detachment wherever it might go, and upon these it must depend for the following reasons. All the advantages which can be given to brinjarries are an exemption from duties and a monopoly of the consumption, excepting what is brought into camp by the bazaar people themselves. This will not be sufficient to induce brinjarries constantly to attend a detachment. They make a larger profit by their trade with both coasts in salt, and of course will generally prefer it. After what has passed, however, it may be depended upon that wherever brinjarries are really wanted, that is to say, whenever the troops are likely to be in distress, there will be no difficulty in finding brinjarries to supply their camp and make them pay well for their grain.

I have not materials or experience to enable me to state exactly the expense in money of the different articles which I have stated, but when the enlarged scale of the Company's military expenditure, and the real benefits to be derived from the detachment, not only to this country but to the Carnatic, are considered, the trifling additional expense will be no object.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[318.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 26th Feb., 1800.

In consequence of your letter of the 22nd I have ordered Capper to take the command at Paughur, and I have removed thither a company of his battalion in order that he may keep there his head-quarters. It would have been inconvenient to put him in any of the small posts in the Nundydroog district, because Cuppage has the command of the whole, and is doing well against the Polygars, and we should be obliged either to

take out of his hands the command and place it in Capper's, or divide it, which would destroy the unity of our operations. I will send the order for this removal to Government for their approbation, and will explain the cause of it.

I wrote General Brathwaite a long letter yesterday in answer to one which I received from him upon the subject of a field-detachment. His idea goes further than yours, and you will perceive by my letter that we can very nearly go the length of yours; but our means in troops are not equal to the extent of his. My letter will show you what we have and what we shall want. I have no fears for the north at present. Dhoondiah appears inclined to plunder the Nizam, to whom Harponelly is given. At Kolapoor the gentlemen succeeded against the blackguards, and the former are the strongest in Savanore and towards our frontier. As long as that is the case we have nothing to fear. You have heard of the conspiracy here to murder the hunters * and carry off the Shah-zadahs. Black people lie so confoundedly that I am really at a loss to say whether or not such a plan was ever seriously formed and intended to be put in execution; it is certain that it was talked of. The informer has given a very clear and distinct account, which has been in some degree corroborated within these two days, and from this my belief, which has hitherto been that there was no truth in the story, has been a little staggered. However, the accused have almost proved an alibi as clearly as black men can prove anything, although their failure in the proof of some of the circumstances alleged by them and their friends, and their contradictions, would hang them in an English court of justice. Barclay, who has conducted the inquiry, is convinced of the truth of the story. I intend, at all events, to keep the fellows in confinement for a little time and see what will turn up.

My detachment is collected and ready to start, but the *Ducks* † will not be prepared to swim till the middle of March. You will be glad to hear that I have found the resources of this country comeatable beyond my most sanguine expectations.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* Colonel Wellesley and other gentlemen who hunted with the Shah-zadahs or Royal Princes.—ED.

† Bombay sepoys.—ED.

[319.] *To Major Disney.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 27th Feb., 1800.

You will doubtless have heard that a detachment has been collected at Seringapatam, and another at Cannanore: their object is to force Wynaad * from the Pyche Rajah. The plan which I have formed for this purpose is to enter the district from this side with my detachment, and that that from Cannanore should enter it by Cotiote; † but from letters which Lieutenant-Colonel Close and I have received from Colonel Sartorius, it would appear that the Pyche Rajah is in possession of, and in force in, Cotiote; and if that should be the case, it will be necessary that the Cannanore detachment should enter Wynaad by the Tambercherry ‡ Pass.

When I had the pleasure of seeing you at Nuggur, I recollect that you told me that you had served in Cotiote during the war in that district; and I rather believe that your corps occupied a post in it until the late war in Mysore broke out. I shall be very much obliged to you for any general information that you can give me of the nature of the Cotiote country, and the strength in that district of the Pyche Rajah. I wish particularly to know whether there is any post of our troops in it at present, its strength, and its position relatively with Wynaad on one side and Cannanore on the other; whether there is any road or communication between such post (if there is one) and Wynaad, or in general between the Cotiote and Wynaad districts; the length of this road, and the name of the pass in the Western Ghauts through which it comes.

I shall likewise be obliged to you for any information that you can give me respecting the Tambercherry Pass. It is said here that the rains set in in Wynaad in the month of March. Have the goodness to communicate to me your observations upon this subject, and to keep the contents of this letter to yourself.

Believe me to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* *Wynaad* is a mountainous, elevated, and thickly-wooded tract, sloping from the culminating ridge of the Ghauts towards Mysore. Area 1188 square miles. Wynaad village is 40 miles E. of Tellicherry.—ED.

† *Cotiote* is a small section of the province of Malabar, situated due east from Tellicherry. Area about 300 square miles.—ED.

‡ *Tambercherry* town is 20 miles N.E. of Calicut.—ED.

To Josiah Webbe, Esq., Secretary of Government. [320.]

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 28th Feb., 1800.

I have received a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, from Colonel Sartorius; and Colonel Close has likewise received one, a copy of which he has enclosed to Lord Clive. From both it appears that the Pyche Rajah is possessed of Cotiote, so that our job will be heavier than was at first imagined. The answer to the letter which I wrote to Colonel Sartorius on the 26th will throw more light upon the subject, and will enable me to write more particularly to Government. In the mean time it is proper that I should inform you, that by the accounts I have received of the time at which the rains usually commence in Wynaad, I am afraid that we shall be hard pressed for time. I understand that the rivers and nullahs begin to fill in April. If Sartorius is not to be ready till the 20th March, we shall not be able to do much, or anything effectual, before the rains begin; but if he should be obliged to adopt the longer route of the Tambercherry Ghaut, and to make a preparation in consequence which is to detain his detachment till the beginning of April, there is no doubt but that we shall be too late; and in either case, in order to complete the settlement of the country, and finally to establish the Company's authority, it will be necessary to detach a force into Wynaad again in the next season. It is true that, my detachment being collected and prepared to march, I might alone move into Wynaad immediately. I am strong enough, and I should have more time to complete the settlement of that country. But the Rajah would then go into Cotiote. We must equally operate upon him from both sides in the next season; and as the possession of Wynaad is no object, excepting to establish the Company's authority, it may be a question whether it is not better to leave him undisturbed in Wynaad until an opportunity offers in the next season of rooting, not only him from Wynaad and Cotiote, but all other blackguards of the same kind who are in opposition to the Government, and bullying the Company's servants on the Malabar coast. For this purpose I would form, both here and below, strong detachments in the month of October, when the rivers fall; and they ought to be pursued as long as there is a man in arms, or a stronghold unexplored. My idea is, that we

shall not be able to effect, in this season, all that is to be done; that we must take the field again in the next; that, in the mean time, the Pyche Rajah will murder and plunder in Cotiote; and, therefore, that we shall do well to defer any operation until we can do all that is necessary. Colonel Close is of my opinion; but Sartorius's answer to my letter, and further information respecting the season, will enable us to write our opinions fully to Government. In the mean time I am prepared to march as soon as I hear that the Bombay troops are collected and equipped. I write to you now to open the subject, and that you may have time to consider of it.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[321.] G. O. Seringapatam, Saturday, 1st March, 1800.

The commanding officers of corps will be so kind as to give particular orders respecting the preservation of cleanliness in their lines. Every morning all dirt must be removed to a distance in front of the encampment beyond the quarter guards. The privies must be made in one particular place at a distance from the tents. The quartermasters of European corps, and quartermaster serjeants of Native corps, are responsible for the cleanliness of the encampment; and the Deputy Quartermaster-General will be so kind as to notice and report any neglect in this particular which he may perceive.

A captain of the day to mount in camp, to whom all extraordinaries are to be reported, and who will report verbally to Colonel Wellesley. This tour of duty to commence at morning parade on halting days; and the captain on duty must remain in camp, and in case he should notice any neglect of the orders for the preservation of cleanliness, he will report it.

An adjutant of the day to attend at the Dowlut Baug at 12 o'clock daily for orders, which he will issue afterwards at his tent in camp, where the other adjutants are to attend on the drum beating.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Camp near Seringapatam, Sunday, 2nd March, 1800. [322.]

The commanding officers of Native corps going on detachment having expressed a desire that the families of the sepoys should be left at Seringapatam, a place will be allotted for them on the island.

The commanding officer of each corps will leave with the families of his men a trusty non-commissioned officer, upon whom he can depend, to pay each family the amount which the sepoy to whom it belongs may choose to leave for them. He will give to Mr. Gordon, the paymaster, an account of the whole sum which the sepoys of his corps will leave to their families, which Mr. Gordon will pay to the non-commissioned officer left in charge of them.

This sum will be in lieu of an equal sum which would have been to be paid to them; and of course the officers commanding troops and companies will be obliged to give a receipt for the full amount of their abstracts.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor. [323.]

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 2nd March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 26th February. The appointment to commands under the Government of Fort St. George in time of peace is a matter of patronage in the hands solely of the Governor, and is a subject of great jealousy and delicacy. Like all other patronage under similar circumstances, it is frequently bestowed upon those who are, perhaps, not the most deserving of it; and the successful candidates sometimes owe their good fortune to the influence of their friends rather than to their own merit. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to point out what line you ought to follow, in order to obtain for your services that attention which they deserve. A public application through me, which is the most natural line, might be deemed improper, and might fail in producing the object for which you might make it. I know that, under former Governments, it would have done so; and one from yourself to the Governor would be unpleasant to you, and might be equally unsuccessful. I therefore propose to write privately to Lord Clive to state your services, and the situation which

you left when removed into Mysore, and to inform him that you have communicated to me your wishes to have a separate command. Although I don't promise entire success from this measure, it will bring you forward to Lord Clive's notice; and his desire to pay attention to officers whose services deserve it, may induce him to place you in a situation which will be agreeable to you. I have this day written to Lord Clive.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[324.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 5th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 12th February.* On the 9th of last month the intentions of Government respecting Wynaad

* *Colonel Kirkpatrick to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.*

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, 12th Feb., 1800.

Although it is probable that you will be officially apprised, before this letter can reach you, of the measures which Lord Mornington has directed to be pursued with respect to Wynaad, his Lordship, notwithstanding, thinks it may be useful to convey to you in this private form a general idea of the instructions which have been sent to the Government of Fort St. George on the subject.

You are, no doubt, already aware of the pretensions which the Pyche Rajah has set up to Wynaad, and of his irregular proceedings in consequence. The decided opinion of Lord Mornington is, that any consideration of those pretensions previously to our taking possession of the district conformably to the stipulations of the Treaty of Mysore would be fatal to the authority of the Company. His Lordship is therefore determined not to admit of any compromise on this subject. The authority of the Company is to be established in Wynaad as soon as possible; and if the Pyche Rajah should presume to resist the measure, his contumacy is to be punished with the most signal severity.

His Lordship is of opinion that it will be proper on this occasion to assemble such a force on both sides of Wynaad (i. e. in Malabar as well as in Mysore) as shall be sufficient either to overcome the Pyche Rajah in the first instance, or ultimately to reduce him to submission. It would be of the most dangerous example, his Lordship thinks, to adopt any temporizing course in such a case. He has, therefore, instructed the Government of Fort St. George, that as soon as the troops shall be ready to enter the district on both sides, the Pyche Rajah (should his residence be within the limits of Wynaad, or should he possess any armed force within that district) is to be directed to evacuate it immediately, and implicitly to submit his pretensions to the decision of the Company's Government, on pain of being considered and treated as a traitor and rebel. The experience of the former contest with this turbulent and refractory chief will, his Lordship is persuaded, in the event of his compelling us to take up arms against him, preclude the return of those errors which, on a former occasion,

were communicated to me; and such has been the exertion of the officers and departments of this country, and the readiness of its resources, that a detachment sufficient to obtain the object proposed (provided it should be assisted by one from the Malabar coast) was collected here on the 26th February, and in readiness to move. They are not yet prepared to move at Cannanore, and I don't expect that they will be so till towards the end of this month; and their detachment is necessarily so small, that it appears, by Colonel Sartorius's letter, it will not be safe to attempt to enter Wynaad by the Cotiote district, which he says is possessed by the Pyche Rajah.

I have made many inquiries, and have received the best information, regarding the season and the nature of the country. It appears that in Wynaad it begins to rain in general at the Hooley feast; that it continues showery, and that the showers become gradually more frequent till the middle of April, when the rains become violent, and the nullahs fill. The country in general is jungly, with many open spots; the road not so: so that I should have no apprehensions of want of success, if the Government of Fort St. George, considering the advanced state of the season, the probability of the speedy approach of the rains and the swelling of the rivers, and the delay in the preparations of the Malabar detachment, think it proper to order that my detachment should enter Wynaad alone.

The reasons, however, which I have communicated to Sydenham, in a letter which he will most probably show to you, induce me to believe that the wisest plan will be to defer all operations in Wynaad till after the rains. These are, the impossibility of obtaining complete success against the Pyche

proved so disgraceful to the arms and so injurious to the interests of the Company.

The Governor-General in Council having judged it expedient that the troops in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara should be placed under the general command of the officer commanding in Mysore, whenever the latter shall happen to be senior, the necessary orders have in consequence been transmitted to Bombay and to Fort St. George. It has also been signified to the Government of Bombay that no General officer is to be appointed to command either in Canara or in Malabar without the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council.

I have great satisfaction in informing you that Sydenham, who has suffered severely from the gout, is recovering daily.

I remain, &c.,

WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK,

Rajah without the co-operation of a detachment from Malabar; the probability that the season will be too far advanced to be able to do anything before that detachment will be prepared to move; the certainty of opposition on the part of the Pyche Rajah; and the inefficacy, and even dangerous consequences, to be apprehended from the partial success in Wynaad of my detachment acting alone. If I were to march to-morrow, I could do no more than establish a post in Wynaad; and most probably my utmost exertions would not enable me to make a complete communication to it, before the rains would oblige me to quit the district. That post would not completely settle the country, or establish the Company's authority. I must return again in the next season, and in the mean time the Pyche Rajah will have had an opportunity, and, indeed, will be forced in his own defence, to burn, plunder, and destroy both Cotiote and Wynaad under the eye of my post. Upon the whole, therefore, I should recommend that all operations should be delayed until the plan of the Governor-General can be put in execution. It will be unwise to attempt to establish the Company's authority if it cannot be done completely; and it cannot be done completely in Wynaad and Cotiote unless two detachments formed in Mysore and Malabar co-operate. If the business should be delayed till the next season, the detachments, particularly that from Malabar, may be made stronger, and we may embrace other objects equally necessary with that now in view. Upon this subject I will write to you more fully hereafter. You cannot conceive how ready I have found the resources of this country. As the general command below the Ghauts falls to me in consequence of the arrangement which you have communicated to me, I shall endeavour to ascertain, as soon as possible, the nature of the resources in Malabar and Canara; and by an application of part of our riches in aid of their poverty, I hope in future to preclude the evils which have been constantly felt, and must always be apprehended, from the late and slight equipments of the detachments which it may be found necessary to order out. If the Government of Fort St. George should determine to delay all operations till the next year, I have thoughts of dispersing the detachment which they are now collecting in Malabar, and by this measure I expect to quiet the apprehensions of the Pyche Rajah. I don't apprehend any delay in forming it

again in October, as my means here will enable me to do it as speedily below as I can above the Ghauts.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. [325.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 5th March, 1800.

While I was at Mysore yesterday the castes * came to blows, and I was obliged to threaten to assist the parties in the fight with some of my soldiers, in order to set matters to rights. Things were at peace last night, and this morning the parties came here by appointment. They have come and signed the enclosed agreement, against which I see no objection, excepting

* *Caste*, or *Cast*, is variously stated as derived from the Sanscrit word *Kayast'ha*, a species or class, and the Portuguese word Casta, a breed. It indicates one of the cardinal errors of Hindoo theology, namely, the belief taught in their sacred books that in the beginning four different species of men were created, each one differing as essentially from the other as the elephant from the horse, or the sheep from the dog.

The highly favoured Brahmins, the priestly order, sprang first from the mouth of Brahma, the Creator; the Cshatriyas, or military order, next proceeded from his breast or arm; the Vaisyas, or industrial class, from his thighs; and, lastly, the Sudras, or servile class, from his feet.

In the well-known Hindoo authority, the Code of Menu, B.C. 330, the intercourse between the castes is guarded by numerous restrictions. They are forbidden to reside in the same house, to eat together, or to assume each other's professions, on pain of irrevocable excommunication. Intermarriage is especially prohibited, but in this respect human passions have proved too strong for the heaviest fetters ever forged by priestcraft, and, besides the endless variety of castes into which the original four have become subdivided (every trade and occupation constituting a distinct caste), there has gradually arisen a mass of misery beyond the pale, of the extent of which few Europeans have any adequate idea.

The Mussulmans, especially in Bengal, have to some extent adopted caste as a means of social distinction, but with them it is simply a recent conventionality, and no part of their religious creed; the native Christians in Tanjore and Tinnivelly cling to caste from motives more natural and excusable; but among them all the broad line of distinction is that between high and low caste, patrician or plebeian; while, equally despised and trodden down by both as having no rights of religious fellowship or secular citizenship, are the wretched Pariahs or outcasts, who now amount, according to some authorities, to a tenth, and according to others, to a still larger proportion of the entire Indian population.

In the time of Colonel Wellesley these outcasts were much more numerous in the Sepoy army than at present, owing to the efforts that have been made of late years to fill the ranks with men of high caste.—ED.

that they are not unanimous. One out of eighteen croms (or trades) in one caste won't agree; but I have the satisfaction to say that they are Madras people, and as my butler is at the bottom of the opposition, I have reason to believe that it is only an attempt to get hold of the power of the place, and that a little severity towards the recusants, and a determination to adhere to the agreement, will have the effect of preserving peace and harmony. Let me have this paper as soon as you can, as I have appointed the day after to-morrow for giving the orders and settling the business.

I have received a letter from Lieutenant Davis, the commanding officer at Paughur, who informs me that the Polygars have risen in his neighbourhood. He receives his information from the aumildar, and I hope it is not founded. If it is, I see nothing that can be done excepting to send to Paughur three troops of the 1st Regiment of cavalry; and for that I'll give orders if you think it necessary. We might also draw some of the troops from the Nundydroog district, if you should think they are not wanted there still; but I am afraid matters will be as bad as ever there when we remove the troops.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[326.] *To Major Capper.*

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 7th March, 1800.

As a matter of accommodation to you, and in order to remove you from a situation which you did not deem pleasant, I sent you orders to take the command of Paughur; and that you might have with you your head-quarters and those people belonging to your corps whom you might find useful, I ordered that a company of the 2nd of the 4th Regiment should proceed to Paughur. It was impossible to take from Major Cuppage the command of Nundydroog; and I requested your friend Captain Grant to explain to you the relation in which that post stood with the detachments in the field, and the necessity there was in consequence that those detachments should report to, and should be under the orders of Major Cuppage. Under these circumstances it was impossible to order that you might join

and take the command of either of them. It appears, now, that you are desirous of remaining encamped in the neighbourhood of Nundydroog, with the force which you have now got with you. I have but one objection to that measure, which is, that if the troops are in camp they must be on batta; and as this expense, however trifling, will be incurred not on any public grounds, but for your accommodation, I am afraid it will be objected to by Government. However, as it is not uncommon, particularly in this country at present, to encamp troops in the neighbourhood of large places, and not to put them on batta, provided that the sepoys, &c., clearly understand that they are not to receive it, I beg that you will encamp in the neighbourhood of Nundydroog in such situation as you may think proper, and I will send orders to Major Cuppage that he is not to consider the troops under your command as part of his garrison.

Upon looking over the return from the garrison of Nundydroog, I observe that you have taken out 300 men instead of one company: it is certainly desirable that you should have with you your staff, your drills and recruits; but as the public service may suffer from the weakness of the garrison of Nundydroog, I beg that, as you do not proceed to Paughur, you will send back all men fit for their duty excepting those whom it may be necessary to keep for the drills.

I purpose to recall the order appointing you to the command of Paughur.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Brathwaite. [327.]

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 8th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 4th,* and I am happy to find that there is a prospect of carrying into execution your plan for the public service.

* *Major-General Brathwaite to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

DEAR SIR, Madras, 4th March, 1800.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 25th ultimo; also for the statement enclosed, which will afford me good ground to go upon. I have already loosely hinted in a letter to Government my ideas on what I think

Colonel Agnew will have made you acquainted with the reasons for which I thought it desirable that Major Capper should not go into the field in command of either of the de-

necessary for the better insurance of tranquillity in the lately conquered countries, and I have ventured to state that such a measure will be immediate good policy, and ultimate good economy. I have, however, fairly declared that I am not yet prepared to bring the matter effectually before Government, or to point out the means of carrying it into effect. In short, this letter was meant merely to prepare Government for the subject. I have since seen Lord Clive and conversed with him pretty fully on the subject, and find him perfectly disposed to admit the validity of the arguments adduced by me, and to adopt the measure whenever practicable means can be submitted to him; and I have delivered to him a memorandum on military matters connected with this subject (a mode which I preferred to bringing any thing forward upon record), and he has promised me in consequence to address a private letter to Lord Mornington to request that this Presidency may have the services of the three Bengal Volunteer battalions which are now in the Northern Circars on their way to Bengal, for one year longer. Should this request be acceded to, I think I shall be able to draw up from the Northern Division two good old battalions; and then, by this aid, and other arrangements, I shall be able to give to you a moveable and respectable force, though I cannot flatter myself that it will be very soon, or to the extent I could wish; and his Lordship seems to come readily into my idea of sending to Mysore the 25th Light Dragoons, if not both the regiments.

I have this day received a letter from Major Capper, which I enclose, with a copy of my answer. If you could fall upon any mode of employing Major Capper in the field, unless he is much altered, you would find in him a gallant, active, and intelligent officer.

I have, &c.,

JOHN BRATHWAITE.

Major Capper to Major-General Brathwaite, Commander-in-Chief.

SIR, Camp near Nundydroog, 29th Feb., 1800.

I should have done myself the honour of addressing you some time since on the subject of my situation at Nundydroog, had not Colonel Wellesley informed me that he was in daily expectation of some arrangement from head-quarters which would relieve me from my unpleasant situation. I have now been nearly a month at Nundydroog, the garrison of which place has been furnished from my battalion, and commanded by a junior officer.

By the division orders received yesterday, I find that I am appointed to the temporary command of Paughur with *one* company, a situation if possible more unpleasant than the one I have been relieved from. Colonel Wellesley, in appointing me to this station, had, I am persuaded, no other view than relieving me from the awkward predicament in which I have been so long placed. As he expresses that he is willing to meet my wishes so far as he can do it without inconvenience to the public service, I have in consequence written to him, requesting that I may be permitted to join one or other of the detachments of my battalion now on field-service; and as these companies, with the exception of Captain Munro, are commanded by very young officers, I should suppose that, in the event of the Polygars making any disturbance, the service would benefit more in having an officer with them who had been frequently

tachments of his corps. Nundydroog is the point to which all the detachments acting against the Polygars on the Nizam's frontier must look for support. If I had wished it, I could not

employed in the field than in having them commanded by young men just arrived in the country.

I have taken the liberty of stating these facts in the full persuasion that you will think that one company is by no means a suitable command for a field officer in charge of a corps the greater proportion of which is in the field, and more particularly as I was sent up here by a general order to take charge of my battalion. I hope, therefore, you will indulge me so far as to order the head-quarters of the 2nd battalion 4th Regiment to be in the field. I could then join such part as Colonel Wellesley might direct. There are two companies of Major Cuppage's battalion now encamped in the pettah of Nundydroog doing no duty, and there are two more companies of the same regiment, with a troop of cavalry and a brigade of guns, encamped about four miles from Nundydroog, commanded by a very young lieutenant.

I have ever been ready and forward to do my duty on all occasions, as you, Sir, who are so well acquainted with the character of every officer in this army, well know. I therefore trust I shall be spared the mortification of being ordered into a garrison, whilst so large a proportion of my battalion is on field service.

I have, &c.,

J. CAPPER.

Major-General Brathwaite to Major Capper.

DEAR SIR, Madras, 4th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 29th ultimo. An address from you to me direct, situated as you are, is altogether so irregular, that I am reduced to the necessity of considering it as a private communication, and replying to it by a private letter. I therefore inform you that as I am about writing a private letter to Colonel Wellesley, I shall in that enclose your letter and a copy of this my answer, which is to inform you that it is not my design to interpose my authority between Colonel Wellesley and any disposition or distribution of the troops or officers under his command which he may judge it necessary to make, as the doing so would be to deprive Colonel Wellesley of the means of sustaining that responsibility which attaches to his present command.

I do not mean by this to say that I shall not be accessible to any just cause of complaint preferred by any subordinate officer against his commanding officer, when sent through that commanding officer. I have little reason, however, to expect any such from the Mysore country, and am decidedly of opinion that what you have stated to me does not come under that description. Of the importance of the command given to you, Colonel Wellesley is certainly the most proper judge; and however agreeable to you it might be to be otherwise employed, your appointment to the command of Paughur will never appear to me as any just grounds of complaint. If Colonel Wellesley should think your services requisite in the field, he will no doubt call for them there; but if he attaches importance to a garrison or fixed station, and requires your services there, I trust you are too old and too good a soldier to think upon reflection that any attention can be paid to the inclination of any subordinate officer that is not countenanced by the judgment of his commander.

I am, &c.,

JOHN BRATHWAITE.

deprive Major Cuppage of the command of Nundydroog; and if I had ordered Major Capper into the field, I must have made his detachment independent of Major Cuppage. This would have been a bad arrangement for the public service, as in the first place it would have deprived us of the advantage of having the general command of all the detachments acting in one district, and on one point, in the hands of one person; and next we should have lost the advantage of Major Cuppage's experience, who has been conducting that Polygar business ever since the fall of Seringapatam. Under these circumstances I removed Major Capper to Paughur; but as that arrangement was made merely for his convenience, and as it appeared by his letters to his friend Captain Grant and to me, that he preferred to remain encamped in the neighbourhood of Nundydroog, I have recalled the order which appointed him to the command of Paughur, and I have desired him to remain encamped in the neighbourhood of Nundydroog (not under the orders of Major Cuppage) until some other arrangement could be made, provided that it is understood by him and the sepoys that they do not get full batta. I imagine that Government would object to paying this merely for his accommodation. As soon as the proposed exchange of territory between the Company and the Rajah is finally concluded, I hope the country will become more settled, when I shall have it in my power to lessen Cuppage's command, and to make an arrangement which will be agreeable to Major Capper; and if, in the mean time, an opportunity of employing him offers, I will seize it. I recommended to him to go into Nundydroog again, and to wait with patience until an alteration of circumstances, which I have above explained to you, and which I explained to him, enabled me to make an arrangement which would be satisfactory to him; but since that, I understand that the two Majors have disagreed upon some trifling point, so that there is no chance of his doing that which would be most proper, and would, doubtless, in the end be most to his advantage.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Sartorius. [328.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 11th March, 1800.

I have just received your letter of the 8th, enclosing the copy of that which you have written to the Governor of Fort St. George, and a letter which you have received from Captain Moncrieff. From the latter, I am convinced that the plan, according to which I proposed that your detachment should advance in my letter of the 9th instant, is the only feasible one, and I therefore beg that it may be carried into execution. In doing this, I have only to recommend that whatever may be the delay in consequence, the roads may be well opened and cleared before the troops and their baggage enter it. You desire to have my orders respecting the four companies from Goa. The stronger your detachment is made the better, provided you are able to feed them. I much fear you will be disappointed in your expectations of service from the coolies, which you state, in your letter to the Governor, "must be pressed and retained under a guard." If there is any doubt respecting the provisions, it is better that you should not have the four companies.

Since I have received your letter this day, I have given directions to the departments here to increase the quantity of rice and provisions with the detachment of troops to be sent from hence to such extent as may be practicable, between this day and that on which I shall march. I have been induced to this from a consideration of the slight dependence which is to be placed on the coolies; but, in justice to you, I must say that it is not to be attributed in the least to you, but to the nature of the resources and means of the Company on the Malabar coast.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [329.]

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 13th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter and some papers which I have received from Major Disney. These, with the letter from Captain Moncrieff to Colonel Sartorius, will give you a good picture of the state of our affairs in Malabar, and an idea of what we have to do.

The conclusion which I have drawn from all my information upon this subject is, that there are two things which we have to apprehend, want of provisions and the want of a road. As long as we have provisions, all the Nairs in Malabar cannot hurt us, or oblige us to take a step which will give them an advantage. But the want of open roads, in which those who carry our provisions and supplies, and our followers can move in safety, would be as fatal to us as to move from hence without any supply at all. That, therefore, to which I must direct my attention must be, after having provided everything that it is possible the troops can want, to take care not to move one step until I shall have cleared at least so much of the country as to make it certain that my followers can accompany me without the risk of those attacks which have always proved fatal to the Bombay troops.

This plan of operations, which in my opinion can alone prove at all successful in the end, must necessarily take up much time. But it is to be considered that the Company's reputation as well as their authority is at stake; and advantage being taken of the experience afforded by the former contest, nothing ought to be done which can expose the troops to similar misfortunes. Our object is not to make a dash into Wynaad, but to establish the Company's authority there permanently. We are aware of the species of opposition with which we shall meet, and our proceedings must be guarded accordingly.

In this season we cannot hope for more than to establish ourselves in Wynaad (even if we should have time to do that); and if the business is to be followed up in the west, we must begin early to throw in our resources to Wynaad, and we shall then with ease clear out Cotiote from above the Ghauts as well as from below. All that I fear is, that you at Madras will become impatient, and will imagine that we are more slow than is necessary. But let it be recollected that troops must be fed, that provisions must be carried for them, that those who carry them must be in safety, and that to insure that the country must be opened, and I shall be rather less abused for delay.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. [330.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 13th March, 1800.

By a letter from the Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, dated the 5th instant,* I find that the officers com-

* *To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, commanding the Forces in Mysore.*

SIR, Fort St. George, 5th March, 1800.

I am directed to furnish you with the enclosed extracts of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council.

The Governor-General in Council having deemed it expedient that the officers commanding in Canara and Malabar should be under the command of the officer commanding the forces in Mysore, whenever those officers shall be junior in rank, they have accordingly been directed to put themselves under your command.

I have, &c.,

J. WEBBE, Sec. to Government.

Extracts of a Letter from the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council [*to the Governor in Council of Fort St. George*], *dated 4th Feb.*, 1800.

1. We propose in this letter to reply to the several despatches of your Lordship in Council, and of your secretary, noted in the margin.

2. We approve the various arrangements reported by the Commanding Officer in Mysore in his letter of the 10th of September, 1799; and request that our approbation of the same may be communicated to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.

3. We commend the early attention manifested by your Lordship in Council to the reduction of the expensive establishments attached to the army in Mysore. The modifications of your orders for that purpose, suggested by the commanding officer in Mysore in his letter of the 20th September, appear to us, under the circumstances stated by Colonel Wellesley, to have been reasonable and necessary; and we entirely approve the subsequent orders of your Lordship in Council on this subject.

5. The several proceedings of the commanding officer in Mysore, reported in his letter of the 22nd September, have met our entire approbation.

7. We were highly pleased with the decision and vigour of the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger's conduct in driving the Mahrattas from the village of Hullihall, of which they had taken possession in violation of the rights of the Company and of the Nizam under the Treaty of Mysore. We request our sentiments on this occasion to be communicated to Lieutenant-Colonel Sentleger.

8. The letter written by the Hon. Colonel Wellesley to the killadar of Darwar, in consequence of the expulsion of the Mahrattas from Hullihall, was very proper. We also much approve the activity and judgment of that officer in personally examining the line of frontier dividing the Soonda from the Mahratta territories.

11. We are clearly of opinion, for the reasons stated by Colonel Wellesley, that the military defence of the district of Soonda must be intrusted to the troops stationed in Canara: we therefore desire that this district may be united to the military command of the officer commanding in Canara.

(A true Extract) G. BUCHAN, Sub-Sec.

manding the troops in Canara and Malabar have been directed to put themselves under my command. I conclude that it will be agreeable to the Government that they should continue to conduct the duties of the troops in those provinces respectively, and I have given them directions accordingly. As I have never had the honour of serving under the orders of the Government of Bombay, I am ignorant of the standing rules and regulations of their service, of the channel of communication pointed out for the military, and other matters in which I am desirous of being correct; and I shall be obliged to you if you wil furnish me with such information as it may be in your power to afford.

Colonel Sartorius will already have made you acquainted with the arrangements which have been made below the Ghauts preparatory to the proposed operations in Wynaad. I intend to march from hence on the 20th instant with the detachment which, in obedience to the orders of the Governor-General, is to penetrate that district from Mysore; and I expect that the detachment of the Bombay army will be prepared and will move from Calicut in the first week in April, and enter Wynaad by the Tambercherry Pass. I have preferred that route, although in many respects not the most favourable, on account of the lateness of the season, the difficulty of equipping the troops in Malabar, the strength of the Pyche Rajah in Cotiote, and the unfavourable nature of that district to the operations of our troops. From the accounts I received, it did not appear possible that we should be able to establish the Company's authority completely, both in Wynaad and Cotiote, before the Malabar rains should set in; and I preferred to secure the one, and to leave to Government the option whether the other should be undertaken in a more favourable season, rather than, by an attempt at both objects, to risk that to obtain which the detachments have been ordered.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[331.] *To Major-General Brathwaite.*

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 14th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and have sent its enclosure to Gholam Ali Khan. I find that Tippoo was

married to the daughter of Imaum Buckshee, who, I understand, was the father of Imaum Hussein; but even during his life she went about the Mahal in the habit of a widow. She is now there, and I imagine is as comfortable as the other women are. There were two women here, the grand-daughters of Chunda Saheb and of Sufder Ali's sister, and they receive from the Company 200 star pagodas *per annum*. Futteh Hyder married the daughter of one of them, and they now reside with him at Vellore. I am acquainted with Imaum Hussein, and if he should come here, I shall be happy to show him any attention in my power, and to forward any further inquiries which he may be desirous of making respecting his family.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Sartorius. [332.]

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 15th March, 1800.

Colonel Close has communicated to me certain papers (enclosures from the Commissioners in Malabar) which he has received from you, the contents of which induce me to think that the largest force which can be spared from Goa and from Bombay should be brought to Cannanore, and applied in such manner as the exigency of the service may require. If, in consequence of my letter of the 11th inst., you should have desisted from your requisition for the flank companies of the Native battalions at Goa, it is desirable that you should renew it, whether your means of subsistence and equipment should enable you to take them to the field or not. I observe that the gentlemen of the Commission have acquainted the Government of Bombay of the state of affairs in Malabar, and I conclude that such reinforcements as can be spared will be sent from thence.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To J. Smee, Esq. [333.]

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 15th March, 1800.

Lieutenant-Colonel Close has communicated to me, at different times, papers which he has received from you, particularly

some, enclosed with your letter of the 11th instant, of a most interesting nature. As I am charged with the conduct of the operations of the detachments now forming in Malabar and Mysore, and as you appear to have made laudable endeavours, and to have succeeded in obtaining good information of the strength, means, and resources of the enemy with whom we shall have to contend, I am about to acquaint you of the plan of operations which I intend to pursue; and I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to me such further information of the state of affairs below the Ghauts, and of the Pyche Rajah's strength, as it may be in your power to afford: As, however, notwithstanding their professions of loyalty and attachment to the Company's Government, I suspect that the whole caste of Nairs are interested in the preservation of the Pyche Rajah, I request that great care may be taken not to communicate to them more of this plan than is necessary to get their information. My intention is to march from hence on the 20th instant, to enter Wynaad at Edatera, where I shall leave the Company's cavalry to collect provisions, &c., and to proceed along the great Calicut road till I communicate with the detachment of the Bombay army, which I have ordered to proceed by sea to Calicut, and from thence into Wynaad by the Tambercherry Ghaut. I understand that this road through the Wynaad country is open and broad, and will require but little repair to make it practicable for troops with guns, stores, &c.; but if it should not be so, I am determined that nothing shall induce me to advance, and thereby risk the subsistence and existence of the troops, and the reputation of the Company's arms, till I shall have cut such a road as their followers can proceed on in safety, and as will facilitate my communication with this country. After I shall have joined with the Bombay detachment, I propose that either jointly or separately, as may be found most convenient, the two detachments shall cut their way to Binaar or Wynaad, which I understand will be the most convenient situation for a post and depôt. Under different names, the stronghold of the Rajah in the Wynaad country has been described to me as being on a high jungly mountain. I don't conceive that I shall succeed in establishing the Company's authority in Wynaad until he be deprived of this hold, and, of course, my operations will be directed against it; but whatever length of time it may take, I shall not deviate from the principle I have

adopted, viz., to open the country for my supplies, and to secure my communication with my rear. From all that I have read and observed of the former contest with the same man, I am of opinion that the want of success is to be attributed to the difficulties in feeding and supplying the troops, which were in great part occasioned by the want of roads.

Having thus given you the principle and outline of the operations which I shall pursue, I proceed to state to you the reason why I have preferred to move the Bombay detachment into Wynaad by the Tambercherry Ghaut, instead of through the Cotiote country; which plan, it appears, you deem most favourable. The orders of Government are, that we are to establish the Company's authority in Wynaad. By letters from Colonel Sartorius, and by the general tenor of all the information which I have received of the state of affairs in Cotiote, it appeared not to be practicable to move the detachment of the Bombay army through that district, or even farther into it with safety than Cotaparamba. Its absence from Wynaad might risk success in that district, at the same time that its being at Cotaparamba could answer no purpose towards subduing the Pyche Rajah, as it is very clear that the Mysore detachment alone would not be equal to establishing the Company's authority in Wynaad, and afterwards, in this season, to co-operate in Cotiote with the detachment assembled at Cotaparamba. I therefore thought it best to insure an object which will give us such advantages towards obtaining the other in a future season, should Government think proper to order it to be undertaken, as will make that also certain, rather than by an attempt at both objects, one of which is avowedly unattainable at the present moment, to risk success in that to which my attention has been particularly directed by Government.

By letters and papers which have been sent to Colonel Close by Colonel Sartorius and by you, it appears that there is something very like a general confederacy among the Nairs; and I therefore submit it to you, whether it does not require some consideration before you adopt the measure of giving arms and ammunition to any of them, whatever may be their professions towards the Company's Government.

As I have not time at present to write to the Commissioners in Malabar, I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate

to them such parts of this letter as you may think necessary for their information.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[334.] *To W. H. Gordon, Esq.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 20th March, 1800.

Government having approved of Captain Marriott's coming here to take charge of the Mahals of Tippoo Sultaun and Hyder Ali, and of the younger Princes, I beg that you will pay him the following sums for their use, which have hitherto been paid to me by order of the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore:

For the ratib of the Mahals, 300 rupees *per diem*, to commence from the 21st instant inclusive.

For the servants and for enaums for certain women in the Mahals of Tippoo Sultaun and Hyder Ali, 316 Canterai pagodas per month, to commence from the 1st March.

For the servants and attendants on the Princes, 450 rupees per month, to commence from the 1st March.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[335.] *To Colonel Sartorius.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 20th March, 1800.

I have this instant received a letter from the Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, by which I am informed that the Governor in Council has determined not to carry on the expedition in Wynaad this season, although it is probable that it may be undertaken early in the next.* His Lordship has,

* *To the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, Commanding the Forces in Mysore.*

SIR, Fort St. George, 17th March, 1800.

I have had the honour of receiving your letters of the 9th and 12th instant, and of communicating them to the Right Hon. the Governor in Council.

His Lordship, on the most mature consideration of the proposed attack intended by the Governor-General on the Pyche Rajah, is of opinion that a partial success in Wynaad would be inadequate to the object of the armament. His Lordship is therefore much concerned that the insufficiency of the force

therefore, desired that I should make such a distribution of the troops in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, and such an arrangement for the equipment of them, as may, in my opinion, be best

*destined to co-operate from Malabar, and the lateness of its equipment, will defeat the success of the united operations against that chieftain.

From the comparative openness of the Wynaad country, as well as from other causes, the Governor in Council had no doubt that the troops from Mysore would effectually establish the authority of the Company in that district; but as the force which has been appointed by Colonel Sartorius for the service in Cotiote is not considered sufficient to maintain the Company's authority in that district against the power of the Pyche Rajah, his Lordship deems it more advisable that the attempt should be postponed until arrangements can be made to secure the success of an united attack, than that the advantages should be confined to partial success, or the authority of the Company exposed to the danger of an unsuccessful attempt.

Although the advantage of possessing a post in Wynaad, from which your operations may commence at an early period after the rains shall have ceased, is unquestionable, yet as that district is neither remote from the seat of your resources, nor defended by any places of importance now in the hands of the Pyche Rajah, the Governor in Council does not consider that on the one hand your progress could be facilitated by an immediate attack, or on the other hand impeded by desisting from the attempt on Wynaad, to such an extent as to preponderate against the serious inconvenience of interrupting the operations of the troops, or of exposing them to the inclemency of the approaching monsoon.

Under these considerations the Governor in Council deems it advisable to postpone any military operations against the Pyche Rajah, and his Lordship directs you to issue the necessary orders for distributing the detachments assembled for this service in Mysore as well as in Malabar to their respective cantonments, or to such other stations as with reference to the season you may consider better calculated to preserve the health and comfort of the troops.

In the meanwhile his Lordship directs me to acquaint you that the entire subjection of the Pyche Rajah, as well in Wynaad as in Cotiote, is the proper object of this armament; and his Lordship accordingly desires that your attention may be directed to such a disposition of the force in Mysore and in Malabar, and to such an arrangement for the equipment of them, as may in your judgment be best calculated to enable you to act, with vigour and effect, on the plan of united operations as soon as the season shall admit of your taking the field.

Adverting to the General Orders of the * ultimo, by which the officers commanding in Malabar and Canara have been placed under your command, the Governor in Council deems it unnecessary to issue separate orders to those officers on the subject of this despatch; but if the system of rigid economy stated by Colonel Sartorius to have been recently established in those provinces should be found to cripple the movement of the Bombay detachment to such a degree as cannot be remedied by the authority vested in you, the Governor in Council directs that no time shall be lost in furnishing his Lordship with sufficient information to enable him to obtain from the Governor in Council at Bombay a suspension of the impedimental regulations.

I have, &c.,

J. WEBBE, Sec. to Government.

* Blank in manuscript.—ED.

calculated to enable them to act with vigour and effect as soon as the season shall admit of their taking the field.

It is very desirable that the troops which have come from Canara and from Goa should return to their respective stations, provided they can do so with ease at present, and that they can be brought to Cannanore again, at the time when the season will admit of our commencing our operations in Wynaad and Cotiote. Your local information enables you to form the best judgment upon the subject, and I beg that you will act accordingly.

I propose, early in the ensuing month, to pay you a visit at Cannanore, and I shall have some conversation with you regarding your equipments, the resources in Malabar, and other matters. In the mean time, I conceive that the coolies stated to have been pressed, may be discharged; and that such other articles of equipment which occasion expense, and which you do not think necessary to retain in order that the troops may be ready to take the field early in the next season, may be discontinued. I shall write to you again before I leave this place for Cannanore; and, if it should be convenient to them, I should be glad to meet Captain Moncrieff and Mr. Smee there.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[336.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 20th March, 1800.

It is necessary that I should inform you that I have been obliged to employ the troops to quell a disturbance occasioned by the Pariah people, chiefly the lower orders of gentlemen's servants and the soldiers' cook boys. There had been at Seringapatam, as well as in other parts of Mysore, a difference between two castes, which here, as well as elsewhere, they settled to their own satisfaction; but it appears that the lower orders have an interest in the disputes of the higher castes, and during this settlement they manifested their discontent by repeated riots, and some of the heads were confined. On the 17th, in the morning, the day after the settlement of the dispute above mentioned, mobs of cook boys went about the streets of the Fort and Pettah before day, threatening the inhabitants

if they opened their shops or sold anything till their head men were released. They then went to the different fords, stopped the people bringing provisions and supplies to the market, detained and plundered them. The shops were shut, and no efforts of the police officers could disperse the mobs.

Under these circumstances, I thought it proper to order out small parties of cavalry and Native infantry from the camp, and a small party of European infantry from the garrison, against the largest mob, which was assembled under the Caryghaut hill, immediately above the ford. The officer commanding the cavalry was within 100 yards of them for above an hour before the infantry came up, and sent them repeated messages to desire they would disperse. They remained, and suffered the infantry to approach them within half musket shot; and still, notwithstanding they were ordered to disperse by the officers commanding the two parties of infantry, they remained till they received their fire. Four of them, including the two head men who had been sent out, were killed, and two wounded; and this mob, as well as the others, dispersed immediately.

I attribute the folly of their obstinacy, and their absurdity in supposing that I should sit quiet, and allow the lowest orders of the people to starve the troops, having a camp on one side of them and a large garrison on the other, to nothing excepting to the experience they have had of success, from too much indulgence on former similar occasions in the Carnatic; but in this country, where the Honourable Company's authority is but newly established, I could not suffer it for a moment to be trampled upon by the lowest order of the people, in the service of their officers and troops. I have the pleasure to inform you, that since the infantry fired every thing has been perfectly quiet, the rioters have returned to their peaceable occupations, and I do not imagine that they will again disturb the peace of Seringapatam.

Four persons caught in the fact of forcing the bazaar people to shut their shops, and evidently connected with the other rioters, were tried by a General Court Martial, and sentenced to be hanged; but as I conceived the example which had been made to be fully sufficient, and as every thing had remained quiet from the time the troops fired, I did not think it necessary to carry the sentence into execution.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[337.] *Instructions for Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey.*

Seringapatam, 22nd March, 1800.

You are to march to-morrow morning with the troops which have been put under your orders, and the Rajah's cavalry under Bishto Pundit, towards Ooscotta, on the Hemavutty river, by the route of Chinroypatam, Gram, &c., by which the army marched hither from thence.

Kistnapah Naig, the Polygar of Bullum, has a Polygar station at a place called Ey Goor, which is about six miles from the river above mentioned, and is described in the enclosed paper from Captain Campbell, who went there in the month of September last. From this station, where he has collected about 3000 or 4000 of the people of the country, he attacks the convoys of provisions, &c. which are going to the Rajah's troops at the neighbouring fort of Munserabad, where there is likewise a body of the Rajah's troops encamped; and interrupts the communication between that fort and the post of the Rajah's troops at Ooscotta. You will be joined at Ooscotta by the infantry above mentioned, to be encamped at Munserabad, and you will immediately attack the people at Ey Goor: you will burn that place, and you will hang all the people that you may find in arms, or that you may have reason to know have been so.

It was the rainy season when Captain Campbell went to Ey Goor; but I have reason to believe that you will find more roads to that place in this dry season than that one which he describes. When you will attack it, you will of course take care to leave your provisions, camp, and baggage behind you in safety, and to keep your flanks strong and clear.

After you will have performed this service at Ey Goor, you will move (by Lacoonda) to the Bissolee * Ghaut, where the Polygar likewise has a force, with which he has interrupted the communication between this place and Mangalore. You will drive him from thence and communicate with a post of the Bombay army, which is at the bottom of the Pass in the Soobramany Pagoda.

On arriving at Ooscotta you will issue a proclamation, which will be dispersed for you by the Rajah's servants, inviting all the peaceable inhabitants to remain in their villages, and stating

* *Bissolee*, or *Soobramany*. The mountain of this name in Canara, along which the Pass lies, has an elevation of 5611 feet above the sea, and towers far above the neighbouring heights.—ED.

it to be your intention to burn all villages which you may find deserted, and to hang all people that may be taken in arms. On your march to the Bissolee Ghaut you will put this proclamation in execution.

It is very desirable that Captain Colebrooke should visit all the passes into the lower country to the northward of the Rajah of Koorg's territories; and I request that you will enable him to do so. After having performed the services above mentioned, and after some of the Rajah's troops under Seyd Mahomed will arrive in the country, should you see no further reason for remaining there, you will move with your battalion to Paughur, where you will put it in garrison; you will send the 2nd of the 3rd to Chittledroog, where they are to be in garrison; and you will send Captain Colebrooke and his guides, the artillery and guns, and the pioneers, to Seringapatam. You will have with you a supply of rice, which is sent to be used only in case of necessity, and is to be returned to Seringapatam if it should not be wanted.

If you should find it possible by means of the Rajah's cavalry or infantry to attack the post at Bissolee Ghaut at the same time when you will attack Ey Goor, you will do so; and Captain Colebrooke will afterwards visit it and any passes to the Canara country that may be in the neighbourhood.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick. [338.]

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 22nd March, 1800.

Since I wrote to you last, orders have been received from the Government of Fort St. George to stop the expedition into Wynaad.

By my letters and other papers which I transmitted to that Government you will have perceived what chance we had of success, and the extent to which we should have gone in this season; but there is every appearance of an early fall of rain; we should in that case have suffered great distress, and should in all probability have been obliged to quit the country without effecting any thing. On the other hand, if the season had remained open, the advantages which we should have derived would not have been very great, and would not have been a

compensation for the risk which we run in making the attempt. Our greater means early in the next season will enable us to effect all our objects with ease.

I purpose to go to Cannanore in the course of a few days to get a little knowledge of their means and resources in the Malabar province. I only wait till I get a little strength after an attack of fever which I have had. I have appointed all the gentlemen who have any thing to do in Cotiote to meet me, and I hope to form a plan for our future operations, which will answer our purpose.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[339.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 23rd March, 1800.

In consequence of your letter of the 17th instant I have ordered the flank companies belonging to the corps in the garrison of Seringapatam to join their respective corps; that all detachments and individuals belonging to the stores which had been taken from that garrison should return to it. The bullocks hired for the service are to be discharged on the 31st instant; the grain and gunnies provided are to be kept in store till wanted.

Within these few days accounts have been received that Kistnapah Naig, the Polygar of Bullum, has got possession of the Bissolee or Soobramany Ghaut, which had been used as the tappall communication with Mangalore, and that he had stopped our tappalls. It appears that he has collected a number of the ryots of the country at a place called Ey Goor, which had been burnt in September last by Captain Campbell, and that the Rajah's troops had found some difficulty in keeping up the communication, and in supplying with provisions their post at Munserabad.

I have therefore sent Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey with his battalion, five companies of the 2nd of the 3rd, and two guns and artillery attached, and fifty pioneers, and a small proportion of grain, to drive the people from Ey Goor, and re-establish the communication with the province of Canara, and I have instructed him to treat with rigour any of the inhabitants who may

be found in arms. As soon as the Rajah's dewan will have equipped with arms and accoutrements a body of infantry which has hitherto been employed in the Anagoondy and Harponelly districts, they are to be sent into the Bul country, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey is to withdraw his corps, and to proceed to Paughur, to send the five companies of the 2nd of the 3rd to Chittledroog, and the pioneers, guns, and artillerymen to Seringapatam. In the mean time, as I have heard that the Polygars about Paughur have assembled some people and threaten disturbance, I have ordered two companies of the 1st of the 8th from Chittledroog to reinforce that post. I have sent Captain Colebrooke with Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey, in order that he may examine three passes into the Canara country, which are between Koorg and the Hyderghur pass. The other five companies of the 2nd of the 3rd are gone back to Chittledroog. Colonel Pater has represented that Sera has been found an inconvenient situation for the cavalry, as there is a scarcity of grass, water, and wood. I find upon inquiry that no gram has hitherto been laid in there, and I should therefore propose to place the 2nd Regiment of acvalry either at Chenapatam, which I am informed is a convenient situation, or in some convenient spot on the Maddoor river, if there should be no objection. I have kept this corps in this neighbourhood till I receive the orders of Government. I shall have no difficulty in assembling in the next season troops, bullocks, provisions, &c., for the expedition proposed in a very short time.

I purpose on the 25th to set out for Cannanore, where I expect to meet the gentlemen who are best acquainted with the Cotiote country, and I hope with their information to form a plan for our operations above and below the Ghauts. I shall likewise have an opportunity of ascertaining the means of equipment, &c. in the province of Malabar, and how far it may be necessary to assist them from this country.

In my letter of the 15th I informed you that I had ordered Major Capper to Seringapatam from the Nundydroog district with a detachment, the 2nd of the 4th. It is convenient to remove him from Nundydroog, as he is senior to the commanding officer there. It will be a convenience to the garrison of Seringapatam that this detachment remain in it, and it is not wanted elsewhere.

I have the honour to enclose copies of orders which I have issued, and which require the confirmation of Government. I was induced to appoint Captain Ogg to be my Persian interpreter, from the want of an officer in that situation in the frequent communications which I am obliged to have with the natives, and because it was originally intended that I should have one. Captain Ogg's diligence in arranging the Persian books captured at Seringapatam, and in collecting and arranging the papers of the late Sultaun, has doubtless been made known to his Lordship.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[340.]

To the Adjutant-General.

SIR, Seringapatam, 23rd March, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter to the Secretary of Government, and of papers sent therewith.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Captain Robertson, and one from Major Kennett, relative to serjeants for their corps. I have lately recommended that Serjeant-Major Turton may be appointed an ensign in the 33rd Regiment, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay my request before the Commander in Chief, that he will appoint Serjeant Lewis, of the 33rd Regiment, to be garrison serjeant major; Serjeant Masters, who was heretofore baggage serjeant of the army, to be key serjeant; and Serjeant Farrell, late of the Pioneers, now on the invalid establishment, to be barrack serjeant of Seringapatam.

The 1st battalion 8th Regiment, which I heretofore informed you was on its march towards the Carnatic, is still halted at Chittledroog for orders, excepting two companies, which you will perceive by my letter to the Secretary of Government are ordered to Paughur. When the five companies of the 2nd of the 3rd will arrive at Chittledroog there will be no difficulty in relieving those companies, and then this corps will be in readiness to march wherever the Commander in Chief may order it; but, considering the service on which the troops will be employed immediately after the rains, he will perhaps be induced to leave

it in this country, in which case I will order it into any garrison that he may think proper to point out.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of the Military Board. [341.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 24th March, 1800.

I enclose a return of the number, state, &c. of the elephants and camels, the property of the Honourable Company. The camels have been found unhealthy, and in wet weather unable to carry their loads; I do not therefore recommend that they should be retained. The elephants are hardy, and useful for many military purposes besides the carriage of camp equipage, and it is therefore very desirable to retain them in the service. The only disadvantage attending them is the permanent expense in peace; but unless that is incurred, as they cannot be caught and trained at the moment when they may be wanted in war, the advantages to be derived from them must be foregone.

The establishment, as it stands at present, is rather more expensive than the bullocks and bamboo coolies would be who would carry the same number of tents; but it will not be difficult to decrease the expense by discharging the supernumerary attendants, and by giving rather a lower pay to some of those who receive most. It will likewise be proper to turn out of the service the ten young and the six old elephants, and to replace them by sixteen fit for immediate work, and to strike off the strength and replace the two elephants sent to Hyderabad and that at Vellore. The establishment will then consist of sixty-eight serviceable elephants, which will carry about 550 loads; and if the supernumerary attendants are discharged, and other arrangements made among the attendants, the expense will be considerably reduced.

Captain Barclay has received a letter from Captain Wilks, the Military Secretary of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, which contains certain queries upon this subject. He is now preparing answers to them, which will most probably be

communicated to the Military Board, and will bring the whole subject before them.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[342.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 25th March, 1800.

I am going to Cannanore for about a fortnight or three weeks, and I shall leave the command of the troops here in your hands.

I recommend that you should keep your guards as they are at present, as you might otherwise find the numbers of discontented people in the fort unpleasant. Let me know when the flank companies of the 77th arrive, and what they want, and I will send orders respecting their return to Chittledroog, and other matters connected therewith. 4 companies of the 2nd of the 4th are coming: 2 of them are to go to Mysore to relieve the 2 companies there, and 2 of them are to be hutted in the fort in any place which Grant will point out.

The cutwal will wait upon you daily with his report, upon which you will give him your orders. I recommend that you should allow my moonshee to sit in your house; he will be able to give you information upon some matters which may be referred to you. I send you some papers relative to the late settlement between the castes, and I recommend that any attempt to disturb the peace of the place may be resisted as it was on the 17th inst.

I leave a book of letters from the Military Board. I shall be obliged to you if you will favour me with a line occasionally when any thing particular happens.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[343.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Periapatam, 28th March, 1800.

By this occasion Barclay will send you some orders providing for the wants of the 77th flank companies, and for the removal

of the sick and convalescent Europeans from Sera and Seringapatam. The doolies which the 77th will get are those lately repaired, the bearers those belonging to the army which are still at Seringapatam, and which I believe have been delivered over to Mr. Gordon: if they have not been so delivered, desire Mr. Anderson to hand them over to him. I write by this post to Mr. Gordon, and give him an authority for still retaining in the service the dooly bearers who will remain at Seringapatam even after the 77th will have marched. Desire Mr. Anderson to provide for the medical care of the 2nd Regiment of cavalry as he thinks best, and to let me know to whom he gives charge of them, that I may give an order upon the subject.

It appears extraordinary that Colonel Stevenson should have allowed the 77th to depart so incomplete in lascars and bamboo coolies; and they are so much so that I should imagine that Captain Macpherson has calculated his wants upon the Bombay allowances of these people, and not upon those of Fort St. George. Let him know that he shall have whatever Seringapatam can afford, but at the same time apprise him that there is a gentleman at Madras who makes people pay for every thing they indent for beyond what is allowed by the regulations of Government.

I have not provided for carriage of the tents of the 77th, as I conclude that that which they have brought will go back with them; but if the people should make any difficulties, let them indent upon Captain Barclay, and Grant may furnish them with the camels intended for the 2nd Regiment of cavalry. Barclay writes to Grant by this post, providing other carriage for the 2nd Regiment in case this arrangement should be necessary.

Major Mandeville might have informed me of the necessity of burning powder, but I certainly do not recollect that I acquiesced in the necessity of doing so on the parade, or at all in the fort. I recommend to you to give him a hint upon this subject. I am glad to hear that Macleod is so well. I hope that he will beat —— ——.

I arrived here this morning in two very long marches from Seringapatam. I was detained on the 26th for bamboos for some of my own and of the sepoys' tents, as I thought it best not to start till we had got every thing we wanted.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[344.]

To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.

MY DEAR COLONEL, Periapatam, 28th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter which I have received from a soldier in the 77th Regiment, and I shall be obliged to you if you will tell him that if he has any thing to communicate to me, he must send it in the regular form through his commanding officer.

In all corps, but particularly in those in this country, there are great abuses and irregularities in the mode of disposing of any property a soldier may have had. I imagine that we all have adopted different methods of checking them, but I am afraid without great effect, as the interference of the civil tribunals will always control our regimental regulations, and will force the payment of those improperly obtained legacies. In every point of view it is desirable that the civil courts should not have occasion to interfere in any military or regimental concern; but they certainly will interfere when applied to, and the writer of the enclosed letter appears to be one of those who are most ready to call for their interference. Under these circumstances, if there be not something palpably improper in the will, a copy of which is enclosed, which can be proved in the clearest manner, it is advisable that you should order that the legacy claimed should be paid. If there be any thing improper in the will, it is desirable that the man should be tried for it by a regimental court martial, and a copy of their proceedings will be the best answer to any interference on the part of the civil courts.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[345.]

To the Secretary of Government.

SIR, Periapatam, 28th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 23rd. I need not assure you that I shall be happy to take any trouble which Government may think proper to impose upon me; but, for two or three reasons which I am about to state, I think there is a better method of executing the proposed works at Seringapatam than to order Mr. Castles to undertake them under my superintendence. 1st; Mr. Castles is a very young man, who undoubt-

edly has a very good character, but I know him only by report, and he may not be much better than others: 2ndly; it is necessary that I should frequently be absent from Seringapatam; in the course of this year I certainly shall not be there for several months, and during that suspension of my actual superintendence a good deal of mischief might be done, for which I could not be responsible: 3rdly; the works which are most wanting are of a nature to which a contract is peculiarly applicable, and on which it would be scarcely possible to graft the evils and inconveniences which have usually been felt from that mode of executing public works. I have not by me at present the paper which I sent to the Military Board, but, as well as I recollect, I recommended that the unfinished part of the second or inside rampart should be thrown into the inside ditch; that the outside rampart and its parapets should be thickened; that the stone glacis on the river faces should be completed; and that the ditch should be deepened. I conclude that the last is that upon which the Military Board cannot decide until regular levels are taken, and as it is the least material, I would lay it aside entirely till the other works are completed. The other three are mere cooly work, in the execution of which there can be no connivance between the contractor and the engineer. In the execution of the stone glacis there may be more nicety than in the other two, and it will be necessary to employ masons; but if in the advertisement for the contract for this work it is particularly stated that it is to be completed in the same manner as that part finished by the Sultaun, it will at all times be in my power to check any impropriety which may be going on. I would have each contract separate; and indeed it will not be very easy to commence to thicken the outer rampart until the inner ditch is filled: therefore the execution of that work may likewise be deferred.

There is another reason why it is desirable that these works should be done by contract. There are several works going on at Mysore and in other parts of the Rajah's country in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and I really think that Mr. Castles would find it very difficult to procure the people to perform the work. Your great contractors at Madras would find it worth the trouble and expense, and would send from the Carnatic tank diggers and others, who, with the assistance which the place could afford, would soon complete what we

want; but these Mr. Castles could not command. We might make an arrangement with the contractor for the assistance of pioneers, which we might give him.

I lately sent to the Military Board the report of a committee upon the works at Seringapatam. Several repairs are absolutely necessary. The Fort is still open on the side which we attacked, and the first object for the attention of the engineer should be to execute the most material of these during the time that the contractor might also be employed under his directions. We shall then get on well, and you may depend upon it that I shall not pass unnoticed any thing that I may perceive improperly executed.

I have got thus far on my way to Cannanore. I expect to be back at Seringapatam on the 20th of next month.

If you should determine to execute the works at Seringapatam by contract, let me know it, and particularly what the Military Board proposes should be done; and when I return I will send you a few memorandums upon the subject, which you may find useful in closing with the contractors.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[346.] G. O. Periapatam, 28th March, 1800.

An officer from the garrison of Seringapatam is to proceed to Sera, and to take charge of the European sick; and he will indent upon the stores for three private tents, besides his own tents, and upon Mr. Gordon for carriage for them. As soon as the doolies above ordered from Chittledroog arrive at Sera, he and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Gardiner, and all the sick and convalescents now at Sera, will proceed by Bangalore to the Carnatic. At Bangalore he will meet certain other convalescents, Europeans, who will be sent from the garrison of Seringapatam, of whom likewise he and Mr. Gardiner will take charge, and the whole are to be disposed of as follows:

Those belonging to the 19th Dragoons and the 74th Regiment are to be taken to Poonamallee, and given over to the officer in charge of the invalids and recruits of His Majesty's regiments. Those belonging to the 2nd battalion of artillery to be sent to

the Mount; those belonging to the 25th Light Dragoons to be left at Arcot; those to the Scotch brigade at Vellore; those to the 12th Regiment at Wallajahbad; those to De Meuron's Regiment to be sent into Fort St. George.

After having performed this service the officer will join his corps at Seringapatam, and will bring with him the doolies and bearers; and Mr. Gardiner will report himself to and receive the orders of the Medical Board.

On the 15th of April the sick and convalescents of His Majesty's regiments in Seringapatam are to be sent to Bangalore in charge of an officer, who will indent according to the regulations for such doolies as may be necessary for them, and for tents and carriage. This officer will deliver over charge of these sick and convalescents to the officer coming from Sera, with the sick from thence, and he will return to Seringapatam and join his corps.

Mr. Gordon will provide for victualling the details of Europeans proceeding, according to the above orders, from Seringapatam and Sera to their respective destinations in the Carnatic.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [347.]

SIR, Veerajundrapett, 30th March, 1800.

I have received a letter from Lieutenant Stevenson at Hullihall, in which he informs me that Dhoondiah had joined with one of the Polygars dependent on the Nizam, and that the two had proceeded towards the Anagoondy country with a view to plunder it: this intelligence is confirmed by accounts from Darwar. I learn also from thence that Scindiah's troops have not yet got possession of the fort of Kolapoor, and that accounts have been received there from Poonah stating that Nana Furnavees was dead.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Commissioners in Malabar. [348.]

GENTLEMEN, Cannanore, 4th April, 1800.

Colonel Sartorius has communicated to me your letter of the 25th of March, as well as one from Major Walker to you upon

the subject of the disturbances in the southern districts of Malabar. It gives me great satisfaction that under the existing circumstances it is in my power to leave in that part of the country such a number of the troops as will in some degree curb the disturbers of the public peace. I have accordingly desired Colonel Sartorius to order to Cotaparamba 2 companies of the 8 now at Calicut, and to place under the orders of Major Walker the other 6.

I have now before me the copy of a letter which General Stewart wrote to Mr. Spencer on the 8th of February on the subject, I believe, of the disturbances now in my contemplation. It is probable that hereafter the state of the Company's forces and the season will be more favourable than at this moment for commencing decisive operations against those who disturb the peace of the community, and that Government will be induced to order that these should be commenced. In the mean time the force now placed under the orders of Major Walker will give some protection to those of the Honourable Company's subjects that are peaceably inclined, and will extend in some degree, and support, the authority of the civil magistrates.

Mr. Smee will have informed you of his having succeeded in his endeavours to prevail upon the friendly Nairs to open certain roads into the heart of the Cotiote country. I consider these to be so important to the success of the operations intended early in the next season, that I have ordered 1200 of the coolies, who had been entertained for the service of the troops, to assist in the work; so that by their means, and by the labour of the pioneers, two posts should be prepared at stations which have been pointed out to Captain Moncrieff of the Pioneers. If these works should be completed previous to the setting in of the rains, it is my intention to forward to them grain, provisions, &c. &c.; at all events, I shall throw into Cotaparamba a large supply of these articles: and I have ordered to that station two companies of Native infantry, to be employed either as garrisons for the posts, which I hope will be constructed; or to Cotaparamba, as a further security to those articles which I propose shall be thrown into it.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. [349]

SIR, Cannanore, 4th April, 1800.

Since I had the honour of writing to you last, I have come here for the purpose of making myself acquainted with certain matters regarding the Bombay establishment, which I could not know at a distance.

Colonel Sartorius has already laid before the Government the orders which I had given to him consequent on the directions which I received from the Government of Fort St. George, not to carry on in this season the operations intended against the Pyche Rajah, but to make such arrangements of the troops and departments as I may think "may be best calculated to enable me to act with vigour and effect on the plan of united operations as soon as the season shall admit of my taking the field." He has likewise laid before the Government a letter which he has received from the Commissioners in Malabar, expressing their wishes that the Native part of the detachment which had been assembled might be employed in the southern part of the province, under the orders of Major Walker.

I have been able to comply with their wishes to the extent of six complete companies: the other two will go to Cotaparamba, to be employed as I shall state hereafter. The companies of the 75th will march to Mangalore; those of the 84th will return to Goa by sea. I ordered Colonel Sartorius to retain in the service the coolies who had been sent from Bombay, as well as those who had been hired in Paulghaut, because I had hopes that means might have been devised of employing them previous to and during the monsoon, so as to give us great advantage when the season should allow the troops to take the field. By the ability and exertions of Mr. Smee, who has prevailed upon the friendly Nairs in Cotiote to open certain roads into the centre of that country, I have been enabled to employ the pioneers and 1200 of the coolies to assist them in this work; and I have strong hopes that two posts will be constructed, one at Canote and the other at Montana, previous to the setting in of the rains. If these should be completed, I propose to employ the coolies in throwing into them supplies of provisions, grain, &c., for the detachment which will move through Cotiote in the next season: at all events, they shall be employed in throwing those articles into Cotaparamba. I have

requested Colonel Sartorius to order two of the companies of the Native infantry of the detachment to Cotaparamba: these will be moved forward to the posts to be constructed, or they will remain at Cotaparamba as a further security to the provisions which will be thrown into that place if the new posts should not be completed. As soon as the rains set in, the coolies from Paulghaut will be discharged; those hired at Bombay will be detained in the service, to complete the attainment of the objects above stated.

I have the honour to enclose a letter and some papers which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Disney. This officer has been for some time employed under my command: I found him active, zealous, and able; and I therefore retained him in the command of Nuggur and of the province of Bednore, to which I recommended to the Government of Fort St. George that he might be appointed. I am concerned that his health should oblige him to quit the service, to which he will certainly be a loss; and I take the liberty of recommending him to the favourable notice of Government.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[350.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Cannanore, 5th April, 1800.

I have the honour to inform you that I have disposed of the detachment which had been collected for the proposed service in Wynaad, and have made arrangements as follows:

The detachment of the 75th marches to Mangalore, that of the 84th returns to Goa by sea, and that of the Honourable Company's regiment is gone to Cochin. There will be no difficulty whatever in collecting troops from these places, at the time when the season will admit of military operations.

In consequence of a letter from the Commissioners in Malabar to Colonel Sartorius, in which they have stated their wish that the Native part of the detachment should be stationed in the southern districts of this province, which have been lately much disturbed by Mopilla and other chiefs, I have ordered six out of eight companies to proceed to a place called Pynaad; the other two I have disposed of as I shall state

hereafter. I do not expect more from this position of the companies above mentioned than to give protection to the property of the well-disposed inhabitants in the district immediately in the neighbourhood of the post which the troops will occupy, and thereby in some degree to diminish the extent of the range in which the depredations are committed. As, however, the troops are not wanted elsewhere, they may be thus employed.

Till a system is adopted for getting possession of the strongholds of these Rajahs and disturbers of the peace, and for making them amenable to the authority of Government and of the civil magistrate whenever their crimes may render it necessary to call for them, it is impossible to establish peace, excepting in the neighbourhood of the posts occupied by the troops. Such a system, however, may be easily carried into execution, and may be connected with the expedition into Wynaad.

I have ordered two Native companies to Cotaparamba. Previous to my departure from Seringapatam, I had directed that about 700 coolies which had come from Bombay, and others which had been hired in Paulghaut, should be retained in the service, as I was in hopes that previous to and during the rains they might be employed so as to give us great advantages when the season should admit of the troops taking the field. Upon my arrival here, I found that Mr. Smee (whose zeal I cannot sufficiently commend) had prevailed upon some of the friendly Nairs in Cotiote to undertake to open two roads into the heart of that district, one leading to Pereweil by Canote, the other to Montana: I instantly employed 1200 of the coolies and the pioneers to assist them in the work, which is already in great forwardness. As soon as the roads are opened, I propose by means of the Nairs to establish two posts, one at Canote, the other at Montana, if the season should continue open a sufficient length of time, and to throw into them, by means of the coolies, grain and stores for the detachment which will move through Cotiote early in the next season. These posts will be occupied by the present garrison of Cotaparamba. If the rains should be early, and I should not be able to complete the posts at Canote and Montana, I shall then employ the coolies in throwing the stores for the detachment into Cotaparamba, for which the additional garrison will be ample security. At all events, these arrangements will give us great advantages when we shall commence our operations, and will

be well worth the expense of the hire of the Paulghaut coolies for one month, and of those hired at Bombay during the rains. The service rendered by Mr. Smee will be justly estimated when it is recollected that it was thought impossible for the largest detachment which could be collected in Malabar to penetrate, and establish themselves in the centre of Cotiote, and that that object will now be effected without the assistance or interference of a sepoy in the service of the Honourable Company. If the Pyche Rajah should oppose the making of the roads, the Nairs will continue them, or otherwise, as they may think proper, upon a comparison of their strength with his. Excepting that the house of the head man, Kydree Amboo, is to be guarded by the Company's arms, nothing will be risked in giving it to them, after the opinions which have been received of the impracticability of entering Cotiote with the largest detachment which could be collected. The employment of the Company's troops might certainly insure the completion of the work; and as some of the Nairs are well inclined towards the British Government, it might not be attended with the risk which was expected. But on the other hand, it must be recollected that the coolies must have been employed in carrying provisions and stores for the use of the troops, and in consequence we should have been deprived of all our means of working with the celerity which is necessary in this advanced state of the season. Besides, the presence of the troops might induce the Nairs to withdraw their assistance, the capriciousness of their temper being well known. Upon the whole, then, I preferred to risk a failure from the opposition of the Pyche Rajah, and his superiority to the other Nairs, rather than to withdraw the coolies from the work in order to employ them in carrying provisions and stores for the troops, and to expose them to the chance of caprice or treachery in the Nairs.

However, no opposition is expected from the Pyche Rajah, and I have great hopes that the work will be completed.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[351.] *To Admiral Rainier.*

SIR, Cannanore, 5th April, 1800.

Colonel Sartorius will have informed you that the Government of Fort St. George have given orders that an expedition

which was intended for the Wynaad country should not take place, and it has therefore been found necessary to send back the troops to the stations from which they had come to form a detachment in this province. Some of them had come from Goa, others from Mangalore; and those from the latter place will return by land, those from the former by sea, as in this advanced state of the season, and on account of the difficulties on the road, it is feared that the rains will commence before they will reach their stations. Of 200 Europeans who are to return to Goa, Captain Hayes, of the *Fly*, has found accommodation for 50 on board his ship; and there is a vessel in the roads which is deemed fit for the purpose, which will contain 50 more. There will still, however, remain 100 Europeans with their officers, who it is desirable should go to Goa; and as it is not deemed safe to send them in the boats commonly used in the transportation of troops on this coast, and there are no other vessels in the roads, I am induced to apply to you that in case any of his Majesty's ships should remain on this coast, you will do me the favour to have these men of the 84th Regiment taken to Goa. If any vessel should arrive either here or any where on the coast within reach of this place in which it shall be deemed safe to send the troops, Colonel Sartorius will take the opportunity of sending them away, notwithstanding that you may grant my request, as I am fully aware of the inconvenience to his Majesty's ships of taking troops.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick. [352.]

DEAR SIR, Cannanore, 7th April, 1800.

I arrived here on the 3rd.

Mr. Smee, the gentleman who has for some time had charge of the Cotiote district, has made an arrangement with the friendly Nairs for opening certain roads which are essentially necessary for our future military operations. I have given directions that certain coolies and others who had been collected for the service of the troops which were to have been employed on the expedition may be sent to their assistance, and I have great hopes that these works will be finished before

the rains set in. I then propose, if possible, to construct places of strength and security for grain, provisions, and stores, in the centre of Cotiote, with which by means of these roads the communication will be easy and secure; and during the rains I propose to employ the same people in filling them with such articles in sufficient quantities to last a detachment of 3000 men for two months. The troops on this side will then be well advanced for a co-operation on Wynaad early in the next season. If it should not be possible to finish these roads and depôts previous to the setting in of the rains, I propose during their continuance to throw a quantity of grain, &c., into Cotaparamba, which at least will put us forward to a certain degree.

It is extraordinary that it should be possible now to do without troops, that which it was deemed impossible to perform with the largest detachment which could be collected in the province of Malabar; but the Nairs themselves have been brought to consent to it, and the Company's troops are not to be employed excepting in guarding the house of the head Nair during the time that he and his people will make the roads and posts. Mr. Smee for this deserves great credit.

If the Pyche Rajah or his friends should oppose the measure, and should be stronger than our friends the Nairs, it must be given up, as certainly the Company is not now sufficiently strong to force it. For that reason, and as nothing could be more disgraceful than to fail in an undertaking of the kind, if the Company's troops should be employed in it, however anxious I may be for its success, I leave it entirely to the Nairs, giving them only the powerful assistance of our working people.

It might be imagined that the employment of our troops, with the assistance of the friendly Nairs, would insure the completion of the work against the attempts of the Pyche Rajah to interrupt it; but if the troops are sent into Cotiote, the coolies, instead of being employed upon the roads, must be employed in carrying provisions and stores from the sea-coast, and thus I should lose the most powerful means of completing the work with the celerity which is necessary at this season of the year. Besides, the capricious temper and savage disposition of the Nairs are such, that even the slightest dispute between one of them and our officers and troops would induce them to betray us, notwithstanding that at this moment we are on such good terms as that they render us a service which must tend to

the complete settlement of the Company's authority in that country, of the magnitude of which they are fully aware.

Upon the whole, then, as the completion of the work depends entirely upon the good will of the friendly Nairs, I have thought it best to leave it to themselves, giving them the assistance of all the working people which this province could furnish. I have arranged a plan of operations upon Wynaad, supposing that I shall have posts in the centre of Cotiote, or that I shall not have one more advanced than Cotaparamba, and we shall speedily accomplish the settlement of the Company's authority in those districts.

The annihilation of the Pyche Rajah will have a great effect on the minds of the disaffected, with which this province abounds. There never was a country which, from its nature, its situation, the manners of its people and its government, was so well calculated for turbulence; but the fall of the Pyche Rajah, and the reduction of Wynaad, will curb it considerably; and I shall direct my inquiries to ascertaining the means of settling the other parts of this province which are disturbed.

The whole country is one jungle, which may be open in some parts, but in others is so thick that it is impossible to see objects at the distance of two yards; and till roads are made, the country is impracticable for our troops. In this jungle, criminals who deserve punishment, those who wish to evade the payment of the dues to Government, and those who oppose its authority, take refuge, where they are supported by chiefs who have strongholds in the upper country, and by the fruits of the trees and a little cultivation scattered in different parts in valleys in the jungle. The province of Malabar is bounded on the N.E. by the Koorg country, and on the E. by Wynaad, Mysore, and Coimbatoor. From Malabar into Wynaad there are many Passes, and it has been the constant practice of all those who have disturbed the peace of this province, when they have been pressed by the troops below the Ghauts, to slip up into Wynaad, which country it would almost appear that Tippoo had allotted to the purpose of giving an asylum to those who should disturb our Government. Accordingly, in Wynaad, and Todinaar bordering upon it, they have many strongholds, from whence they issue to burn, plunder, and destroy below the Ghauts, and to which they retire when pressed. The subjection of Wynaad therefore, and of the Pyche Rajah, who is

at the head of the disturbers of the peace, is the first object; and the next will be the establishment of easy communications for our troops through that district between the upper and lower country, and then easy access to every considerable stronghold both above and below the Ghauts. Small posts and small detachments of our troops will then be able at all times to give effectual assistance to the civil magistrate, with whom it will rest to do his duty. The nature of the people is considerably influenced by that of their country and its situation. They are savage, cruel, and everything that is bad. Every man is armed against his neighbour. The Nair * destroys the Moplah,† and the Moplah the Nair, and both agree in despising and resisting the authority of the Company's government, and of its magistrates. Property has been established without a symptom of civilisation, and English law administered by Native agents. The consequence is, that the whole system is tyranny, and corruption, and impunity. The great Landholder, as he is called, when he finds it most convenient to tyrannise legally, pays the Native judge, and supports him in his office by his influence. The complaints of the inferior landholders and cultivators reach the European gentleman superintending, who, instead of dismissing and punishing the judge, finds him too strong for him. On the attempt to punish, the judge and his patron retire to the jungles, the whole country flock to their standard, the cultivation is neglected, and the revenue is lost. To pursue them in the jungles would be useless and dangerous, and under these circumstances the superintendent is obliged to submit and to restore the judge to his situation, and to wink at future enormities. Various remedies have been proposed; some have proposed to disarm the people, others have made propositions which would

* The Nairs constitute the chief landed proprietors and the principal military tribe of Malabar. They are divided into eleven grades of occupations, but all profess to be soldiers. The Nair ranks in caste below a Brahmin, to whom he may approach, but must not touch. Other classes dare not approach within 12, 20, or 96 steps of a Nair; and a Poliar (slave or serf) must, when desirous of communicating with a Nair, stand at the greatest distance at which he can be heard, shouting from the top of his voice. No Nair knows his own father, and every man considers his sister's children as his heirs.—ED.

† The Moplahs are a numerous race in Malabar, who appear to have migrated to this coast from Arabia, and to have been traders to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea from a very early period. They have adopted many Hindoo customs, which are adverse to the injunctions of the Koran, but may in other respects be reckoned among the most fanatical disciples of Islam.—ED.

not tend more to remedy the evil. To disarm the people entirely, would in the first place be impossible; and in the next it would have the effect of delivering over the disarmed part of the community (that is to say, those who should submit themselves to the orders of Government, and allow their arms to be taken) to the mercy of those who should oppose its authority, and would therefore be cruel. To disarm the people may be practicable and proper hereafter; but it will first be necessary to conquer them.

The plan for this I have already stated, and if I receive the orders of Government, and there should be nothing more important for the troops in the next season, I think this country can be settled. It will afterwards remain with Government, by a reform of those parts of the system of tenure of lands not applicable to this country, and of the judicial system, to establish the civil authority upon a firm foundation.

In my journey through Koorg I saw the Rajah. He appeared to be much afraid that we on the eastern side of the Peninsula were not aware of the services which he had had it in his power to render to the Company, and that we should listen to his enemies, who he said were very desirous of prejudicing us against him. After a long conversation he appeared better reconciled to us than he was at first.

There is more simplicity in his manners, and in what he says, and apparently more sincerity, than in any native that I have yet seen. He is much attached to the English, and it would certainly be a misfortune if he were to be estranged from us.

I leave this for Tellicherry to-morrow. I shall visit Cotaparamba, and return here in a few days; and I hope to be at Seringapatam by the end of the month. It is fortunate that the expedition did not go. It has rained every night since I left Seringapatam, and on two nights the wind has been so violent that our tents have been blown away.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan.

SIR, Tellicherry, 9th April, 1800.

I have received your different letters, for which I am obliged to you.

The report that a person pretending to be a son of Tippoo is endeavouring to raise a disturbance in the southern parts of the province of Canara has reached me from another quarter; and although I am certain that no son of Tippoo, nor a relation of the family, can be there, and therefore that the person is an impostor, it is desirable that you should watch him, whoever he may be, and give me the earliest intelligence of his motions.

The flank companies of the Grenadier battalion will remain for some time in Malabar; the detachment of the 75th will, however, return to Mangalore, and I believe they march from Cannanore on this day. In case more Native troops are wanting in Canara, I shall find means to send them there; but in the mean time it is very desirable that the recruits raised should be brought on as fast as possible.

I find that there was no foundation for the report that Kistnapah Naig had possessed himself of Munserabad. On the 27th Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey drove him from a stronghold he had at Ey Goor, which he burnt; he was making arrangements to attack him again on the 30th or 31st, and I have hopes that before this time his followers will have been dispersed, and tranquillity will have been restored to the Bul country.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[354.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

DEAR SIR, Tellicherry, 9th April, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 19th of March.* To have carried on our expedition into Wynaad would have been very

* *Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.*

MY DEAR SIR, Calcutta, 19th March, 1800.

Lord Mornington having attentively considered your letter of the 28th ultimo to Sydenham, and not being able to write to you himself, has directed me to communicate to you his sentiments on the two very interesting subjects discussed in it.

His Lordship agrees in opinion with you that it is too late to undertake the expedition against the Pyche Rajah this year, and he will write accordingly to Lord Clive. It is much to be lamented, however, that any circumstances should have occurred to render it necessary to postpone a measure of such

distressing to the troops, on account of the early and heavy fall of rain; and if the rivers had swelled in the upper country, we should have been in an awkward situation, which might have had unpleasant consequences. Colonel Sartorius will find no difficulty in explaining the reason why his detachment was not prepared to march till the 1st of April. The truth is, that the

urgent necessity. His Lordship had no reason to suppose it possible that the troops in Malabar would not be able to move *till late in March*, and this is a point which remains to be explained to him by those whom it concerns. With respect to Colonel Sartorius's information of Cotiote being in the possession of the Pyche Rajah, it is quite unintelligible to his Lordship, who supposes that Colonel Sartorius must have committed some blunder on the occasion. It is true that the Rajah has expressed a wish, and even made a demand, to be reinstated in it; but neither his wish nor demand has been complied with; and, if he had made himself master of the district by force, it is probable that the Governor-General would have been regularly advised of such an event. In closing this subject, his Lordship desires me to observe that he shall be happy to find that the object of the expedition has been kept as secret on the Malabar side as he knows it to have been at Seringapatam; since otherwise the presumption of the Pyche, in consequence of its being deferred, is likely to reach an intolerable height. You will easily conceive the great reluctance with which his Lordship postpones a measure so extremely necessary, and as easily believe that nothing but his persuasion (from your report) of the absolute impossibility of carrying it into execution this year could induce him to relinquish it for a moment.

Combining the details which you have given respecting the plot attributed to Dhoondiah with the intelligence from Poonah, Lord Mornington is strongly inclined to believe that there is considerable foundation for that story. I refer you to the enclosed extracts of letters from Colonel Palmer for the intelligence alluded to. Nothing is more likely, his Lordship thinks, than that Dhoondiah should wish to get such an instrument into his hands as one of the sons of Tippoo might be rendered; and his experience of the Peshwah's character will not allow him to suppose that Prince incapable of participating (secretly) in such a project. On the whole, his Lordship is satisfied that there is nothing short of an open rupture which may not be expected from the Court of Poonah; and that, therefore, the proceedings of that court, as well as the movements of all the Mussulmans about you, cannot be too vigilantly watched. Even my friend Hubeeb Oollul should not be excepted on this occasion. He is a Hâfiz; and a Hâfiz can hardly be other than a bigot. Besides, he was formerly much connected with Dhoondiah, who, in the moment he escaped from Seringapatam, sent Hubeeb Oollul a message, inviting him to join his fortunes.

His Lordship directs me in conclusion to say that he most anxiously desires the speedy removal of all the Princes from Seringapatam to Vellore; and that in the meanwhile he thinks it advisable that you should discontinue the indulgence of taking them out on your hunting parties.

I am sorry that I cannot give you any favourable account of poor Sydenham. He is so much reduced (though no longer suffering from the gout) that it will be absolutely necessary for him, I understand, to go to sea.

Lord Mornington has been so constantly engaged of late by his despatches to Europe and by the affairs in Oude (in addition to the ordinary business of

Company have no influence in this country, and therefore can't command its resources.

This is the cause of the slowness of equipping the troops. The public correspondence between Colonel Sartorius and me upon the subject of the Rajah's *possessing* Cotiote, which is before the Government of Fort St. George, will explain exactly how that matter stands.

From the manner in which the road making goes on, it appears now that the Company's influence is the strongest, at least in the western part of the district. But till within these few days it was the opinion of all those trusted with the management of the public affairs in this province, that the largest detachment which could be collected could not with safety attempt to penetrate it; and, therefore, although Colonel Sartorius did not use the most proper term when he said the Rajah was possessed of Cotiote, yet he is well supported in his opinion

the Government) that he has found it impossible to write to you; but he hopes to be able to do so very fully in a short time.

I remain, &c.,

W. KIRKPATRICK.

[ENCLOSURES.]

Colonel Palmer to the Right Hon. the Governor-General. Dated Poonah, 21st February, 1800.

P. 8. I am informed that an emissary from Mysore arrived some days ago in this city, and is secreted in the Peshwah's house. By whom or for what purpose he has been sent, my informant is not yet able to discover. But, admitting the fact, there can be little doubt of the object of such an agency being to disturb the possessions of the Company or the Nizam in that quarter; and I fear that the disposition of Bajee Rao to promote that object is as little to be doubted, though I do not comprehend by what means he can essentially assist in such a scheme, and every motive of justice, gratitude, and even his interest, if he understood it, ought to deter him from engaging in it.

(A true Extract.)

Colonel Palmer to the Right Hon. the Governor-General. Dated Poonah, 28th February, 1800.

P. 5. I have not yet been able to obtain any further information concerning the person whom I mentioned in my last address to be an emissary from Mysore, and secreted in the Peshwah's house, except that he is a Mussulman, and is treated with respect. I do not know whether there is remaining in that country any person of consequence who may be supposed desirous or capable of exciting commotions against our Government; but it is probable that the late revolution will suggest to many needy adventurers the means of profitable imposition by practising on the credulity of this or other Courts which may be disposed to foment or aid disturbances in Mysore.

(A true Extract.)

that our troops could not pass through it, and it is therefore very immaterial whether the Rajah possessed the district or not, as far as it regarded our military operations.

I have still kept in confinement the leaders of those who were accused of the conspiracy at Seringapatam; and of course, since I heard it, I have discontinued to take the Princes out hunting, or off the island of Seringapatam. I have constant intelligence of the motions of Dhoondiah, and of the Mahratta chiefs on the frontier. Almost all the latter, at least those whom I have thought most favourable to us, because they have appeared most inclined to peace and good order, have lately collected their forces at the siege of Kolapoor.

The consequence is, that Dhoondiah has gathered strength, has plundered several places near Kittoor, and to the northward of Darwar, in which he has found property; and I am informed that he has once appeared to the southward of Darwar and towards our Soonda frontier. We are tolerably strong to the northward, and in a few days, when a detachment will have attained the object of an expedition against Kistnapah Naig into the Bul country, we shall be still more so. Pursheram Bhow's family will naturally be anxious for the safety of Savanore, and I therefore imagine that a force will be detached immediately from Kolapoor to oppose Dhoondiah's progress.

I have heard from more than one quarter that there is a person in the southern parts of Canara who pretends to be a son of Tippoo, and has raised men, but in small numbers, and has had a communication with Dhoondiah.

The officer commanding in Canara informed me that about four hundred men belonging to the corps of recruits deserted nearly at one time: he attributed their desertion to this report, and he thought that they had joined him. It does not appear, however, by any account, that he has anything like that number of people, and he has certainly hitherto committed no disturbance. I rather believe that the emissary at Poonah may be from this man.

There are people now employed to find out exactly how this matter stands, and I shall then report it regularly to Government.

A number of persons telling the same story may have learnt it from the same quarter, and I don't wish to put upon record a tale so improbable, until I shall have in some degree ascer-

tained the ground upon which it stands. In the mean time, if I find out where this impostor is, I shall give him a hunt, although that part of Canara is so jungly that it is more than probable I shall not find him.

In general, Canara is more open than this country; and excepting in the district of Neliserum, in which I am informed the fellow is, the people are well affected to the Government, and do not carry arms.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[355.] *To W. H. Gordon, Esq.*

SIR, Tellicherry, 9th April, 1800.

I have received your report upon the proposed coinage of the Bengal gold mohurs and Soolack rupees in your treasury into Rajah's pagodas and rupees. By this it appears that, valuing the Rajah's pagoda at 8 per cent. above the star, each gold mohur will produce 4 star pagodas 16 fanams 11½ cash, and more if the difference in value be increased.

It appears that by coining the Soolack rupees into Rajah's rupees, a loss will be incurred of about 5¾ per cent., supposing the Soolack rupee to be now worth as much as the Rajah's, which is not the case. As, however, upon the whole, the loss will be the less to the Company if the gold mohurs and Soolack rupees are recoined as above mentioned than if they are issued to the troops in their present form, and as to issue them in Rajah's pagodas and rupees will be more convenient, I request that you will have them recoined.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[356.] *To the Adjutant-General.*

SIR, Tellicherry, 11th April, 1800.

I have the honour to enclose a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey, and orders issued to the detachment under his command on the 2nd instant; from the latter of which it will be

perceived that he has failed in an attempt to force a post occupied by Kistnapah Naig.

From an experience of a former contest with the same Polygar, in which he was deprived of his fort, his place was burnt, and his people dispersed, and from a knowledge of the country, through every part of which detachments of three and four companies of Bengal sepoys marched in November, I hoped that the detachment under Colonel Tolfrey would be sufficiently strong for all the purposes required, particularly as it was to be aided by a large body of the Rajah's cavalry and infantry. As, however, it has met with this misfortune, I have ordered the flank companies of the 77th, now on their march to Chittledroog, to join it; and that Major Capper's detachment may be sent to Ooscotta from Seringapatam, reinforced by two flank companies of the 73rd, with ammunition, grain, provisions, and arrack. I have besides desired the commanding officer in Canara to send to the Soobramany Pagoda at the bottom of the Bissolee Ghaut the 400 men of the 75th which are now on their march to Mangalore, and such a detachment of the grenadier battalion of Bombay sepoys as can be spared from the duties of that garrison.

The detachment will come under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey. [357.]

Sir, Cannanore, 12th April, 1800.

Besides the reinforcements ordered to your detachment as stated in my letters of yesterday and the day before, I have ordered a detachment of the Bombay army, which will consist of 400 men of the 75th and a part of the grenadier battalion, to proceed from Mangalore, and take post at the Soobramany Pagoda, which, as I have before stated to you, is at the bottom of the Bissolee Ghaut.

I have desired that, if possible, the officer commanding this detachment may ascend the Ghaut, and that he may communicate with you directly across the country; at all events he

will ascertain the nature of the road to the top of it, and the position occupied by Kistnapah Naig at Woochinga; and he will be prepared to co-operate with the detachment under your orders in the attack of it.

As it is almost certain that he will not be able to communicate with you directly across Bullum, I have made arrangements and have given directions for running a tappall directly from Jemalabad to the Soobramany Pagoda. The tappall from Seringapatam to Mangalore, which, since it has been interrupted by Kistnapah Naig, has run by Oostara, the Gamut Kull Ghaut, Jemalabad, and Soobramany, will be complete and certain, although circuitous and long.

As soon as you will have established this tappall to Oostara, you will write to the commanding officer at Jemalabad, and learn from him the nature and length of the communication between his post and the Soobramany Pagoda.

In case you should be in want of tappall peons, I write by this occasion to the postmaster in Mysore, to request he will send some.

Your communication with the detachment of the Bombay army, which will be posted at Soobramany, being thus settled, and the length of time which it will take ascertained, when you come to attack the post which you say the Rajah has on the top of the Bissolee Ghaut, you will arrange matters with the officer commanding that detachment in such a manner as that he may attack it from his side at the same time when you will attack it from yours. All that is required is, that he may have timely notice of your intention, and as far as possible a knowledge of your plan.

I have desired that the officer who will command the detachment of the Bombay army may be instructed to communicate to you all the information which he may acquire, and that he may obey your orders.

He will have with him one month's provisions for his own detachment.

P.S. I enclose a sketch of the passes between Canara and Mysore, and of the situation of Jemalabad and Soobramany. Captain Colebrooke will be able to fix their true situation with Munserabad and your position, as he will find this sketch contains Nuggur, Hyderghur, and Cowleydroog, which are like-

wise in his map, and he may place the passes upon it, referring them to the same places in the same manner as they are in the sketch.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Officer commanding in Canara. [358.]

SIR, Cannanore, 12th April, 1800.

Since I wrote to you last, I have received intelligence from Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey, who commands the detachment employed in the Bul country, stating that he has met with a check. I have in consequence reinforced the detachment, which will be hereafter under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor; but as I understand the Polygar has a force stationed at the top of the Bissolee Ghaut, a combined operation from the Canara side as well as from Bullum may tend to overpower him more speedily than if he be attacked only from the latter. I have therefore to request that you will without delay take the measures hereafter stated, in order to bring a detachment upon him from your side.

As soon as the 400 men of the 75th Regiment arrive at Mangalore, you will be so kind as to send them to take post at the Soobramany Pagoda, with such a detachment of the grenadier battalion as you can spare from the duties of the garrison of Mangalore. They must take with them provisions for one month, and a large quantity of musket ammunition. In case the garrison of Mangalore should be straitened for want of men, you will draw a detachment from Cundapoor; but at all events the detachment now ordered to Soobramany must not be delayed.

You will instruct the officer who will proceed in command of this detachment as follows:—Upon his arrival at Soobramany, he will endeavour to ascertain the nature of the road up the Bissolee Ghaut to Woochinga in the Bul country, whether Kistnapah Naig occupies any position between the top of the Ghaut and Woochinga, and the nature of it. If he should find that he can do it without risk to his detachment, he will ascend the Ghaut, take a position at the top of it, and will endeavour to communicate with the officer commanding the

detachment from the Mysore side who will be in the neighbourhood; at all events, he will communicate with him by a route which will be pointed out hereafter, and will make him acquainted with all his observations, and everything which may come to his knowledge on the points above mentioned.

As it is probable that you may not have means of carriage for the quantity of provisions and ammunition ordered, I have requested Colonel Sartorius to supply you with 200 coolies, who will go from hence to-morrow. The want, however, of carriage for the whole quantity of ammunition and provisions is not to stop the detachment. The 75th have with them carriage for provisions for ten days, with which, if more carriage cannot be immediately provided, they may move forward to the Soobramany Pagoda; and then they will wait for the remainder of their provisions. I conclude that there will be no difficulty in sending them after the detachment. If you should be able to procure carriage for the detachment, you will apprise Colonel Sartorius thereof, who will recall the coolies and discharge them from the service. Since Kistnapah Naig has occupied the Bissolee Ghaut, the communication between Seringapatam and Mangalore has gone by the Gamut Kull Pass, and by Jemalabad. I understand that you have a post in Jemalabad, commanded by an European officer. You will be so kind as to instruct him immediately to ascertain whether there is any direct road between Jemalabad and Soobramany, and the nature of it; if there should be such a road, you will desire the postmaster in Canara to post a large proportion of runners upon it, and the officer commanding at Jemalabad will take care that all letters for the officer commanding the detachment at Soobramany are forwarded without delay; and that on the other hand, all letters from him to Colonel Montresor or Colonel Tolfrey may be forwarded in like manner.

You will apprise the officer commanding the detachment to be posted at the Soobramany Pagoda of the nature of this arrangement, to insure his communication with the detachment on the Mysore side; and you will inform him that by this means he will most probably receive orders from the officer commanding that detachment to attack Kistnapah Naig's post on the Bissolee Ghaut (if there should be such a one, and if he should not be able to communicate with him directly across Bullum) at the same time that it will be attacked from the

Mysore side. These orders, and all others which he may receive, he will obey; but as I understand that the Ghaut itself, as well as the country above it, is very jungly, it is desirable that he should take no more baggage or provisions with him than from his information he will deem absolutely necessary for the time that he will be out. The remainder may be left in safety in the Soobramany Pagoda.

You will inform the officer commanding this detachment, that if Kistnapah Naig should be posted at the top of the Ghaut, the object will be to attack him from both sides at the same time. This, considering the closeness of the country, the long and circuitous communication between the detachments, will be difficult, and will require the greatest attention on his part to be prepared to move at the time when the other detachment will be ready.

I am on my return to Seringapatam, to which place I request you will write to me.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Sartorius. [359.]

SIR, Cannanore, 13th April, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 9th instant, and have taken into consideration its enclosures regarding the claim of the Moplahs to be retained in the Company's service till after the monsoon.

In my opinion they have no foundation whatever for such a claim; and even if the inconveniences to be apprehended were greater than that stated by Lieutenant Osborne in his letter, I should think they ought to be discharged. To act otherwise would tend to disclose to the Moplahs the plans of Government for a future season, would answer no good purpose, would be expensive, and is not rendered necessary by the engagement entered into by you. This engagement states that the Moplahs are to receive two months' pay after the expiration of the war, that is to say, after the period when their services are no longer required, and they are discharged. In my opinion, they are discharged at this moment; and although they may be wanted again, their entering the service will depend upon themselves,

and will be the consequence of another bargain to be made with them. They ought therefore in justice to receive the two months' pay from the day on which they were discharged from the service. It is true that this sudden discharge was not in contemplation when the bargain was made, but that by no means alters its tenor.

The desire which I have that all engagements made with the natives should be strictly adhered to, and the probability which exists that the services of these Moplahs will soon be required again, induce me to wish that they should receive their pay for two months from the day on which they were informed that their services would not be required. But it appears that they do not deem that they have a claim to this allowance; but they ask to be kept in the service in the expectation of being employed after the rains.

If that should be the case, it will be clear that they did not understand that the Company was bound to pay them for two months after their discharge, excepting they had been in the field. It will not then be necessary to pay them.

Upon the whole, I request that you will act as you think proper; and I give you my opinion that if the Moplahs think themselves entitled to two months' pay, they ought to get it, as there is no doubt that by the engagement they are entitled to it.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Memoranda for Colonel Sartorius.

1. As soon as possible, it will be proper that a sufficiency of grain for two months for 3000 Natives, and of arrack for the same period for 800 Europeans, and a large quantity of musket ammunition, should be placed in Cotaparamba.

2. When the roads will be completed to Montana by Pyche, and to Tutucullum or Canote by Mananderry, posts are to be established at Montana and Canote, and they are to be held by detachments of the Company's troops. A road is to be made, if possible, direct from Montana to Canote.

3. Although these posts may be established, and held, it will be proper that a small detachment should remain in Pyche Fort and in Mananderry, in order to secure the communication between Cotaparamba and the new posts.

4. When the posts at Montana and Canote and the necessary buildings will have been finished, and the road between them completed, it will be proper to move forward to those posts the grain and provisions and ammunition above requested to be laid in at Cotaparamba.

5. It will be proper that there should be at least one gun, if not two, in each of the posts at Canote and Montana.

6. As it is said that the Pyche Rajah will endeavour to prevent the making of the proposed roads to Montana and to Canote, it will not be proper under the present circumstances to risk a contest to force it: but at whatever place the road may have arrived when he will attempt to stop it, it will be proper to construct a redoubt, provided the situation is fit for it; and this redoubt must be kept filled with stores, &c., &c., in the same manner as above requested with regard to the posts to be established at Canote and Montana.

7. After the posts will have been completed at Canote and Montana, it will be proper, if possible, to continue the road on to Pereweil, and in a direction which will be pointed out by Captain Moncrieff.

8. There are two rivers on the road between Cotaparamba and Montana, and one or two on that to Canote. These rivers are not fordable during the rainy season. It will be proper to have a jungar upon each of them, platformed as is that between Tellicherry and Cotaparamba. As in case an attempt should be made upon either of these posts, the jungars would immediately be destroyed in order to prevent assistance from reaching them, it will be proper that a certain number of boats, platforms, &c., should be laid up in Cotaparamba in order to avoid the inconvenience of waiting till boats to cross the rivers could be brought from the coast.

9. It will be proper to reinforce Cotaparamba, in order that the commanding officer there may be able to give assistance to any of the posts in advance which may be attacked.

10. A few of the Bombay coolies will be kept during the rainy season.

11. As there are no arms at Mangalore, as the troops there are employed in the field, and their arms are totally unserviceable, I request that Colonel Sartorius will send to Mangalore from the arsenal at Cannanore 300 stand of arms.

12. The troops stationed in the Cotiote country may be

supposed at all times liable to be attacked; their arms are in bad order, and they ought to have new arms without delay.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[360.] *To the Adjutant-General, Bombay.*

SIR, Cannanore, 13th April, 1800.

I have found the troops in the province of Malabar much in want of arms and accoutrements, of which there is but a small quantity in the stores, and they are equally deficient in the requisite quantities of other military stores.

I am informed by Colonel Sartorius that he has indented and has written frequently to make known these wants. I shall be obliged to you if you will state them to the Commander-in-Chief, and request him to draw to them the attention of Government.

I have received letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan, in which he informs me that there are no arms or accoutrements at Mangalore, and that for the want of them a large body of recruits are still useless, as it has been impossible to discipline them. When the detachment of the 75th came to Cannanore lately to be employed on service in the field, a large proportion of their arms were unserviceable: they were supplied from the stores at this place, but returned the arms before they marched back to Canara.

Under these circumstances I have thought it proper to request Colonel Sartorius to send from hence 300 stand of arms to Mangalore without delay; and I hope the Commander-in-Chief, seeing the necessity that these articles should be provided for the troops, will take measures for having them sent to the coast before the monsoon sets in.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[361.] *To Colonel Sartorius.*

SIR, Cannanore, 13th April, 1800.

As I do not understand that there has ever been a Captain of Guides on the Bombay establishment, excepting during the

time that the troops have been employed in the field, it does not appear to me to be proper that Captain Moncrieff should hold that appointment for a longer period. It is, however, absolutely necessary that the Pyche Rajah should be closely watched during the monsoon; no person is so fit as Captain Moncrieff to have the charge of those who will give intelligence of him; and as you have experience of what has been the custom heretofore, you will be so kind as to make such an arrangement for an allowance for him as you may think proper, and submit it to the Government of Bombay.

I have had great satisfaction in observing the zeal and intelligence of Captain Moncrieff and of Lieutenant Bentley, and whenever the service in contemplation takes place, I shall certainly recommend them to Government for the appointments which you mention.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

To J. Spencer, Esq. [362.]

Sir, Cannanore, 13th April, 1800.

The troops are likely to suffer considerable inconvenience, and the public service will be impeded, if those which are at this place, and belong to the garrison of Goa, are not sent back to their station. I understand that it is not so impossible as it is stated to be for the *Intrepid* to take at least a part of those troops which still remain here; and I am therefore desirous that that ship should be ordered to these roads, in order that that matter may be ascertained. You will oblige me if you will order her here.

I shall be concerned to be obliged to make a complaint of any public servant; but if I find that this ship can take men, and that this accommodation for the public service has been refused by the captain without cause, I shall be obliged to report it to Government.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[363.] *To Captain Marshall.*

SIR, Veerajundrapett, 16th April, 1800.

I this morning received your letter of the 9th instant.

The report which Captain Stevenson will have made to you of the state of affairs in the Mahratta country will doubtless have pointed out to you the necessity that you should be much upon your guard. In a short time, when the rains will set in, your communication with the Mysore country will be so long and difficult, that it will be scarcely possible to afford assistance to your post at the time when you may want it; in the northern parts of Canara, to which you might look for support, there are no troops, and I am therefore induced to refer you to Goa for such assistance as may be necessary. By this post I send to Sir W. Clarke a copy of this letter; you will report to him as well as to me all intelligence which may reach you, and all extraordinary occurrences, and I will request him to reinforce your post should it be desirable.

In order to enable you to communicate with Sir W. Clarke quickly, I shall make arrangements for running a tappall between Soopah and Goa. It appears to me very desirable that you should occupy Mundragoor: under the present circumstances this post is more important than Budnaghur; and I therefore recommend that you should withdraw the troops from this last, in order that you may be enabled to put 100 men with an European officer into Mundragoor. You will take care that these men are well supplied with musket ammunition, and you will desire the paymaster's servant in Soonda to place in Mundragoor grain, &c., for these men for two months: this is to be used only in case of necessity.

I conclude that the troops in Hullihall are well supplied with everything they want: if not, you will immediately apply to Sir W. Clarke for all the military stores and ammunition of which you may be in want; and you will desire the paymaster's man to lay in at Hullihall grain, &c., for your garrison for two months.

The first symptom of an intended attack upon you will be the want of supplies in your bazaar. The country will probably be overrun with cavalry, and you may be distressed for provisions.

The grain above mentioned will last till you can be relieved.

I am fully aware of the nature of your post, and I have great confidence that even if it should be attacked, being defended by the brave troops under your orders, it will hold out the time upon which I calculate.

I am on my way to Seringapatam, to which place I beg you will direct to me.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Sir W. Clarke. [364.]

SIR, Veerajundrapett, 16th April, 1800.

By the accounts lately received of the state of affairs on the Mahratta frontier, it appears that Dhoondiah Waugh is gaining ground in the Savanore country. I have been therefore induced to consider of the state of our troops and garrisons in Soonda, and of the means of providing further for their security.

After my return from Soonda last year, I recommended to Government that that province and the troops in it should be put under the orders of the commanding officer in Canara, as it appeared to me that his communication with it would be more secure, shorter, and easier than mine. By an extract of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor-General to the Governor of Fort St. George, I perceive that he approves of this arrangement; and I should accordingly put it in execution at the present moment, only that in fact the commanding officer in Canara has no troops, and no means whatever of giving assistance to the posts in Soonda if they should be attacked. I am therefore induced to have recourse to you and to your force at Goa to provide for such an event.

As eventually the province of Soonda will come under the commanding officer in Canara, and the arrangement which I now propose will be but temporary, I think it best that the payment of the troops, &c., &c., should remain as at present. All therefore that I have to trouble you with is, to receive the reports which will be occasionally sent you by the officer commanding in Soonda, to communicate to him your orders, and to afford him the assistance which may be necessary in case he should be attacked.

I now enclose you the copy of a letter which I have written to Captain Marshall, by which you will perceive the arrangements which I have made. I will likewise send you copies of all similar communications, and I shall be obliged to you if you will make me acquainted with the orders which you may have occasion to give him.

I purpose to write to Government upon this subject, and you will doubtless receive their orders.

I shall be obliged to you if you will make arrangements with Mr. Uhthoff for running a tappall from Goa to Soopah.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[365.] *To the Adjutant-General, Bombay.*

Sir, Seedapoor, 17th April, 1800.

Since I had the honour of addressing the Secretary of Government, the roads which I then stated were making have been completed to Pyche and to Manandérry. These posts were to be occupied by the Company's troops.

There was every reason to believe that the roads would soon be completed to Montana and to Canote, at which places I have directed that redoubts and buildings for containing provisions and stores may be constructed, and that the two posts may be connected by a road across from the one to the other.

I have desired that a large quantity of provisions and ammunition may be thrown into Cotaparamba without loss of time; and as soon as the posts at Montana and Canote will be constructed and connected with each other, and held by the Company's troops, these articles will be removed to them. Pyche and Mananderry will still be kept during the rains, in order to secure and render more easy the communication between Cotaparamba and the more advanced posts at Montana and Canote; and I have directed Colonel Sartorius to place platformed jungars upon the rivers which cross the roads, and are not fordable during the monsoon. He will besides place boats, &c., in Cotaparamba, in order that in case any attempt should be made on the advanced posts, and the jungars should be destroyed to prevent them from receiving relief, it may be possible

to ford them without waiting for boats to be sent for from the sea-coast.

In this manner arrangements have been made for establishing and securing posts in the centre of the Cotiote country, which will materially forward the operations of the troops at the opening of the ensuing season.

I have had occasion to order into the field a detachment consisting of 400 men of the 75th, and a part of the grenadier battalion from Mangalore, in order to assist in subduing the Polygar of Bullum, who has interrupted the communication between Mangalore and Seringapatam, has disturbed the government of the Rajah of Mysore, and has given a check to a body of troops employed against him on the Mysore side.

With this detachment will be sent one month's provisions. In order to facilitate the communication between the troops which will act on the Mysore side and those in Canara, and that a combined operation may take place on a force which the Polygar has on the Bissolee or Soobramany Ghaut, I have desired Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan to request the postmaster in Canara will run a tappall between Jemalabad, by which the tappall from Mysore now passes, and Soobramany Pagoda, where the detachment of the Bombay army will be posted.

I have the honour to enclose copies of letters between Colonel Sartorius and me which will best explain the arrangements which have been made upon the points to which they relate.

I have received your letter of the 29th March, and have given orders that the drafts from the two corps which have been stationed in the provinces of Bednore and Soonda may be sent, those from the 1st of the 5th to Mangalore, those from the 1st of the 4th to Goa, in charge of Captain Stevenson.

After I had visited the posts in Soonda in October last, I recommended to Government that that province should be put under the orders of the officer commanding in Canara, as it appeared that he would be better able than I should at all times to communicate with it, and to afford it that ready assistance which might be necessary.

By an extract of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor-General to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, I perceive that his Lordship approves of that arrangement, which I should accordingly carry

into execution at the present moment, when the Mahratta provinces in the neighbourhood are in great confusion, and it is evident that our old adversary Dhoondiah Waugh is in force, only that it does not appear possible to remove from Canara any of the troops, however urgent might be the call for their service in Soonda. I have, therefore, desired the officer commanding in that province for the present to report all occurrences to Sir W. Clarke as well as to me; and I have requested Sir W. Clarke to afford him such assistance, if necessary, as the nature of the case may appear to require. There is every reason to believe that there will be no occasion for it; but if there should be any during the monsoon, to move one of the Native corps to the assistance of the post at Hullihall will serve the common cause better than keeping the corps in Goa. I hope, therefore, that this temporary arrangement will be approved.

The corps in Soonda will still be paid by the paymaster in Mysore.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[366.] *To Colonel Stevenson.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 19th April, 1800.

Intelligence which has reached me this afternoon has induced me to order to the northward the two regiments of cavalry which have been hitherto in this neighbourhood and at Bangalore. I also by this post send orders for the 1st Regiment of cavalry to prepare to take the field.

I have made arrangements that a tappall may be posted direct between this place and Sera; so that our communication will be more speedy than it has been hitherto.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[367.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 20th April, 1800.

I arrived here yesterday.

The progress which Dhoondiah has made in Savanore, and the

large force which he has collected, have induced me to order the three regiments of cavalry into the field, and to the northward. I have besides at Chittledroog the 77th Regiment and three battalions of Sepoys, and I have in view all the arrangements for collecting a large force should an invasion of the Rajah's territory render that measure necessary. I have heard no more of the impostor in Canara, whom I mentioned in my last. Colonel Close thinks that the emissary at Poonah is from Dhoondiah, which I think probable.

I have found out that the recruits who deserted from Mangalore went to Kolapoor. It is said that the Rajah's emissaries gave some of them, and promised all, a very large sum of money.

I have not carried into execution the arrangement for placing Soonda under the orders of the commanding officer in Canara, as in case assistance should be wanted there he cannot afford it, being himself so weak; but I have desired the commanding officer in Soonda to report to Sir W. Clarke as well as to me, and I have requested the latter to afford him assistance, if it should be necessary. Sir William has one regiment of Europeans and two battalions of Sepoys; and as it is not very probable that an attempt will be made upon Goa during the monsoon, it may not be inconvenient to send one battalion of Sepoys into Soonda when a reinforcement may be required. Soonda will still remain under Mysore until there are more troops in Canara. I have secured the posts in Soonda as far as possible by throwing in provisions, &c., &c.

When I left Malabar, all military matters were going on as I could wish, and if there be leisure in the next season, I have no doubt of settling that province to the satisfaction of Government.

I am, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey. [368.]

Sir, Seringapatam, 21st April, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your letter in answer to mine of the 21st. I conceived that you would be glad to have an opportunity to take a post in the attack of which you had before failed, and, as I was very desirous that no time should be lost in

getting possession of it, as soon as the largest detachment which under the present circumstances could be collected should join you, I wrote the letter to which yours is an answer. As, however, it appears that you do not now think your force or your equipment sufficient, and as you have asked for some stores of which there are none in Mysore, or indeed in the Company's territories, I must request that you will not make the attack, but that you will remain where you are until you are joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor. I trust that he will find the force, armed in the usual manner and with the usual equipment, sufficient.

If the Polygar should abandon the post at Arrekeery upon the arrival of the Europeans, which I still think probable, you will be so kind as to take possession of it, although Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor should not have joined you.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[369.] *To Major-General Sydenham.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 21st April, 1800.

I had intended to write to you from Malabar, but I was perpetually in motion in that province, and I was at last hurried from thence by the failure of Colonel Tolfrey in the Bul country, and the desire to remedy it as soon as possible. I heard from Lord Mornington (or rather Lord Wellesley, for I hear that he was created a Marquess by that title in November last) that Ben had been very ill indeed, but that he had gone to sea, and he had received a letter from his surgeon on the day he wrote, assuring him that his perfect recovery was certain. It was probable that he would remain at sea for some time.

I have been much annoyed by Tolfrey's failure, which is still unaccounted for. Private letters from the detachment hint that the Sepoys did not behave with their usual resolution, which from many circumstances I think more than probable. The corps were weak in officers, and those they had with them very inexperienced, and they had no Europeans excepting a few artillerymen, who behaved admirably. However, upon the whole, there is no excuse for not taking a post to which they could bring up their guns and march in a column of companies, and into which the Europeans and one of the Native officers penetrated.

The Polygars on this side of India have had a bad example of success against the Bombay Native troops, and in fact they don't care for the Natives, and always stand against them in their strongholds. I have now sent Europeans there, and I hope to give a good account of this Polygar in a few days.

We are going on well here. I am sadly in want of gun-carriages for six-pounders and for the cavalry guns. We have now only two repaired carriages for the former, and the work is so slow that I cannot expect to have any sufficient number in a serviceable state for some time. Can you relieve us in this way?

During my stay in Malabar I got good information of their manner of going on, and I hope that we shall be able to accelerate their motions in some degree in future by assistance from this country.

I am, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick. [370.]

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 21st April, 1800.

We have more accounts of Dhoondiah's progress towards Savanore in confirmation of what I wrote to you yesterday.

The state of the case regarding this man is very curious. Having quitted the service of the Rajah of Kolapoor, he seats himself with an immense body of troops on our frontier, and he is not thought so worthy of attention as that the questions should be asked, to whom does he belong? and for what reason is he come? Surely, if the Mahratta Government is anything but a name, it may be made either to crush this man, to allow us to destroy him, or to avow him. He either belongs to the Mahrattas, or he does not: if he belongs to the Mahrattas, they ought to remove him to a greater distance, as no state has a right to assemble on the frontier of another such a force as he has on ours; if he does not belong to the Mahrattas, and he is there contrary to their inclination, they ought to allow us to drive him away, and to join with us in so doing.

Our tranquillity in this country has really depended for these last four months on the contests between Goklah and Dhoondiah;

and now that the former is gone away to the siege of Kolapoor, it is very probable that it will be disturbed by the latter. I think that the tranquillity of a great nation ought to have a more firm foundation.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[371.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, 22nd April, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey, and of my answer. I think it probable that you will find your force fully sufficient, and I conclude that if the Polygar should remain in the post at Arrekeery,* you

* The following description of Arrekeery and the adjoining Polygar forts was furnished to Colonel Wellesley by Captain Colebrooke.—ED.

"April, 1800.

"Arrekeery is a strong Polygar post, 3 miles S.E. by E. of Munserabad, and about 2 miles to the westward of the Hemavutty river. It consists of 6 villages bounded on every side with heights and forest of large trees intermixed with bamboo, to the extent of between 2 and 3 miles round them. The principal roads leading to it are: one from Munserabad, which turns off the Ooscotta road 2½ miles S.E. of the former place; one from Saylispoor (a village on the W. bank of the river, 3 miles N.E. by E. of Munserabad); and one from Ooscotta, which leaves the Munserabad road at a barrier, 7 miles 6 furlongs from the fort of Ooscotta. These roads are extremely narrow, and difficult to pass from the steepness of the heights. They are in some places cut for 6 or 8 feet into the hills, and but just broad enough for two men to advance in front. Where they are cut in this manner, it is done with a number of turnings, in manner of a sortie. All these roads are defended by strong stockades of cocoanut trees and stone walls, with a trench in the rear, over which planks or trees are laid for the more ready communication to defend the wall, and can be withdrawn at pleasure. In most places the forest is impenetrable, but where the smallest opening occurs, it is defended in the manner above mentioned. There are numbers of straggling villages within the forest, the inhabitants of which are all attached to the Polygar, Kistnapah Naig. These they desert on the approach of a force, but all assemble for the defence of the barriers on the roads leading to Arrekeery, in which their families, cattle, and grain are said to be collected. The number of people so employed cannot be ascertained: it would, however, appear, by the best intelligence that can be procured, that Kistnapah Naig is not there himself; but that his son, with about five or six hundred people in his pay, besides ryots, are stationed to defend it. Three barriers (it is said) must be carried before the village can be gained.

"Ey Goor, although nearly encompassed with hills and forest, cannot be compared with Arrekeery in point of strength. The principal entrance is to

will attack and get possession of it without delay. It is desirable that the barriers and works at Arrekeery and all the villages said to be in the forest should be burnt and destroyed, and you will then be the best judge of the necessity of occupying tha post with the Rajah's troops in order to insure the communication with the fort at Munserabad. The advanced state of the season and the closeness of the country, as it is represented, between the river and the Bissolee Ghaut, induce me to believe that it will be necessary to defer to a future period those operations which in my opinion can alone succeed in settling that country, even if the Polygar should withdraw from the posts which he is said to occupy near Woochinga. Under these circumstances it will be desirable that your object should be confined to obtaining a knowledge of the road, country, and distance between the Hemavutty and the Ghaut. For this purpose I should propose that after having got possession of Arrekeery you should advance with your camp, provisions, &c. as far as the country continues open, and as you can bring your followers in safety. Your camp

the eastward, and is defended by a slight mud wall, pierced with loopholes, and has a thick bamboo hedge, the entrance through which, if stockaded, would preclude the possibility of entering by that side. There are, however, two more entrances, one from the Munserabad side, and one from Hissuloorpet. These are only footpaths, which present no great obstacle to one or two men passing abreast, but are not penetrable for guns. By the road to the eastward, guns, with some difficulty, might be got up; the ascent is however rather steep, and the road cut into the hill 6 or 8 feet, and in many places scarcely broad enough. The village stands on an eminence, but is commanded by another to the southward, within about 300 yards. This is tolerably easy of access, but was defended by a small mud battery with one gun. The Polygars have abandoned Ey Goor, which, from its being assailable on three sides, they no doubt conceived less calculated for making a defence than Arrekeery.

"Malully, situated on the E. bank of the Hemavutty, 3 miles E. by S. of Munserabad, is another strong Polygar combie, but the inhabitants are attached to the Rajah's Government. It is surrounded with an impenetrable bamboo hedge, of 30 or 40 feet high, and about 20 broad. It is also nearly encompassed by a thick forest, and a ditch of 8 feet wide and 7 deep. The only entrance is to the northward, and is defended by a stone gateway, in form of a house, with a strong wooden door wide enough to admit carts.

"After entering the gateway, a variety of small footpaths branch off to the houses, which are scattered about within the space enclosed by the bamboo hedge. Within this space the forest and bamboo are so intermixed with the houses, that not more than two or three can be seen at a time. The inner barrier of Arrekeery is said to be the same kind of bamboo hedge, and in every respect much stronger.

(Signed) "J. Colebrooke, Captain Guides."

should then be left with a sufficient guard; and having concerted matters and fixed a day with the officer commanding the party assembled at the Soobramany Pagoda, you should push a light detachment with two or three days' provisions, according to the distance, and sixty rounds of ammunition, through the jungle, and the officer commanding at Soobramany should do the same, till the two parties should meet at any known place which you might point out. It would be proper to send Captain Colebrooke with your detachment, and to desire the officer in command at Soobramany to send with his an officer who has been accustomed to the examination of country. Thus we shall obtain some knowledge of the road to the Ghaut, in which we are deficient at this moment, and at this advanced stage of the season I cannot hope for more.

If all the country is similar to that near Munserabad, it may be possible for you to push through it without risking the loss of your baggage, stores, and provisions, or there may be a better method of obtaining the same object than that which I have pointed out. I merely state the extent to which I wish you to go, and to which in my opinion it is possible to be successful, and the manner in which I should propose to carry into execution a plan for gaining a knowledge of the country in the most difficult and enclosed one that I can imagine. After having obtained this knowledge of the country you will be so kind as to order the detachment of the Bombay army to return to Mangalore, and you will place yourself in such manner as to obtain the following objects:—

1st. A garrison of the Rajah's troops is to be thrown into Munserabad, and provisions and stores to last that garrison for six months.

2nd. You will make arrangements with the officers of the Rajah's troops that they are to occupy such positions on either bank of the Hemavutty as will secure the communication with Munserabad. For this purpose it will be proper that some of them should remain on the other side of the river, and others in the neighbourhood on this side of it, either opposite Saylispoor or at Ooscotta. The remainder might perhaps be dispersed at Gram, Hassen, Oostara, &c. &c.

3rd. Boats should be prepared and kept in some place of safety on the river. When you will have made all these ar-

rangements, the troops are to return to the situations from whence they came, as stated in my instructions to Colonel Tolfrey. In case a stand is made in Arrekeery, no person in arms is to be spared; and as the country round the forest is open, you will find small bodies of the Rajah's cavalry posted in different stations of great use in pursuing the fugitives.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey. [372.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 22nd April, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 20th by express, with an enclosure from Kistnapah Naig. This I have had translated, and it contains a statement of his case and claim to his country. I enclose an answer, which I beg you will send to him, in which I inform him that he must come in and submit himself to the Company's authority. This letter, nor anything short of his coming to your camp to deliver himself up, is to stop the operations against him.

I have likewise received the letter in which you inform me that some of the Polygar's people had got in your rear, and had attempted to interrupt Captain Colebrooke's junction with you. By this day's post I write to Captain Todd to inform him of this circumstance, in order to put him on his guard, and I shall take the same precaution with Captain M'Pherson of the 77th. One month's provisions for 200 Europeans have been sent from hence with the different detachments.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General, Bombay. [373.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 23rd April, 1800.

I have to inform you that when I was in the province of Malabar I was desirous on many accounts that the flank companies of the 84th Regiment which had been brought from Goa for the proposed service in Malabar should be sent back to that

place when it was determined that that service should not take place. At the request of Colonel Sartorius, part of them were taken in the *Fly*, commanded by Captain Hayes, and in a vessel belonging to Cannanore which went with her; and a letter was written to Captain Hall of the *Intrepid*, which vessel was lying at Calicut, to request that he would take to Goa those men who still remained at Cannanore. To this letter an answer was received stating that Captain Hall had no room in his ship for the men; but as I had heard that she was not so full as it would appear by this answer, I wrote to the President of the Commission, who was then at Mahé, to request that the *Intrepid* might be sent to Cannanore in order that it might be ascertained whether she could receive the men or not. The *Centurion* was at Cannanore when the *Intrepid* arrived on the 15th instant, and I hear from Colonel Sartorius that Captain Rainier having sent an officer to examine whether she was capable of receiving men, had stated that she could take some. In the mean time, however, a letter came from Admiral Rainier in which he desired that the *Centurion* might take the men, in answer to an application from Colonel Sartorius and myself; and I must also state that Captain Rainier had consented to take them before this letter arrived. The *Intrepid* in consequence received none.

As the public service has not been put to any inconvenience by this refusal by Captain Hall to give the public means under his charge to forward it, it may not appear absolutely necessary to bring this matter forward to a public investigation. I make it known to the Commander-in-Chief and to Government only to show the necessity of some reform in this branch of their service. They have a right to require from those in whose hands they place the command of their troops the most prompt and ready execution of their orders, and of those measures which the public service may require, and an attention to economy in carrying their measures forward; but I beg to observe that if all the public means are not to be applied to the public service when necessary, if they can be kept back with impunity and applied to private ends at the will of any individual, the responsibility attending delay and expense ought not to be laid upon the commanding officers of the troops.

I have been further induced to bring this subject under the view of the Commander-in-Chief, as I have been informed by

Colonel Sartorius that it is not uncommon for the gentlemen in command of the Company's cruisers to refuse their assistance when it is required for the public service on the Malabar coast; and that one of them did refuse it upon a late occasion, when Colonel Sartorius was desirous of availing himself of it to remove part of the detachment intended for field-service from Cannanore to Calicut.

In writing upon this subject, it is but justice to Captain Hayes to inform you that I found in him the greatest readiness to forward the public service, and that Colonel Sartorius speaks highly of the assistance which he has received from him.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

To Colonel Sartorius. [374.]

My dear Sir, Seringapatam, 23rd April, 1800.

I have had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 18th instant, and I enclose the copy of one which I have written to the Adjutant-General at Bombay relative to those gentlemen in the marine service.

I have perused Captain Moncrieff's letter to you, and I am happy to find that he is going on so well. The pioneer camp must of course be secured from insult while the corps are at work; and if the number of men they have with them is not sufficient for that purpose, they must be increased to any number that may be necessary, either from Pyche and Montana, or from Cotaparamba.

In my memorandums which I gave to you I stated that Pyche and Mananderry were to be occupied, even if the posts at Montana and Canote should be completed. The orders for the buildings in those places are very necessary.

Your tappall is long coming here, which is a terrible inconvenience, and I imagine that it might be remedied by a correspondence with the Commissioners upon the subject. About eight hours after I had arrived at Veerajundrapett on the 16th, the tappall came in which had left Cannanore on the 14th one hour and a half before I had, and I halted six hours at Ercoor and twenty hours at Stony River. This surely requires at least

some inquiry. Your letter by express, dated the 18th, I did not receive till this morning.

I send you a letter which I beg you will forward to Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan. The Polygar has completely interrupted our communication both by Soobramany and Jemalabad, but the Europeans will be near him in a day or two, and I trust that they will occasion the re-establishment of it in any line that I may find convenient.

I was hopeful that I should have been able to send Mrs. Sartorius some apples, but they are all gone. I am, however, collecting for her a proper assortment of garden-seeds, which I will send by the tappall. Pray present my best respects to her.

I am, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

[375.] *To the Commissioners in Malabar.*

Gentlemen, Seringapatam, 24th April, 1800.

Colonel Sartorius has transmitted to me the copy of a report which he has received from Captain Ward, who commands at Cotaparamba, stating that certain Moplahs, inhabitants of Runditerra, had quitted their families and proceeded up the Ghauts to join the Pyche Rajah. It is well known that this Rajah now holds part of the Company's territories in defiance of their authority, and that he is in rebellion against their government. Upon this principle it is that the Commissioners have withheld the payment of the pension which it was agreed he should receive from the Company's Government, and I should therefore imagine that there can be no doubt of making an example of those who may be known to join with him for the purpose of rebelling against the Company. It may be said that there is no proof that these Moplahs have joined the Pyche Rajah, and that they may have quitted their habitations for purposes perfectly innocent; but I must observe that in all well-regulated countries the cause of absence of such a number of individuals from their district is generally known to the officers of the police, and that it ought to be known in this instance. If it be true that they are absent from their habitations, and the cause of their absence

is not known, from the restless disposition of these people, and their disinclination to the Company's Government, it may fairly be concluded that their absence is to be attributed to designs inimical to the Company.

Under these circumstances I take the liberty of recommending to you that their families and properties may be seized, not only as a punishment to them, but in order to deter others from following their example.

I have, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

To Colonel Montresor. [376.]

Sir, Seringapatam, 24th April, 1800.

Since I wrote to you last it appears that the Polygar has interrupted the communication between Colonel Tolfrey's camp and the Curdagall Ghaut, so that it will be impossible for you to correspond with the officer commanding the detachment assembled at the Soobramany Pagoda. I am in hopes, however, that as soon as the post at Arrekeery will be forced, the runners will be able to go upon the road, and it will then be in your power to make your arrangements according to the manner proposed in my letter of the 22nd. At all events it is so desirable that we should gain some knowledge of the road to the Bissolee Ghaut, and of the nature of the country, and of the posts occupied by Kistnapah Naig, that I wish you to try to get to it, even if you should not be able to communicate by means of the Curdagall Ghaut with the officer commanding the detachment at Soobramany, and should therefore be obliged to act without his co-operation and assistance. From a drawing of the country which I have received from Captain Colebrooke I am induced to believe that it will be less difficult than we imagine, and that the distance is certainly not so great as was stated.

You will perceive by my letter of the 22nd to Colonel Tolfrey that I have received one from the Polygar, and have written him an answer, the purport of both of which is in my letter to Colonel Tolfrey.

I think it probable from his having written that he will not stand against the Europeans; but if he should stand, and you

should unfortunately not be able to carry the post, I recommend it to you to attack it the next day, and I have no doubt of your success even after a failure in the first attempt, which I don't think probable. Our affairs in this country require that that Polygar should be severely and speedily punished.

We are threatened to the northward with an attack from Dhoondiah Waugh, who, you might have heard, was driven out of Mysore in the last year. I have assembled the cavalry near the Mahratta frontier, and have taken other measures for the defence of the provinces under my charge. We are besides threatened with the rising of Polygars on our north-east frontier, so that upon the whole you will perceive the necessity of bringing to a speedy and successful issue the operations intrusted to you.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[377.] *To Colonel Stevenson.*

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 25th April, 1800.

As soon as the cavalry arrive at Chittledroog, I propose that the three regiments shall proceed to Hurryhur under the orders of Colonel Pater. As soon as I receive your report of the state of your field-pieces, I propose to order one of the battalions now at Chittledroog to join the cavalry with two or four guns, and I have already prepared for this by ordering to Chittledroog a large number of the Company's draught bullocks. This battalion will have to furnish a detachment to occupy Hoonelly as soon as the river begins to fill; and I have already given directions that a large number of boats may be collected there in order to provide against what I think the most probable event, viz., that Dhoondiah will invade the Bednore country as soon as our communication with it will be rendered difficult by the swelling of the river Toombuddra.

If matters are serious, I imagine that we shall all take the field, and that the result will be a clear understanding with the Mahrattas as to the manner of treating this Dhoondiah. Indeed this ought to be the case at all events, as I don't see how our Government can suffer the Rajah's frontier to be insulted, the

inhabitants of the country terrified, and consequently an expense incurred for their protection, without coming to this clear explanation.

Till we see what turn affairs will take, it is not necessary that you should move.

I am, &c.,

Arthur Wellesley.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Pater. [378.]

My dear Colonel, Seringapatam, 25th April, 1800.

The cause of the orders which I have given that your regiment should proceed to Chittledroog is that I have received accounts that Dhoondiah has made considerable progress in Savanore, that he is unopposed there, and that he has collected and has been joined by numbers of people and discontented and disaffected of all descriptions belonging to this and to the Nizam's country. When a force such as that is collected upon our frontier by a man who is well known to have designs upon the Rajah's country, it behoves me to be upon my guard, and to make preparations for its defence. Accordingly I propose to place the three regiments of cavalry under your orders at Hurryhur, or in a convenient situation in the neighbourhood, and to add to them a battalion of infantry with some guns as soon as the bullocks shall arrive at Chittledroog from Seringapatam. When the rivers begin to fill, it will be necessary that this battalion should send a small detachment to occupy Hoonelly, which is about twenty-five miles higher up the Toombuddra than Hurryhur, and on the left bank of it; at this place I have ordered that boats should be collected in order to provide against by far the most probable event, viz., that Dhoondiah will invade Bednore as soon as he finds that our communication with that province is rendered difficult by the swelling of the Toombuddra. If matters are likely to be serious, of course we must all take the field; in the mean time you will command the body of cavalry, &c. collected upon the frontier. Upon this subject I have but little to write to you. I am aware of your experience and good sense, and I feel perfectly confident that, guided by these, all will be right. We have all

about us, however, persons who are interested in imposing upon us, whose object it is to exert the influence which they have over us to pervert our judgments, and to show us everything in colours the most glaring. Against these I must warn you. In this country there must naturally be parties, and the people will represent everything according as it will be most favourable to the party to which they belong.

All parties will agree only in one thing, that is, in representing Dhoondiah's force and the danger to be much greater than it really is, and therefore all accounts must be received with caution, and not acted upon excepting after the clearest proof of their truth. You may depend upon it that if matters become serious, or at all likely to be so, I shall not sit in the Dowlut Baug and look on, but I shall collect upon this frontier without delay the largest body which can be spared from all the provinces under my orders. No responsibility, therefore, will rest upon you excepting for the troops immediately under your command.

The official orders for you to take the command of the cavalry will go to Chittledroog in a day or two. My horse is arrived in good condition, and much improved in his paces. I have this instant heard that the 25th Dragoons are ordered to be in readiness for service, most probably for this country.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[379.*] *To Captain Kirkpatrick.*

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 25th April, 1800.

By a letter which I have this day received from Colonel Palmer, it appears that the emissary at Poonah, who has been given up to him, was sent there by Meer Mahomed, the brother of Hunnar Ulia Khan. This man is at present at Hyderabad; and it is very probable that you may have it in your power to induce him to state whether he sent Mirza Ali Reza to Poonah, and the object of his mission. The account given by the latter throws no light whatever upon the subject: all that appears is that he was sent to Poonah by Meer Mahomed with letters and a verbal message. Not only are we ignorant of the contents of

the letters, but, what is more material, of the purport of the verbal communication. I shall find out in a day or two who Mirza Ali Reza is, when I shall write to Colonel Palmer.

I am obliged to you for the account of the arrival of the howdahs, and I hope they were acceptable to those for whom they were intended.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan. [380.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 26th April, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 19th, and I am much concerned at the disaster which you have communicated to me. I have still hopes, however, that if there were any troops in the upper fort, that still remains in our possession.

I conclude that you have sent the 75th Regiment to Jemalabad, and that it is not improbable but that ere now they may be in possession of the lower works. If they should be so, an the Polygar has the upper fort, it will be necessary that you should send to the 75th some howitzers, &c.; and if you should have none, I will make preparations for sending some from hence. By all accounts I have of the place, the only practicable method of getting possession of it is to annoy those who hold it with shells. As to repossess Jemalabad now becomes the first object, that must have all your means, and the Polygar in Bullum must be left to the detachment now in that country from Mysore.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [381.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 26th April, 1800.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan, who commands in Canara. As Jemalabad is represented as a fortress of great strength, and very difficult of access, and as some reports have reached me through this same aumildar which have turned out unfounded,

I have hopes that if any part of the garrison was in the upper part of the fort it is still in our possession, and that our loss will have been confined to that part of the garrison which was in the village and was surprised. At all events I have written to Colonel Mignan to desire that if Jemalabad has fallen into the hands of Kistnapah Naig, he will take measures immediately for fitting out an equipment to regain possession of it. Colonel Sartorius has sent him some troops from Malabar.

This misfortune will not have any effect immediately upon the operations in Bullum. These were necessarily to be independent of the co-operation of the Bombay troops from the Soobramany Pagoda for some time, and indeed the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor is so respectable that it is alone sufficient for everything intended. I trust that it will not be necessary to send any troops from this country in order to assist in the operations against Jemalabad, although I have taken measures for fitting out some howitzers, &c. to be sent from this garrison. At all events if Jemalabad has fallen, and it is to be retaken, the means of forming a body of troops for field-service on our northern frontier, should that measure be necessary, are considerably diminished, as in such case I reckoned upon at least two if not three battalions of infantry from Malabar, Canara, and Goa. I hope to-morrow to be able to give you some further intelligence.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[382.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 26th April, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 6th instant, and having made inquiries respecting Mirza Ali Reza from every person at this place at all likely to know anything about him, I do not find that he is known. They all agree that the Sultaun had no brother-in-law, nor any connection of that name; and they even say that they do not recollect any person so nearly connected with any of the women in the Mahal, although not married to the Sultaun, who could be in the situation described as his by Mirza Ali Reza. I conclude, therefore, that he has not

given a real account of himself; and from what I am about to state, I am induced to believe that his statement of the nature of his mission to Poonah is equally false.

He says that he was sent by Meer Mahomed with letters and a verbal message to certain persons at Poonah. Having delivered the letters to their address, he cannot produce them; but he avoids also to tell the purport of the verbal communication with which he was charged, and which, from the practice of the natives never to put in writing anything important, it is much more material to know. If he be sincere in his desire to make known to me everything, upon what ground can he pretend ignorance of the contents of the letters, or does he conceal the purport of the verbal communications? But his falsehood appears not only in his being unknown here, and in his want of candour in his story of his mission, but in the account he gives of the arrangements made for the family and dependants of the late Sultaun. It is not true that a provision was refused by any of the family or connections, and I believe that at this moment there is not an individual unprovided for. Meer Mahomed was the brother of the late Cummer u Deen Khan, and he was not provided for by the Commissioners because it was imagined and understood that the provision made for Cummer u Deen was for his whole family, and not because Meer Mahomed refused the provision which was offered him. Upon the whole, then, if this man be the real emissary, you may depend upon it that he has not told you the real nature of his mission.

I am obliged to you for your letter upon this subject, and I shall thank you for any further communications with which it may be in your power to favour me.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan. [383.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 28th April, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 20th, and its enclosure. By both it appears that you are not certain that Jemalabad is lost, and my letter of the 26th will have shown you that I hoped that the upper fort remained in our possession.

Although I have received accounts from Oostara, stating that the Bullum Rajah has taken Jemalabad, I still hope that his success has been confined to the surprise of the party which was in the village; but, as it may be otherwise, I think it proper to make provision for retaking Jemalabad without loss of time.

You will be so kind as to collect a force which you may deem sufficient for the siege of that fort, and as you are not so strong in Canara as is necessary for this purpose, you will send a requisition for one battalion of Native infantry to the commanding officer at Goa, with a copy of this letter; and if you should not deem that force sufficient, you will send a requisition to the commanding officer in Malabar, to whom I shall write to be prepared for it, for another.

This force, with what you will have in the province of Canara, may be sufficient; but if you should not think so, you will let me know it.

You will recollect that it is probable that the whole force of the Bullum Polygar will be directed towards interrupting the siege of Jemalabad; that he will probably attempt this by attacking your convoys of provisions, &c. going thither from Mangalore, and according to the nature of the country between Mangalore and Jemalabad they must be strong. It will therefore be necessary that you should provide a sufficient force for your convoys as well as for the siege.

In our present state of affairs on our northern frontier, which I must observe will be rendered worse by the loss of Jemalabad, I cannot say that it will be in my power to give you any assistance (excepting in ordnance and stores) from this country; but if matters should mend, the whole force of Mysore shall be turned to regaining Jemalabad.

In case the officer who commanded at Jemalabad should be alive, you will be so kind as to put him in arrest, and he must be tried by a general court-martial as soon as he will be sufficiently recovered of his wounds to be able to bear the trial. It will be proper that the Sepoy who, it appears, was not wounded, and who ran into Mangalore on the 19th instant, should be confined, and if the place still remains in our hands he must be tried by a general court-martial. Whether Jemalabad is lost or not, the event is most disgraceful to those who occupied it, and as such it cannot sufficiently be exposed to the view of the whole army, to whom certainly such events are very uncommon. It ought,

however, to be a lesson to all to be at all times on their guard, but to be particularly so when, as in this case, there was every reason to know that a banditti in arms was at no great distance from the post. If you should be able to furnish ordnance and stores for the siege of Jemalabad, it will be a matter of convenience to the general cause if I am not obliged to send them from hence.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of Government. [384.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 30th April, 1800.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine to Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan, and the extract of one from the latter to me. By those it appears that the upper and lower forts of Jemalabad are taken not by a force of Kistnapah Naig's, but by certain deserters* from the Company's service, joined with the former garrison of the place, which had been suffered to depart when Colonel Sartorius took it. These deserters left a corps of recruits stationed at Mangalore to the amount of 350 at one time, with a havildar and six disciplined sepoys, and no intelligence has been received of them from the time they deserted (the 20th of March) to this.

I have no doubt but that Kistnapah Naig will endeavour to send assistance to the person who is in possession of Jemalabad; but before he can do so, Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine will have possessed himself of the lower fort, and most probably the upper fort will be surrendered to him. At all events I have desired Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan to direct all his means towards regaining possession of it, and for this purpose I have desired him to make a requisition upon the commanding officer at Goa for one battalion, and if necessary upon the commanding officer in Malabar for another. In order to enable the latter to comply with this requisition if it should be made, it will be necessary that some of the small detachments should be called in. These are out only for the purposes of police, which they enforce only in the places in which they happen to be

* 150 recruits and a havildar, who deserted in March.—ED.

stationed, and therefore the inconvenience in withdrawing them will be but trifling. However, by Colonel Mignan's letter it appears that he considers himself sufficiently strong, and there is therefore reason to hope that he will not be obliged to call for more than the battalion from Goa, even if he should find that necessary. By the accounts I have received of Jemalabad, there is reason to believe that the upper fort is quite inaccessible excepting by one flight of steps, which is enclosed by a wall on each side, and goes from the lower to the upper fort. When the former was stormed by the 75th and 77th Regiments an attempt was made to enter the latter with the fugitives, and the troops followed them up the steps, but they were repulsed with very considerable loss, and nothing more was done by the garrison than to throw large stones and shot down the steps, which bounded from one wall to the other on each side of the stairs, and had very destructive effects. After the lower fort was taken, the killadar destroyed himself, and the upper fort was surrendered.

Under these circumstances it is difficult to estimate the time which it will take to regain possession of this fort. As I don't expect that our troops will be able to storm it, much will depend upon the quantity of provisions there may be on the top of the hill, and on the hopes those who possess it may have of being relieved. All the steps have been taken which can tend to enable the troops to attack it immediately; and in case it should not fall previous to the setting in of the rains, I have warned Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan of the probability that endeavours will be made to cut off his convoys going to the besiegers, and I have desired him to provide sufficiently for their strength.

Since my last, accounts have been received that Dhoondiah was employed in besieging Dummul;* parties of his cavalry had plundered some villages in Harponelly, which are situated about two coss from the fort of Oollull. This fort is held by the Rajah's troops.

The Nizam's aumildar and his killadars have withdrawn from the province of Harponelly. It does not yet appear whether Dhoondiah will move by Harponelly or Savanore; but he is taking the best means of securing the country in his rear, whatever may be his object hereafter.

I enclose the extract of a letter which Major Cuppage has

* *Dummul* is 52 miles S.E. of Dharwar.—ED.

received from the Polygar of Gomnair, who, it appears, has been collecting armed people from the Carnatic. There is no doubt but that all the Polygars are in expectation that the Company's troops will be employed, and they are prepared to take advantage of whatever may happen. Under these circumstances the most prudent measure would be to collect the troops in the field, in order to be prepared to resist, and thereby most probably prevent, the invasion of the Rajah's country, which is threatened; but this step may be attended with consequences of which his Lordship alone can be the judge; and however desirable it may be in a military point of view that the troops should be collected, I don't propose to put a large number of them into the field until I receive the further orders of Government, or unless it should be absolutely necessary.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Marshall. [385.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 30th April, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 23rd instant. If the bullocks cannot go down the Ghauts to Goa during the monsoon, it is a reason why you should exert yourself to get up everything you will want before the rains set in, and you will do so accordingly. The rise of the price of provisions in your bazaar is very natural, and may be attributed to causes totally unconnected with politics or military operations.

The scarcity or want of supplies may be a symptom of an intended attack upon you, but the rise in price will certainly not be so. I conceive that upon your application to the aumildar he will give every assistance to Mr. Gordon's man which may be requisite to enable him to lay in the grain ordered. You will be so kind as to speak to him, and let me know if he makes any objection to giving his assistance. You will build a tiled place for your provisions, and send me the bill made out in the usual form, and it will be paid.

I don't recollect that either of the tanks are so far from Hullihall as you mention; but you will not have reason to complain of want of water soon.

I observe that since Captain M'Farlane's departure the hircarrahs employed under the orders of the commanding officer at Hullihall have given but little intelligence, and that has not always been the earliest or the most correct that has been received. If you find them inattentive to their duty, you will discharge them from the service, as in that case they are worse than useless.

I have no doubt but that people are employed to watch your post, and to give notice of your movements; but that of course is an inducement to you to be upon your guard, and the enemy will derive but little advantage or hope from the intelligence of your post which he will receive.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[386.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 30th April, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 23rd, by which I perceive that we have lost both the upper and lower forts of Jemalabad. You seem to think yourself strong enough, and it may not be necessary to call for the assistance which I mentioned to you in my letter of the 28th; but you must recollect that the force which is to remain before Jemalabad during the rainy season, if we should not previously get possession of it, must be sufficiently strong to defend themselves against any attempts which may be made by the Bullum Polygar or other disaffected persons to relieve the place.

In case you should find it necessary to leave the 75th Regiment at Jemalabad during the rains, you will make arrangements immediately for covering them in, and indeed measures ought to be taken immediately for providing cover for whatever troops it may be necessary to leave there.

The havildar and all the ringleaders of those who have taken Jemalabad must be hanged; the others must be kept in confinement at Mangalore till the orders of Government are received respecting them. It might not be impossible for Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine to tamper with the garrison to give up

the havildar; at all events he may state to them that that is the only chance they have of mercy, and thus he may divide them.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To J. Spencer, Esq. [387.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 1st May, 1800.

Upon considering the state of our information regarding the Wynaad district, I find it very defective; I therefore conceive that it will be very desirable that Yeman Nair should accompany the commanding officer of the troops which hereafter may be sent into that country, and that he should be prepared to go to whatever place may be pointed out to meet him. I shall be obliged to you if accordingly you will detain him at Calicut till his services may be required, and if you will make him such allowance for his support as you may think necessary until the orders of Government upon this subject can be received.

Colonel Sartorius has transmitted to me a letter of the 24th instant, which he has received from you. I am concerned that the loss of Jemalabad, which has occasioned the necessity of moving into Canara some of the troops in Malabar, should have obliged Colonel Sartorius to alter the disposition of the remainder, which was agreeable to the wishes of the gentlemen of the Commission. My letter to Colonel Sartorius of the 28th of April, in which I request that he will prepare to send into Canara one battalion, if Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan should require it, and which he will doubtless lay before the Commission, points out the nature of the arrangements which appear to me to be necessary under the present circumstances; but I am afraid that they will be still less agreeable to the Commission than those proposed by Colonel Sartorius. It cannot be supposed that either he or I have any views in them excepting to fulfil the duties to the public for which we are responsible; but as the grounds upon which I have made the arrangements which I have ordered are clear, I have no objection to stating them. About one half of the effective force in Malabar is scattered in small detachments, which have been made at the requisition of the

civil power. As long as there were bodies of troops in certain situations equal to giving assistance to these detachments, there was no immediate necessity for calling them in, although I always considered that each detachment was at all times liable to be cut off, and that their safety depended upon the forbearance rather than upon the fears of the natives. I besides observed, and the communications which I have had with the Commission sufficiently prove it, that these small detachments answered no end whatever of police excepting probably in the places where they were stationed. To keep them out, therefore, when it became necessary to weaken the main posts upon which they have depended for assistance would be highly dangerous, and is a measure for which I will not be responsible, and to draw them in will be attended with but little inconvenience.

In your letter to Colonel Sartorius you state that part of your plan for providing for the peace of the country, framed in consequence of a report which you have received from Major Walker, is to form a corps of police which is to act against the disturbers of it under the orders of one of the Company's servants, and that this corps with others were to look for support to the regular troops, who should keep their appointed stations. This corps, if it should be worth anything, might be a support to the regular troops in their appointed stations; but I acknowledge I cannot see the use of which the regular troops would be to the corps of police excepting that they might probably preserve the peace in the stations in which they might be placed, and thereby preclude the necessity of making detachments from it. The question again comes to be one of safety and utility; and I must say that when the main posts are weakened, I shall not like to depend for the safety of the small detachments upon a police which is to be raised.

It appears to be the opinion of the gentlemen of the Commission that the station at Angarypur is now only sufficiently strong for its own defence; if that is their opinion, is it possible that there can be a doubt whether the best method of employing the few troops which will remain, and that most likely to retain the honour of the Company's arms, is not to call in the small detachments, each and all of which are liable and likely to be cut off every night? and when the civil magistrate finds it necessary to call for the assistance of the military, it may be given to him in a manner which will save the Company's arms

from disgrace, although they may not be successful. I have no business to give an opinion upon any civil question, but as it appears by your letter that you propose to make a requisition on emergency for a force to be stationed at Pynaad, in order to make it certain that Attam Goorkul will receive the decision of Government on his fate, I beg leave to suggest to you the propriety of using this force, should the commanding officer be enabled to afford it to you, in seizing the person of this man; that you should besides advertise a reward for his apprehension in case he should avoid the military, which is more than probable; and I should suggest to you the propriety of trying and punishing him for his crimes, the enormity of which, I understand, has not been exceeded in Malabar, only that I perceive by your letter that he has been taught to expect the decision and of course the mercy of Government. At all events if it is supposed that even with this expectation he will resume his old habits as soon as the necessities of the service require that the force stationed at Pynaad should be removed from it, it will be proper that before they are removed means should be taken to secure his person.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Sartorius. [388.]

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 1st May, 1800.

I have received your letters of the 27th and 28th. I am obliged to you for your intelligence regarding our affairs in Cotiote. In these difficult times it is pleasant to hear that one of the measures which were afloat is nearly in security. As Monanderry redoubt is not useful, it would be wrong to occupy it, particularly if our doing so can be disagreeable to our friend Amboo. I think, however, that it ought either to be occupied or destroyed; but that will depend much upon its situation relatively with the road, upon which you and Captain Moncrieff must be the best judges.

I enclose you a letter to Mr. Spencer, which I beg you will read and forward to him; it gives him a hint of my sentiments upon the manner of going on in Malabar, and explains the grounds of the arrangement of the force which I requested

might be made, in my letter of the 28th of April. It is to be sure too ridiculous that Attam Goorkul is to be forced by means of troops stationed at Pynaad to accept the mercy of Government, and that there should be a risk that he will not accept it if the troops are withdrawn.

If you have an opportunity, you may tell Mr. Spencer that it is my opinion that if he will hang Attam Goorkul if he can, and Ony Moota, and at all events all those criminals who are in the gaol at Calicut, and who deserve it, or rather for whose crimes the law sentences death, he will not suffer any inconvenience from the removal of the troops into Canara.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[389.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 1st May, 1800.

You will read with concern the information which I have sent to the Government of Fort St. George of the loss of Jemalabad. The officer who commanded it with a very sufficient garrison was surprised by a party of those recruits who I formerly told you had deserted from Mangalore, lost his fort God knows how, and I believe with his whole garrison was put to death. He resided in the village below, instead of in the fort on the top of, the hill, and he could have had none of his troops above, otherwise the fort would not have been lost. The surprise of this officer was more inexcusable, because he had had instructions from me to ascertain particularly the time which the tappall would take to run from Oostara by Jemalabad to the Soobramany Pagoda, as I proposed that two detachments acting on Bullum, one from Mysore, the other from Canara, should communicate by that route, and it was desirable to ascertain the length of time which a letter would be on the road between the one and the other. He must have received these instructions on the 14th or 15th. The Polygar of Bullum stopped the tappall between Oostara and Jemalabad on the 16th, and by that he must have known that he was in his neighbourhood, and yet he was surprised on the morning of the 19th by another banditti. Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine, with a detachment of the 75th and the Grena-

dier Battalion which was intended for the Soobramany Pagoda, marched on the 19th at night from Mangalore, reached Jemalabad on the 21st, and I am in hopes that he is now in possession of the lower fort, as he had no doubt of getting it by storm. The upper fort is inaccessible excepting by one flight of steps, and it is impossible to estimate the time which it will take to get possession of it. Measures are taken, however, for collecting troops, &c. for that purpose.

The detachment which had been formed, as I heretofore told you, against the Bullum Polygar was not successful in forcing a post which he occupied; I understand that the Sepoys did not behave with their accustomed resolution, as they failed in forcing a barrier after some European artillerymen and the Native officers had got over it. I have reinforced this detachment with European flank companies, and expect to hear of their complete success.

I hear from Malabar that our posts in Cotiote are nearly established, and everything thereabouts quiet. The gentlemen of the Commission object sadly to our withdrawing some of the troops from the southern districts in order to make up a force for the siege of Jemalabad; but as one detachment is asked for only to induce or force a notorious criminal to accept the mercy of Government which is held out to him, and others only to preserve the peace of the places in which they happen to be stationed, and that to leave any of the detachments out is attended with risk, as they are not sufficiently strong to protect themselves, and there are no means of giving them assistance if they are attacked, I have determined to call in most of them, and not to risk the safety of the troops.

In the mean time if the gentlemen of the Commission will only hang those who deserve it, and who are in their hands, instead of forcing upon them the pardon of Government by means of their troops, they will have no reason to apprehend anything from the necessary absence of the troops.

Dhoondiah is getting on in Savánore; he has been joined by Rajahs, Polygars, and disaffected and discontented of all descriptions, and he is now employed at the siege of Dumnul. Some of his Beyde* horse have plundered some villages in Harponelly, and the Nizam's aumildar and killadars have withdrawn from that province. The Rajahs of Anagoondy and Harponelly,

* *Beyde*, or *Beder*, a class of Chandalas or outcasts, who live by the chase.—ED.

who had been delivered over to Meer Allum by Purneah, are with Dhoondiah. I think it very desirable that our troops should be collected, and I wait the orders of Government for that purpose. The loss of Jemalabad is inconvenient, as it deprives us of some of the troops which might be employed in the field, but I hope will not be so on any other account.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[390.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 2nd May, 1800.

I have just received your letters of the 30th of April, and you may rest assured that I will lay before Government and the Commander-in-Chief the high sense which I entertain of your conduct, and of that of the gallant officers and troops under your orders. I regret exceedingly the loss which has been sustained, particularly that of Captain Grose, who will be lamented by his whole profession.

There is a fort at Ooscotta in which you may find it convenient to place your wounded men, with a medical gentleman and a sufficient guard. I will do my utmost to send from hence some doolies for their conveyance at least to Chinroypatam, where they will be nearer to all the medical assistance which can be afforded than at that place. I am certainly very desirous that my instructions should be carried into execution as they were stated to you in my letters of the 22nd and 24th of April: 1st, that the post at Arrekeery should be entirely destroyed; 2ndly, that the road and country to the Bissolee Ghaut by Woochinga should be examined; 3rdly, that the arrangements should be made as stated in my letter of the 22nd for keeping Munserabad during the rains.

The first and third will probably not be difficult; the second may be attended with more difficulty than I am aware of, and I leave it entirely to yourself to carry it into execution or not, as you may find it practicable. The great object has been gained. The Polygar has been shown that he cannot oppose the Company's arms with impunity; the other is one of importance certainly for the operations which must take place in that country in a future season, and it must be much facilitated by

the impression which your success at Arrekeery will have made; but this impression may not be so great as I imagine, or there may be impediments to attempting it of which I am not aware, and I must therefore leave it to your judgment, taking upon myself the responsibility of whatever you may decide. I don't think that you can expect any assistance from the Bombay detachment in Canara. Jemalabad was taken by surprise on the morning of the 19th of April, not by Kistnapah Naig, but by some recruits who deserted from a corps under Captain Baird at Mangalore in March last and some of the old garrison of the place, in all 150 men, under a havildar likewise a deserter. They put the officer and the whole garrison to death. Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine arrived at Jemalabad with his detachment on the 21st, and had no doubt of being able to get the lower fort by storm, and I am informed by Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan that he had ordered him to attempt it. As the last letter I received from Mangalore was dated the 23rd of April, I cannot say what may have been the consequences of Colonel Cumine's attempt; if he should have succeeded in getting the upper fort, he will have marched to the Soobramany Pagoda, and although he should not co-operate with you, his being there will have much effect in facilitating your operations. If he should have got the lower fort only, he will still be at Jemalabad.

I have made arrangements for assembling a force below the Ghauts for the siege of Jemalabad, if necessary. At all events it will be impossible; under the existing circumstances, to spare from this country any troops for that purpose.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Adjutant-General. [391.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 3rd May, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter, &c. which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, in which he states that he has carried the post of Arrekeery, at the attack of which the detachment heretofore failed. Since that failure it is probable that the Polygar had strengthened his post considerably, and the loss which has been sustained in the attack proves that the

resistance was great: the conduct of the troops, therefore, who carried it merits the favourable notice of the Commander-in-Chief, and I have promised Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor to represent it to him. In Captain Grose, who was unfortunately killed, the Honourable Company have lost a gallant, active, and zealous officer, who will be lamented by his whole profession. The further operations in Bullum are to ascertain the nature of the road to the Bissolee Ghaut, and to provide for the security of Munserabad during the rains by an arrangement of the Rajah's troops on both sides of the river Hemavutty, and by throwing into it a sufficient quantity of provisions. To do the latter may not be difficult; but there may be difficulties and impediments to the march of troops to the Bissolee Ghaut at this season of the year of which I am not aware, and I have therefore desired Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor to go there or not, as he may find it practicable. It will be impossible at present to take those measures which will effectually keep that road open; all that can be done is to gain such a knowledge of it as will enable any detachment which may be sent into that country hereafter to act with advantage; but for this it is not worth while to risk the loss of men, or to detain the detachment long in that part of the country.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[392.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 4th May, 1800.

I have received your letters of the 1st and 2nd instant. I return that which the Polygar wrote to you, and I beg you will inform him in answer thereto that all I can do for him is to promise him protection in case he should come into Seringapatam, which I strongly recommend to him.

He is perfectly aware that all those who have submitted to the authority of the Company in this country have not had reason to repent thereof; that he may hold out for some time, but that sooner or later he must fall; and that it is better that he should submit himself to the authority and trust to the generosity of the Company, than that he should be destroyed by their power. I acknowledge that I feel extremely for the loss sustained, and

which must still be incurred, in this contest; but it is to be considered that it is one not so much for territory as for power, and that in fact the offers which have been made to the Polygar are fair, and that his acceptance of them would be more advantageous to him than that he should hold his country. To permit him to do the latter will occasion demands and contests of the same kind in all parts of this country; as in fact there is no part of it to which there is not a claimant upon grounds as strong as those which Kistnapah Naig has to what he calls his.

It is very desirable that wherever you find a village deserted you should burn it, and wherever a man is in arms he should be put to death. For this my public instructions will be sufficient authority, and at present there is no other mode of making an impression. In destroying Arrekeery it will be desirable to open the jungle as much as possible, and burn every habitation which it contains. I understand that the jungle is not large, and your encamping in the neighbourhood of it might give you an opportunity and leisure to destroy the post entirely.

Mr. Gordon has shown me your letter to him, and I'll make arrangements for sending to Ooscotta money and as much arrack as will last till your provisions will be expended. Before then it will be necessary to withdraw the detachment from Bullum. Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine has taken the lower forts of Jemalabad, but the deserters were still in the upper fort on the 27th of April.

Some more of the Rajah's infantry will march from hence to-morrow for your camp, and 200 of the cavalry will be withdrawn in order to send them to Gomnair Pollam, on our N.E. frontier. It will be desirable that the cavalry should keep the open country in the neighbourhood of your camp clear: when they were in Tippoo's service, they were very expert in cutting up all persons who ventured beyond the picquets, and I should think they would find no difficulty in keeping clear the open country between Munserabad and Ooscotta.

I wrote to Government some days ago about your appointment to the command of Bednore; to this letter I have received no answer. When the answer comes, if that part of it should not be noticed, I will appoint you in orders immediately.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[393.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 4th May, 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the lower forts of Jemalabad were taken, and that a gallant attempt was made to get into the upper one, on the 27th of April, by a detachment under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine. The loss sustained is not stated; but his Lordship will perceive by the details of the affair, which will doubtless be laid before him by the Commander-in-Chief, that Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine and his detachment are deserving of his Lordship's favourable notice.

I have consented to the execution of a plan for the blockade of the upper fort of Jemalabad, the details of which are before the Commander-in-Chief, as I think it probable that we shall thereby get possession of it as soon as if we collected a large body of troops and a large equipment with a view to more active operations; and this arrangement will leave at the disposal of Government some of the troops which would otherwise be employed at the siege.

The Dewan received accounts this morning stating that Appah Saheb (Pursheram Bhow's son) had detached a force from the siege of Kolapoor to oppose Dhoondiah's progress in Savanore, which consisted of a body of infantry and about 5000 horse; against this force Dhoondiah detached one of similar numbers from the siege of Dummul, which attacked the former, beat and dispersed them, and brought prisoners to Dhoondiah's camp above 300 horse. He has detached to Harponelly under Beem Rao some infantry and 2000 horse, and in that province, as I informed you on the 30th of April, there is no force to oppose him.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Anderson, and I beg to recommend that he may have the allowances which it appears were intended for him by the late Commander-in-Chief.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan. [394.]

SIR, Seringapatam, 4th May, 1800.

I have received your letters of the 27th and 28th of April. I approve much of your idea of blowing up the lower part of the steps to the fort of Jemalabad, and you will do so accordingly, provided you think it can be done effectually, and will prevent the garrison above either from coming down entirely, or from coming down so low as that they will annoy the detachment which will still be employed in blocking them up. The arrangement to be made then will be to keep such a force at Jemalabad as will secure the lower forts against any attempt which may be made to relieve the party in the upper, and for this it may not be necessary to call upon either Goa or Malabar, and perhaps it may not be necessary to leave at Jemalabad the 75th Regiment. I shall send a copy of this letter to Colonel Sartorius, and I shall desire him not to send the battalion to Mangalore, even if you should have required it, until you shall state to him that it will be necessary for the blockade after the steps to the upper fort will be destroyed. It will still be desirable to send some howitzers to Jemalabad. I have no doubt that there are several people in Canara ready to rise, as stated in your letter of the 27th of April; but it is impossible to make provision for opposing in all parts of the country people who may have that disposition. We must be satisfied if we can find means to oppose them when they manifest that disposition by acts of violence and rebellion.

I beg that you will inform Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine that I have received great satisfaction from his reports of his measures, and of the conduct of the 75th Regiment and the Grenadier Battalion; and that I will point it out to Government and the Commander-in-Chief as being highly deserving of their favourable notice.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick. [395.]

MY DEAR SIR, Seringapatam, 5th May, 1800.

Since I wrote to you on the 1st instant our affairs here have mended considerably.

Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor with the detachment in Bullum has beat the Polygar, forced his post, burnt his villages and magazines of grain, and dispersed his adherents. Lieutenant-Colonel Cumine with the 75th and part of the Grenadier Battalion has taken the lower forts of Jemalabad, but failed in a bold attempt to get the upper fort.

I have adopted a plan for blowing up a part of the rock on which it is placed, which will block up the holders of it in such manner as that they can never expect to get down without our consent, and thus I hope to get the fort as soon as if a large force and a large equipment were collected. There is also this advantage in the arrangement now proposed, that the troops will be disposable by Government which it would have been otherwise necessary to employ at the siege of Jemalabad.

Matters go on well in Malabar. Our post at Canote is finished and established. The troops are at Montana, but the redoubt is not quite finished. Dhoondiah has beat a detachment which Appah Saheb sent to impede his progress in Savanore, consisting of 5000 cavalry and a large body of infantry; 300 horse were taken and brought into his camp. He has detached 2000 horses and some infantry to Harponelly, where, as I before informed you, there is nothing to oppose him. I have just heard that he has got possession of Dummul, and is advancing to Havanoor in the Savanore country, very close to our borders. He has been joined by all kinds of people, chiefly Mussulmans, numbers from Aurungabad, Hyderabad, Cuddapa, and almost the whole of Tippoo's cavalry.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[396.] *To the Adjutant-General, Bombay.*

SIR, Seringapatam, 5th May, 1800.

I enclose you copies of a correspondence which has passed between the Commissioners in Malabar and Colonel Sartorius, because by one of the letters it appears to be the wish of the latter that it should go before Government, and not because I conceive there is anything in it so serious as is imagined by the Commissioners, or which calls for their interference.

Upon receiving the report of the fall of Jemalabad, Colonel Sartorius determined immediately to detach into Canara a force which would enable Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan to make arrangements for retaking it. Of this not only I approved, but, as you will have perceived by my letter to you of the 30th of April, I desired Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan to make a further requisition upon Malabar for one battalion if he should find it necessary. It was impossible for Colonel Sartorius to make this detachment into Canara without drawing in some of the posts, and he certainly did not diminish the number of his stations to the degree to which he will be obliged to diminish them if he should carry into execution the orders which I gave him, and which I reported to you on the 30th of April.

The measure, then, of drawing in the detachments, if it be an improper one, rests upon me; but I have a perfect reliance upon the Government and the Commander-in-Chief that it will not be censured upon the representation of the Commissioners in Malabar who may undoubtedly feel an inconvenience from it, until the whole of our situation in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara is examined, and it shall be found that it was in my power to provide a suitable remedy for the misfortune which had happened in any other manner excepting in that reported. My letter to you of yesterday will have shown my anxiety not to weaken Malabar if possible, and my readiness to adopt any measure which would preclude that necessity.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I wrote to the President of the Commission, which will further elucidate the subject.

Government have now before them all that I can say upon the measure itself, for which I am responsible; the next question is, whether the words of Colonel Sartorius's letter of the 26th of April merit any animadversion. They speak for themselves, and upon them I have nothing to say.

In the short time that I have had the command of the troops, I have had an opportunity of showing my readiness to perform that part of my duty, viz., to attend as much as possible to the requisition of the civil power. If then it should be decided that I was wrong in drawing the troops from Malabar, and that my arrangements were faulty, I hope that the error will be attributed to one of judgment, and not to an unworthy

desire to do that which should be displeasing to the Commissioners.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[397.] *To the Commissioners in Malabar.*

GENTLEMEN, Seringapatam, 6th May, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 2nd instant, with its enclosures, copies of which I had already received from Colonel Sartorius. These, as it appeared to be Colonel Sartorius's wish, I had already sent to be laid before the Bombay Government, but I acknowledge that I see little reason in any part of the correspondence for calling for their interference.

An arrangement has been made of the military force in Malabar, which, I am concerned to observe, is not satisfactory to the gentlemen of the Commission; but it is the best that I can devise in these difficult times, and I hope I shall have credit with the Government of Bombay and the Commander-in-Chief for having adopted it only as a measure of necessity. This I might likewise claim from the gentlemen of the Commission. Colonel Sartorius is not responsible for this arrangement; and therefore if the Government disapprove of it, their censure must fall upon me. The words of Colonel Sartorius's letter speak for themselves, and upon them I have nothing to remark excepting that it is unfortunate that the Government should have reason to fear that there is a difference between those charged with their civil government and the officer at the head of the military in Malabar, only because a letter may not have been worded in a manner which would be agreeable to the former. I am obliged to you for your communication regarding Runditerra.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[398.] G. O. Camp near the Caryghaut hill, Tuesday, 20th May, 1800.

The troops to march to-morrow by the right.

The *general* to beat at half past four; the *assembly* at half past five o'clock.

The detail coming on the duty of the quarter guard of the 73rd to move 100 yards in advance.

The guns, tumbrils, store and arrack carts, to follow the line in the high road. The baggage to keep on the right flank, not to go ahead of the line, and to keep clear of all sown fields.

A non-commissioned officer and twelve pioneers to go on with the advance, and the remainder to move at the head of the guns. Quartermasters, &c., to meet the Quartermaster-General on the right of the line a little before assembly beating. Orderly hour to be one o'clock on halting days, and four o'clock on marching days, when adjutants will attend at the Deputy Adjutant-General's tent for orders.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Captain Quin, [399.]

DEAR QUIN, Camp at Archinelly, 22nd May, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter from the agents regarding Mr. Cornwallis's* accounts.

I perfectly recollect that the attested certificate alluded to was sent to the office of the Mustermaster-General; but whether it was or was not, it is a matter of indifferenee, and could not tend to enable Mr. Cornwallis to make out his accounts. The certificate might indeed be a voucher, and might cause their being passed, but will not give him one material which he has not at the present moment.

The certificate is of certain recruits enlisted previous to the 31st of March, 1794, and to the day of embarkation at Cork, up to both of which periods we were mustered in Ireland, which recruits did not join the regiment, and therefore could not be mustered, until we reached Ostend. We never were mustered on the Continent, nor at all after we left Ireland till we went to Mitsling camp. The regimental book, the weekly state or monthly return book, or the first muster roll taken after the period when we left Ireland, will give a list of these men's names, the dates of their attestations, and when they joined the regiment. Let me have this list as soon as possible, and I will write

* Paymaster of H. M. 33rd Regiment.—ED.

a letter to the agents upon the subject, a copy of which I will send to the regiment.

If there be a copy of the certificate sent to the Mustermaster-General with the regiment, it would answer better than the list I have mentioned; but I rather believe there is not, as it must have been lost with the other regimental papers.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[400.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Camp at Archinelly, 22nd May, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Major Browne, who commands the corps of Bombay Sepoys at Nuggur. Jerrah is a mud fort and village in the province of Soonda, about four miles from the Werdah, and close to the Mahratta frontier. It is about twelve miles from Chandergooty; so that there is every reason to believe the intelligence to be true.

I have sent intelligence to Sir William Clarke that this party is at Jerrah; and it is probable that it will leave the Honourable Company's territories when the battalion approaches, which must by this time be on its march from Goa. It will not be proper to send the cavalry towards them, as the country about Jerrah is very jungly, and otherwise unfit for cavalry; and until I reach the frontier with the infantry, it will be impossible to take any other measures to drive them out.

The fort at Chandergooty is held by an officer and a company of Bombay Sepoys; and there is another post of Bombay troops at Bilghy, about twelve miles from thence.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[401.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Camp 2 miles north of Chinna, 23rd May, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th instant with its enclosures, which I had already considered when in Malabar.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the detachment lately collected for field service in that province has not received field allowances since the end of the month of March, excepting those corps or detachments of corps which composed it which may have been since employed on duties in the performance of which they are entitled to field allowances according to the established regulations of the Government of Bombay.

Whenever I have found it necessary to order any of them upon such duties, I have reported such necessity to the Adjutant-General of the Bombay army, as being one of the channels of communication with the Government pointed out by you in your letter of the 3rd April.

I have not had occasion to authorize the issue of any allowances whatever excepting such as have been reported to Government in the manner above mentioned, either by myself or by Colonel Sartorius. In case the Government should approve of what has been done, I conclude that they will have sent orders regarding the expenses incurred, and the allowance given to Captain Moncrieff for intelligence (which is the only one which has been given), to the Military Auditor and Military Paymaster-General.

In case at any time I should find it necessary to give authority that any expense should be incurred, I shall certainly attend to the orders of the Governor in Council as communicated in your letter of the 6th instant; and I shall report regularly and fully to Government the cause of incurring such expense, its amount as far as is possible, and its probable duration.

I shall communicate the orders of Government upon this subject, and regarding the staff appointments, to Colonel Sartorius, to whom this part of your letter more particularly relates. I shall also take care that in future these orders are attended to. It is proper, however, that I should state to you that excepting those of the Deputy Quartermaster-General and Captain of Guides, which were not discontinued till the receipt of my letter of the 13th of April by Colonel Sartorius, a copy of which I now enclose, all the other appointments which were made with a view to the field services of the detachment, and reported regularly to the Government of Bombay, were discontinued upon the receipt of my letter of the 20th of March,

which Colonel Sartorius enclosed to Government with his of the 1st of April.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[402.] *To Colonel Pater.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Nagmunglum, 24th May, 1800.

I have had the pleasure to receive your letters of the 20th and 21st instant, and I am glad to find by the former that the country is so little alarmed. Your presence at Hurryhur will tend to quiet even the slight fears which might have heretofore existed.

Your report of the state of Hurryhur, and its want of provisions, induces me to think that the troops ought not to be left there. Of what use can our Sepoys be in a fort in which there are no provisions? If attacked whilst you are absent on any excursion, they must surrender; and it is therefore much better that they should not be in it, and that they should be employed either in taking care of your camp, or in any other manner that you may think proper.

I have written to Purneah both regarding the state of the works and provisions at Hurryhur, and he will doubtless give orders to his people upon the subject: in the mean time, if you are not satisfied that there is a sufficient quantity of provisions in the fort to last the troops at least the time which it may be required that you should be absent from them, I beg that you will withdraw them from it, and dispose of them as you may think proper.

I am sorry to hear that you feel a want of gram, but I had long ago taken all the measures to supply it which you point out. You may depend upon it that orders have been sent to all parts of the country to sell gram and all other grains to our people. The gram agents have bullocks, and ought to send out to buy it, without obliging the people to bring it to your camp, which they will not do readily.

But between ourselves I am afraid that what is said of the gram system has some foundation; and it may be depended upon that if there be any failure on the present service, another will be

adopted which will not be so advantageous to the cavalry. I am therefore very anxious that you should be properly supplied, and I have adopted every method which I can think will tend to that object; but if the gram agents do not make use of the means put in their hands, I can expect nothing but failure.

You surprise me with what you say regarding forage: surely there must be either grass or straw upon the Toombuddra. However, your present position will answer all the purposes for which I sent you to the frontier as well as if you were at Hurryhur; and if you get forage there, it is better that you should remain in it.

I wrote to you on the 21st regarding the 1st Regiment of cavalry. If to put them in Hurryhur will not answer, do with them what you will; for as far as they are connected with the public service, the first object must be to put them in a safe and quiet place where they will have time to recover.

By Colonel Torin's last letter to you, it appears that they are entirely gone, and that I can form no hope of their being fit for any service whatever. You will do with their guns what you please.

I have received a report that a party of 500 people belonging to Dhoondiah, headed by a Moorman* who was heretofore an aumildar in Soonda, have taken and plundered a small mud fort and village on the other side of and near the Werdah, called Jerrah. This place is about twelve miles from Chandergooty, where we have a post, and is close to the Mahratta frontier. The gentlemen of the cavalry know it well, having passed it on their marches into and from Soonda.

I expect to join you soon.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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* The Moormen are an industrious, intelligent race, who are found located on the Malabar, and on the southern portions of the Coromandel, coasts; in Ceylon, and along the shores of Eastern Africa, where they form the majority of the shopkeeping and mercantile class. They are very dark coloured. They do not appear to be of Asiatic descent, but rather to have had their original home in Morocco.—ED.

[403.] *To the Officer commanding 2nd battalion 2nd Bombay Regiment.*

SIR, Camp at Nagmunglum, 24th May, 1800.

I have received intimation from Sir W. Clarke that you are on your march to join the troops about to be collected to the northward.

Information has been sent to me by Major Browne, who at present commands at Nuggur, stating that a party belonging to Dhoondiah, consisting of 500 men, belonging to a Mussulman who had been before an aumildar in Soonda, had taken and plundered a mud fort and village, called Jerrah. This place lies close to the Mahratta frontier, about four miles from the river Werdah, twelve from the fort of Chandergooty, where we have a post, and about the same distance from Sercey. You will pass by these last two places, and I know that there is a road from the latter to Jerrah, as well as from Jerrah to Chandergooty.

I shall be obliged to you if, when you have arrived at Sercey, you will make inquiries regarding the strength and position of the party at Jerrah; and if you find yourself sufficiently strong compared with them, I beg that you will attack them without loss of time, and drive them out of the country. You will hang all of this banditti who may fall into your hands. After having performed this service, you will proceed upon your march as hitherto ordered.

I enclose a sketch of the country from Soonda to Shikarpoor.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[404.] *To Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan.*

SIR, Camp at Nagmunglum, 25th May, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 16th instant, in which, after informing me of the attempt made upon Buntwell, and the measures taken to secure that place, of which I approve, you state that there are several forts on the sea coast of Canara to the northward and southward of Mangalore, which you are desirous of destroying.

I certainly approve of the principle of destroying those forts of which we can make no use, and have not troops to garrison, and I think it probable that the measure would be approved of by Government; but I cannot authorise it till I receive their further orders, excepting in a case of very evident necessity.

In the mean time, however, I recommend that you should take measures either for removing to a place of security, or for destroying entirely, all powder and military stores which those forts contain; and I beg that you will without delay send me a list of their names, a description of them, and an account of their situation relatively with each other, and with the country and the sea.

I have received your letter of the 20th instant with its enclosure, which I propose to forward this day to the Adjutant-General. I have to inform you that the warrant for holding courts-martial which has been intrusted to me, gives only the power which you have received from Major-General Bowles; and as it is not usual to get greater powers, I imagine that Major-General Brathwaite will be disinclined to extend yours. But I must observe to you that you have already received the orders of Major-General Brathwaite in the copy of a letter from the Adjutant-General to me, dated the 9th instant, which I transmitted to you, "to show no mercy to the banditti which the fort at Jemalabad contains;" and therefore I should imagine that you can have no doubt respecting the propriety of putting in execution any sentence which a general court martial may pass upon these people, should you determine to try them, more particularly as it appears that you deem their punishment an act of necessity, for which most probably the warrant you have received from Major-General Bowles provides. I shall, however, send that part of your letter to the Adjutant-General, and you will receive the orders of the Commander-in-Chief upon the subject.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Camp at Nagmunglum, Sunday, 25th May, 1800. [405.]

Weekly states to be sent in to the Deputy Adjutant-General every Monday morning, at nine o'clock on halting days, and an hour before orderly time on the days of march.

Frequent complaints having been made of camp followers taking straw and firewood from the villages without paying for them, Colonel Wellesley requests that gentlemen will give particular orders to their servants, and the Commissaries of grain, of provisions, and of stores to the bullock masters, to pay for such straw and firewood as they require; and he gives notice that any person found taking them again for nothing will be punished.

Colonel Wellesley has great pleasure in publishing to the troops, on the day of the arrival of the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, the General Order by Government on the successful attack of the post of Arrekeery, and in adding thereto a public testimony of his approbation of the conduct of this detachment, which he has taken frequent opportunities of laying before Government.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[406.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Camp at Nagmunglum, 26th May, 1800.

I was joined yesterday by the detachment which has been employed in Bullum under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, and I propose to proceed on my march to the northward to-morrow morning. This detachment has, as far as the time and season would permit, effected the objects for which it was sent into Bullum. The tappall communication is thus open by Jemalabad. Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor has examined the road to the Bissolee Ghaut, has destroyed the strongholds at Woochinga and other places, has burnt many villages and magazines of grain, has thrown provisions and stores for the rainy season into Munserabad, and has made such a disposition of the Rajah's troops as will tend to the security of that fort, and to confine the Polygar to the jungles. He had re-occupied Arrekeery on the evening after he had been driven from it by our troops, when they went back to their camp, and he constructed the barrier again, to carry which might have occasioned some loss. As it appeared impossible to destroy the jungle so entirely in this season as to prevent him from occupying it, or to place in it such a body of the Rajah's troops as would keep it against him when our troops should be withdrawn, I desired Lieutenant-

Colonel Montresor not to risk a loss again in the attack of the post, but to give his attention to other objects.

I have received accounts that one battalion of Bombay Sepoys is on its march from Goa, and it is probable that they will reach the Toombuddra at about the same time that I shall. I have likewise heard that the party which had taken Jerrah has been driven out of the country by some of the Rajah's troops; but I believe they have entered Soonda at another point, and they will be out of the reach of that battalion. Some of the Rajah's troops were in pursuit of them.

I enclose an extract of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan, in which he proposes that he should have permission to destroy certain forts upon the sea coast which contain powder and military stores, and for which he cannot afford garrisons, as in that country they must ever be useless, and might prove detrimental, to the Company; but I wish to have his Lordship's orders upon the subject; and in the mean time I have desired Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan to destroy the powder and military stores which he can neither remove nor guard, and to send me an account of the forts, their relative situation with each other, the country, and the coast, and such other information as he can afford.

I enclose a statement upon which I have given directions that 3000 bullocks may be taken into the service, besides about 1300 employed with the Bullum detachment. I propose that the arrack for the Europeans should be carried on bullocks, as it is impossible to procure carts which are equal to the service, and I have besides every reason to believe that this mode of carriage will be found equally cheap and more convenient in the country in which the troops may be obliged to act.

Only one month's advance is made for 1000 of these bullocks: for the remainder I have been obliged to allow that the usual advance should be given. They are entertained by the Paymaster, and on the 1st of June will be delivered over to the bullock agent, according to the orders and regulations of the Government.

In order to send two companies of the 2nd battalion 5th Regiment to join their corps, I have been obliged to weaken considerably the posts in the Nundydroog district; and in case an attempt should be made by the Polygars on the Nizam's frontier on any of them, there is not a body of troops collected

at any point which could give support or relief. Since October last there has been a small detachment in the field with two guns: I propose to draw from Nundydroog and the other posts such a number of men as will make that detachment sufficiently respectable, and to place it in such manner as that it may move with facility on any point that may be menaced.

It is probable that this arrangement will preserve the tranquillity of that part of the frontier.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[407.] *To Colonel Sartorius.*

SIR, Camp at Belloor, 27th May, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 22nd and its enclosures. It appears to me very probable that the letter to the Cherical Rajah, of which Mr. Hodgson sent you a translation, was written by the Pyche; but at all events it is clear that the name of Dhoondiah is used among the Company's discontented and disaffected subjects in Malabar in order to create disturbance. It behoves you therefore to be particularly on your guard should that person make an irruption into the territories of the Company or of the Rajah of Mysore, and to take immediate and decided steps upon the first appearance of serious disturbance. When this shows itself, it will be proper that you should bring the troops together in such manner as that they will be in security, and under cover during the monsoon, after which it may be necessary to collect them in one body in order to oppose those who may be desirous of disturbing the public tranquillity.

I am anxious to hear farther from you respecting the person said to be a vakeel from Dhoondiah to the Bibby [Beebee or Lady] of Cannanore.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[408.] *To Colonel Stevenson.*

MY DEAR SIR, Camp at Belloor, 27th May, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 25th.

I understand that there are at Chittledroog an inner fort

besides that upon the hill, a pettah surrounded by a wall, and an old pettah outside round which there is no wall.

Our stores, I understand, are in the inner fort, which is entirely separated from the outer or pettah, surrounded by a wall, excepting by a gate which goes from the one to the other. My wish is that the inhabitants should be moved from the inner fort into the walled pettah, from which our troops should be moved, and that the former should only be occupied by officers and troops, the latter only by the native inhabitants. I mention this because it appears that I did not clearly explain myself in my letter of the 22nd, and that you imagine that I am desirous that the native inhabitants should be moved quite outside of the wall. Of this I am by no means desirous. All I wish is that the troops and inhabitants should be separated, and that the former should alone have possession of the fort properly so called, in which are placed our ammunition and stores.

I wish that the repair of the barracks of the 77th should be completed.

I have been joined by Colonel Montresor's detachment, and I hope to be joined by the 25th Dragoons at Sera. Dhoondiah or some other plunderer from the Mahratta country has entered the Company's province of Soonda, but not in great numbers. Some battalions of Bombay Sepoys are on their march through it, and I hope will clear it.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

[409.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Belloor, 27th May, 1800.

I have received yours of the 26th and its enclosures. I had already heard of the march of the battalion from Goa, and have provided bullocks for them. I did not know of their want of money; but Captain Munro's supply of that, and of bullocks to bring them through Soonda, will be very acceptable.

I enclose you a letter which I received last night, which agrees with Captain Munro's account rather than with that of Ram Rao, of the nature of the force which has entered Soonda. Ram Rao's cavalry will have driven them out before the Bombay battalion will be near them. It does not come by the

Budnaghur road, but by that of Soonda and Sercey, unless the officer commanding it should alter his route upon hearing of the irruption of these vagabonds. Whether they belong to Dhoondiah, or are only robbers, it is clear that it is necessary that we should come to an understanding with the Mahrattas regarding that frontier.

I enclose you some papers which I received last night from Colonel Sartorius, by which it appears that Dhoondiah has been meddling in Malabar. I acknowledge that I should rather believe the truth to be that the letter to the Cherical Rajah was written by the Pyche; but whether it was or not, it is very clear that the name of Dhoondiah is made use of among all the Company's turbulent subjects to create disturbances, and it is therefore the more incumbent upon our Government to get the better of him. I have received an excellent account of Hoonelly from Colonel Pater, who desired Captain Balfour of the artillery to visit it. He reports it to be in a perfect state of defence: guns, powder, shot, provisions, &c., well arranged and prepared. All appears to be so perfect, that I do not propose to put any of our troops into the fort, unless the killadar wishes it; and I shall be obliged to you if you will mention him to Purneah as a man deserving encouragement. The boats are in great forwardness; and there is a large wooden boat at Hooley Honore, which I propose to have brought down to Hoonelly as soon as the river fills.

I return you the bill for the cook-rooms, which I have signed, and to which I have annexed a copy of the authority which I received from Government to build them. If you will send the bill to Gordon, he will pay it.

The pension to Mahomed Ali is 250 star pagodas *per annum*, payable at Seringapatam on the "Family Fund," and is in Class No. 1. He received the arrears of it from the 1st January. We agreed about Shah Abbas, as you say.

The guards at Severndroog and Oustradroog belong to the companies of the 2nd of the 5th, and they will soon be withdrawn. This is the reason why I am anxious that Purneah should place people in those forts on whom he can depend.

I write to Colonel Sartorius this day; and I shall desire him, in case he perceives any symptoms of serious insurrection in Malabar, to begin to bring his forces together in such manner as that they will be secure, and prepared to join one another when the season opens.

I conclude that Stevenson will have informed you of the attempts which have been made to seduce the sepoys to desert from the 2nd of the 3rd. A committee was assembled to examine into the matter, but they could make nothing of it, although Stevenson thinks that Dhoondiah has been endeavouring to raise men at Chittledroog, as it appears that Cuppage thinks that he has been making the same endeavour at his post and district. It certainly is very desirable, on many accounts, that our troops should be kept separate from the inhabitants at Chittledroog; and I accordingly desired Stevenson to turn over the subject in his mind, and to let me know whether it would not be possible to remove all the inhabitants from the fort, properly so called, into what I understand is the pettah, although it is equally surrounded by a strong wall, and that the former might be given up solely and entirely to the troops, who should have nothing to do with, and should not inhabit the latter. I do not know whether Colonel Stevenson has entirely comprehended the meaning of what I wrote to him; but if he has, he appears to be of opinion that it will be practicable, and not difficult, to remove from the fort all the inhabitants.

I shall be glad if you will let me know what you think upon this subject, and whether there will be any objection to the arrangement on the part of Purneah. I understand that the inhabitants of Chittledroog are very numerous; that they are of the caste of the old Rajahs; and were, in general, heretofore, sepoys and peons in the service of the Sultaun. They refuse to take service with us in any manner whatever: at Chittledroog we can get neither recruits, servants, lascars, coolies, nor bullock drivers; and I cannot think that it will be very safe to leave in a fort with our troops a large number of fellows such as these are described to be.

Upon looking over the authority from Government, I perceive it goes only to repairs; but the building of the offices was allowed, I know, in a private letter from Webbe. Send the authority to the Paymaster, or not, as you think best.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[410.] G. O. Camp near Belloor, Tuesday, 27th May, 1800.

A company of Native infantry, consisting of fifty men, with an European officer, to form the rear guard to-morrow. The officer will see that all the public stores, as well as the bazaars and baggage, move off the ground early, and he will come up in their rear. The brinjarries are allowed to come on at their leisure.

Captain Heitland will send a party of pioneers, on coming to the new ground of encampment on marching days, to clear the lines, and to make the communication from corps to corps perfectly easy. He will afterwards make a road from the ground where the provision department is pitched, into the high road by which the troops march.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[411.] *To Colonel Pater.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Belloor, 27th May, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 24th, and I am obliged to you for your intelligence and for Captain Balfour's report of Hoonelly, which is very satisfactory. I agree with you in thinking that it will not be necessary to put any of our troops in that fort unless the killadar should be desirous of having them; but as we have an object so interesting as our boats there, I shall not much relish to see them under the care of any people but our own, and when the river fills it will be necessary to move a force up there (a company for instance) to take care of them. This company might remain on this side of the river, and it will be in perfect safety as soon as that fills. It will not be necessary to detach it before then. I beg that you will acquaint the killadar at Hoonelly how much pleased I was at Captain Balfour's report of the state of his fort, and that I have in consequence recommended him to the favourable notice of Purneah.

I have received a letter from the Military Board respecting gram, by which it appears that very large advances have been made to the gram agents.

I anxiously recommend great attention to the provision of that article: there is plenty of it in the country in which you are, and no restriction on its sale, and I acknowledge that I am of

opinion that the Government have a right to expect that it will be well provided. If it be not, it may be depended upon that the system, which is not a favourite one, will be altered. You cannot say too much to the gentlemen upon this subject.

The 25th has arrived in this country, and I hope will join me at Sera.

Send somebody down to Oollull to see in what state it is.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [412.]

SIR, Camp near Myasundrum, 28th May, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Major —— of the 77th to the postmaster in Mysore, in which he makes a complaint of his servant employed at Chittledroog. I am concerned that he should have to complain of any of the persons employed under the Civil Government.

In order to prevent the inconvenience which must arise at all times from an appeal to the head of the office, whenever there may be any reason to complain of any of the servants of the post office, I have this day given out an order by which I request that all complaints may be made to the commanding officer of the place at which they may arise. I shall be obliged to you if you will do me the favour to inquire into the circumstances stated by Major ——, and let me know the result.

It is the business of the servant of the postmaster to deliver letters to the person to whom they are addressed, and to demand and receive payment of the postage established by Government: but it is not his duty to refuse the delivery of a letter because payment of the postage of another has been refused; in that case it is his duty to complain, and accordingly he has been ordered to deliver to Major —— his letter.

It appears by Major ——'s letter to Mr. Cochrane that he did refuse to pay postage for one letter, and that he refused to pay for another letter as double because it was written upon a single sheet.

It is necessary that he should be informed that under the post office regulations it may be necessary that postage should

be demanded for a letter on the public service from Bombay; but there is one circumstance always required in order that a letter should be free of postage, which is that it should be superscribed *on the service*, and with the official signature of the person who may have written it. In that case if it be written by, or addressed to, a person entitled by the regulations to write or receive letters on the service, it is free of postage. Major ——, as commanding officer of the 77th, is entitled to receive letters on the service; but I understand that this letter was not so superscribed, and therefore the postmaster's servant was in the right to ask for the postage, and Major —— ought to have paid it. I beg that you will inquire into this circumstance.

The regulations of Government point out that the postage of letters is to be increased in proportion to their weight, and therefore it may have happened that the postmaster's servant was right in asking double postage for a letter, although it was written upon a single sheet. You will also be so kind as to make this matter a subject of your inquiry.

Although I have written more upon this subject than its importance may appear to require, I cannot conclude without expressing my concern that any officer, more particularly one of Major ——'s rank and standing, and experience in the service, should have written to a civil servant of the Government the concluding paragraph of the enclosed letter. As I am convinced that it was not sufficiently thought of, and that the threat to take possession of the letter would in no case whatever have been put in execution, I shall say no more upon the subject.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[413.] G. O. Camp near Myasundrum, Wednesday, 28th May, 1800.

As it sometimes happens that the post office regulations are not understood, and that differences arise between the officers of the army and the people employed in the post office department, the officers are requested, whenever they have any thing to represent respecting the people of the post office, to make the same known to the commanding officer of the station at which the subject of complaint may arise, and the commanding officer

will be so kind as to inquire into the matter, and decide upon it according to the post office regulations of the Government. On the other hand, the post office servants will receive orders to make their complaints, should they have any, to the commanding officers of stations, who are requested to afford them protection, and to take such steps as the nature of their representations may appear to require.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Ross. [414.]

DEAR SIR, Camp at Currup, 30th May, 1800.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26th instant,* and I am much flattered by your desire that I would

* *Major-General Ross to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.*

DEAR SIR, Bangalore, 26th May, 1800.

I had the pleasure to write you of my arrival at Bangalore before I learnt you had left Seringapatam, which I much regret, as I flattered myself with your advice and assistance in the business on which I am to be employed there.

That I may not be altogether deprived of that advantage, I take the liberty of enclosing you a copy of my instructions, in the hope you will be so obliging as to favour me with such communications as may appear to you expedient respecting them.

I remain, &c.,

PATRICK ROSS.

To Major-General Ross, Chief Engineer.

SIR, Fort St. George, 23rd April, 1800.

1. In consequence of the opinion delivered by the Military Board of the necessity of farther information previous to deciding on the reform proper to be adopted for the works of Seringapatam, the Right Hon. the Governor in Council is pleased to direct that you shall proceed to that place, without delay, for the purpose of examining and reporting to the Military Board, for the information of Government, the whole reform necessary to be made in that important fortress.

2. I am, in consequence, directed to communicate to you the general principles which are to regulate your investigations and reports with regard to the extent and intention of the reforms to be introduced.

3. First, His Lordship in Council considers the local position of Seringapatam to preclude, in a very great degree, the supposition of the attack of an European enemy, which is an event too far removed from probability to influence the plans for the reform of that fortress, farther than as more perfect lines of defence may be obtained without any material addition of expense.

4. Second, The present exterior rampart and works, however unskilfully constructed, preserve in a considerable degree the natural advantages of the

communicate to you my opinions regarding your instructions received from Government. I should have been happy to meet you at Seringapatam, but I was obliged to march from thence as soon as I had prepared a sufficient quantity of equipments to put the troops in the field.

I conclude that you will have seen the letter which I wrote to the Secretary of the Military Board regarding the reform of the works at Seringapatam: in that I delivered my opinion upon the subject, and I have had but little reason to alter any part of it after the fullest inspection of all the works as President of the Annual Committee. The place certainly wants the means of giving a flanking fire; but that defect may in some degree be remedied by the completion of some and the enlargement of other cavaliers, and by thickening the rampart sufficiently in all parts. It might also be possible to give flanks by drawing in the ramparts, and making them in the form of redans; but I must observe that the foundation of the new lines which must be made will in a great measure be laid in the second ditch, which will be attended with much difficulty, and probably a larger expense than it appears that Government will be willing to incur. I do not think it possible to throw out flanks upon the river faces, for want of room. The improvements then which I would recommend on the river faces are first, to throw the inner rampart into the inner ditch; secondly, to thicken the outer rampart and parapet; thirdly, to complete the stone glacis.

situation, and if built of durable materials, which you will ascertain, ought not to be disturbed, excepting where the line of defence is radically defective.

5. Third, It is, therefore, the intention of Government neither to undertake any new works nor to make any addition to the present, farther than may be consistent with the above principle.

6. Fourth, The preservation of the exterior rampart, under the foregoing limitations, being established as a first principle, all superfluous interior works, particularly those which remain unfinished on the sides where the river forms an additional defence, ought to be destroyed.

7. His Lordship considers it unnecessary to enter into farther detail on this subject, as he has the satisfaction to observe that the plan recommended by you to the Military Board appears to be founded on principles nearly similar to those above stated, and that the details of that plan, as far as his Lordship can judge from the information before him, appear to be judicious and economical.

8. The officer commanding in Mysore will be directed to furnish you with every assistance and facility in his power for the execution of these instructions.

I have, &c.,

J. WEBBE, Secretary to Government.

It appears to me also to be possible, as I stated in my letter to the Secretary of the Military Board, to sink a cunette in the ditch on the river faces, which besides the river would afford an additional impediment to the besiegers.

On the land faces you will perceive that the defences are more complete than they are on those upon the river. The outer rampart, however, wants thickening and completing. The cavaliers ought to be enlarged, and you will most probably find that you will be able to give flanks on these faces either by improving those works already constructed by Tippoo for this purpose, or by throwing out others. For this there is sufficient room, and it can be done without difficulty. For the detail of my opinion regarding these faces and the ditch in front of them, I must refer you to my letter to the Military Board, and indeed in general for that which I hold upon this whole subject.

I ought now to apologize to you for having troubled you at all upon it, as I assure you that I am writing entirely from memory, and that I have not before me a single memorandum or document which can enable me to recollect what I have thought upon this subject. I do it, however, to show you how anxious I am respecting this place, and to give you every assistance in my power in forwarding your labours.

I hope that you will make use of my house at Seringapatam, and you will receive from Lieutenant-Colonel Saxon, who commands there in my absence, all the attention and assistance which is due to you, and which the place can afford.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Pater. [415.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 27th instant, enclosing a paper of intelligence.

In a conversation I have had with Dr. Anderson regarding the state of the 1st Regiment, as also of the situation best calculated to promote their recovery, he is decidedly of opinion that Chittledroog will by no means answer, and that they will be more likely to regain their health at Hurryhur. Supplies have been ordered into that place, and as the rain has fallen to

the northward there may not now be much difficulty in procuring forage for the horses; but if it should be otherwise, another arrangement must be made, and the sick men may go into the fort, and those who are well may remain with the horses in the rear in a place where there is forage and they will be in safety. You may take their guns for your regiment or the 4th, as you may think best. I have made this arrangement from a determination not to bring into the line or calculate upon the services of the regiment or any part of it until it becomes quite healthy and efficient.

I cannot form the most distant conception of any obstacles the gram agents can have to encounter in procuring gram, as I have received repeated letters from Colonel Close in which he says that the aumildars have received orders not to impede the sale of that or any other article; as far as I can see they have obeyed them, and the gram agents have nothing to do but to give a good price and they will get what they want. I am well convinced that Government will be astonished and displeased to have a report come before them that the shadow of a difficulty exists, after all that has been done to remove everything like one.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[416.] *To Major-General Brathwaite.*

MY DEAR SIR, Camp at Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

I have received your letters of the 26th, enclosing statements of arrack and dooly bearers, and I am glad to see that we are getting on so well in these essentials. The country bearers, however, appear satisfied, and do not desert; but it is grievous to the villages to detain them, and I am therefore very anxious to get those from the Carnatic. I am getting on as I could wish; we marched this morning fourteen miles in four hours. The rains have set in, I believe, on the Malabar coast, as we have had some very heavy, which, however, have done no harm to us excepting to our field officers' tents; their flys are too heavy for a bullock after they have received a night's rain. My Europeans are in high health and order, but Colonel Tolfrey's corps is miserably weak, and at the same time so respectable in officers

that I cannot allow them to go into garrison. I expected to meet the 25th at Sera, but I hear that when they were about to mount the Pednaigdurgum Pass they received an order from the Quartermaster-General to proceed by Ryacotta, for which I cannot account: but I conclude it is all right.

The difference in the load for the six pounder which I mentioned to you was two ounces; and I have no doubt but that our brass guns would stand it perfectly well. I enclose an extract of a letter from Mr. Yeldham to Captain M'Leod, which in my opinion makes it very clear that a Mustermaster for this country is absolutely necessary.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson. [417.]

MY DEAR SIR, Camp at Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 29th, and I find that your description of Chittledroog agrees precisely with that which I had received before: what you call more properly the principal fort I named the pettah, and it is there where I wish to remove all the inhabitants.

The question will be whether they are completely shut out from the interior fort and from the hill. I fear nothing from an enemy out of doors when I shall be in the field to the northward, but I shall not like to leave a small garrison in the midst of that large and bad kind of population.

If we can only place this garrison in such manner as that they will be free from surprise, my object will be answered; and it is then a matter of indifference to me where the inhabitants may be.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Pater. [418.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp 2 miles south of Cullumbella, 1st June, 1800.

I have had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 28th May, with its enclosures from Captain Price and Captain Mac-

gregor, and I acknowledge that your concluding paragraph, in which you tell me that you want for nothing, and that your people and your horses are in high health, order, and spirits, afforded much consolation after the impression received by the perusal of the former part of it. Most certainly orders have been given to permit the people of the country to sell you every thing that you may want, and that they may have; but orders have not been given to the aumildars to interfere to procure anything for you; because I am exceedingly anxious that the troops should be independent of the civil Government, from which I desire nothing more than that they will remain neuter, and I am willing and desirous that we should depend for our supplies on what alone can make them plentiful, viz. our own money and the interest which the people of the country have to dispose of the articles in their possession of which we are in want. This interest they will steadily pursue if the Government remain neuter, and that is all I desire from them; and it is all the assistance which I receive or ever have received in probably the most plentiful camps that have ever been known in this country. Under these circumstances I have to recommend to you to order the gram agents to purchase gram at any rate, and immediately to complete their bullocks, and to keep them so. You should have no nerrick for rice in your bazaar; let the bazaar people purchase it and sell it for what they can: it will be dear probably just at first, as gram will be likewise, but the high price given will occasion a desire to sell, a consequent competition among the sellers, and will lower the price.

What I have above written is the dictate of common sense proved to be true by experience, and you may depend upon it that the interests of the people are a better foundation for supplies than the exertions of any aumildar or civil Government, provided they will remain neuter.

You may ask, if the people feel this interest, and are allowed to act as it dictates, why do they refuse to sell their goods, and ask so enormous a price for them, and one so much above that which is common and natural? I answer because it is their interest. They know perfectly well what is likely to happen, and from experience they know what they are likely to get for their goods when what they expect will happen. They therefore now ask a larger price for them than they are worth, and keep them up to get it; but give that price and you will immediately create a

competition which will reduce it as low as it probably ought to be.

I have in my camp at this moment all the Company's bullocks, and my consumption of gram is probably greater than that of all the regiments of cavalry put together. I have never had any assistance whatever from any aumildar, and I have not yet heard that there has been any difficulty in procuring that or anything else, and the price is low. If it were ten times higher it must be given, and as long as the Government will not interfere I shall be well supplied.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Camp at Angeysamoodra, 1st June, 1800. [419.]

All the draught cattle, with the country carts employed in the provision department, and all the hired carriage bullocks, are to be handed over to Lieutenant Mackay, according to the order of Government of the 10th May last.

All the hired bullocks in the service, with the troops in the field, are to be mustered at six o'clock in the morning of the 3rd instant.

As more of the country bearers are employed to carry each dooly than are allowed by the regulations of Government, they are to be paid twelve pagodas for each dooly they carry, instead of two pagodas per man, according to the regulations; and at the rate of two and a half pagodas for a maistry or duffadar for every six doolies. Mr. Anderson will be so kind as to pay them all, at this rate, for the time they have been in the service, and he will continue to pay them until a general distribution of doolies can be made to the different corps. As those hired at Seringapatam, for the present service, were taken into the service early in the month of May, they are to be paid for the whole month. The Paymaster will muster and certify the number of doolies carried by the country bearers, instead of the number of bearers employed, as according to the regulations of Government.

There is nothing in this order to alter the mode of paying and mustering the Carnatic bearers employed in this service.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[420.] *To Colonel Stevenson.*

SIR, Camp at Sera, 2nd June, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 31st May, in which you enclose one which Major —— has addressed you on the subject of the inquiries which I had requested you to make in my letter of the 28th May. The points which I referred to you for inquiry were first, whether the letter in question was marked *on service*, and superscribed by the name of the writer; secondly, whether, as coming from Bombay, it was not liable to postage; thirdly, whether another stated to have been written on a single sheet was not of the weight of a double letter as laid down by the regulations of Government.

I observe that upon these points no new light has been thrown, and it is perhaps at present out of your power to procure any. Indeed the inquiry is comparatively of little importance, and need not be renewed. I beg that you will do me the favour to send me a copy of your communication with Major ——, in order that I may judge whether it contained anything which could in the most distant manner warrant the very improper letter which he sent you in reply to an inquiry directed by me, before I take any further steps upon the subject.

It is not usual for an officer in command to forward such a letter without previously endeavouring to prevail on the writer to recal it; and I beg to know whether you had any communication of that nature with Major —— before you sent me his letter.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[421.] *To the Secretary of Government.*

SIR, Camp at Sera, 3rd June, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 29th May, in which you have enclosed an extract from a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor-General regarding property found in forts belonging to the late Tippoo Sultaun.

I never heard that jewels or treasure had been found in any of them excepting in Seringapatam. The property which they

contained when they fell into the hands of the Company's troops was in general grain and military stores. These, by the orders of the late Commander-in-Chief and of Government, were given over to the officers of the Government of the Rajah of Mysore, and in consequence of an arrangement since made by me, have been received by the Company's civil and military officers, as garrison and military storekeepers, in the forts and posts occupied by the Company's troops.

The grain and provisions found in the forts in Canara were by the orders of Government given over to the collector or his aumildars, and the military stores are in charge of the military officers. I never heard that any other species of property had been found in the forts in Canara.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Commissioners in Malabar. [422.]

GENTLEMEN, Camp at Sera, 3rd June, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 26th May, in which you enclose a Persian copy of a letter supposed to be from Dhoondiah Waugh to the Cherical Rajah, and the translation of one from the Cotiote Rajah to Attam Goorkul. I had already received from Colonel Sartorius a translation of the former; and I desired him, in case of any movements in Malabar which gave either you or him reason to believe that there would be any serious rising there, to begin to collect his corps in such situations as that they would be in security during the monsoon, and free from its effects; and that as soon as the weather should permit, he would collect the troops at such place as he might think most proper in order to oppose the rebels.

It is impossible that there should be any serious rising without your having timely notice of it, which you will of course communicate to Colonel Sartorius; and it will then be the moment when it will be proper to collect the troops to oppose it.

I hope, however, that the body of troops which I shall have collected in a few days to the northward will induce Dhoondiah to attend more to the means of providing for his own safety than to those of annoying the Company or their allies, and that there will be no rising in any part of their territories.

It is very satisfactory to see that Attam Goorkul has no communication with the Cotiote Rajah. I hope that the measures which have been taken to keep down the influence of the latter in Cotiote will have the wished for effect, and that in consequence he will be kept above the Ghauts during the monsoon. If that should be the case, I have but little apprehension for the tranquillity of Malabar.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[423.] *To Colonel Pater.*

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Sera, 3rd June, 1800.

It is impossible that you can believe that I could make so absurd an arrangement as that stated in Purneah's letter to his aumildar after all that I have written to you upon the subject.

The arrangement I made was this. In consequence of private representations which went up to the Presidency (God knows from whom) that there was a scarcity of gram at Chittledroog, which got to the ears of the Commander-in-Chief, I received a private letter from him, in which he told me that he thought I ought to throw in there in store a large quantity of that article.

I accordingly ordered Mr. Gordon to lay in at Chittledroog a hundred garce of gram, which is equal to about two months' consumption for the whole of the cavalry. I knew that gram was not scarce to the northward, but I also knew that this supply would be of use; and I particularly ordered Mr. Gordon to purchase it in the southern districts and to bring it up from thence rather than to buy it to the northward, where he would have interfered with the cavalry, and with the brinjarries entertained for their supply.

In order to get gram throughout the country it was necessary, first, that Purneah should permit the free sale of it everywhere; secondly, that it should be allowed to pass everywhere duty free. I desired Purneah to give orders accordingly to all his aumildars, and I have received repeated letters from Colonel Close in which he informs me that they have been given.

I now enclose you a letter to the aumildar of Buswaputtum, and a translation of it. I have besides sent orders to the pay

office at Chittledroog to cease all purchases of that article; so that I have hopes that you will not find any more difficulty. The man employed by the paymaster at Buswaputtum, if there be one, will be called in; if you should hear of him, send for him and give him my orders not to purchase another grain in your neighbourhood at his peril.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Camp near Sera, Tuesday, 3rd June, 1800. [424.]

Whenever a man is sent into the general hospital at Sera, or into any other general hospital, a list of necessaries, clothing, arms, and accoutrements will be sent with him to the surgeon from his regiment. For these, the surgeon in charge of the hospital will send a receipt, and he will be responsible for them when the man comes out of the hospital, or in case he should die.

To-morrow, being His Majesty's birthday, Captain Tomkyns will fire a Royal salute at sunrise.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To the Secretary of the Military Board. [425.]

SIR, Camp at Taverkerry, 4th June, 1800.

Mr. Gordon has communicated to me your letter of the 23rd May, and I am concerned to observe that I should have given any orders which do not meet with the approbation of the Board.

On the 9th of February I received the orders of Government to equip a detachment of troops for a certain expedition, the success of which I knew depended upon their being prepared to take the field at an early period, and which was not undertaken, although my detachment was collected and prepared, on account of the deficiencies in the equipment of another body of troops intended to co-operate with those in Mysore. At the time when I received these orders, there were not means in the arsenal of Seringapatam to carry one round of spare ammunition, of which deficiency I had informed the Military Board at an early period.

Under these circumstances I ordered the commissary of stores to make up 500 ammunition boxes, and I at the same time informed the Military Board that I had given these orders. By his exertions I was enabled to report the detachment to be in readiness to take the field before the end of the month of February.

It may naturally be asked why I did not order the commissary of supply to make the boxes instead of the commissary of stores? I should in that case answer that I knew that the commissary of stores could, and that the commissary of supply could not, make them so as that they would have been prepared at the time when the detachment ought to take the field; and as a proof that I did not err in my judgment upon that occasion, I mention that although the latter received orders from the Military Board to supply ammunition boxes at about that time, he had not supplied more than fifty when I marched from Seringapatam at the end of the month of May, and I was obliged to consent to receive ammunition barrels instead of the boxes which had been ordered by the Military Board.

I beg that you will do me the favour to lay before the Board again my letter of the 12th February, and they will perceive that although the word commissary only is used, the commissary of stores is clearly meant. In their answer they approve of the measures taken for the equipment of the force, concluding that it was by the commissary of supply that the doolies, &c. were to be made; but I never understood that the making of the ammunition boxes was objected to.

It is almost unnecessary that I should assure you that the only object I had in the orders which I gave upon this occasion was to forward and accelerate the service: if it had gone on, they would have had that effect; and I am afraid that Government would not have approved of my conduct if there had been any defect in the equipments, or they had not been prepared in time. I take the liberty of enclosing Captain M'Intire's bill; and after the explanation which I have above given of the circumstances under which the expense was incurred, I hope the Military Board will order the payment of it.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

G. O. Woodanelly, Thursday, 5th June, 1800. [426.]

No straw or other sort of forage to be burnt on the ground before marching, nor any larger fires to be made in the camp than may be necessary for cooking victuals. The nearest guards to be answerable for apprehending offenders against this order, whom they will confine, and report to the Deputy Quarter-master-General.

Officers and heads of departments are requested to direct their servants, and the people employed under them, not to take more forage from the country than may be actually necessary for their cattle.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Pater. [427.]

MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Huroor, 6th June, 1800.

My letter of the 30th May gave you a latitude either to throw the 1st Regiment of cavalry into Hurryhur or not, as you might find there was forage for their horses. There were only two things positive in it: one was that their sick should not be left in Chittledroog, as it appeared to be the opinion of Mr. Anderson that that would do them more harm than good; the other that the regiment should not be brought into the line in any manner whatever, as it appeared to be the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Torin and of Mr. Grant that all the men were nearly in a convalescent state, that all required rest, and that to move them would only make them worse. Under these circumstances I expect that you will do what you think best for that regiment.

You are mistaken respecting the salubrity of Hurryhur. The Bombay army had its hospital there in the war before the last, and we had ours there in the last year for a short time. It was found by both to be a most healthy situation, and if my operations lead me that way I propose to establish my hospital there.

I hope that my letter to the aumildar of Buswaputtum will have had its effect. Purneah mistook me entirely. I have sent to the aumildar at Chittledroog a copy of the letter above mentioned, and I have besides desired him to forward to your camp 2000 brinjarries loaded with gram which Purneah had

given orders should be delivered to the paymaster. In this as well as in the purchase of gram at all to the northward, the paymaster has disobeyed my positive orders, for which I have a strong inclination to make a complaint to Government.

I thank you for your news. I hope that the tone in Dhoondiah's camp will be changed before long. You will receive of course the English news. I have besides to tell you that our Government has assumed the sovereignty of Surat, with the entire consent of the Nawáb and all the principal inhabitants.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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